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SUMMARY REPORT 
AIMS AND APPROACH OF STUDY 
The aim of this study was to consider the economic implications of 
environmental liability systems and to examine the economic case for action 
by the EU.  A parallel study (t) examined the legal aspects. 
Environmental liability systems are of interest for a number of potential 
benefits that they can offer: 
•  They can provide incentives to prevent -or remedy environmental damage 
not currently covered by other instruments.  · 
•  They can directly compensate the victim. 
•  They give force to the polluter pays principle. 
•  They are, in some circumstances, mor~  economically efficient than 
regulatory (command and control) or economic instruments. 
The approach taken in this study was to first identify in principle what the 
expected benefits and costs of a liability system would be, and then to 
examine the available empirical data .and supporting studies.  Finally, 
interviews were carried out with a small number of firms in seven industrial 
sectors in each of five countries, four from the EU .and one from East 
Europe.  Interviews were also carried out with representatives of banks and 
insurance companies· in the five countries.  ·  · 
A significant finding of the study is the surprising lack of previous studies 
into the economics of environmental liability systems.  None of the EU 
countries studied had carried out empirical economic studies into either the 
costs, or the benefits, of their existing or future liability systems.  A similar 
lack of empirical analysis is evident among the principal economic actors; 
firms, insurance companies and banks.  The research conducted for this 
study was unable to find any firm or industrial association which had fully 
quantified their existing and future environmental liabilities <
2>.  Nor did 
the research reveal that banks or insurance companies were able to quantify 
the future costs in any detail. 
There are many reasons why the empirical basis for policy making in this 
area is poor.  Two specific reasons are: 
•  environmental liability systems are novel in Europe and very little 
experience exists; 
(I) 'Study of Civil Uability Systems for Remedying Environmental Damage: Legal Study', Mci<enna & Co, 1996 
(2) We are aware that a small number of multinational firms have made provisions in their accounts for some or aU of 
their expected future liabilities. 
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•  as with the evaluation of other prevention systems (eg policing, fire 
services), the target for performance is the avoidance of accident ~r 
damage; this effect is inherently unobservable. 
Environmental Liability Systems and Other Instruments 
The use of an environmental liability system was compared to alternative 
types of instruments, ie regulation and economic instruments, using a 
number of criteria: 
•  economic efficiency in controlling pollution; 
•  incentives for prevention, remediation and future technology 
development; 
•  transaction costs < 1>; 
These criteria were used to provide initial indications of the relative 
applicability of environmental liability systems to different types of 
environmental problems. 
Environmental liability systems work best where there is clear causation, for 
example in accidental damage or where a single polluter affects a single 
• 
I 
I 
victim.  Environmental liability systems can be efficient due to their  I 
flexibility, since they allow the polluter to choose the least cost actions < 2>, 
but these choices may be made more .difficult due to the uncertainty of the 
potential size of liability. Uncertainty will be greatest where causation is 
unclear and the size ·and value of damage is difficul_t to assess, eg ecological 
damage from diffuse pollution. 
Regulatory instruments can be relatively effective where the socially optimal 
pollution level is known, small differences in marginal abatement costs exist, 
and the regulator has good access to information on abatement costs. 
Economic instruments can be effective where the underlying markets are not 
characterised by market failures and where there are large variations in 
firm's pollution control costs so that giving firms freedom to choose their 
abatement options can reduce these costs. Both regulation and economic 
instruments require regular monitoring of the firm's polluting activities. 
Taking these characteristics into account leads to the conclusion that an 
environmental liability system has a comparative advantage in accidental  I 
pollution problems to all media, gradual pollution, especially for damage to 
soil and water, provided causation can be proved at reasonable cost,and 
possibly also for historic soil contamination (provided that transaction costs 
can be kept low). Environmental liability systems have comparative 
disadvantage for diffuse pollution (especially air, possibly water) where there 
are multiple polluters and multiple injuries, and where causation is difficult 
to prove. 
(l) These costs include legal costs, administntion costs, risk assessment procedures, monitoring and enforcement costs. 
<2J  This is an advantage they share with econoaic instruments. 
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'Tb.ett· is a complementarity between environmental liability systems and 
other instruments, since no one instrument is effective for all types of 
pollution. An example of this is ecologic.U Jamage to natural habitats and the 
unowned environment, where the comparative advantage depends on the 
type of pollution and its sources. 
The efficiency of alternative instruments can, in principle, be compared by 
examining the costs they impose on polluters and regulators in order to 
achieve a desired environmental objective.  In those cases where economic 
instruments are applicable to pollution problems, a number of empiri~ 
studies have found them to be more economically efficient than regulations, 
ie they can achieve the same environmental objective at lower, sometimes 
substantially lower, cost  Unfortunately, there are no existing empirical 
studies of the performance of environmental liability systems, in terms of 
cost-effectiveness or efficiency compared to other instruments. 
THE COSTS OF ENVIRONMENI'AL DAMAGE 
Environmental Damage 
There continues to be considerable unremedied environmental damage in the 
EU which could, as a starting point, be internalised by an environmental 
liability syst~m. In attempting to determine just how large, this study again 
faced enormous deficiencies in the data.  No EU country has sufficiently 
detailed data to be able to produce a ~omprehensive estimate of this 
unremedied environmental damage.  Partial estimates exist for some types of 
pollution but the data is very scarce and extremely variable.  Using an 
indicator approach, we have estimated the annual costs of residual damage 
for EU countries could vary within the range of 4-7%  of GOP  Ct>.  This 
range arises ~ough  three factors: 
•  the different levels of polluting activity in Member States; 
•  the sensitivity and concentration of receptors; 
•  the different levels of existing environmental protection. 
A common EU approach to an environmental liability system has the 
potential to level out these differences between existing levels of 
environmental protection, although it would be complex to design a system 
which achieved the same effect within different jurisdictions, even if there 
were not variations in the sensitivity of receptors. 
The uncertainty in the level and distribution of damage, and the scope for 
discrepancies in the valuations between different po~uters, is clearly 
unsatisfactory.  However, if a European system of environmental liability 
were introduced, courts would require guidance on the application of 
damage valuation methods.  A first step could be to prepare a set of 
(I) Note that if annual damages are as high as this, then it implies that a 'green accounting' estimate of GOP growth 
would be negative for most countries in •ost yeus. 
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a framework for assessing damage values. 
52.2  Current Levels of  Envit'OIImentlll Expenditure 
52.3 
The study has attempted to collate existing data on European industries' 
expenditure on pollution prevention.  This is of interest for two reasons: 
•  discrepancies in expenditure between EU Member States might already be 
affecting competition; 
•  to assess the overall size of current expenditure in relation to the 
estimated value of residual damage.  H residual damage was internalised 
through an environmental liability system, would this significantly 
increase the cost burden on firms compared to current environmental 
expenditure. 
The reliability of the data is very uncertain but it tends to indicate that there 
is a discrepancy between countries in spending by industry on pollution 
prevention.  · 
The evidence from industry is that, where an environmental liability system 
exists, firms are unable to separate their environmental costs into those 
induced by the environmental liability system and those carried out for other 
reasons, eg compliance with regulations or company environmental policies. 
Most prevention activities are inducecl by the combined effects of many 
factors. 
Although firms are not able to identify clearly the extra expenditures which 
might be induced by stricter liability systems in the future, overall the costs 
of environmental protection and regulation issues remain a 'top three' 
concern for industry.  In combination with other parts of the environmental 
protection system, a strict liability framework can be expected to induce a 
greater level of care towards environmental protection by firms. 
It is not possible to measure the extent to which different elements of a 
stricter liability system would induce further preventative expenditure by 
industry. 
The Impact of  an Environmental Liability System 
In relation to the environmental problems for which a liability system may 
be most effective, what share of environmental damage could be addressed? 
Estimates of the share of environmental damage by media suggest that the 
proportion of damage to land lies in the range 10% - 40%  of total damage. 
Another indicator ·is the proportion of non-diffuse (ie point source) to diffuse 
pollution; this is probably around 15%.  In relation to soil contamination, 
accidental releases may cause only around 15%  of damage, compared to 85% 
for on-going releases (see Section 2.1). 
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If an environmental liability system is applied only to those types of 
problems to which it is most suited, then it might only internalise a small 
percentage of total environmental damage Ct>,  although . t can create wider 
incentives for prevention. 
An environmental liability system might be applicable to some transboundary 
pollution problems such as accidental water pollution, but probably not for 
other trans  boundary problems from many different sources (  eg air pollution) 
where it is difficult to determine and prove which source caused (a share of) 
the pollution damage 
52.4  Competitiveness and the Costs of Liability 
Existing Liability Systems 
It seems unlikely, based on the results of the interviews, that existing liability 
systems in EU member states are currently creating any significant distortion 
of trade.  In the interviews, no firms indicated that the environmental 
liability system on its own was a problem.  This is not surprising, since the 
current cost of environmental liability system is a negligible percentage of the 
value of output, and so has little influence on current production decisions. 
Environmental cost differences would have to persist for the long term, and 
be expected to continue, to influence decisions about the location of future 
investments.  Furthermore, the approach of multinational firms, who are the 
most frequent types of firms to view investment location decisions in an 
international context, is to apply the same environmental standards to all EU 
countries that they operate in, irrespective of differences in environmental 
standards and legislation. 
Most firms indicated that environmental issues overall were a factor in 
investment decisions, but not necessarily between countries.  Firms are also 
concerned about transparency in decision making and a predictable 
regulatory environment. 
Future Liability 
Without a common approach to environmental liability systems in Europe, 
the costs of compensation for damage could diverge within the EU. 
A trade model of a key competitive industry, the bulk chemical industry, was 
used to simulate the effects of future liability systems on competitiveness by 
examining the impact of cost differences up to 2%  between countries.  The 
results of simulations showed that in, the long run, this could produce 
relative changes in market shares of individu~ EU countries of between -4% 
and +2%.  In an industry like the chemical industry, which is very 
competitive and where the products of a number of firms are close 
substitutes for each other, relatively small differences in costs can have quite 
(I) This can be compared to the estimate for Germanyj the environmental liability system is currently estimated to 
intemalise onJy about 1  ~  of  total environmental damage. 
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v significant effects on loss of market share.  However, the trade links and cost 
differences with countries outside the EU are an important factor, and 
possibly more important tha"l the environment-related cost differences 
between EU members and between EU members and third countries, in 
altering the relative competitive position of EU countries vis-a-vis third 
countries. 
Within the EU, the internal market has levelled out a number of 
impediments to trade and investment. There is also a greater similarity 
within the EU in terms of availability of infrastructure and economic policies, 
than is the case with third countries. Therefore, the impact of environmental 
cost differences might be expected to be greater within the EU and create 
problems of internal competition. In the framework of this study, however, it 
was not possible to find conclusive empirical evidence in this regard. 
For other industries examined in this study (leather tanning, 
pharmaceuticals, electronics, hard coal mining, pulp and paper, wood 
industries), the impact on competitiveness of future environmental liability 
systems is likely to be less than for chemicals.  This is because these 
industries are either less competitive than chemicals, are traded less or have 
a higher share of transport costs in their ~otal costs. 
525  The Benefits of  EU Action 
The empirical support for assessing the benefits of EU action has been found 
to be limited by lack of data.  It is nevertheless possible to summarise the 
general case for EU action. 
Environmental liability systems can create effective means to remedy some 
types of environmental damage, eg accidental damage with clear causation, 
and _incentives for prevention of environmental damage in general. 
Conversely, it can be argued that in the absence of an environmental liability 
system damage would be higher, as firms would then not face any potential 
· liability claims.  Therefore, a liability system could be a further policy 
instrument to use as a complement to existing instruments. 
There is already a divergence of environmental liability systems, as well as 
current environmental expenditure, across the EU countries.  The differences 
could increase, for example if those countries who have expressed 
willingness to sign the Lugano Convention do implement systems of that 
type and other countries do not..  The competitiveness analysis provided 
only a general indication of whether the cost differences which might 
emerge would distort future trade.  But environmental issues are a major 
concern of firms in environmentally sensitive sectors.  Firms want certainty  I 
across all the EU to promote the single market and facilitate mobility of 
capital.  In this context, the uncertainty of divergent and changing liability 
systems in different countries could be a more important factor in long term 
decisions than the direct cost differences. 
The issue of including transboundary pollution within the scope of an 
environmental liability system depends on the type of pollution.  Most 
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transboundary pollution is airborne, ie of a diffuse nature and with unclear 
causaf:ion and is not therefore well suited to internalising through an 
environmencalliability system.  Other existing cases  of transboundary 
pollution, such as polluted rivers, impaired habitat areas and tranSport of 
hazardous waste, may be amenable to being handled through an 
environmental liability system.  However, they may also be capable of being 
handled through bilateral or international agreements. 
THE RESPONSE OF ECONOMIC ACIORS 
Firms' Responses 
Existing liability systems have only had a limited impact on pollution 
expenditure or compensation payments and have not been, of themselves, a 
major concern to firms.  There has been no clearly identified impact on 
competition.  However, due to the joint effects problem, firms are mostly 
unable to separate the impact, on their costs, of an environmental liability 
system from other environmental policies  . 
It is therefore not surprising that induced prevention costs have appeared to 
be small and have been hard to detect  Of the firms in the survey, none 
had made quantitative assessments of their liabilities or quantified the 
reductions of risk due to preventative expenditure.  Similarly, they had not 
assessed the consequences of future liability systems and were unable to 
distinguish clearly the potential effects of most policy elements. 
SMEs 
The flexibility of an environmental liability system, in allowing firms to 
choose the means of prevention, could be advantageous to SMEs. · SMEs 
may also welcome the transparency and level playing field that a legal 
system offers.  However, most environmental policy instruments, including· 
liability systems, can bear more heavily on SMEs than on large firms in 
relation to their financial resources. 
SMEs are more vulnerable to environmental risks since they are not as 
diversified as large firms and have limited management capability for 
prevention.  This makes them more exposed to the risks of a large pollution 
incident.  Damage caused by one process may therefore create significant 
environinentalliabilities for a small firm. 
The cost of complying with the complex regulations related to an 
environmental liability system, and the cost and length of possible litigation, 
will tend to be fixed costs which bear more heavily on SMEs. 
Limits on liability, if set in relation to the activities of large firms, would be 
untenable for small firms; there would need to be a size related element in 
determining the limit, although this might lead to some damage remaining 
uncompensated.  This potential problem would be exacerbated if large firms 
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set an EU wide limit 
Insurability is a crucial issue for SMEs, since they have limited financial 
resources to cover their own risks.  Risk assessment procedures carried out 
or required by insurance companies (and banks) would be relatively more 
costly to small than large firms. 
Liability risks could lead banks to take a more conservative approach to 
valuing fixed assets as collateral for loans, particularly if  insurance companies 
place relatively low limits on their cover.  This would reduce the borrowing 
capacity of SMEs and result in lower investment 
Having said that, a SME's impact on the environment can be proportionally 
greater than its size and SMEs' collective impact can be considerable.  I 
Therefore it is hard to justify that they be fully exempt from liability rules. 
Moreover, there are EU compensatory mechanisms such as the Community 
Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Purposes. These provide ·more 
favourable conditions for SMEs to help them adapt to environmental 
standards. 
Attitudes of Firms to Future Liability Systems 
During the interviews with firms their attitudes to current and possible  I 
future liability systems were discussed.  The interviews indicated that most 
firms surveyed accept the polluter pays principle but are not willing to pay 
for another.firm's damage; hence there was a reluctance to consider 
participation in industry-financed joint compensation funds. 
Firms also wanted a fitness-for-use criterion ~pplied to clean up standards. 
Firms do not want: 
•  retroactive liability 
•  compulsory financial security 
•  joint (industry financed) compensation funds 
•  strict liability without limits or defences 
The interviews also indicated that firms might possibly under certain 
conditions accept: 
•  compulsory insurance 
•  rights of action by NGOs 
53.2  Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies expressed two distinct concerns in relation to 
environmental liability systems.  One is the increased vulnerability of 
insurance companies from old policy exposure for historic pollution, 
especially under a system of retroactive liability.  The other is the need to 
change insurance policies to cope with stricter environmental liability. 
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The insurance market's role is considered to be very important foi' three 
reasons: 
•  liabilities will probably need to be insurable for all but the very largest 
firms, in order that firms can manage their financial risks; 
•  to ensure that victims will be compensated when the size of compensation 
exceeds the firm's ability to pay; 
•  the test of insurability is an indicator of whether the environmental 
liability system will be able to efficiently intemalise the damage costs. 
Uninsurable risks, unless arising through known ongoing activities of the 
firm, will either be because the risk is not assessable (in which case the 
firm will not be able to respond rationally) or because a claim would not 
be able to succeed because the type of problem makes causation difficult 
to prove. 
The proportion of environmental damage covered by insurance is currently 
small, estimated on the basis of our discussions with insurance companies at 
less than 1%.  However, retroactive liability would create a long tail of claims 
for which insurers have not collected a premium, and therefore for which 
they do not have planned reserves. 
U increased insurance coverage is desired for polluting firms then any 
decisions taken on what will be included in a future stricter environmental 
liability system must take into account the views and financial interests of 
the insurance industry. 
Insurance companies are beginning to separate environmental risks from 
general liability policies, or create 'pools.  They now manage the process of 
offering environmental damage cover more carefully with greater risk 
assessment.  They focus on clearly specified environmental risks where these 
can be estimated and premia set accordingly.  The new policies tend to reduce 
the size of cover and restrict scope, to limit insurers' overall exposure to 
environmental risks.  Site audits are becoming increasingly required before 
insurance is given to polluter industries.  These increase transaction costs 
(possibly by adding around 10%  to premia) and can affect SMEs' capacity to 
purchase insurance.  Although environmental policies are more costly than 
general liability policies, they are, in principle, available to all sizes of firms. 
Compulsory insurance has been proposed as a way of ensuring that all 
victims will be compensated.  The experience of compulsory insurance in 
Germany has highlighted the practical problems concerning this provision. 
Insurers that we have spoken to in the context of our study are opposed to 
the idea, one reason being that they do not wish to be placed in the role of 
pollution police.  There is also a fear that, by intervening in the insurance 
market in this way, overall costs and premia will rise.  Furthermore, because 
of the immaturity of the environmental liability insurance market, insurers 
would need to gain considerably more experience before any compulsory 
scheme can feasibly be introduced. 
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policyholders, especially SMEs.  If  individual insurance companies have the 
right to refus(~ <. Jver for high risk firms, they would then either have to close 
or incur a large financial burden to achieve satisfactory pollution prevention 
standards as judged by the insurer.  In the short term costs might rise 
substantially if  insurance companies take a conservative approach to limiting 
their risks.  Insurers would also try to limit the size of cover for high risk 
firms. 
The key difficulties for the effectiveness of insurance in future environmental 
liability systems, as identified by the insurance industry, include: 
•  the lack of a claims history (on frequency and size of claims) on which to 
· assess risks; 
•  the uncertainty in future claims, which will be influenced by a series of 
unknown risks (l); 
•  therefore insurers are unable to reliably assess or quantify the scope of 
cover or the change in the size of premia under stricter liability regimes. 
Prevention incentives for firms may be provided by the self-insurance 
components of policies, but, so far, premium rates have not reflected to any 
significant extent varying levels of risk in a transparent and objective way. 
Current rates  may vary widely between different insurers and firms (with 
comparable risks).  Therefore, so far, ~e  costs of insurance are unlikely to 
have provided effective economic signals. However, this market is a fairly 
recent one and the accumulation of experience by i.r)surers is likely to lead to 
higher economic efficiency in future, as has been the case with other 
insurance markets. 
Insurers will provide some cover under stricter regimes, but the scope or cost 
is unknown.  In the immediate future, the scope will tend to be limited as 
follows: 
•  No cover for damage to natural habitats and the unowned environment. 
•  No cover if the burden of proof is reversed with no defences. 
•  Insurers will not cover retroactive liability. 
•  Insurers will cover accidental damage but hardly any ongoing pollution. 
•  Insurers do not expect to cover much or any air pollution damage. 
Insurance markets may need considerable time to evolve and mature.  The 
environmental liability insurance market is not currently attractive to 
insurers and they will need considerably more claims experience before they 
are able to set premia which reflect the real risks of polluters and have the 
confidence to place a significant proportion of their reserves at risk. 
(I) The particular risks involved in environmental liabilities are: the development of scientific knowledge about 
hazardous substances; the daims consciousness of the public; the valuation of damages and/or the standard of 
restontion; the litigiousness of the public; and the law court's interpretation of liability and damages. 
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Due to the circularity of this problem, insurers will need to be encouraged to 
increase their cover under environmental liability policies in parallel with the 
development of future environmental liability systents.  There is therefore a 
case for gradu~  step by step development of this market. 
Banks 
Banks were also interviewed in the study countries.  They appear to be more 
uncertain than insurance companies about the implications of current and 
future liability systems.  The discussions focused on the following issues: 
•  the impact of an environmental liability system on borrowers' access to 
loans; 
•  the potential risks to banks of acquiring the environmental liabilities of 
their borrowers. 
Not all banks are yet fully aware of the environmental risks of their 
borrowers but see the problem mainly in relation to SMEs (who form the 
bulk of bank's secured lending).  . 
There have begun to be cases where bad debts have occurred as 
contamination of land reduces the value of the banks' collateral.  The need 
to carry out even a limited assessment of environmental risk raises the 
transaction cost of lending and disproportionately affects small loans. 
Therefore small firms may be particularly affected by costs of risk assessment. 
The availability of finance could be restricted for those sectors whi~h have 
traditionally borrowed against the value of property, but who are canying 
out potentially contaminating activities, since the security value of property 
will be reduced.  This would also affect SMEs particularly badly. 
If joint and several liability creates a 'deep pocket' syndrome, the uncertainty 
of a firm's future liabilities will reduce their credit standing and their 
borrowing capacity.  Banks would be even more cautious if they felt that 
they could become the 'deep pocket' themselves. 
Banks are particularly concerned to limit the liability of the lender in cases 
where the bank takes a charge over the assets of the firm.  Without this 
protection, banks would not be prepared to lend to many high risk firms. 
Compulsory financial security is an area where banks see considerable 
difficulties.  Most financial security instruments have a limited term (eg 5 
years) and so would not provide security for damage which has a long term 
delayed effect.  The value of the financial security would directly reduce the 
borrowing capacity of the firm and this would particularly restrict lending to 
SMEs. 
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Compensation funds are under consideration as a complementary 
mechanism for compensating victims or remedying damage which might 
otherwise not be covered by a liability system.  They may also offer some 
benefits when remediation is slow or to avoid complicated litigation between 
multiple polluters and victims. 
Funds which have been examined by this study include those in Germany, 
the Netherlands, France, Japan and the US.  Experience shows that the 
funds have most often been applied to diffuse pollution problems and to 
orphan contaminated sites for which there is no responsible party liable to 
pay for the clean up, but the funds have had varying degrees of success.  It 
has proved difficult to predict the level of claims arising and to match the 
claims met to the availability of funds. 
There are two main drawbacks to compensation funds.  Firms are resistant 
to compensation funds where it might result in them paying large amounts 
for other firms' pollution, including their competitors.  It may appear 
inequitable as well as conflicting with the polluter pays principle. 
Furthermore, unless financing of funds is proportionate to actual pollution, it 
fails to create efficient incentives for prevention.  But if proportionate 
financing is possible (ie where there is clear causation) there is less need for 
a joint compensation fund.  Reconciling these two problems requires finding 
a funding basis which strikes an delicate balance between maintaining equity 
and efficiency while providing a simple and broad funding base. 
There may be a valuable role for a compensation fund to remedy damage or 
compensate victims where there are many sources of the polluting emissions 
(eg air pollution) so that assigning liability for each individual source would 
not be worthwhile under an environmental liability system, and where the 
emissions could be easily monitored so that taxes on these emissions could 
finance the fund.  This then would combine a compensation fund to remedy 
the damage with an economic instrument (a pollution tax) to finance it. 
The level (local, national or EU) at which funds are organised may differ for 
administrative and financing purposes.  Cost effective administration requires 
a strong local involvement, while financing may also appear more equitable 
if locally based so that the benefits of the "fund are felt by those who have 
contributed to it.  Using existing national systems for collecting-taxes or 
charges can reduce the costs of administering a fund.  While it is possible to 
argue for e~onomies of scale in large (eg EU level) funds which have a ,very 
broad funding base, there is little evidence to support this and the trend is 
towards more locally or nationally based funds. 
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SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC STRENGniS AND WEAKNESSES OF AN EU 
ENVIRONMENI'AL LIABILITY SYSTEM 
A key finding of the study has been the lack of economic data on· costs and 
benefits.  Analysis of the issues is therefore surrounded by considerable 
uncertainty (1).  This suggests that a cautious attitude should be taken in 
the shaping of an environmental liability system. 
The size of unremedied environmental damage is highly uncertain but is 
nonetheless probably quite large. An environmental liability system is a 
complementary instrument to other policy instruments. Its appropriate use in 
addressing this damage depends on the type of problem; unclear causation is 
a key issue in limiting the scope of application of environmental liability. 
Accidental damage is well suited to liability, but this is only a small part of 
damage. 
Environmental liability is potentially a flexible instrument but introduces a 
high level of uncertainty for economic actors in assessing their risks.  Since 
insurability of risks would be a supportive factor for the development of a 
liability system, the shaping of an environmental liability system should also 
aim to minimise the uncertainty of future liabilities. 
Based on the economic issues examined in this study, implications can be 
drawn on th.e strengths and the weaknesses of the economic case for several 
of the elementS of  a future environmental liability systems.  These summary . 
findings are given below (a short explanation is given in brackets after each 
point):  · 
THE  ECONOMIC CASE IS  STRONG FOR: 
•  Accidental pollution. (An environmental liability system is likely to be 
more effective than other instruments, for damage to all media, in both 
remedying and compensating damage to the environment, and in creating 
incentives for prevention.) 
•  Gradual pollution, provided causation can be proved at reasonable cost. 
(Uability for accidental pollution will also result in increased care towards 
pre~enting gradual pollution.) 
•  Encouraging the development of the insurance market in specific niche 
categories of environmental insurance in parallel with the development of 
the environmental liability system. 
•  Strict but proportionate liability. (This is consistent with polluter pays 
principle.  Proportionate, rather than joint and several, liability is strongly 
preferred by fiims, banks and insurance companies, although it may be 
difficult to prove which part of the damage is attributable to each polluter 
where there are many polluters and causation of damage is not clear.) 
(I) There is a need for more economic studies at the national or sectoral level to address this issue. 
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remediation)  .. 
•  Developing a set of European guidelines for the application of damage 
valuation techniques and a framework for assessing damage values; this is 
particularly needecl if  ecological damage is to be included within the scope 
of an environmental liability system. 
•  Providing protection to lenders from the liability of their borrowers (also 
providing protection to contractors carrying out site remediation to limit 
their liability). 
THE ECONOMIC CASE IS UNCERTAIN FOR: 
•  Rights of action by NGOs. (More cases of environmental damage could be 
dealt with if NGOs have a right of action, under control of the judiciary, 
especially for ecological damage to the unowned environment where 
normally no individual citizen has an interest to take action. However, 
even with built in mechanisms to· avoid legal procedures as much as 
possible, it is likely to increase transaction costs.) 
•  Reversing burden of proof. (The advantage of placing the burden of proof 
on the operator is that he is more familiar with the possible effects of the 
emissions from his activities than is the plaintiff. On the other hand, it is 
always difficult to prove something negative, eg that the emissions have 
not caused the da~age.) 
•  Limits on firms' liability. (Most risks are small, but risk averse firms may 
over-invest in prevention with unlimited liability.  Banks would also 
restrict lending under unlimited liability due to a conservative assessment 
of the worst case large risks.  Insurance companies will always limit cover. 
Limited liability, possibly only for a transitional phase, will still give 
incentives for prevention, while significantly reducing uncertainty.) 
•  Special provisions for SMEs. (An environmental liability system can have 
both advantages and disadvantages for SMEs.  It will increase the burden 
on SMEs disproportionately in relation to their financial resources, but 
exempting them does not prevent pollution). 
• 
•  Publicly financed compensation fund.  A joint compensation fund  I 
financed by industry contributions may not be efficient or fair since the 
current firms are not responsible for the pollution (as in the case of sites 
contaminated by past pollution).  There is a public good aspect to using 
public funds to remedy such en~onmental  damages.  · 
ERM  EcONOMICS  EcoNOMICS OF  I.JABJUTY:  EC  DG  XI 
xiv I 
• 
I 
I 
J 
• 
• 
I 
1'HE ECONOMIC CASE IS WEAK FOR: 
•  Retroactive strict liability with no defences. (Insurers and banks would . 
.  withdraw from the market, activity on old sites would be inhibited.) 
•  Industry funded compensation funds. (Firms are not willing to pay for 
their competitors' pollution; clean firms would pay twice, thereby creating 
. a disincentive for prevention; the size of contributions would be arbitrary 
and therefore not provide effective economic incentives.) 
•  Compensation fund organised at the EU level. (Locally or nationally. 
organised funds may be more effective). 
•  Compulsory insurance. (Insurance companies may only be able to o~er 
comprehensive and· cost-effective policies in a very mature liability 
insurance market where the risks for all firms are well understood.  It 
would be difficult to ensure that insurers do not charge excessive rates) . 
•  Compulsory financial security. (This could $everely reduce lending to 
SMEs for investment. It would also be limited in duration and not match 
the timescaie of potential liability to long term problems.) 
•  Extending the scope to diffuse spurces of damage, eg ongoing~ 
pollution. (Without clear _causation liability is difficult and costly to prove.) 
•  Joint and several liability. (This is unlikely to produce efficient-incentives 
for prevention and can lead to high transaction costs.) 
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XV 1  AIMS AND BACKGROUND TO TilE STUDY 
This Final Report has been produced by ERM Economics for DG XI  of the 
European Commission.  The report summarises the issues and findings 
resulting from the research carried out during the study: 
Economic aspects of liability systems and joint compensation  ~~~stems for 
remedying environmental damage. 
Environmental Liability System  (ELS) is the term used where civil law (and 
sometimes administrative law) provides a specific opportunity for pollution 
victims to bring claims for  against polluters.  If polluters are found to be 
liable for the damage, they will then be required to compensate the victims 
or remedy the damage.  Special features of an environmental liability systems 
as an environmental policy instrument include: it is driven by the pollution 
victims, it provides for direct compensation to victims, it seeks to make 
polluters fully liable for all the damage caused. 
Compensation Funds are usually designed to ·operate when polluters can not 
be identified or can not pay to remedy the damage. The compensation fund 
then either compensates victims or pays to remedy the damage. The fund is 
financed by a collective group of polluters. 
Study Team 
ERM Economics' core team was supported in this work by a large team of 
contributors including Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)  of Italy and by 
researchers from the Universities of Bonn and Dortmund in Germany. The 
mam inputs to the study of these and other contributors are shown below: 
ERM Economics(Overall project management,  UK country analysis,  US 
experience) 
Professor Helmut Karl, University of Bonn (Germany country analysis) 
Professor Ingo Heinz, University of Dortmund (Estimates of environmental 
damage costs). 
Dr Sven Erichsen, Jauch & Hubener (German  insurance industry) 
Dr Roberto Malaman and Dr Domenico Siniscalco, FEEM, (Italy country 
analysis,  small and medium sized enterprises) 
TAU Consultora Ambiental (Spain  country analysis) 
ERM Htingary (Hungary country analysis) 
ERM Italy (firm interviews in Italy) 
Dr Ted Buijs, Oranjewoud (Insurance industry, compensation funds  and 
Netherlands country analysis) 
Professor Alistair Ulph (Simulations of industrial competitiveness) 
Professor David Pearce (Valuation of environmental damage) 
Dr Anthony Heyes (Economic analysis of policy instruments, future environmental 
damage). 
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1.1.1 
AIMS OF THE STUDY 
This study was designed to investi!,at.! and analyse the economic effects of 
civil liability and joint compensation systems for remedying environmental 
damage, with a view to providing analytical material on the basis of which 
the European Commission can develop its policy in this field.  It focuses on 
the economic issues.  A parallel study was undertaken by other consultants 
to examine the legal issues. 
The economic analysis aimed to examine whether environmental liability 
systems have the potential to be a more efficient tool than other 
environmental policy instruments, particularly for the prevention of 
pollution. The study addresses the following: 
•  What are the economic implications of extending the use of 
environmental liability systems and/or compensation funds? 
•  What are the main econdmic effects of action and non-action of the EU 
regarding civil liability for environmental damage? 
•  What are the economic costs and benefits of alternative types of liability 
systems and compensation funds? 
Background to Environmental Liability in the EC 
The European Commission issued a Green Paper  (l) in 1993 to initiate 
discussion in this field.  This study was commissioned by the European 
Commission in the context of the preparatory work it felt was required to 
appraise the need and desirability of further EU initiatives on this subject. 
Environmental policy has been implemented, up till now, mainly through the 
use of regulatory instruments (command and control).  More recently, there 
has been a growing interest in the use of economic instruments although 
their application has so far been limited. 
Civil liability systems for remedying environmental damage are a 
complementary set of instruments which offer a third approach. 
Civil liability < 2
> is a legal tool to make those responsible for causing 
damage, pay compensation for the costs of remedying that damage.  The 
Green  Paper set out various options for the elements of an environmental 
liability system. 
Many different types of environmental liability system are possible, covering 
some or all of the following aspects: 
(I) 'Green Paper on the repair of damage caused to the environment', European Commission, March 1993 (COM (93) 47) 
CZ>  Civil liability arises under private law, whereas criminal and administrative liability arise under public law. 
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2 ..  fault-based or strict liability; 
•  joint and several or proportionate liability; 
•  types of environmental damage to be covered; 
•  limitations of liability and financial security; 
•  the right to bring a legal action. 
Section  1.2 discussed the economic implications of these and other issues 
regarding the different types of environmental liability systems. 
Also in 1993 the Council of Europe proposed a convention on civil 
environmental liability, known as the Lugano Convention  (1>.  So far this 
convention has been signed by eight countries of which five are EU Member 
States (Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).  Although 
there has been no ratification of the convention to date, several Member 
States are in the process of ratifying the convention.  This situation raises the 
possibility that there could be a growing divergence of environmental 
liability systems within the EU. 
These two documents stimulated discussion about the overall case for 
implementing environmental liability systems and, in particular, whether 
action at the EU level was justified by the following particular European 
dimensions of the issue: 
•  the impact of environmental costs on competition in the single market 
and the distortion of trade within and outside the EU; 
•  transboundary pollution issues; 
•  the subsidiarity principle and Member States' development of their own 
liability systems within their diverse jurisdictions.  · 
This study, and the parallel legal study, provide a further and more detailed 
examination of the issues related to environmental liability systems in the 
EU. 
1.1.2  Why have an Environmental Liability System? 
No one environmental policy instrument can achieve all the environmental 
objectives on its own.  Each type of instrument has different strengths and 
weaknesses (these ate discussed in Section  1.3 below).  The particular 
characteristics of a liability system are that it has the potential to  compensate 
directly the victims of pollution, is driven by the actions of the victim or their 
representatives as in some cases for NGOs regarding ecological damage to 
the unowned environment.  In some circumstances, it may also be more 
economically efficient than other instruments.  The benefits of including a 
liability instrument within the panoply of environmental instruments may 
(I) Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment', Council of 
Europe, June 1993. 
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3 therefore be seen, in the context of a number of principles and criteria which 
guide EU environmental policy, to: 
•  provide incentives to prevent environmental damage (the prevention 
principle); 
•  provide a more efficient instrument for certain types of pollution 
problems, compared to regulatory or economic instruments (the cost-
effectiveness and economic efficiency criteria); 
•  ensure that polluters become liable for the damage they cause (the 
polluter pays principle); 
•  create a mechanism to provide compensation for the victims of pollution 
(the equity principle); 
•  remove or reduce the distortion of competition due to differing 
environmental costs within the single market; 
•  provide improved rules and mechanisms for dealing with transboundary 
pollution problems. 
The study has examined the extent to which these benefits are likely to be 
realised, together with the costs and other economic problems associated 
with implementing environmental liability systems within the EU. 
1.1.3  Research Methods 
The study has been carried by a multi-disciplinary team drawn from several 
countries, and has followed four principle lines of research: 
•  Existing studies; reviewing existing economic studies and experience in 
selected EU (and some non-EU) countries. 
•  Interviews and country analyses;  undertaking interviews with key economic 
actors (firms, insurance companies and banks) in selected countries. 
•  Topic  papers; five  key topics were examined in greater detail:  valuation of 
environmental damage;  impacts on industries' competitiveness; insurance; 
implications for small and medium sized enterprises; and compensation funds. 
•  Industrial competitiveness simulations; carrying out simulations of the impact on 
trade competitiveness of possible future costs due to divergent liability systems. 
Existing Studies 
An early step in this study was to attempt to  collate information, at the 
national level, from similar economic studies to this one.  It had been 
expected that the costs and benefits of liability systems would have been 
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I Table 1.1a 
tesearched elsewhere, especially in those countries which have introduced 
some form of enVironmental liability systems of their own (eg Germany, UK, 
tJetherlands, Denmark). 
Surprisingly, it was found that almost no substantive studies had been 
carried out in the EU countries either by Governments or industry.  Table 
1.1a indicates the paucity of studies and lack of existing economic 
information within the EU countries selected for this study and three other 
countries with a strong interest in liability systems.  Most analyses refer back 
to the US  data on Superfund where the costs, and also to a very limited 
extent, the benefits have been examined in some studies (eg Probst et 
al (1)). 
National Empirical Studies on the Economics of Liability Systems and. 
Compensation Funds 
Existing Economic Studies Covering: 
Country  Costs of  liability  Benefits of  Compensation 
systems  liability systnns  Funds 
Germany  None  None  Some 
Hungary  None  None  None 
Italy  None  None  None 
Spain  None  None  None 
UK  None  None  None 
Netherlands  None  None  Yes 
Denmark  None  None  None 
Japan  None identified  None identified  None identified 
us  Yes  Limited  Yes 
Interviews and Country Studies 
In order to maximise the usefulness of the study while keeping its costs and 
duration within acceptable boundaries, the research focused on five  countries 
selected to be representative of the range of approaches to environmental 
protection and stages of development of liability systems in Europe.  These 
countries were: 
•  Germany; 
•  Italy; 
•  Spain; 
•  UK; 
•  Hungary. 
(I) 'Footing the Bill  for SupE>rfund Clean Up: Who pays and how?', Probst et al, The Brookings Institute and Resources 
For the Future, 1995. 
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liability systems since 1991 is the most extensive in Europe.  Shorter 
comparative country case studies were carried out for the other four 
countries. Hungary was included as an example of an East European 
country with more limited experience in environmental liability. A summary 
of the current legal framework for environmental liability in these countries 
appears in Annex B. 
Specific research was also carried out in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, 
France and Japan, and the US experience of Superfund was also reviewed. 
The country studies collated the available information on past economic 
studies, estimates of the valuation of environmental damage and current 
expenditure on environmental protection.  Interviews with industry, 
insurance companies, banks and relevant Government departments were 
carried out to assess the costs and implications of existing environmental 
liability systems and to seek views on current and possible future liability 
systems and compensation funds.  Interviews were carried out with 16 
insurance companies and 7 banks in the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Hungary.  The main industrial interviews were carried out with 63 firms and 
focused on firms and industrial associations in the following major sectors: 
•  chemicals, petrochemicals, oil production and refining; 
•  pulp and paper; 
•  pharmaceuticals; 
•  leather tanning; 
•  electronics; 
•  wood treatment; 
•  mining; 
•  iron and metals. 
Topic Papers 
Six topics were identified as being of particular concern for their economic 
itriplications. In addition to industrial competitiveness (see below), the topics 
covered were the insurance industry, valuation of environmental damage, 
compensation funds, implications for SMEs.  In addition experience with 
Superfund in the US  was reviewed. 
Industrial Competitiveness Simulations 
A trade simulation model of the basic chemicals industry was used to 
simulate the possible competitiveness implications of cost differences between 
EU countries and its main trading partners, if environmental liability systems 
were to diverge in the future. US Superfund costs were used as indicative of 
the maximum likely cost impacts. The implications for a number of other 
industries (wood products, pharmaceuticals, electronics, leather tanning, pulp 
and paper, mining) were also assessed by comparison with the chemical 
industry simulations. 
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1.1.4  Limitations 
It became evident early in the study that there were serous limitations to the 
availability of empirical economic data.  There are a number of reasons why 
this problem was faced. 
•  Prediction difficulties.  A liability regime is more difficult to model than 
other policy regimes.  The response of economic actors is highly sensitive 
to the context (legal and market structure), to the precise design of the 
liability system, and to the interpretation of the courts.  Furthermore, the 
elements of the liability system can be linked with each other and it is 
difficult to assess the effects of the separate elements of a liability system. 
•  ]oint effects problem.  The impact of a liability system is difficult to separate 
from the simultaneous impact of other environmental policy instruments. 
Firms carry out p_ollution prevention measures in response to the 
combined effect of all the pressures they face (eg environmental 
regulations, liability and public pressure) and are unable to associate a 
particular expenditure activity with a particular policy instrument (the 
joint costs/joint effects problem). 
•  Speculative and uncertain effects.  There is very little actual experience of 
liability systems in Europe.  Even in the US, where the Superfund system 
has been operating since 1980, the transferability of experience is limited 
and the criticism of the approach has now led to a number -of very 
different proposals for radical reform.  Thus even within the US  domain 
past experience is still leaving considerable uncertainty over future 
directions. 
•  Poor data.  There is a severe lack of reliable data with which to 
characterise the problem, ie on environmental damage (that might be 
captured by a liability system), on current and future costs of preventative 
measures, and on the potential liabilities faced by different firms and 
industries. 
•  Uncertain  damage values.  Reliable valuation of damage is required by all 
economic actors in order to make rational decisions (eg on preventative 
expenditure, insurance premia, bank lending).  However, the size of  faced 
by _a  firm are dependent on a series of unquantifiable risks: 
•  the public's attitude to pursuing litigation and the likelihood of the 
victims taking legal action; 
•  the uncertainty of legal proofs of liability; 
•  the uncertainty of valuation methods; 
•  the uncertainty of interpretation by the courts. 
This study has therefore had to  test theoretical arguments against very 
restricted empirical data in order to draw inferences on the economic 
implications of future environmental liability systems. 
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1.2 
This Volume I comprises the Main Report.  The remainder of Section  1 
introduces the economic issues in liability systems, compares this instrument 
to other environmental policy instruments, and briefly characterises the 
environmental liability systems in the selected countries. 
Section 2 presents the findings from the empirical analyses to assess the costs 
of environmental liability systems in relation to the estimated total cost of 
environmental damage and also in relation to current expenditure on 
pollution control. 
Section 3 discusses the results and summarises the findings on the economic 
issues arising out of the interviews with the main economic actors (firms, 
banks and insurance companies) and the analysis of the potential impacts on 
industries' competitiveness. 
Section 4 provides a short review of compensation funds. 
Volume II comprises a series of discrete topic papers elaborating on the issues 
in the Main  Report.  These topic papers cover: 
•  Valuation of environmental damage: review of methods; 
•  Impacts on industries' competitiveness; 
•  Implications for the insurance sector; 
•  Implications for small and medium sized enterprises; 
•  Compensation funds; 
•  Economic review of the US experience with Superfund. 
THE ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILI1Y'SYSTEMS 
Environmental liability systems can differ enormously in their design and 
implementation.  Each main element of the liability system can have varying 
economic implications.  The purpose of this section is  therefore to discuss the 
main economic issues related to the various elements of liability systems and 
to highlight those issues which are analysed more fully in Sections 2-4.  Key 
economic impacts, which are used to assess the issues, include: 
•  the effect of the type of system on transaction  costs; 
•  the efficiency of incentives for pollution prevention expenditure; 
•  the degree of uncertainty in quantifying risks and the effect of this on 
decisions taken by economic actors. 
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Uncertainty 
In contrast to regulatory instruments, which tend to have predictable and 
certain effects, a liability instrument involves a considerable amount of 
uncertainty regarding the level of prevention that will occur, the damage 
that will occur, and the financial liabilities that will result from the damage. 
There are several sources of this uncertainty since many economic actors are 
involved and they are not always able to foresee the risks. Sources of 
uncertainty include: 
•  The probability that unforeseen or unexpected damage will occur. 
•  The likelihood that victims will make a claim. 
•  The difficulty of proving who caused the damage.  Proof involves several 
steps linking the emissions of the polluter to the damage caused.  Proof 
becomes more difficult where there are time lags between emissions and 
damage occurring or being detected.  Establishing individual liability is 
also complicated where multiple polluters have contributed to the damage 
and more costly under a joint and several liability regime. 
•  The size of the . A number of factors contribute to this uncertainty, 
including the methods of economic valuation of damage, the size of 
liability under a fault  based regime, the restoration standards and speed of 
restoration required, the subjectivity of Courts' interpretation. 
The difficulties and uncertainties of proving who caused the damage and of 
valuing the damage are particularly pronounced for diffuse sources of 
ecological damage. 
The effect of uncertainty is likely to be to impose higher costs on various 
economic actors.  T~ese costs may appear in a number of ways. 
Banks may respond by limiting the size Qf loans they offer, raising the 
interest rate, or raising the amount of collateral they require. Insurance 
companies may similarly respond by lowering the amount of cover they offer 
or raising the premium rates. Both banks and insurance companies are likely 
to incur higher risk assessment costs and these will ultimately be passed on 
to firms. The consequences of this could be disproportionately higher on 
SMEs. 
The response of risk averse firms who are faced with uncertain future costs 
may be either to over-invest in pollution prevention (t) or, in some cases, to 
withdraw from risky activities altogether. This may particularly affect SMEs. 
A possible alternative response, particularly by SMEs, might be to under-
(I) Over-investment may occur because firms will be strongly averse to  the possible costs of a large accident or damages 
claim, even if it has a very low probability of occurring. This will lead them to invest an uneconomically large amount 
(ie more than is socially optimal for the sector as a whole) in avoiding low probability damages. This type of ~::~v~l'U 
behaviour is sometimes referred to as the lottery tffect.  · ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · · 
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invest where the size of the potential liability is greater than the firm's total 
resources 
Although uncertainty is a disadvantage for environmental liability as an 
instrument, the size of the effects may be small and may diminish over time 
as experience grows. Many of the implications are discussed more fully in 
later sections. 
Scope of  System 
The scope of the system determines the extent of coverage of different types 
of environmental damage and is also important in relation to the costs 
involved in proving causation. At the simplest level of categorisation, 
environmental problems may be characterised by the affected medium:. 
•  human health; 
•  materials and buildings; 
•  land/soil; 
•  water; 
•  air; 
•  ecological damage < 1>; 
and by type of causation: 
•  accidental damage or damage triggered by a unique event; 
•  gradual or ongoing pollution. 
The economic impacts of the scope of the system are influenced by media 
and types of damage covered, as  th~se affect how easy or difficult it is to 
prove causation.  If causation is not clear, the main economic impacts will be 
twofold.  Firstly, it will raise the costs of bringing a claim (administrative 
costs, scientific investigations, legal costs of both parties etc - these costs are 
collectively referred to as transaction costs).  Secondly, it will introduce 
uncertainty to all the economic actors (firms, insurance companies, banks) 
about the size of their potential liabilities.  A risk averse actor will tend to act 
cautiously when faced with uncertainty which may lead to uneconomic 
outcomes, eg under (or over) investment in pollution prevention, high 
insurance premia, restricted availability of bank finance. 
One criterion for determining scope is to focus on the largest areas of 
unremedied damage and/or those  which are unlikely to be satisfactorily 
controlled by other policy instruments, eg ecological damage. 
This criterion would orient liability towards achieving overall environmental 
objectives but could lead to high transaction costs and considerable 
uncertainty concerning the size of future liabilities. 
(I) In  this study the term erologiazl dilmage is uSt'd to refer to damage to natural habitats, natural resources or species 
which are either publicly owned or unowned, sometimes referred to  as the unow11cd mviro11mcr:t.  An  example is  the Joss 
of habitat of an endangered bird species. 
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The criterion of clear azusality is important in order to establish certainty of 
effects and rationality of action" by the economic actors.  For example, 
insurers are more likely to be willing to provide cover for a potential liability 
for which a claim could be pursued through the Courts. If this is not 
possible, it may well be an uninsurable risk since insurers might refuse to 
accept the claim. 
Causation is easiest to prove when: 
•  there is a single polluter with scientifically established effects; 
•  there is no, or a short, time lag between releases of pollutants and damage 
occurring; 
•  damage can be traced to a unique incident or event; and 
•  there is an injured party who can sue. 
Under these circumstances, transaction costs would be relatively low and 
liability could be reasonably assessed.  Conversely, proof is more difficult 
when the damage is caused by multiple polluters through gradual pollution 
and when the effects are revealed after a long delay.  This situation can lead 
to high transaction costs and unquantifiable risks. 
Environmental problems where causation could be more easil¥ established 
include: 
•  accidental releases to soil and water; 
•  some accidental releases to air; 
•  possibly gradual releases to soil; and 
•  possibly some gradual releases to water. 
1.2.3  Historic and Future Pollution 
Historic damage, especially the problem of soil contamination of old 
industrial sites, has created a large legacy of remediation costs raising a 
number of issues. 
Some damage was created by firms who were either complying with existing 
requirements at the time or were not able to know of later discovered toxic 
effects. These firms have not therefore included the unanticipated costs of 
clean up in their production costs and have not set aside financial reserves 
for the purpose (1).  The same problem applies to insurance companies who 
were unwittingly providing cover for unanticipated  without building up 
reserves. A further problem is that many sites have passed through multiple 
ownership and uses.  Liability is difficult to apportion equitably and some 
polluters may no longer exist, creating the problem of orphan  sites. 
(I) We are aware of a small number of multinational companies who have made provisions in their accounts for future 
liabilities. 
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historic damage. However, if they knowingly polluted with hazardous 
substances or contravened the then existiug regulations, it  is nevertheless 
justifiable to make them pay for the remediation of such damage.  The 
problem of paying for remedying the remaining damage is primarily a 
question of creating a funding mechanism to pay for cleaning up pollution 
caused by past activities. This raises the question of what share should be 
borne by industry, consumers and public funds? 
Retrospective liability may frequently also involve unclear causation, raising 
the problems of high transaction costs and large uncertainty concerning the 
level and attribution of the liabilities. 
Future liabilities can be considered in .four cases. 
•  Releases in contravention of existing regulations.  A liability system would 
strengthen the economic incentive for compliance. 
•  Releases at levels in compliance with current permitted standards, but 
which later turn out to cause damage. If these are covered it would create 
incentives for firms to continue researching into acceptable release levels 
of both .controlled and uncontrolled substances, since they have the best 
information about their actual releases. 
•  Accidental releases.  A liability system covering these could create 
incentives- for due care in continuing operations and the installation of 
appropriate preventive measures. 
•  Development risks.  The discovery, through scientific advance, of 
hazardous substances which were previously thought to be safe.  Making 
firms liable for development risk creates incentives for research and 
development into new pollution problems and control methods. This is 
likely to be. efficient since polluting firms are also the ones who have the 
greatest access to information on the release of substances, and therefore 
the most efficient research and development possibilities. 
1.2.4  Restoration Standards 
The standards applied to the remediation of damage are a major cost factor. 
The alternative approaches are: 
•  restoration to original condition; 
•  restoration to a standard based on cost-effectiveness or fitness-for-use for 
the planned use. 
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The first approacl} was originally used by Superfund.  It resulted in 
remediation costs estimated to be about 35%  greater than tho~  e .lkely under 
the second approach (I>. 
Due to the criticisms of high costs in Superfund, there is now a strong 
pressure < 2
> for more flexible approaches to be taken to restoration 
standards and speed (ie the second approach) even though this may result in 
a gradual degradation of the environment in relation to its original condition. 
1.2.5  Strict Versus Fault Based Liability 
Strict liability makes the polluter liable so long as it can be shown that he 
caused the damage.  Fault based liability requires the additional proof that 
the polluter was negligent in relation to some duty to behave accordi.rig to a 
certain standard.  Strict liability therefore eases the burden of establishing 
liability which will tend to incur lower transaction  costs than a fault based 
system. 
Both strict and fault liability create prevention incentives, but to different 
extents.  Strict liability extends the scope of the system and hence leads to 
more remediation and/or more damage prevented with greater compensation 
for victims.  Potentially liable parties need to be able to assess the costs they 
would face if damage occurs, and this may be clearer under strict liability 
since under fault liability there is the additional uncertainty of establishing 
fault. If polluters can assess their risks, they can then determine their optima] 
level of prevention expenditure. 
Fault liability may also be economically optimal but this depends on whether 
the court's negligence criteria reflects the economically optimal level of 
prevention. 
There are a number of economic consequences which may be anticipated 
from a strict liability system in comparison to a fault based system, although 
their individual and collective significance is difficult to assess.  Strict liability: 
•  could increase the incentive for prevention to reduce environmental risks 
since the polluter is liable for any damage that he causes; 
•  increases the demand for insurance, while insurers may be expected to 
impose lower financial limits; 
•  may have higher damage costs since where the victim may influence the 
level of damage costs (eg if the victim fails  to take precautions to minimise 
the damage to his property); 
(ll Brattle/IRI (1995)  Assessment of Costs Savings Resulting from  Implementation of the CMA Remedy Selection 
Approach.  Report prepared for Chemical Manufacturers Association, USA 
(2)  Including in proposals for revision of Superfund. 
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•  raises the level of insurers and banks' transaction costs in setting-up 
policies/loans, since they may need to carry out more comprehensive risk 
assessments; 
•  increases the frequency of claims (I}  while the costs for proof decrease 
since there is no need to prove faulty behaviour. 
Defences 
The impact of strict liability may be moderated oy allowing certain defences 
on the part of the polluter.  For example, defences include: 
•  Acts of war or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and 
irresistible character; 
•  Where damage resulted necessarily from compliance with a specific or 
compulsory measure of a public authority; 
•  Where the victim contributed to or caused the damage due to a negligent 
or deliberate act < 2> ;  · 
•  Where it was not scientifically known at the time that the activity would 
create adverse environmental impacts. 
Allowing the possibility of defences has two effects.  It reduces the amount 
and cost of remediation but raises the transaction costs in proving and 
defending the liability. 
]oint and Several or Proportionate Liability 
Where multiple polluters have contributed to damage, the issue arises 
whether liability should be proportionate to their contribution to damage or . 
whether any polluter should be joirit and severally liable for the whole 
damage and then have to recoup contributions from the other polluters. 
Proportionate liability conforms with the polluter pays principle since it 
places responsibility for damage in relation to cause.  It creates a regime of 
reasonable certainty for economic actors to assess risks and undertake 
prevention. 
However, there are two problems with proportionate liability where multiple 
polluters are concerned.  Firstly, victims may need to bring multiple claims 
and may not easily be able to identify the responsible parties.  This will 
create a disincentive to bring a case and will raise the victim's transaction 
costs.  Secondly, it may be difficult to prove which party caused the damage. 
Joint and several liability, on the other hand, increases the transaction costs 
of the polluters.  The costs of litigation increase since it encourages multiple 
litigations between firms and between insurance companies (this can also be 
(I) But note that in the case of product liability the claims frequency has not increased since there has been a trend 
towards settlement rather than litigation. 
(2)  The first thrt>e defE'nces outlined abovE' are set out in thE'  Lugano convE'ntion (Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, Council of Europe, June 1993). 
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a problem under proportionate liability - unless the share of liability is 
decided by administrative body). 
Joint and several liability can encourage two phenomena, the deep· pocket 
syndrome and forum shopping.  The deep pocket syndrome is where the--
victim seeks redress from one of the polluters with the greatest financial 
resources to pay, irrespective of the size of the contribution to the damage. 
This can create considerable uncertainty among firms and other economic 
actors about their possible liabilities.  Faced with ~his uncertainty, firms may 
withdraw altogether from risky activities.  It also creates reduced incentives 
for prevention, since the liability for damage does not reflect the actual level 
of care <t>.  Finally, it may also temporarily distort competition since some 
firms may be forced to pay for their competitors' damage. 
Forum shopping occurs where the victim chooses the jurisdiction in which he 
brings the claim, and may search around different countries to find the most 
favourable regime.  This may arise were the multiple parties are based in 
different countries. 
Joint and several liability arises as an issue principally where multiple 
polluters contribute to the damage and clear causation for individual 
polluters would otherwise be difficult to prove.  It has already been noted in 
Section  1.2.1  that this type of problem is not well suited to an environmental 
liability system. 
1.2. 7  Rights of Standing for Interest Groups 
A number of rights of standing may be granted to public interest groups (eg 
NGOs). These include the rights to intervene in administrative decisions, the 
rights to be granted a judicial review, or the rights to bring actions on their 
own account. The advantages of granting a right of standing to interest 
groups are: 
•  an increased commitment of the public with respect to environmental 
protection; 
•  public bodies may not be able to deal with all cases of ecological damage; 
•  in some cases, NGOs may have more expertise than small local public 
authorities where ecological damage is concerned; 
•  decisions by public bodies may be influenced by short term political or 
economic interests rather than long term environmental interests. 
(I) On the other hand, joint and several liability is likely to increase prevention activity, since more cases are likely to be 
brought and the risks of a large size of claim  increase.  Without faint and several liability the victim may not be able &o 
prove the share of causation. 
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of environmental damage may not be easily pursued.  One is where there 
are multiple victims and each individual victim only suffers a small damage. 
In this case the transaction costs of pursuing many individual claims would 
be too high.  They could be lowered by granting rights to an interest group 
to bring a class action. 
The second is the question of who would bring claims to get restoration or 
compensation for ecological damage to the unowned environment.  The 
issue for this problem is whether to grant rights of action to NGOs and/or 
individual citizens rather than leaving it entirely to a public body. 
The problems associated with granting a right of standing are: 
•  Too many false or weak claims may be pursued (especially with reversed 
burden of proof - see below) <I>.  However, so far there is no experience 
to support this in the countries where NGOs do have a right of standing. 
•  Some NGOs may pursue claims for political purposes, eg by bringing a 
claim against a high profile company. 
•  NGOs are strongly represented in some EU countries, but not in others. 
Information Rights 
Since firms have a near monopoly of information relating to the production, 
prevention and release of pollutants, they may be required to reveal that 
information at some point during the legal process. 
If firms are not required to provide information prior to a court case, then 
the costs for plaintiffs in establishing their case may be very high and create 
a disincentive to pursue their claim. · On the other hand, there could be 
excessive costs to the firm if they were required to release information to any 
party before they had established the basis for a reasonable claim  .. 
1.2.8  Burden of  Proof 
The burden of proof normally rests with the plaintiff.  Under certain liability 
systems the burden may be reversed to the defendant.  This encourages 
plaintiffs to bring claims and increases the claims frequency.  On the other 
hand, since most information rests with the firm, it is overall economically 
efficient for the firm to produce the relevant knowledge about causation at 
the lowest cost.  It also creates increased prevention incentives. 
There are degrees of facilitation of  the burden of proof  for the plaintiff. 
Proof involves three steps.  These are proving that: 
(I) Fishing  trips is  the term  that has been given to the possible situation where a victim  with a weak case nevertheless 
makes a claim at very little expense, but where the costs of proof are all reversed to  the defendant. 
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•  specific substa~ces were emitted; 
•  the emissions were capable of causing the damage; and 
•  damage must be shown to have been a result of the emissions. 
A limited degree of facilitation  of the burden of proof for the plaintiff may 
relate only to one or two steps, eg the first step, establishing that the firm 
could have emitted the substance  because the firm falls in an industrial 
category or type of process that tends to emit the substance due to the raw 
materials or technologies used. 
1.2.9  Financial Limits 
1.2.10 
The issue of financial limits arises where there is a potential risk of damage. 
which exceeds the financial resources of the firm.  In order for economic 
actors to take rational decisions, they expect to be able to quantify their risk. 
If firms are exposed to excessively large potential liabilities there could be a 
number of impacts. 
Insurance companies will always impose financial limits on their cover; any 
risk to the firm greater than this would go uninsured.  Banks may not lend if 
liability could exceed the firm's reserves.  ·Firms, especially small firins, may 
therefore withdraw from risky activities.  Another possibility is that firms 
may ring fence their risky activities into limited liability firms with minimal 
assets.  They would not be able to compensate the victims out of their assets 
if large  occurred. 
Unlimited liability risks are hard td calculate and may create uncertainty, 
particularly for small firms < 1>.  On the other hand, if financial limits on 
liability were imposed, it would lead to some unremedied damage.  However, 
most current claims for  are small and therefore a level of financial limits 
could be found which would contain the majority of. 
Compulsory Insurance or Financial Security 
Compulsory financial insurance or some other form of financial security is a 
means of ensuring that each firm has a minimum level of resources to 
compensate victims if they cause damage.  The issues associated with this 
option is whether this is an effective way to ensure victims are compensated, 
whether it will encourage the growth of the insurance market, and whether 
it will impose unreasonable costs on the insured. 
Insurer's costs of risk assessment are likely to rise if they have to carry out 
risk assessments on firms that are high risk and might otherwise not have 
received insurance cover.  Although firms can be required to have cover, it is 
more difficult to ensure that insurance companies provide that cover. 
Potentially, this places insurance companies in the position of deciding 
(I) Howevt>r,  the Product Liability Directive has been implt>mented  by most  Mt>mber States with unlimilt>d  liability, 
without any reportt>d  adverse effects. 
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whether or not to sanction a firm's polluting activities.  Insurers are 
unwilling to act as pollution regulators. 
Firms are also likely to be concerned that they may become captive to high 
insurance premium rates or that insurance may not be available to them. 
]oint Compensation Funds 
The principle of a compensation fund is that damage is remedied or victims 
compensated from a fund which is financed by a collective group of 
polluters.  The need may arise where no liable party can be identified or no 
longer exists, where a large number of polluters is involved, or in emergency 
cases where there is an urgent need to restore damage quickly.  In practice, 
most funds are focused on diffuse pollution problems (eg air pollution) or 
orphan sites (t).  · 
The operation of compensation funds raises the issues of economic incentives 
and the polluter pays principle.  The conflict in the application of 
compensation funds lies between the desire to target the financing of funds 
at the actual polluters, whereas the compensation is directed towards 
pollution without a clearly responsible pa~. Firms will have economic 
incentives for prevention only if the costs they face relate to their actual 
pollution and if  increased prevention lowers their contribution to the fund. 
However, if polluters can be clearly identified for the purposes of financing, 
do not need to be compensated through a fund.  If the fund is financed 
through a common charge on all polluters, it raises the possibility that clean 
firms may be contributing to the pollution costs of heavy polluters and firms 
who may be their competitors.  A similar conflict arises if the fund is 
financed by a charge on current polluters in order to pay for the remediation. 
of past pollution < 2>. 
A further issue relates to the question of whether a fund should be 
administered locally, nationally or at the EU level..  The benefits of local 
administration are likely to be that the benefit is felt locally by those who 
have contributed to the fund and no transfer of income is involved, while 
national or EU level funds have the greatest possibility of spreading the 
financial burden and applying a common approach to compensation. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABIU1Y AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 
~A variety of policy instruments are available for use in the control of 
polluting activities.  These instruments include the broad classes of regulation 
(eg emissions standards, technology-based standards), economic instruments 
(eg taxes, charges or tradeable permits) and liability systems. 
(I) An orphan site is a contaminated site where the responsible party can  not be found. 
(2) This problem may potentially be avoided if the charge is levied as a surcharge on insurance premia. 
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I I  These instruments can be complementary.  They have different strengths 
and \ Te  tknesses when applied to different pollution problems.  Regulatory 
instruments are likely to perform well where the control costs for firms are 
known or similar and the socially optimal level of emissions is known. 
Regulatory instruments will be reasonably certain about achieving a target 
level of environmental emissions. 
Economic instruments are likely to perform well where the marginal value of 
damage is known and where there are large variations amongst firms' 
pollution control costs so that efficiency savings can be obtained by enabling 
firms to choose their own level of abatement to minimise the sum of their 
costs of control and the costs of damage. 
A liability system has potentially even more flexibility since it is driven by the 
victim's claims and does not require any prior knowledge about standards, 
costs or damage values.  It leaves to the firm the choice about the extent and 
type of pollution prevention and abatement measures - a feature that it 
shares with economic instruments 
In comparing policy instruments, a number of criteria can be considered 
(each of these five criteria relate to one column in tables  1.3a and 1.3b below): 
•  how great is the incentive for preventative action? 
•  how great is the incentive for clean up and remediation? 
•  how great is the incentive for R & D into pollution prevention 
techniques? 
•  how cost-effective is the instrument in prevention and clean up? 
•  how large are the transaction costs likely to be? 
Applying these criteria to the types of pollution problems in Section  1.2.2 
enables an indicative picture to be drawn of the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of environmental liability systems for various types of 
environmental problems, as shown in Table  1.3a. 
The applicability of each instrument in relation to a damage type has been 
subjectively assessed against each one of the above criteria which is 
applicable.  The instrument has been rated as either having a relative 
strength (.I), a relative weakness (  JC), or neith~r (?)  (balance of strengths and 
weaknesses, or uncertain).  Not all the criteria are relevant to each case, and 
not all the instruments may be realistically applied to each damage type. 
The first category covers environmental damage caused by accidental 
discharges to air or water bodies where the damage is  clearly identifiable (eg 
evidence of fish kill from a water pollution spill) and fairly readily traceable 
to a single source.  These cases are examined in Tables  1.3a  and 1.3b. 
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substances to sPil :tnd water bodies) from one or more identifiable sources 
where the causation regarding the damage can be established, although not 
always easily.  In this category transaction costs may be higher than with 
accidental pollution since gradual pollution can involve a long time period 
between the pollutants being gradually discharged and the damage 
becoming evident, which can raise the costs of proving that the polluter is 
responsible for the damage.  Where there are many sources of gradual 
pollution and the causation is even more unclear, then the transaction costs 
of liability systems would be higher still and lia~ility systems are less 
applicable. 
This category also has a? for the effect on incentives for R&D regarding air 
pollution since it may be more difficult to determine that a single polluter 
caused the gradual air pollution. This lowers the incentive for such polluters 
to invest in R&D  to reduce the risks of becoming liable for the damage. 
The third category relates to ongoing pollution <t>  mvolving diffuse damage 
from many sources where there is no clear causation.  Where the ongoing 
pollution can be clearly traced to a single or many sources (dear causation), 
this category would entail similar entries to the gradual pollution category 
above. 
Under the criterion of cost-effective clean-up, all  the entries are ? since the 
position on this criterion depends on how the standards defining the clean 
up of the damaged asset are determined (see Section  1.2.3  above). 
Liability systems cannot have an incentive effect to prevent past land 
contamination since the contamination has already occurred.  Nevertheless, 
they might create an incentive for firms  to carry out R&D to improve 
(technologies for)  the clean up of contaminated land and  prevent future 
contamination. 
(t) Such ongoing pollution is  the residual environmental damages from  a firm's ongoing level of pollution emissions that 
are  permitted  under the existing regulations because it would be excessively costly to  require that the emissions are 
eliminated. 
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Table 1.3a  Advantages and Disadvantages of Environmental Liability Systems for 
Differert "7.nvironmental Problems 
Criteria 
Incentive for: 
Medium  Damage type  Cost- Low 
Prevention  Clean up  R&D  effective  Transaction 
clean up  Costs 
Water  AcddenW releases,  ./  ./  ./  ?  ./ 
cle.uly identifiable 
damage, single or multiple 
sources with cle.u 
causation 
Gradul pollution, single  ./  ./  ?  ? 
or multiple sources, 
causation may be difficult 
to prove 
Ongoing pollution, diffuse  jC  jC  ? 
d.unage, many sources, no 
cle.u causation 
Air  AcddenW reluses, single  ./  ./  1'  ./ 
or multiple sources with 
cle.u causation 
Gradul pollution, single  ?  7  7 
or multiple sources, 
causation ma~  be difficult 
to prove 
Ongoing pollution,  jC  jC  ? 
diffuse damage, 
many sources, no clear 
causation 
Land  Cumulative historical  7  7 
contamination: single or 
multiple sources, with 
cle.u causation 
Cumulative historical  ?  ?  7 
contamination: many 
sources, no clear causation 
Future contamination,  ./  " 
7 
acddenW releases, single 
or multiple sources with 
clear causation 
Future contamination,  "  " 
?  ? 
gradul pollution, single 
or multiple sources, 
causation may be difficult 
to prove 
Future contamination,  jC  jC  ? 
ongoing pollution, many 
sources, no clear causation 
Key: t! = strength  JC=  weakness  1 =  balanced or uncertain 
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depends in part on the type of pollution involved.  Environmentalliab~ty 
systems may be applicable to damage to ecological assets where the damage 
can be readily traced to a single or multiple source (eg from accidental 
discharges or gradual pollution) and where reasonable costs for the 
restoration of the damage can be readily derived.  But environmental liability 
systems are unlikely to be applicable for damage to ecological assets due to 
ongoing diffuse pollution from many sources since there are the following 
three areas where ecological damage raises greater difficulties for the 
application of environmental liability systems thah is the case of damage to 
other receptors such as damage to buildings or humans. 
•  It can be more difficult to prove causation, ie that a polluter caused the 
ecological damage, where there are many possible sources of the damage, 
long time lags in the impact mechanisms and a variety of other possible 
factors affecting the condition of the ecological asset and the incidence of 
the damage. 
•  Ecological damage raises greater difficulties and uncertainties concerning 
the valuation of the damage than is the case of damage to more tangible 
assets such as human health and property.  In some cases (eg restocking a 
river following a pollution incident) restoration costs can be fairly readily 
estimated.  However, in other cases, restoration of the damage may not be 
feasible.  In such cases, and also when restoration of the damage would 
be very expensive, it may be necessary to value the damaged assets to 
determine compensation or compare restoration costs to benefits. 
Valuation involves difficult and subjective issues (see section 2.1). 
•  In addition, ecological assets are generally not owned by an individual or,. 
if they are owned by an individual, the owner may not be interested in 
the restoration of the ecological damage.  This raises issues of who can 
bring a claim for such  - the public authorities or NGOs or individual 
citizens- and who should receive the compensation for ecological 
damage?  In some other cases there may be relevant property rights 
involved (eg rights of fishing on a river).  In such cases damage can be 
fairly readily assessed and liability systems may be appropriate. 
Table  1.3b presents a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of 
environmental liability systems compared with the other main environmental 
policy instruments for tackling these major different types of environmental 
problems.  Each entry (eg ./or X) in Table  1.3b presents an indicative 
assessment of each instrument in respect of each of the criteria detailed 
above and in Table  1.3a. 
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Comparison of Environmental Policy Instruments 
Medium  Damage type 
Water 
Air 
Land 
Accidental releases, clearly 
identifiable damage, single or 
multiple sources, with clear 
causation 
Gradual pollution, single or 
multiple sources, causation may be 
difficult to prove 
Ongoing pollution, diffuse 
damage, many sources, no clear 
causation 
Accidental releases, clearly 
identifiable damage, single or 
multiple sources, with clear 
causation 
Gradual pollution, single or 
multiple sources, causation may be 
difficult to prove 
Ongoing pollution, diffuse 
damage, many sou.rces, no clear 
causation 
Cumulative historical 
contamination: single or multiple 
sources, with clear causation 
Cumulative historical 
contamination: many sources, no 
clear causation 
Future contamination: accidental 
releases, single or multiple 
sources, with clear causation 
Future contamination: gradual 
pollution, single or multiple 
sources, causation may be difficult 
to prove 
Future contamination: ongoing 
pollution, many sources, no clear 
causation 
Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Alternative Instruments for Different 
Environmental Problems<
1> 
Liability System  Regulations  Economic 
Instruments 
././???  ././~?? 
~XX?~  ./-./~?  ./././././ 
~???X 
(2) 
./././?? 
(2) 
./?./??  r/t!t!r/r/ 
(1)  Each symbol (eg ./, ? or X) refers to the criteria set out at the sta~ of this sub-section 
and in Table 1.3a 
(2)  Economic instruments (eg landfill waste charges) may provide incentives to reduce 
waste generation and disposal or reduce emissions of other pollutants and also provide 
resources for clean up as part of a programme of public expenditures or financial assistance 
to clean up contaminated sites.  Such charges might form  part of the contributions to a 
compensation fund. 
Key: ./ =  strength  ~ =  weakness  7 = balanced or uncertain - =  not applicable 
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so that in most cases the best result may be achieved by a combination of 
the alternative instruments rather than relying on a single instrument.  For 
example, environmental liability systems may be most appropriate for 
ensuring that the polluters pay the victims for any damage from accidental 
releases, for preventing future land contamination and paying for the clean 
up of future land contamination.  Such environmental liability systems might 
effectively complement the traditional environmental regulations and 
economic instruments - the latter have potential merits for promoting further 
reductions in ongoing pollution below the existing levels where it is easier to 
measure emissions than damage and where valuation of the environmental 
damage costs can be more easily determined by the public agencies. 
Environmental liability systems have merits where it is easier for the damage 
costs to be valued by the victims. 
Drawing together the assessments indicated in Tables  1.3a and 1.3b, a 
preliminary indication of the relative strengths and weaknesses of a liability 
system in comparison to other policy instruments is that: 
an environmental liability system has a comparative advantage for tackling 
future environmental damage: 
•  accidental releases to all media; 
•  gradual pollution, especially for damage to water and soil contamination 
especially non-historical (and other than from diffuse sources), provided 
that causation can be proved at reasonable cost; 
an environmental liability system has a comparative disadvantage for: 
•  diffuse pollution (air, water, land), multiple polluters; 
•  multiple injuries with unclear causation. 
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I 2  EXISTING ENVIRONMENIAL DAMAGE COSTS AND POLLUTION 
CONTROL COSTS 
This section (Section 2.1) first reviews existing techniques that are currently 
being applied in Europe for valuing environmental damage costs to see how 
well they could underpin an environmental liability system.  It also defines 
the types of environmental damage costs and the techniques for their 
valuation that are referred to in Section 2.2 
Section 2.2 then reviews some available estimates of environmental damage 
costs so as to indicate the scale and nature of the existing residual 
environmental damage costs and how they may evolve in the future.  It also 
highlights differences in these environmental damage costs between EU 
countries. 
Section 2.3 reviews briefly the available estimates of the expenditures in 
different European countries on existing pollution controls. 
The analysis in Section 2.2 and 2.3  of the differences between individual 
Member States' environmental damage costs and their existing expenditures 
on pollution controls is designed to help inform discussions of any possible 
scope for the development of an environmental liability system at an EU 
wide level. 
2.1  TECHNIQUES FOR  VALWNG ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
2.1.1  Introduction 
Sound and uncontroversial environmental valuation techniques are ideally 
desired to support the implementation of an environmental liability system. 
An environmental liability system involves actual financial payments so that 
doubts about the robustness of the underpinning valuation techniques 
creates the potential for costly disputes (1), although the implementation of 
an environmental liability system could itself significantly increase the 
application and robustness of damage valuation techniques- as has occurred 
in the US. 
Uncertainties about the valuation of environmental damage both for 
individual cases and at the aggregate level could create difficulties for the 
main parties involved in making key decisions concerning an environmental 
liability system: 
•  the Courts who would have to determine the appropriate level for the 
damage costs; 
•  the authorities who would have to determine the appropriate level for the 
environmental ~amage costs to be recovered from polluters (in 
administrative liability cases); 
(I) Navrud, S.,  Pruckner, G.J., (1996),  Environmental Valuation - To  Use or Not to Use?  A Comprehensive Study of the 
US and Europe.  To  be published in EnvironmenW and Resource Economics 
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liabilities and the extent to which they should implement pGllution 
prevention measures to reduce these liabilities;  -
•  the insurers who would have to determine the extent of their possible 
exposure for environmental liabilities so as to determine whether it is 
worthwhile for them to offer insurance and, if so, the appropriate level of 
premia to set for such policies;  --
•  the banks who would have to determine the extent of environmental 
liabilities for firms to whom they provide loans and their effect on the 
bank's bad debts and also whether the banks would provide bonds for 
the environmental liabilities of firms. 
•  the victims who need to know the level of environmental damage (:osts to 
press for. 
This section therefore aims to examine the existing techniques for valuing 
various types of environmental damage costs with respect to their adequacy 
for the implementation of environmental liability systems. 
In addition, this section examines briefly any variations in the valuation 
techniques that are commonly applied in different European countries so as 
to indicate whether an EU wide environmental liability system could be 
consistently applied across the EU. 
Criteria for Assessing Valuation  Techniques 
A key issue for the effective and efficient operation of liability and 
compensation system for remedying environmental ~amage  is how adequate 
are the existing available techniques for determining a monetary valuation 
for the environmental damage costs. in question. 
Criteria for assessing the adequacy of existing valuation techniques to fulfil 
this role include: 
•  Robustness and the scope for disputes about the valuations.  This 
concerns the following issues: 
•  The validity of the assumptions that have to be made concerning key 
variables on which data are lacking. 
•  The extent to which different valuations have been or can be produced 
by the plaintiffs and victims due to differences in approaches, 
methodologies, data and assumptions; and hence what is  the incentive 
for both parties to incur transaction costs in commissioning separate 
studies and critiques of each other's studies. 
•  The extent of possible disputes or consensus about the appropriate 
approach and methodology for valuing the environmental damage 
costs. 
•  Public acceptance of the valuations. 
•  Acceptance of the techniques by the courts. 
•  Practicability in terms of availability of data. 
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•  Costs of acquiring data and applying the techniques to determine the 
valuations. 
Whereas some valuation techniques may be appropriate for determining 
approximately the significance of environmental damage to input into the 
environmental policy making process, their application for an environmental 
liability system entails much stricter tests in respect of the criteria outlined 
above. 
Review of Tech:: 1·ques for Valuing Environmental Damage Costs 
Major types of environmental damage costs are impacts on use values which 
include: 
•  Losses of economic outputs such as reduction in yields in agriculture or 
forestry due to air pollution.  · 
•  Extra defensive expenditures incurred by individuals or firms such as 
increased expenditures on repainting or replacing materials damaged by 
air pollution or expenditures incurred to prevent damage arising (eg 
moving stock animals away from polluted site). 
•  User damage costs such as lower or impaired recreation benefits due to 
water pollution or damage to forests caused by air pollution or destruction 
of natural habitats. 
In addition, there can be impacts on non-use values which include:  . 
•  Welfare losses to individuals who do not currently use the affected 
environment but derive welfare benefits from having the option of doing 
so or from knowing about the quality of the environmental assets 
(existence values). 
•  Intrinsic valuations of  to the natural environment for its own sake rather 
than the above valuations which concern losses of human welfare arising 
from damage to the environmental assets. 
The uncertainties and difficulties of valuation become progressively greater 
as one moves down the above list of possible types of environmental damage 
costs. 
The main steps involved in the valuation of environmental damage costs 
include: 
•  identifying and estimating the level of the discharges of the pollutants 
that caused the damage, and converting the discharges into an1bient 
concentration levels of the pollutants; 
•  assessing the physical impacts of these discharges and ambient 
concentrations of the pollutants through, for example, the use of dose 
response relationships < 1>; 
(I) Dose responSt>  relationship give estimates of the effects of a pollutant on physical parameters such as  incidence of an 
illness, yield losses of agricultural crops etc. 
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The lack of information, uncertainties and scope for controversy are more 
pronounced as one moves towards the last step. 
The techniques for the economic valuation of environmental damage costs 
include: 
•  Estimating the costs of restoring the damaged environmental asset.  It is 
relatively easy to obtain such cost estimates.  However, this technique 
does not represent the value of the damaged asset as such.  Moreover, it 
raises important and difficult issues concerning definition of the standards 
to which the asset should be restored since using a cost-effective fitness 
for use standard entails much lower costs than restoring the environment 
to its original condition < 1>,  which can be difficult to specify. 
•  Market based approaches which apply existing market prices to the 
physical iinpacts estimated through dose response relationships (eg 
changes in yields of agricultural crops or timber due to air pollution). 
•  Estimating the defensive expenditure incurred as a result of the pollutants 
(  eg the costs of protecting, cleaning, repairing or replacing the affected 
asset, such as materials and buildings). 
These valuation techniques can be fairly readily applied to derive directly 
tangible estimates of damage costs for certain types of environmental 
damage, although considerable uncertainties and potential for disputes still 
remain concerning the estimates.  These environmental damage costs are 
termed type I environmental damage costs in this study and in the analysis 
of available data on damage costs in Section 2.2.2 and Annex C. 
In addition, there are the following types of techniques for valuing 
environmental damage costs which involve greater uncertainties and 
difficulties - these are termed type II environmental damage costs in this 
study and in Section 2.2.2 and Annex C. 
•  Travel costs methods which have been used to assess impacts on 
recreation where the extra travel costs that consumers pay to visit a 
recreation site, instead of an alternative, are used to estimate the value of 
to this site (eg water pollution at a lake). 
•  Hedonic pricing methods where the differences in prices or rents for 
properties and land in areas with different environmental pollution levels 
(eg noise or air pollution) are analysed to indicate the value of damage 
costs from these pollutants. 
•  Surveys where users and non-users are asked either directly for their 
willingness to pay for the changes in the quality of an environmental  I 
asset (eg loss of a natural habitat, damage to  a lake or river) (contingent 
valuation methods) or their willingness to pay estimates are derived from 
their responses to questions about their relative preferences for the 
environmental impacts (eg noise or air pollution emissions from traffic) 
(I) Brattle/IRI (1995)  Assessment of Cost Savings Resulting from  Implementation of the CMA Remedy  ~lection 
Approach.  Report prepared for the Chemical Manufacturers Association, USA. 
ERM  EcONOMICS  EcoNOMICS oF l.!As1UTY: EC  DG  XI 
28 compared with an item involving a monetary payment (eg fares) (stated 
preference •echniques  ). 
•  Benefit trans(er methods where the valuations derived from any of the 
above studies for other situations are applied to a particular case. 
Navrud and Pruckner (1996)  (t) review the existing studies involving the 
above valuation techniques and found that some hedonic pricing studies 
were carried out in Europe and the US in the 70s and early 80s, but that 
there has since been a move away :.tom hedonic pricing and travel cost 
techniques towards contingent valuation methods. 
They also state that benefit transfer methods can involve greater 
uncertainties due to potential for disputes about the valuations made in the. 
original study and its applicability to the case in question.  They conclude 
that benefit transfer is best suited for deriving ball park estimates to guide 
policy development, but that their use is not defensible for environmental 
liability cases (Navrud and Pruckner (1996, p9).  Consequently, original 
damage valuation studies are likely to be needed for environmental liability 
cases entailing considerable transaction costs. 
-Table 2.1a identifies some possible techniques for valuing the environmental 
damage cost categories examined in Section 2.2 and highlights some issues 
regarding their adequacy. 
•  The valuation techniques have been most extensively applied for the 
traditional pollutants (eg acid rain) on which there is a body of experience 
and data on their applications; 
•  The least knowledge, expetience and data are available on the main 
emerging pollution problems (such as health impacts of chronic toxic 
water and air pollutants) about which there is the greatest uncertainty 
and concern. 
•  The long time lags before many current pollutants create perceived  (  eg 
increased deaths or illnesses) increases the uncertainties and disputes 
about damage costs and the difficulties of valuing them. 
•  Lack of baseline data, especially on environmental conditions before the 
incident may make it difficult to assess the damage caused by an incident. 
There are some uncertainties concerning the survey techniques, such as 
contingent valuation methods (CVM), to determine individuals' willingness 
to pay for the remediation of intangible environmental damage costs such as 
ecological damage.  These uncertainties concern: 
•  whether the respondents can adequately comprehend the changes in 
environmental conditions; 
•  whether the questioner providing information on the environmental 
conditions biases the respondents' views; 
•  the specific manner in which the questions are posed; 
•  how respondents have interpreted these questions; 
(I) Navrud, S,  Pruckner, G J (1996) Environaenta.J Valuation- To use or not to use?  A comparative study of the United 
States and Euro~.  Forthcoming in  Environmental and Resources Economics. 
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are valuing; 
•  how respondents h,.v-.  interpreted the questions; 
•  possible biases in respondents' valuation such as over estimating the value 
where they think they will not in fact have to pay (free rider issues); 
•  whether the sample is representative and how the findings should be 
interpreted and grossed. up. 
There have recently been attempts to provide guidelines in the US for 
carrying out CVM to overcome these limitations < 1>. 
The value of these intangible environmental damage costs are essentially 
determined by the public preferences which are difficult to anticipate.  Public 
co~cern about environmental damage, especially for damage to natural 
habitats, is likely to keep rising in. the future as incomes rise and with 
increasing pressures on a declining stock of natural habitats. 
As a result, it would be difficult for insurers to anticipate and predict what 
the public's preferences and ,valuations will be' and hence what could be 
their liabilities for ecological  due to a pollution incident that might arise 
some time in the future. 
Navrud and Pruckner (1996) review the experience in Europe with 
environmental valuation and suggest that there are large differences across 
Europe in people's preferences towards environmental protection.  This is 
due in part to differences in income levels and environmental conditions. 
Differences in people's environmental prefer,~nces and valuations due to 
these factors would not affect the efficiency and effectiveness of 
environmental liability systems.  One potential advantage of an 
environmental liability system is that it could provide a mechanism for 
raising environmental standards in those locations where the individuals 
concerned are most concerned about the environmental . 
However, the differences across Europe in people's preferences and 
valuations are also fundamentally due to differences in the availability of 
information on the state of the environment and their knowledge and 
perceptions of the environmental.  Therefore better information on 
environmental conditions is needed.  Differences in individual's knowledge 
and perception mean that an environmental liability system based on civil 
liability would lead to  gr~ater clean up and pollution prevention in countries 
where the individuals are more aware of the  and also where the individuals 
(or the environmental groups) are more likely to take legal action.  These 
countries are likely to be those with already higher environmental standards 
(eg Germany, UK).  Hence there is unlikely to be an ·even application of 
environmental liability systems across Europe, especially if there are 
differences in the acceptance of valuation techniques across Europe (see 
below). 
(I) Arrow, K Solow, R,  Portney, P R Leamer, E,E, Radner, R, Schuman, H, (1993).  Report of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration Panel on Contingent Valuation.  Resources for the Future, Washington DC. 
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I Table 2.1a  Valuation  Techniques for Specific Environmental Damage Costs 
Receptor  Type  of Damage  Possible Valuation Technique  Example  Adequacy 
Human health  Mortality impacts  Dose response functions plus:  Health Costs  of Particulate  Dose response relationships for 
Matter,  Pearce  and  some pollutants  (PM1o.  NO,.,S01 
standard value  of statistical life  Crowards  (1996).  and  Lead),  but great 
estimates- ie WTP to reduce  uncertainties for other 
risk faced  by i1divlduals  Health  Costs  of SOz.  NO,.,  pollutants(  CO,  dioxins,  VOCs, 
and Particulates,  Landrieu  Ozone); 
medical costs of treatmert  (1995).  chronic effects of pollutants 
paid by rest of society  much less understood than 
acute effects; 
some forgone  output and  Wdl courts  accept economic 
productivity  values of life? 
Morbidity impacts:  Dose response functions plus:  Health Costs of Particulate  As  above 
Matter,  Pearce  and 
Crowards (1996) 
Surveys of ildividuals' WTP to  Uncertainties  and disputes over 
avofd morbidity  estimates,  or  survey methodology  and 
medical treatment costs.  findings;  costs  of surveys 
Buildings  Material  Analysis  of incremental  Benefit of  Reducing 502  Fairty  well established;  need 
replacemenVrestoration  replacemenVrepainting costs  emissions,  ECOTEC  (1994).  inventory  of materials  affected; 
costs  lllcertainties about dose 
response  relationships for 
specific poUutants 
Loss  of historic  WTP  surveys  Durham Cathedral  Study,  Uncertainties  and disputes over 
buildings  Willis  (1994)  survey methodology  and 
findings~ costs  of survey 
Travel costs  methods  Problems of interpreting resutts. 
Agricutture  Loss of crop  output  Dose response relationships  Effect of Ozone  on Wheat,  Fairty  weU  established; 
plus marl<et value  of loss  Brown  et al.,  (  1996).  Uncertainties  about dose 
output  response relationships  and 
specific effects  of pollutants 
Industry/commerce  loss of tourist profits  Changes  in tourism profits  Costs  of Amoco  Cadiz  oil  Lack  of  data on tourism (visitor 
spill  (Bonnieux and  Rainelli  numbers and profits)  so that 
( 1991, 1993)  surrogate indicators needed 
(bread consumption): 
Problems  of determining 
baseline  of position in  absence 
of oil  spill. 
Increased industrial  Estimates  of extra costs  Determining extent  extra  costs 
costs  (eg  water  (market based techniques)  due to pollution; 
treatment,  repair  of  Defmition of extra  costs -
buildings)  whether just incremental 
expenditures  or  short or long 
run marginal  costs  of additional 
resources  used. 
land  Costs  of treating  Estimate  of costs  of  Costs  of treating  Definition of standard for 
contaminated  soil  techniques  contaminated  sites  (Carrera  treatment  (?use  of  cost-
and  Robertiello  (1993))  effective and fitness for use 
criteria); 
Variations in  definition  of  sites 
needing treatment; 
lack of  consistent  data on  sites 
and their costs. 
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Contamination of  WTP  surveys  Nitrate Pollution,  Hanley  Usual concerns over  CVM 
aquifers  1989.  appDes. 
Milan study,  Press  1995. 
Costs of treating aquifer or 
alternative waler supply source  Cambridge Water Co vs  No dispute  over level of claim 
Eastern Counties leather  and estimate  costs of 
remedying contaminated  aquifer 
Study f6r Chemical  Whether alternative more cost-
Manufacturers Association  effective options  are  available 
of cost-effectiveness  of  (eg alternative suppUes); 
treating Superfund sites  determination of the  opportunity 
costs of these supplies. 
Forests  loss of revenue  and  Dose  response relationships,  Damage to Forests in  Fairty  wea  established; 
extra costs from  plus valuation by  Market  Europe  IU problem of determining 
deterioration in tree  based studies of eXIra costs  baseline  of costs and profits 
growth  due to  air  and foregone profits  without air poUution; 
poUution  long lags before poUutants 
affect trees:  disputes about 
dose response relationships. 
Reduced  recreational  Surveys of vislors' views on  Recreational Value  of  See  above for surveys  re 
benefits  impacts  and WTP to prevent  Forests,  Willis  and Benson  historic buildings 
them  (1991) 
Travel cost methods  Ditto 
Hedonic Property  Price  Garrod and Willis  (1991) 
Method  Merlo  and Signorelli  (1990) 
Costs  of remedying  damage  Fairty  easy to  estimate;  but 
(eg  replant trees)  or recreating  possible  disputes  about 
a forest  or habitat elsewhere  whether costs reasonable  and 
most cost-effective  options; 
Are replaced trees  an  adequate 
substitute? 
lack of baseline  data on original 
conditions  of forest 
Non-user and  option  Surveys of general population  Norfolk Forest  (forthcoming)  See  above for surveys of 
value  benef~s  Bateman.  historic buildings; 
Fishing industry  lost yieldS/catch  and  Market based studies  ECOTEC  (1994).  Fairty  straight forward,  but 
extra  costs  problems  of determining 
baseline  position  w~out 
pollution; 
Problem  of previous position  of 
overfishing 
Water  supply  Extra water treatment  Estimates of extra costs  Fairty  straightforward 
costs 
Natural  hab~ats and  loss of biodiversity  WTP  survey  MacMillan et  al.,  1994.  See  above for surveys  re 
biodiversity  loss  from  acid  deposition  historic  buildings 
Costs  of remedying  Costs  of restocking rtver;  Section  16·  of Water  NRA's  guidance facilitates  cost 
damage  to water  Costs  of remedial operations  Resources Act in  UK;  recovery;  but 
courses from  water  NRA's guidance  on  lack of baseline  data on 
pollution incident  standard castings  environmental  conditions  before 
pollution incident; 
disputes about mortality rates 
for restocked fish  and number 
of new fish  needed 
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Residual damage that 
camot be restored 
Option values  and non-
users' values 
loss of Tourism and 
user benefits 
Possible Valuation Tectvlique  Example 
Surveys of userstvislors to 
natural habitats 
Economic impacts on tourism  Impacts of Amoco  Cadiz 
(BOMieux and  Rainnem 
(1991) 
Surveys  of users 
Adequacy 
Definition of residual  damage; 
problems with surveys even 
more marked due to intangible 
nature  of damage to 
irreplaceable  assets; 
increasing importance of 
damage  due to risilg pressures 
on natural habitats and 
increasing public concern 
Ditto;  plus problems of defining 
sample 
Oitficulties of defllling basetine 
of tourism levels  in  absence of 
envirorvnental impacts; 
how allow for changes in 
quality as  weU  as number of 
vistts 
See  above for problems  of 
surveys,  especially how users 
perceive the  environmental 
damage 
Footnote:  WTP  = what  individuals  are  willing  to  pay  to  secure  or  prevent  an  envirorvnental  change  • WTP  usually  estimated  by  surveys  of 
individuals. 
CVM  =  Contingent valuation method for valuing the  envirorvnental  good 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Valuation techniques have been much less extensively applied in Europe 
than is the case in the USA  (1).  Experience with applying valuation 
techniques is currently more limited in Europe, especially in Cohesion 
countries, although some valuation studies have been carried out over the 
last few years in Spain and Portugal 
There is a lack of scientific and economic data in Europe concerning 
emissions levels, ambient environmental conditions, scientific dose response 
relationships and the economic valuation of (marginal) changes in the levels 
of these impacts.  CORINE provides data on air emissions C 2>,  but there is a 
lack of consistent data on water pollution, wastes and contaminated sites. 
A number of valuation studies have been carried out in Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden, UK and France on, for example, the impacts of air 
pollutants such as S02 on human health, forests, agriculture and buildings. 
Most of this work has built on scientific analysis of dose response 
relationships.  Many of the ~xisting studies have applied market based 
techniques such as estimates of additional costs of repairing damage to 
buildings. 
Interest and application of contingent valuation methods has occurred later 
in Europe than in the US, but the number of CVM studies has increased 
significantly over the last few years - mostly in the UK, Norway and Sweden 
although some CVM studies are now being carried out in Central and 
Southern Europe.  More than 200 valuations of environmental  in Europe 
have been carried out using contingent valuation, travel costs or hedonic 
pricing valuation techriiques. 
There are some differences between European countries as to the extent to 
which the various valuation techniques have been applied.  Valuation 
techniques, especially contingent valuation studies, have been more 
extensively applied in the UK, Norway, Sweden and Finland than in 
Germany and the Netherlands.  Few valuation studies have been carried out 
in Southern European countries.  These differences are largely due to the 
lack of expertise in the latter group of countries to carry out valuation 
studies. 
In Germany and the Netherlands, there have been studies of type I 
environmental damage costs based on dose response relationships and 
market based valuation of the resulting physical impacts in terms of output 
(ll For a review of valuation studies in Europe see: 
Georgiou, S (1994),  UK Studies of the Economic Valuation of Environmental Impacts.  Review prepared for the 
Department of the Environment. 
Navrud, S,  Pruckner, G J (1996) Environaental Valuation ·To use or not to use?  A comparative study of the United 
Sbtn and Europe.  Forthcoming in Environmental and Resources Economics. 
Navrud, S (ed) (1992) Pricing the Ewopun Environ•enl  Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Merlo, M,  Della Puppa, F, (1994), Public Benefit Valuation in Italy.  A ftview of forestry and farming applications.  In 
Budgaard, A. Bateman, l, Merlo, M,  (eds) Identification and Valuation of Public Benefits from  Farming and Countryside 
Stewardship. 
For a review of contingent valuation studies see: 
Carson N,  Wright R I  J,  Alberini A,  Flores N, (1995): A bibliography of Contingent Valuation Studies and Papers. 
Natural Resource Damage Assessment Inc. 
(2)  Eurostat (1995) Europe's Environment: Statistical Compendium for the Dobris Assessment 
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damaged assets rather than use of the more uncertain and controversial 
consumer survey techniques such as contingent valuation methods (CVM). 
Greater application of valuation techniques in European countries would be 
needed to develop the greater experience and data needed to underpin an 
environmental liability system. 
The European Community's Fifth Environmental Action Programme  <t> 
recommends that a community cost-benefit methodology should be drawn 
up for application to all projects and policies with an environmental 
dimension.  There are differences in Member States' current practices and 
expertise regarding the alternative valuation techniques.  Adoption of best 
practice appears necessary to achieve a consistent application of the 
techniques across member states.  However, under the prevailing situation it 
would probably not be effective to require simply the adoption of best. 
practice.  · 
Therefore as a first step it appears fruitful to encourtzge the adoption of best 
practice by collating and sharing available experience on the application of 
valuation techniques .in European countries, developing and promulgating 
guidelines for the performance of valuation studies and  promoting the 
development of expertise to carry out such studies (eg training and technical 
and financial assistance). 
2.1.4  Application of Valuation Techniques in Environmental Liability. Cases 
US  Experience 
Valuation techniques have for many years been much more extensively 
applied in the US  than in Europe.  The greater expertise in tJ::te  US is related 
to the greater interest in environmental valuation in the US.  Thus Executive 
order 12291  of 1981, for example, required that a formal regulatory impact 
analysis be carried out of the costs and benefits of policies or regulations 
imposing significant costs. 
Interest and experience in valuing environmental in1pacts in the US  has been 
increased by the passage of CERCLA.  More importantly, in tandem with the 
implementation of CERCLA, considerable efforts  wE~re made in the US to 
develop and promulgate best practice guidance on valuation methodologies. 
This included the work of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA)<
1>.  A specific Government Department- the 
Department of Interior - was responsible for promoting the assessment of 
environmental damage costs and promulgating regulations for the 
assessment of natural resource  under CERCLA. 
The US Department of Interior expressed a preference for use of market 
prices to value the losses or, where market prices a:re not appropriate, then 
to use the uniform appraisal methodology used for federal land acquisition. 
Only for those types of environmental damage costs such as non-use and 
option values, then contingent valuation methods (CVM) should be applied. 
(I) European Commission (1993) Towards Susuinability: A European Community Programme of Policy and Action ia 
Rt-lation to the Environment and Susuinable Ot-vt-lopmenl 
ERM  EcONOMICS  EcoNOMICS OF  LiABILITY: EC  DG XI 
35 2.1.5 
The DOl's hierarchy of techniques led to a dispute as to the suitability of 
CVM. 
Consequently a panel headed by Professors Arrow and Solow was set up to 
advise NOAA on the use of CVM.  This panel concluded that CVM studies 
can produce estimates reliable enough to be the starting point of a judicial 
process of damage assessment (1).  The Panel drew up guidelines for 
carrying out reliable CVM studies that should be followed as closely as 
possible. 
NOAA published in January 1994 proposed regulations on natural resource 
damage assessment < 2>,  which reiterate the Panel's recommendations, but 
also proposed that the willingness to pay estimates from a CVM should be 
reduced by 50%  because the hypothetical WTP estimates reported by CVM 
surveys overstate what individuals would actually be willing to pay in 
practice.  NOAA is still seeking comments on this proposal.  · 
Existing Liability Cases 
Recent environmental liability cases have revealed substantial differences 
between the damage costs estimates made· by the plaintiffs and those by the 
defendants.  The size of these differences gives each party a strong incentive 
to carry out their own damage valuations and scrutinise those of the other 
parties, which can ent~  significant transaction costs. 
The differences in the valuations were largely due to differences in the 
assumptions used in the analysis rather than disagreements regarding the 
basic v~uation techniques and methodologies. 
Conclusions 
Implementing an effective and efficient environmental liability system would 
expose the techniques used for valuing environmental  to considerable 
scrutiny.  This scrutiny is much more demanding than occurs in general 
environmental policy making since actual financial payments are at stake in 
the liability cases. 
The existing liability cases reveal wide divergences between the damage 
valuations made by the opposing parties.  These are due to differences in the 
assumptions made in estimating the costs (eg whether the most cost-effective 
remediation option has been casted).  Such assumptions often have to be 
made due to the lack of data on the appropriate variables such as baseline 
economic and environmental conditions. 
The difficulties surrounding the valuation of environmental damage costs are 
particularly marked in respect of: 
•  chronic pollutants (eg gradual releases of toxic air or water pollutants);· 
•  ecological damage and other intangible environmental damage; 
(I) Arrow, K Solow, R,  Portney, P R,  Leamer, E,E,  Radner, R,  Schuman, H, (1993).  Report of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration Panel on Contingent Valuation.  58  Federal Register, 4601-4614. 
(2)  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (1994)  Notice of Proposed Rule-Making: Natural Resource Damage 
Assessments.  59  Federal Register 1062, January 7 1994. 
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The -following types of environmental  have the greatest potential of being 
able to be valued:· 
•  acute pollution incidents such as water pollution accidents, rather than 
chronic pollution; 
•  expenditures resulting from the environmental damage (eg costs of 
replacing or repainting damaged assets); 
•  costs of restoring ecological assets damaged by the pollution incidents (  eg 
restocking a river after a fish kill as in Section 161  of the Water Resources 
Act in the UK). 
In the last case, the techniques do not measure the value of the damaged 
asset.  Moreover, if this approach is used, it  raises issues concerning .the 
definition of the standard to which the damaged asset should be restored 
since restoration of the damaged asset to its natural state may not be 
worthwhile and could entail high costs. 
Current experience with the practical application of valuation techniques in 
European countries is more limited than that in the USA, where CERCLA 
was introduced in tandem with great efforts to promulgate best practice 
regarding valuation techniques and where the implementation of CERCLA 
has led to an increased use of techniques to value the environmental 
impacts. 
It is unlikely that an efficient environmental liability system in Europe, and 
the sufficiently reliable valuations that it requires, could rely on the current 
experience with valuation techniques in Europe.  Disputes concerning the 
valuations could result in considerable transaction costs being inC1.rrred by 
each party. 
The uncertainties concerning the valuation of environmental liabilities are a 
barrier to the effective and efficient development at present of an 
environmental liability system.  Due to these uncertainties, firms, insurers 
and banks would be unlikely to undertake an efficient level of prevention 
measures under an environmental liability system.  Partly due to these 
uncertainties, insurers are not currently willing to provide insurance cover 
for ecological damage. 
There are some differences in the extent and manner in which 
environmental valuation techniques are currently applied in practice in EU 
countries.  Such differences could limit the extent to which an environmental 
liability system could be evenly applied throughout the EU.  In some 
countries (eg Germany and the Netherlands), market based valuation 
techniques are applied.  Annex C indicates that such valuation techniques 
could only cover about one third of the total environmental damage costs. 
Contingent valuation methods to value the other more intangible 
environmental  (eg loss of recreation and non-user benefits) raise 
considerable  unce~tainties and methodological and empirical difficulties. 
They are less accepted and are less extensively applied in some European 
countries (eg Germany, the Netherlands) than in others (eg UK). 
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2.2.1 
Increased use of valuation techniques in European countries is needed to 
develop the greater experience with environmental valuation t~chniques and 
data needed to underpin an environmental liability system.  · 
Developing a common approach to environmental valuations would seem 
worthwhile given the advances in the theory and practice of valuing 
environmental damage costs in the last decade, although it does raise issues 
concerning the differences in views within and between Member States 
regarding the appropriateness of alternative valuation techniques. 
For all the difficulties, though, an even application of an environmental 
liability system in the EU does require the development of common 
guidelines for the assessment of environmental damage and the applicability 
of the different techniques in their appropriate circumstances < 1>. 
Therefore it would appear fruitful to encourage the adoption of best practice 
by: 
•  collating and sharing available experience on the application of valuation 
techniques in European countries and elsewhere; 
•  developing  and promulgating a framework for the assessment of 
environmental damage costs with guidelines for the applicability of 
different valuation techniques in their appropriate contexts; and 
•  promoting the development of expertise to carry out such studies (eg 
training and technical and financial assistance). 
COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
In troduc:tion 
This section reviews the available information and uncertainties about the 
level of environmental damage costs in a selected EU country in order to 
indicate the scale of these environmental damage costs as compared with 
GOP and the level of existing pollution control expenditures, and also to 
highlight differences in pollution levels and hence possibly environmental 
damage costs between EU countries. 
2.2.2  Main Categories of Environmental Damage Costs 
Approach 
Our original intention was to prepare a complete set of environmental 
damage costs for all EU countries.  However, consistent data on 
environmental damage costs do not exist for all EU countries.  Consequently, 
an investigation was made of one EU country- th~ former West Germany-
for which some environmental damage cost data could be obtained.  These 
data are presented in Annex C. 
(I) This appears to be worthwhile for other reasons such as the promotion of efficient environmental protection and 
financial reporting. 
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• Table 2.2a  Environmental Damage Costs in (/Oi'm~~) West Germany for Each kfedium 
Medium  % of GOP  Accidents as % of  Accidents as % of total 
damage costs for  environmental damage 
medium  costs 
Air  0.8- 1.0  5%  I% 
Noise  1.0  0%  0% 
Soil  0.4- 0.7  30%  3-6% 
Water  0.4  30%  4-5% 
Wastes  0.3- 0.7  0%  0% 
Others (excluding global  >0.1  0%  0% 
damage) 
Total  >3.0- 3.9  N/A  8- 12% 
Note:  N/  A =  Not available 
Source:  Annex C; and estimates from insurance brokers in Germany on proportion of 
environmental claims accounted for by accidents. 
Table 2.2a summarises the cost estimates from the review of cost data in the 
former West Germany.  The review of the data highlighted the uncertainties, 
gaps and inconsistencies in the available cost estimates.  For example, 
estimates were not available for ecological damage nor for environmental 
damage costs caused by waste disposal.  We have assumed that the latter 
amount to about 0.3-0.7%  of GDP, on the grounds that they are likely to be 
of a similar order of magnitude to the costs for contaminated soil and water. 
Schulz (t) {1986) estimated that environmental damage costs in the former 
West Germany amounted to about 6%  of GDP in 1986.  Wicke {1993)  <
2
> 
updated Schulz's results to allow for the reduction in air pollution emissions 
since 1986 due to recent pollution controls.  The updated results suggest that 
environmental damage costs in the former West Germany amount to about 
133 bn DM {1992 prices) which represents 4.7%  of GDP. 
It is  difficult to reconcile the estimates from the different studies due to, 
amongst other things, differences in their definitions, assumptions and 
coverage.  Wicke's estimates differ from the figures given in Table 2.2a and 
Annex C because Wicke has applied different valuation techniques to cover 
more types of environmental damage.  In particular, Wicke has included the 
costs of environmental protection measures at waste disposal sites {16.8- 33.6 
bn DM), the costs of incinerating sewage sludge and the costs to agriculture 
of ground water protection and controls on the use of treated sewage sludge 
and manure and the costs of C02 control to prevent global pollution.  These 
were excluded from Table 2.2a and Annex Con the grounds that they 
represent the existing costs of pollution controls rather than the costs of 
environmental damage. 
(I) Schulz W (1986)  A survey on the Status of Research concerning the Valuation of Benefits of Environmental Policy 
in the Federal Republic of Germany.  Paper presented at an OECD workshop in Avignon. 
< 2> Wicke, L.  (1993)  Umweltokonomie, Munchen 1993 
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environmental damage costs are significant in relation to GDP.  The damage 
costs are larger than the total private and public current expenditures on 
pollution control measures, which amount to about 1.5%  of GDP. 
Consequently, if the environmental damage costs were fully internalised 
(through an environmental liability system or pollution charges), then this 
would significantly increase the financial costs to industry of environmental 
policies. 
The differences between Wicke's estimates and those shown in Table 2.2a 
highlight the limitations and uncertainties surrounding the available 
estimates and the possible wide range of damage cost estimates. 
Table C1  (in Annex C) also highlights the wide range of the cost estimates 
given by different studies for individual damage components.  For example, 
the estimates for costs of foregone recreation benefits due to forest damage 
caused by air pollutants vary by almost a factor of two.  The estimates for 
the costs of restoring contaminated sites and the costs of contaminated 
aquifers vary by a factor of more than two.  This variation in the available 
estimates is due to differences in the scope of pollutants and environmental 
covered, differences in the valuation methodologies and assumptions for key 
variables (eg stock at risk, dose response relationships, value of the ) and 
how the specific studies have been extrapolated to give nationwide estimates. 
The estimates for the costs of restoring contaminated sites depend on 
estimates of the number of sites requiring clean up, the standard to which 
these sites have to be restored and the time period over which the 
programme for restoring the contaminated sites will be carried out - the 
figures in Annex C assume a ten year programme. 
Moreover, there are considerable uncertainties and gaps concerning the 
available damage cost estimates. 
Annex C distinguishes between two types of environmental damage costs in 
respect of the extent of techniques that have been commonly applied for 
valuing the different types of environmental damage costs.  These are 
defined as follows: 
•  Type I are the environmental damage costs that have been valued using 
estimates of restoration costs or defensive expenditures or values of 
marketable outputs where the changes in the outputs have been 
estimated from, for example, dose response relationships. 
•  Type II  are the environmental damage costs that have been valued by 
other techniques such as consumer surveys and contingent valuation 
methods.  These techniques are more subjective and are subject to greater 
uncertainties than the type I environmental damage costs.  There are also 
greater gaps in the available data for type II  environmental damage costs. 
The type I damage costs represent a small fraction of the total environmental 
damage costs.  Annex C indicates that the less uncertain type I damage cost 
estimates amount to about one third of the available estimates of total 
environmental damage costs, although even for these damage types 
considerable uncertainties exist.·  Allowing for the omitted environmental 
damage costs not included in Annex C,  the type I damage costs probably less 
than one third of the total environmental damage costs. 
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These type I dam~ge cost estimates include the following types of damage: 
•  air pollution damage to human health, buildings, forests, the timber 
industry and. the fishing industry; 
•  costs of restoring contaminated soil.(l); 
•  impacts of contaminated soil on groundwater (eg increased water 
treatment or extra costs of alternative supplies); 
•  impacts of water pollutants on water supply (eg increased water treatment 
or extra costs of alternative supplies); 
•  impacts of mining on agricultural land and outputs and subsidence 
damage to buildings. 
Extrapolation of data on environmental compensation claims from insurance 
brokers in Germany indicates that accidents account for about 30%  of total 
soil contamination and water pollution and about 5%  of air pollution cases. 
Hence, accidents account for about 10%  of the total environmental damage 
costs (see Table 2.2J2).  Gradual and ongoing pollution accounts for the 
remaining 90%  of environmental damage costs. 
Future Environmental Damage Costs 
Table 2.2b presents some .approximate estimates of possible trends in the 
various categories of environmental dam~ge costs in the former West 
Germany.  The assessments of likely future trends for each category of 
environmental damage costs (in the third column of Table 2.2b)  are based on 
the emissions projections by DRI < 2>.  This analysis assumes that 
environmental damage cost unit values will rise in line with GDP growth. 
(I) This category is not actually an environmental damage cost, but rather an estimate of the costs likely to be needed to 
clean up contaminated sites in Germany. 
(2) DRI  (1994) Potential ~nefits of Integration of EnvironmentAl and Economic Policies: Report prepared for the 
European Commission. 
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for Each Medium 
Medium  Damage costs in 1992  Likely Future Trends  Assumed Approximate 
{%of GOP)  in Pollution  Damage Costs in 2010 
{%of GOP) 
Air  0.8-1.0  growth  1.0- 1.2 
Noise  1.0  N/A  N/A 
Soil  0.4-0.7  decline  0.2-0.4 
Water  0.4  decline  0.3 
Wastes  0.3- 0.7  growth  0.6- 1.0 
Others  >0.1  growth  0.2 
Total  >3- 3.9  N/A 
Note:  N/A =Not Available 
Source:  Table 2.2a.  Estimates of future changes in pollution emissions for each medium 
are derived from  the business as usual {reference) emissions projections given in: DRI  {1994) 
Potential Benefits of Integration of EnviJOnmental and Economic Policies {Report prepared 
for the European Commission).  Estimates of assumed damage costs in 2010 are ERM's 
judgements based on DRI's projections for likely future trends in emissions. 
The costs of restoring contaminated sites largely relate to cleaning up the 
backlog of sites contaminated by pollution generated by past industrial 
activity.  The present estimates assume that this backlog of sites will be 
cleaned up over the ten year period (1990 - 2000).  Looking to the future (ie 
2000- 2010), these costs should fall  to less than half of the present estimates 
because existing pollution c-ontrol regulations are leading firms  to implement. 
pollution prevention measures which will reduce the extent to which new 
contaminated sites are generated. 
A recent study for the European Environment Agency (t) concluded that 
the priority environmental problems that are likely to increase in the near 
future (up to 201 0) include: 
•  climate change; 
•  photochemical oxidants (mainly from increasing transport emissions); 
•  deterioration of natural habitats and biodiversity due, in part, to pressures 
from transport projects and tourism; 
•  contamination of groundwater (eg by nitrates) 
•  water pollution from industry; 
•  generation and disposal of hazardous waste; 
•  chronic effects of air pollutants, especially from transport; 
•  urban environment pollution; 
•  environmental impacts from accidents and accidental releases; 
•  conservation and protection of biodiversity. 
(I) European Environmt>nl Agt>ncy (1995)  Environment in the EW"Opean  Union 1995: Report for the Review of the Fifth 
EnvironmenW Action Programme. 
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climate change, are caused by many emissions sources, including transport. 
Similarly, noise pollution is caused by many diffuse sources.  Some water 
pollution is caused by diffuse sources (  eg agriculture). 
Increasing importance is likely to be attached to  natural habitats due to their 
increasing scarcity and the rising values consumers attach to natural habitats 
as incomes rise.  However, there are considerable uncertainties concerning 
their valuation. 
The proportion and level of environmental  for which type n  valuation 
techniques are needed is likely to rise in the future.  Consequently, the 
uncertainties concerning the values of the environmental  (  eg impacts on 
natural habitats) are likely to rise in the future.  There are also considerable 
uncertainties surrounding the chronic effects of low levels of air and· water 
pollutants emitted over a long period, about which there is increasing 
concern. 
2.2.3  Differences Between Countries' Pollution Levels 
The lack of data is even more marked in other European countries.  This 
reflects the limited extent to which valuations of environmental damage costs 
have currently been made.  Moreover, there are considerable difficulties in 
comparing the estimates of environmental damage costs that are available for 
different countries since they are based on different methodologies and 
assumptions. 
Due to these problems of compiling consistent and comparable estimates of 
environmental damage costs across the various EU countries, Tables 2.2c 
and 2.2d compare Eurostat (t) estimates for the relative emissions of three 
major air pollutants from stationary sources, and the level of industrial solid 
waste generated in 1990 as a proportion of manufacturing output, for various 
European countries to highlight potential differences in countries' pollution 
levels and hence pollution damage costs.  S02 was selected because it 
contributes to acid deposition.  NOx plays an important role in the formation 
of photochemical oxidants and contribute to acid deposition.  Both S02 and 
NOx emissions come mainly from electricity generation, while NOx emissions 
come from electricity generation and industrial processes and from transport 
and VOCs are emitted by a wide range of industrial processes and by 
vehicles.  Therefore these three air pollutants and the generation of solid 
wastes by industries cover a wide range of the main sources of the major 
environmental problems in Member States. 
Tables 2.2c and 2.2d show that there are considerable variations in relative 
pollution levels between european countries.  It indicates the relatively high 
pollution emissions in the UK, Italy and Netherlands.  However, it should be 
noted that the Eurostat estimates for 1990 do not allow for the recent 
pollution control measures, such as integrated pollution control in the UK, 
which could be expected to lead to reductions in emissions and damage 
costs. 
(I) The data on emissions are taken from  Eurostat (1995)  Europe's Environment: Sutistical Compendium for the Dobris 
Assessment  They are based on submissions to the Corinair 1990 inventory project. 
ERM  EcONOMICS  EcoNOMICS OF  l.v.BtUIY: EC  DG  XI 
43 Table 2.2c 
Table 2.2d 
Estimates of Relative Air Pollution Levels in 1990 in Various European 
Countries (Emissions Per Unit of Industrial Output - 1000 t/bn ECU) 
Country  sol  Indexed  NO.  Indexed  VOCs  Indexed 
(Emissions Per  to  (Emissions Per  to  (Emissions  to 
Unit of  Gennany  Unit of  Germany  Per Unit of  Germany 
Industrial  Industrial  Industrial 
Output- Output- Output-
1  OOOtlbn  ECU)  1000t/bn ECU)  1000t/bnECU) 
France  4.2  0.5  1.5  .  0.9  4  1.5 
Germany  7.9  1  1.6  1  265  1 
Italy  5.3  0.7  29  1.8  4.5  1.7 
Netherlands  26  0.8  3.7  22  3.8  1.4 
Spain  15.6  2  3.7  2.2  4.7  1.8 
UK  15.4  1.9  5.2  3.1  6.7  2.5 
Source:  Eurostat (1995), Europe's Environment: Statistical Compendium 
Estimates of Relative Industrial Waste Generation Levels in Various 
Countries 
Country 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
UK 
Manufacturing Solid Waste  Indexed to GelllWly 
Output Intensity (lOOOt per 
bn ECU) 
247  1.5 
162 
179 
179 
158 
351 
1 
1.1 
1.1 
0.9 
2.2 
Source:  Eurostat (1995), Europe's Environment: Statistical Compendium 
Conclusion 
Tables  2.2c and 2.2d indicate that the relative pollution levels in different 
Member States vary by about a factor of 1 to 3.1  for the specific air pollutant<; 
and solid wastes examined.  Taking the various pollutants broadly together 
would suggest that relative pollution levels in different Member States might 
vary by a factor of about one to two <t>.  Applying these relative  ~Pollution 
indices to the estimates given for total environmental damage costs in 
Germany indicates that environmental damage costs across EU countries 
could vary within a range of between four and at least seven % of GDP. 
Environmental dama~e costs are likely to be even higher for Eastern 
European countries. ( > 
(I) The data in Tables 22c and 22d may in fact  underestimate these differences since they include emissions for both the 
former East and West Germany.  The relative pollution levels for just West Germany might be even lower than those 
given in Tables  22c and 22d 
(2) Wicke (1993) estimates that environmental damage costs for the former East Germany  are substantially higher (as a % 
of GOP) than those for the former West Germany. 
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2.3.1 
2.3.2 
2.3.3 
I 
CosTS OF POLLlii'ION CONTROL 
Introduction 
This section presents estimates of expenditures on existing pollution controls 
in European countries in order to identify whether there are divergences 
between industries' existing expenditures on pollution control in different 
Member States which might negatively affect the conditions of competition 
in the EU, and to indicate how the estimates of environmental damage costs 
(presented in Section 2.2) compare with industries' existing expenditures on 
pollution control. 
Data Sources 
The analysis is based on data collated by ERECO for DG  XI of the European 
Commission <
1
> < 2
> <
3>.  It is acknowledged that this study is subject to a 
number of important limitations regarding the availability of data and the 
approximate nature of some estimates especially on industries' expenditures 
in some countries (  eg Spain, Greece, Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg). 
Nevertheless, this major study did collate the best available statistics in as 
consistent a manner as possible.  · 
Analysis of  Data on Total Expenditures on Pollution Control 
Table 2.3a presents data on total public sector and private sector expenditures 
on environmental protection measures.  This shows that these expenditure 
levels range from between 1.5%  of GDP in Germany and UK to 0.5%  of GDP 
in the cases of Portugal and Greece < 4>.  The divergence is even more 
marked - up to a factor of 8 to 9 - when the expenditures are considered on 
a per capita basis and when expenditures are divided by an environmental 
pressure indicator that allows for the relative industrial structures and levels 
of output of polluting activities in the various countries.  Thus Germany, 
France, UK, Denmark and the Netherlands spend much more per unit of 
polluting output th~n Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Italy. 
Water pollution control accounts for the largest share of environmental 
expenditures (largely due to expenditures on sewage treatment plants) 
followed by waste management and air pollution control.  · 
(I) ERECO (1993) EnvironmenW Expenditures in the E1U0pcan Community, Final report prepared for DG  XI  of the 
Europan Commission 
(1) The findings of this study were cross checked with estimates from  other studies (eg OECD) and the finn 
investigations carried out for this study.  However, it is difficult to compare results from  different studies for different 
countries due to differences in coverage, definition, methodology and assumptions.  Consequently the comparative 
analysis focuses on the ERECO study since this is the most consistent data available. 
(3)  Definitions.  The ERECO study covered industries' current and capital expenditures on end of pipe techniques for 
waste management, air and water pollution control.  The estimates do not include industries' expenditures on process 
changes and pollution prevention measures that are integrated in firms' investments (eg clean technologies) because of 
the difficulties of identifying the portion of these expenditures that an be allocated to pollution control purposes and 
the problems of obtaining reliable and consistent estimates of these expenditures in the various European countries.  The 
estimates are presented for 1992 (the latest year in which the best available estimates are produced for the various 
European countries), and in ECU at 1992 prices.  ' 
(•l OECD (1993) shows a similar picture for UK, Germany, France, Netherlands and Portugal. 
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2.3.4 
Total Environmental Expenditures in EU12 in 1992(1) 
%Breakdown by Media  rrotal Environmental 
~penditures 
Total 
ECU 
(bill) 
~astes  Air  ~ater 
Belgium/  1.2  40 
Luxembourg 
Denmark  1.2  33 
Germany  20.5  24 
Greece  0.3  22 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
3.9  35 
12.9  34 
0.3  52 
6.8  47 
Netherlands  3.5  33 
Portugal  0.3  30 
UK  124  35 
Total EU12  63.3  33 
17  30 
10  53 
23  50 
2  72 
2  46 
8  54 
11  33 
4  47 
13  43 
4  52 
12  46 
13  49 
[;foise 
5 
I 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
4 
1 
3 
2 
Nature  % of  Per 
Protection  GOP  cap. 
{3) 
Per env 
pressure 
Indicator <
4> 
8 
3 
1 
3 
16 
2 
1 
1 
7 
13 
4 
3 
0.7  120  42 
1.1  225  112 
1.5  255  139 
0.5  29  16 
0.8  100  63 
1.3  226  128 
0.7  73  36 
0.7  119  63 
1.4  232  108 
0.5  34  20 
1.5  214  115 
1.2  183  100 
(I)  Total public ~d  private sector {industry) expenditures on environmental protection 
excluding R & D, water supply management, environmental improvement schemes (eg in 
urban areas), household expenditures, renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
(2)  Waste water collection and treatment; excludes protection of aquifers for certain countries. 
{3)  Definitions vary between countries; care needed in interprefu:tg data. 
<4l  This environmental pressure indicator reflects the environmental pressures caused by the 
relative industrial structures and output of polluting industries in the different countries  .. 
Source: ERECO {1993)  EnvironmenW Expenditures in the European Community.  Final 
report prepared for DG XI  of the European Commission. 
Analysis of Data on Industries' Expenditures on Pollution Control 
This section focuses on industries' existing expenditures on pollution controls 
so as to indicate whether any differences in industries' expenditures on 
pollution controls might affect the competitiveness of industries in the EU. 
Table 2.3b indicates that industries' total capital and current expenditures on 
pollution control are substantially higher in certain European countries (eg 
Germany, Netherlands and France) than others (eg Spain, Greece and 
Ireland).  The estimates are particularly poor for the latter group of countries. 
Nevertheless, even allowing for the data limitations, this still suggests that 
there is an uneven playing field between various European countries in 
respect of their present pollution control expenditures and measures. 
Table 2.3b indicates that industries' current and capital expenditures on waste 
management, air and water pollution control range from between 0.2%  (for 
Greece and Ireland  to about 2.5% for Germany.  The 12-15 fold  difference in 
industries' expenditures in Germany compared with Greece and Ireland is 
greater than the difference for total public and private expenditures. 
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firms' expenditures on pollution control account for bf"!r·reen 0.6- 4%  of 
turnover. 
Water pollution control accounts for the largest share (at about 45%) of 
industries' total expenditures.  This is partly accounted for by the high level 
of industries' expenditures on water pollution control in the UK, which 
includes expenditures by the privatised water companies.  Air pollution 
control accounts for the next largest share (at about 30%) followed by waste 
management (at about 25% ).  Noise control accounts for about 3/~ of 
industries' total expenditures.  Industries' expenditures on air pollution 
control are particularly high in Germany. 
2.3.5  Sectors' Expenditures 
Table 2.3c reports OECD CI)  data on the allocation of the pollution control 
expenditures between various specific industries for Germany, Netherlands, 
Austria and the UK.  This shows that the chemicals industry·accounts for the 
largest share of total industries' expenditures, especially in the Netherlands 
and Austria.  However, for the UK, the expenditures are more significant in 
terms of turnover for the leather tanning (about 3.5%) and pulp and paper 
industries (about 3.6% ). 
2.3.6  Conclusion 
This short review of available estimates of industries' environmental 
expenditures indicates that there may be significant difference~ between the 
level of industries' existing environmental expenditures. 
(I) OECD (1993) Pollution Abatement a.nd  Control Expenditure in OECD Countries.  OECD Monograph No 75. 
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M  ECU at 1992 prices) 
Environmental Media 
Country (J)  Air  %of  Water  %of  Waste  %of  Total  Total(% of 
Total  Total  Total  manufacture 
output) C2l 
Germany  4535  50  3118  35  1372  15  9025  252 
Netherlands  394  46  306  35  135  16  864  203 
France  1013  30  1217  36  1112  33  3342  1.76 
UK  1514  19  4760  60  2014  25  7948  na 
Italy  280  23  552  45  384  32  1215  0.70 
Denmark  19  16  73  62  25  21  117  0.74 
Spain  6  1  231  40  339  59  575  0.79 
Portugal  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Belgium/Luxembou  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
rg 
Greece  6  .  9  37  53  27  39  70  0.16 
Ireland  32  47  8  12  29  43  68  0.21 
Total EU 12  7767  33  10302  44  5437  23  23224 
Source:  ERECO (1993)  Environmental Expenditures in the European Community, Final 
report. 
na =  not available 
(I) The EU  12 countries are listed in ERECO's ordering of their accuracy of the available data, with the most accurate 
(Germany and Netherlands} presented first. 
C2l  Manufacturing output obtained from  1993 data i,: the World Bank Development Report 1994 
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3.1 
ECONOMIC IMPUCATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILIIY SYSTEMS 
BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABIUTY SYSTEMS 
This section identifies the types of benefits that can result from the 
implementation of environmental liability systems so that these benefits can 
be viewed alongside the costs of environmental liability systems which are 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
The benefits of environmental liability systems are that they: 
•  Lead to greater restoration of environmental damage arising from 
environmental incidents.  This can be particularly important for ac.cidents 
which can lead to significant acute environmental damage and where the 
existing regulations do not provide a ready mechanism for the restoration 
of environmental damage and for compensation of the victims. 
•  Increase compensation of victims and increased security for the public that 
might be affected by (industrial) activities with potential to pollute. 
•  Make it easier for victims to secure compensation and the restoration of 
the environmental damage.  This lowers their transaction costs of making 
claims. 
•  Lead firms to implement better assessments of their enviroJ;Ullental risks 
and liabilities which enables and prompts them to implement more 
efficient risk management measures.  This can also identify opportunities 
for other economically beneficial improvements in their operations such as 
better process control and reduced spillages and wastage leading to 
savings in raw materials and energy and improvements in. workers' safety 
and working conditions. 
•  Induce firms to implement greater pollution prevention and control and 
risk management measures to reduce the risks of environmental pollution 
arising. 
For example, in the UK, the National Rivers Authority's recently increased 
enforcement of their powers under Section 161  of the Water Resources Act to 
recover the costs of pollution incidents from polluters.  This has led to 
greater pollution prevention and care being taken by the firms and has 
helped reduce the number of substantiated pollution incidents significantly 
by 31% in 1994 compared with 1993. 
There is little other information currently available documenting the benefits 
of existing environmental liability systems.  This is partly due to:  the 
difficulties of documenting environmental accidents that do not actually take 
place; the lack of baseline information on environmental liabilities - few of 
the firms interviewed had carried out a systematic assessment of their 
liabilities and none had carried out a monetary valuation of these liabilities; 
and the difficulties of disentangling the effects of an environmental liability 
systems from the  other factors affecting the  changes in the number and 
level of environmental incidents (eg changes in technology, industrial 
structures etc). 
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3.2.1  Introduction 
This section identifies the types of costs of an environmental liability system. 
It then reports available data on these costs to indicate their level and the 
key components of the costs of environmental liability systems for tackling 
specific types of environmental problems.  The section also identifies which 
industries are likely to be most significantly affected by these costs. 
Section 3.2.3  reports on experience in the USA with Superfund, for which 
some data are available.  Section 3.2.4 then reports the available data on the 
costs of liability systems in Europe based on the findings from interviews 
with firms regarding existing and alternative environmental liability systems. 
3.2.2  Types of  Costs of  Environmental Liability Systems 
The costs of an environmental liability system can be split into: 
•  the additional economic costs arising from the environmental liability 
systems; 
•  transfer payments in terms of compensation payments from the polluter to 
victims. 
Economic costs of environmental liability systems include: 
•  Transaction costs are defined as expenditures incurred by responsible 
parties and their insurers that do not directly contribute to site cleanup. 
Transaction costs are incurred by the government (eg to assess and value 
the damage costs), responsible parties and their insurers and the victims. 
The transaction costs include: 
•  The costs directly relating to the assignment of financial responsibility -
most of the discussion about transaction costs has focused on this 
aspect.  This includes the costs of negotiation and litigation between 
responsible parties and the government and between responsible 
parties to determine who is liable for which portion of the costs, and 
then between responsible parties and their insurers. 
•  Costs of assessing the environmental liabilities, valuing the damage 
costs and estimating the level of costs that the responsible parties have 
to pay. 
•  The insurers' and banks' costs of assessing a firm's environmental 
liabilities/risks to determine their insurance premia and for their 
decisions on loans to the firm.  These costs will be incorporated in their 
premia or financing charges they levy regarding environmental risks. 
•  Administrative costs of processing claims (eg by insurers). 
•  Costs of additional pollution prevention measures that the environmental 
liability system induces the firm to undertake.  These includes the costs of 
finding out about appropriate control measures  and implementing them 
and any additional R&D into pollution prevention measures by the firms. 
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•  Wider economic implications from: 
•  impacts of the costs on industries' international competitiveness (this 
aspect is examined in Section 3.3); 
•  impacts on the level of industrial investment due to the effects of the 
liability system on availability and costs of finance and insurance (see 
Sections 3.4 and 3.5), especially for SMEs (see Section 3.6); 
•  the impacts of a liability system on industrial confidence. 
Transfer payments include: 
•  Costs of remedying or restoring environmental . 
•  Compensation costs paid by the polluters to the victims. 
•  Industries' contributions to any fund to cover these compensation 
payments and costs of remedying the.  Compensation funds may also 
involve some additional the costs of administering the compensation fund 
and raising the revenue. 
•  Insurers' premia will be designed to cover the expected costs of· 
compensation claims to be paid out of an insurance contract plus the 
insurers' transaction costs. 
Environmental liability systems can entail higher transaction costs  than 
other environmental policy instruments. 
3.2.3  Costs of Superfund (CERCI.A) in the US 
This section reports briefly some available estimates of the costs of Superfund 
-the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) - to  indicate the scale, nature and key determinants of the 
costs  that have arisen as a result of a major piece of environmental liability 
legislation that has actually been implemented and to identify specific 
industries particularly affected by this legislation. 
The Superfund was established in 1980.  It gives the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) the power to identify and compel those responsible 
to clean up the nation's worst hazardous waste sites. 
Under the Superfund program the costs to industry are borne partly by 
direct recovery of costs from responsible parties (about 70%  of the total) and 
partly by a Trust Fund (about 30%  of the total) set up to cover the costs of 
orphan sites for which no responsible or liable party can be found.  The 
Superfund clean up programme had very high transaction costs, which are 
one of its most highly criticised components. 
Clean  Up Costs 
Estimates of the annual total dean up costs of Superfund for remedying or 
restoring environmental, inclu~g  transaction costs, are approximately $2 
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US.  It also represents only 1.5%  of total public and private sector 
expendit  .11\ s to comply with federal environmental regulations. 
Compensation Costs 
The only compensation costs are for land restoration which is included in 
the figures above. 
Transaction  Costs 
Transaction costs for industry (the responsible parties), on average, account 
for about 20%  of these total clean up costs - or approximately about $0.4bn 
pa  .. 
Table 3.2a shows that the transaction costs rise ·substantially with increases in 
the number of parties that are potentially liable for the .  Probst et al suggest 
that transaction costs' share of the total costs rises from 5%  where one 
polluter caused the damage .to 25%  where between 11  and 50 polluters were  I 
potentially liable for the damage < 2>. 
Most of the responsible parties' transaction costs were for legal expenses. 
Other transaction costs include assessing the liabilities and drawing up clean 
up plans for sites.  Transaction costs accounted for about 88%  of the costs 
incurred by insurers, with these transaction costs split fairly evenly between 
the costs of settling disputes between insurers and the firms as to whether 
the insurance policy covers the clean up costs (42%  of the total) and the 
insured firms' legal costs of disputing their liability to pay for the clean up of 
the site (37%  of the total)  (3>. 
However, transaction costs as a percentage of total clean up costs appear to 
fall as sites move through the remedial process.  This is because the initial 
litigation processes between parties 'over responsibility are concluded at the 
beginning of the remediation actions.  This suggests that as more of the 
nation's sites move to the later stages of the clean up process, transaction 
cost shares will fall. 
(t) American Academy of Actuaries (1995), Studies of Su~rfund Costs and Reform. 
(Z)  Probst et al, (1995),  Footing the Bill for Su~rfund Clean up: Who p•y• and how?  The Brookings Institution and 
Resources for the Future 
(3)  RAND (p 22 and 61), Superfund and Transaction Costs, The Experiences of Insurers and Very Large Industrial Firms, 
1992. 
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I. Table 3.2a 
I 
I 
Effects of  Number of  Potential'y Liable Parties 011  Transaction Costs 
Number of responsible parties  Transaction costs as % of total costs 
1 
2. 10 
11-50 
>50 
5% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
Source: Probst, K N, Fullerton, D, Litan, Portney, P,R, (1995)  Footing the Bill for Superfund 
Clean ups: Who pays and how?.  Brookings Institute and Resources for  the Future, 
Washington D.C.  · 
Contributions to Compensation Funds 
The Trust Fund is financed by the following taxes: 
•  a tax on domestically produced or imported oil, which raises about 37%  of 
the total funds.  In 1989, this tax was set at 9.7 Cts per barrel; 
•  a tax on domestic and imported organic and inorganic chemical feedstock, 
which raises about 16%  of the total funds; 
•  A corporate environmental tax of 0.12%  on every corporation's taxable 
income in excess of $2m (in all sectors of the economy). 
Probst et al (1995, p 79)  use input-output models to estimate that the direct 
and indirect increase 1n all industries' costs and prices due to these taXes are 
a small fraction (less than 0.004%) of all industries' production costs <1>. 
Probst et al (1995, p 89) state that the administrative and compliance costs for 
the authorities and the firms of these three taxes form a much higher 
proportion of the revenue raised than is the case with other taxes 
administered by the Internal Revenue Service.  The complications and costs 
of administering the corporate environmental income tax are particularly 
hl~.  . 
Costs of Additional Pollution Prevention Measures 
There is no specific data available for this cost because it is extremely difficult 
for industry to separate out additional expenditure for pollution prevention 
measures, resulting from the Superfund program, from general 
environmental pollution prevention expenditure. 
Costs for  Specific Sectors 
There are concerns that an environmental liability system will impose 
particularly significant costs on specific sectors and that their competitiveness 
might be affected.  This section therefore presents US information on the 
costs for specific industrial sectors.  This information provides the basis for 
the competitiveness analysis in Section 3.3. 
(I) The costs and price increases due to the taxes are less than 0.001%  of production cost for almost all industries and 
slightly higher for petroleum refining (0.003%) and petroleum related products. 
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Chemicals industry 
Table 3.2b presents estimates of the costs  Jf 3uperfund for the chemicals 
industry broken down between: 
•  clean up costs for which the chemicals industry has been assigned liability 
as a responsible party plus the chemical industry's transaction costs 
associated with these liability cases; 
•  the chemicals industry's contributions to the Trust Fund through the 
taxes on chemicals feedstock, petroleum tax and the corporate 
environmental income tax. 
Costs of  Superfund for the Chemicals Industry 
Cost Elements for Chemical Industry  Annual costs ($M 
pa 1990 prices) 
Responsible party costs for clean up plus chemical  492 
indus  try's transaction costs 
Contributions to Trust Fund through chemical 
feedstock tax 
286 
Contributions to the trust fund through petroleum  150 
tax, corporate environmental income tax  <•>. 
Total costs  928 
Annual costs as  % 
of Chemical 
Industry's Value 
Added 
0.4% 
0.2% 
0.1% 
0.7% 
Source: Probst, K N, Fullerton, D, Utan, Portney, P,R, (1995)  Footing the Bill for Superfund 
Clean ups: Who pays and how?.  Brookings Institution and Resources for the Future, 
Washington D.C. 
Other Industries 
Table 3.3c presents estimates of the responsible party clean up and 
transaction costs under Superfund for various other industries compared 
with the chemicals industry.  This shows that the chemicals industry 
accounts for the largest share of the costs of clean up under Superfund, but 
the clean up costs represent a larger proportion of value added for the 
mining and lumber industries. 
Difficulties in obtaining consistent and comparable data on profits across 
industries and the considerable annual fluctuations in industries' profits 
limits the extent to which the clean up costs can be presented and analysed 
as a percentage of the industries' net profits.  Table 3.2c reports estimates 
given in Probst et al (1995).  The figure for costs as a percentage of profit can 
vary depending on the year selected due to variations in the industries' 
profits in different years.  The figure for the primary metals industry was 
derived by dividing this industry's annual dean up and transaction costs by 
its annual profits over the more recent period 1988- 1992, when profits were 
higher than in the early 80s.  This is the more relevant time period for 
assessing the ability of industry to support the annual clean up costs which 
(t) This is bast>d  on the figures in  Probst (1995,  Figure 4.2 (p 76)) which indicate that the direct and indirect costs for the 
inorganic and organic chemicals, chemicals and allied chemicals industries of the petroleum and corporate 
environmental income tax represent slightly more than half of the chemical  feedstock liabilities. 
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.I I 
Table 3.2c 
3.2.4 
this industry is expected to incur over the period 1990 to 2000.  The clean up 
costs are a significant proportion of the profits and burden for the mining 
industry, which actually made losses in 1991. 
Superfund Costs for Various Selected Industries Compared with Chemicals 
Industry  Clean up and  %of total  Costs  Costs as  Index of 
Transaction  costs for  as% of  %of net  Relative costs 
Costs  Superfund  value  (alter  (%  of value 
($m 1990  added  tax)  added) vs 
prices)  profits  chemicals 
Chemicals  492  25%  0.4%  (I)  2.3%  (2)  1 
Mining  220.5  11%  0.7%  >22%  (3)  1.75 
Lumber and wood products  119.9  6%  0.5%  <1%  1.25 
(excluding furniture) 
Petroleum  97.4  5%  0.3%  0.7%  ( 4)  0.75 
Primary metals  148.8  7.5%  0.3%  4.5%  0.75 
(5) 
Fabricated metal products  98.7  5%  0.1%  0.25 
(except machinery and 
transportation equipment) 
Electronics  70.1  3.5%  0.1%  0.25 
Source: Probst, K N, Fullerton, D, Litan, Portney, P,R, (1995)  Footing the Bill for Superfund 
Clent ups: Who pays and how?.  Brookings Institution and Resources for the Future, 
Washington D.C. 
Costs of Environmental Liability Systems in Europe 
Findings from  Interviews with Firms 
Interviews were carried out with 63 firms in the iron, metal, leather tanning, 
pulp and paper, wood preserving, pharmaceuticals, mining, electronics, 
chemicals, petroleum, oil production and refinery industries in Germany, UK, 
Italy, Spain and Hungary to assess the costs and economic implications for 
these firms of existing and possible future environmental liability systems. 
Cll  Tllblt 3.2c presents the estimates for just the clean up of contaminated sites by responsible parties {ie it does not 
include contributions to the Trust Fund) 
(2)  This is based on the chemicals industry's profits in 1991. 
(3)  Mining industry's annual clean up and transaction costs as % of profits in 1990. The mining industry made a loss in 
1991. 
< 4l This is based on the petroleum industry's profits in 1991. 
(5) This is based on the primary metals industry's profits over period 1988 • 1992 
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The research and firm interviews indicated that the costs cf existing liabilit} 
systems in Europe are low and much lower than those of the Superfund in 
the USA. 
A further survey of 30 firms in the iron and metals industry in Germany 
indicated that the law on environmental damage in Germany (UmweltHG) 
iflt991 increased firms' pollution control investments and pollution control 
operating costs by about 3 and 11%, respectively, which represents less than 
0.2%  of these firms' turnover.  The increase in operating costs mainly reflects 
increased transaction costs, such as documentation costs and the costs of 
assessing the firms' environmental liabilities and risks.  The iron and metals 
inqustry comprises mostly small and medium sized firms.  Prior to the 
introduction of the UmweltHG, these small firms did not have as extensive 
procedures for assessing, documenting and managing their environmental 
liabilities as large major firms.  Therefore it is possible that the UmweltHG 
led to greater increases in these small firms' transaction costs and pollution 
control operating costs than. was the case for the larger firms. 
In Germany, experts in the Chemicals Industry Association (VCI)  commented 
that the German Environmental Liability Act in 1991  (UmweltHG) has led to 
little or no significant increase in pollution prevention costs in these 
industries.  This is due to the limited scope of the UmweltHG and the 
greater effect of the environmental regulations in Germany. 
Interviews with firms in the UK, Italy and Hungary similarly indicated that 
firms' costs of existing environmental liability policies represent a small 
proportion of their turnover. 
Other key conclusions from the interviews with the firms include: 
•  Firms' awareness of the existing environmental liability policies varied 
from very high in Germany and the UK to fairly good in Italy and Spain 
to not at all in Hungary. 
•  No firms interviewed have made any quantitative and monetary 
assessment of the potential costs of their_ existing environmental liabilities. 
They were unsure to what extent compensation would be sought for their 
environmental liabilities. 
•  Firms have not assessed the reduction of risk due to preventative 
expenditure. 
•  Most firms across the countries considered that the environmental liability 
system did not have a significant impact on their competitive position. 
•  Most prevention activities carried out by the firms are induced by existing 
command and control policies and not environmental liability policies. 
These results imply that at this stage current environmental liability systems 
are, in general, not affecting firm behaviour or entailing significant costs. 
However, there are few  data or estimates available of the costs to industries 
of the existing or proposed environmental liability system.  This is partly 
because the existing liability systems in Europe are less strict than Superfund 
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and partly because it has proved difficult for industry to cost hypothetical 
and imprecise pr·oposals for ft·tw ,! environmental liability systems. 
Moreover, it is also difficult to estimate firms' costs due to the environmental 
liability system as distinct from, and additional to, the costs they incur for 
environmental regulations since the firm's prevention measures are designed 
both to comply with the environmental regulations as well as reducing the 
finn's environmental liabilities. 
Costs of Possible Future Environmental Liability Policies 
In the interviews, firms were asked how specific elements of alternative 
future environmental liability systems might affect them. 
In respect of the consequences for industries of possible future 
environmental liability policies, the firm interviews found that most firms are 
willing to pay for the environmental damage costs they cause, but not for 
the damage caused by others.  Moreover they argue strongly that the costs 
of remedying environmental damage must be reasonable and based on cost-
effective treatment methods and a fitness for use criteria in setting the 
restoration standards. 
Firms, on the whole, had not evaluated consequences of future liability and 
were unable to clearly distinguish effects of most elements. 
Some firms might accept rights of action by NGOs, although some large 
firms stated that this would result in increased litigation of large firms  who 
may not necessarily be the most polluting. 
Some firms expressed considerable concern and opposition over the 
following elements of possible future environmental liability policies: 
•  Retroactive liability.  Most firms are opposed to proposals for retroactive 
liability, claiming it was unfair if firms  had originally complied with 
prevailing laws in the past.  Retroactive liability provisions would have led 
to the closure of one small leather tanning firm that caused a major 
pollution incident. 
•  ]oint and several liability.  Some firms expressed concern over the likely 
high litigation costs due to the deep pocket syndrome of claimants 
focusing on larger firms with better financial resources. 
•  Strict  Liability.  Firms claimed this would increase their litigation costs and 
were particularly opposed to strict liability without limits or defences. 
•  Ecological damage.  On the whole widening the scope of environmental  to 
include ecological damage of the unowned environment was not viewed 
as a significant problem for most firms.  However, some suggested that it 
would increase uncertainty about the level of a firm's environmental 
liability and the amount of provisions to make. 
•  Compensation funds.  The cleaner firms (eg those with certification under 
BS 7750)  were opposed to a joint compensation fund since they are 
unwilling to subsidise the costs of cleaning up environmental damage 
caused by more polluting industries and their more polluting competitors 
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within their own industry.  Some firms believed in a fund's necessity but 
felt it should be funded by the state. 
Conclusion 
Existing liability systems in Europe have not significantly increased costs for 
European industries.  In relation to possible future environmental liability 
systems, the firms interviewed suggested that they would be willing to pay 
for the damage they cause but not for damage caused by others, and 
provided that the costs of remedying the damage are reasonable and cost-
effective and that it allows them a degree of certainty as to who is or will be 
liable for what sort of damage costs . 
. 3.3  lMPUCATIONS FOR COMPE'1771VENESS OF INDUSTRY 
3.3.1  Introduction 
This section assesses the impacts of differences between existing or likely 
future environmental liability systems in European countries on the 
competitiveness of European industries both with respect to trade within and 
outside the EU.  The analysis is based on the findings of simulations of a set 
of scenarios of  possible differences in the costs of environmental liability 
systems for the chemicals industry that might arise if different European 
countries adopted environmental liability systems of differing stringency (see 
Section 3.3.2).  In addition, Section 3.3.3 provides a qualitative analysis of the 
relative costs of liability systems for some other industries which include the 
wood products, electronics, pharmaceuticals, leather tanning, pulp and paper 
and mining industries.  This takes account of the degree of trade and 
international competition in these industries' markets. 
Section 3.2.4 reported that the existing environmental liability systems in the 
European countries studied have not entailed significant costs for the firms 
and industries investigated and that( on their own, the environmental 
. liability systems had not significantly affected the firms' competitiveness. 
This limited impact of  existing liability systems in EU countries on European 
industries' competitiveness is due to the following factors: 
•  Any differences in the environmental liability systems must be expected to 
persist for a long time (say about 10 years) to influence firms' decisions on 
the location of plants. 
•  In decisions on new plants, multinational companies tend to apply 
common standards based on the latest environmental standards. 
•  Most fums interviewed indicated that environmental issues overall were 
an important factor that firms take into account in their investment 
decisions, but that differences between countries' environmental liability 
policies, taken on their own, had little effect on these decisions.  One 
multinational firm reported that greater confidence and certainty about 
environmental liability policies in the UK contributed to their decisions to 
locate all its manufacturing plants in the UK.  However, this was 
essentially due to greater confidence that the authorities in the UK would 
implement the environmental liability policies more flexibly and 
pragmatically than any differences in the stringency of the policies per se. 
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Without a common approach to environmental liability systems in Europe, 
there could be some divergences between the envirot mental liability systems 
and their associated ~·;osts between different individual Europ~an countries. 
Thus some EU countries have signed the Lugano Convention (eg 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Italy ) or have said they will 
soon do so (eg Belgium, Sweden); while other European countries are not 
willing to sign up to the Convention (Germany, UK, France). 
Consequently this section focuses on the potential impacts on European 
indusMes' competitiveness of such possible differences between EU 
countries' future environmental liability systems. 
3.3.2  Impacts of  Future Environmental Liability Systems on the Competitiveness of 
the Chemicals Industry 
Methodology 
A trade model for the basic chemicals industry (NACE codes 251  & 255) was 
used to simulate the impacts of policy scenarios with differences between 
countries' environmental liability  on the numbers of plants and market 
shares for the main European and OECD groups of countries < 1>.  This 
trade model allows for the direct e(fect of th~ cost differences on demand 
and market shares between the competing countries.  In addition, it allows 
for the long run effects of changes in the profitability of chemicals 
production on decisions on plant locations between the different countries -
where long run is defined as about 10 - 15 years in line with a normal time 
horizon for decisions on new plants.  The model allows for trade linkages 
between countries such as where one country's industry provides basic 
chemical inputs into the chemicals industry of another country. 
The chemicals industry was selected for the model simulations since it could 
be significantly affected by environmental liability systems, its products are 
highly traded and it is subject to considerable international competitive 
pressures from both within and outside the EU. 
Scenarios of P_ossible Future Environmental Liability Systems 
The trade model simulations examine the effects of a hypothetical set of 
different levels of stringency (and costs) of environmental liability  between 
the following five groups of countries: 
•  Group I comprises US and Canada, which are assumed to be subject to the 
strict environmental liability systems set out under CERCLA (Superfund) 
in the US concerning contaminated sites.  This approach to a strict liability 
system is assumed to cover all environmental damage.  The cost 
assumptions used in the simulations are based on an analysis of the costs 
of Superfund for the chemicals industry in the US. 
(1) This tnde model of the chemicals industry was develoPfd (in the early 90s) by Professor Tony Venables and Profe5$0r 
Alistair Ulph (University of Southampton).  It was based on published data on tnde, production and input-output 
relationships for the chemicals industry for all countries in the world for 1985 - the most l't'Cent date for which 
consistent data were available at that time.  Inevitably, the model has a number of limitations whic:h  are highlighted in 
this report.  Most notably, the changes that have occurred since 1985 are highlighted and an indication is given of how 
they might alter the findings of the model simulations. 
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includes countries who have signed up to the Lugano Convention and is 
designed to simulate the effects of some European countries adorting this 
convention while others do not.  The costs of environmental liability 
systems for these group D countries are assumed to be half of those for 
the strict CERCLA based system analysed for Group I countries. 
•  Group Ill comprises Germany, France, UK and Ireland, Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand.  These countries are adopting their own national 
environmental liability polides at an assumed  moderate level of costs. 
The costs of i:'nvironmentalliability systems for these group ill countries 
are assumed to be half of those for Group n  countries. 
•  Group N  comprises EC South (Spain, Portugal and Greece).  These 
countries have fairly limited environmental liability systems that are less 
stringent than those currently implemented by Group m  countries.  The 
costs of environmental liability systems for these group IV countries are 
assumed to be half of those for Group m  countries. 
•  Group V comprises the rest of the world.  These countries are assumed to 
have no environmental liability policies and incur no additional costs over 
their baseline positions.  · 
Table 3.3a presents the main assumptions (2) for the costs of environmental 
liability systems for the chemicals industry in the above groups of countries. 
They are based on the costs of Superfund for the chemicals industry in the 
US.  The cost estimates are derived for the other countries on the basis of the 
assumptio.ns for the country groupings given above.  Discussions with the 
chemicals industry suggested that the cost assumptions depicted in these 
scenarios provide a reasonable basis for analysis in this study. 
(I) Th~  1bov~ country poupinc is based on th~ ftistinc poupinp 1lready specified in the trade model with  th~ croups 
combined lo takr 1c:count of WMthf'r they hive sicned up to the Lupno Convention.  However, the rusting trade 
model's dati do not provide separate analysis for  ~nmark  10 this country has had to be included in the EC  North 
poup of countries ~nn  though it •ppqrs that ~n••rk  aicht in fad be in Croup Ill.  Thf' ftisting trade 111odel's data 
1bo do not provide separate 1nalysis for Sw.-d~n, Finland 1nd Austria which are included in the rest of the world block. 
(Z;I  Tllblt 3.3Q 1nd Table 3.3b presents the findings for the ••in simulations H and L  Scenario H is based on an estimate 
that the costs of sbid mviron111ental liability systems for the ch~mical industry in Croup I countries (eg  USA) amount to 
2.4%  of the turnover of this industry in th~ Croup I countries.  The cost estimates for the countries in Croups 11  - V are 
reduced using the factors  descri~ earlier.  In JCt>nuio 1.. the costs of strict environment<~! liability systems for the 
chemical industry in Croup I countries (f'C  USA) 1re .UchUy lower- at 2%  of the turnover of this industry in the Croup 
I countries.  In 1ddition, '1 other si111ulations were carried out  The points from  these other simulations are highlighted 
in th~ kxl 
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Table 3.3b 
Cost Assumptions (llS  % of  Vlllue IUfded) for Chemicals Industry in Model 
Simulations 
Group  Country  Simulation Case 
H  L 
US  & Canada  2.4  2 
n  EC North  1.2  1 
n  Italy  1.2  1 
m  Gennany  0.6  0.5 
DI  France  0.6  0.5 
m  UK & Ireland  0.6  0.5 
IV  EC South  0.3  0.25 
III  japan  0.6  0.5 
III  Australia & New Zealand  0.6  0.5 
v  Rest of the World  0  0 
% Clulnge in Market Slulres for Chemicals Industry in Model Simulations 
Country  Simulation Case 
H  L 
US & Canada  .9.0  -5.0 
EC North  0  -5.0 
Italy  0  0 
Germany  +3.6  '+2.0 
France  -7.0  -4.0 
UK & Ireland  0  0 
EC South  +4.0  +2.0 
Japan  +2.6  +2.9 
Australia & New Zealand  +3.0  +0.4 
.Rest of the World  c'  c' 
Footnote 1:  c = constant market shares assumed in analysis for the rest of the 
world. 
Findings of the Model Simulations of the Impacts on the Chemicals Industry 
Table 3.3b presents the findings of the simulations detailed in Table 3.3a.  _ 
Case L shows that cost differences of up to 2%  between countries lead in the 
long run to a (relative) fall of 5%  in the market share of the highest cost 
countries (US and EC North) - this represents a reduction in share of world 
trade for the US and Canada from 2%  of the world trade to about 1.9%  or an 
absolute fall in 0.1%  percentage points.  Case L leads to a 2%  rise in market 
share for the European countries with the lowest costs (EC South)- a rise in 
their share of world trade from 2%  to 2.04%  or an absolute increase of 0.04% 
• as indicated in Table 3.3b.  This shows that, in an industry like chemicals, 
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various countries are close substitutes for each other, relatively small 
differences in c.Js scan have quite significant effects on percentage changes 
in market share. 
Comparing the findings for case L with those for H shows that a change in 
the costs of the environmental liability  has a more than proportionate effect 
on their impacts on market shares.  This is due to the scale economies in the 
chemicals industry. 
The changes in market shares, shown in Table 3.3.3b, are small compared 
with recent changes in the market shares experienced by the European 
chemicals industry.  Thus the market shares of the chemicals industry in the 
UK and US declined by about 20%  and 4%, respectively, between 1979- 1994. 
The market share of Western Europe (excluding UK) declined by about 12% 
over this period. 
However, the changes in market shares arising from the costs of 
environmental liability systems in these simulations are much greater than in 
other studies of the impacts of environmental costs on competitiveness. 
These have generally found little direct evidence that the stringency of 
environmental regulations has had significant effects on plant location and 
choice and on industries' international competitiveness (1). 
Limitations of the Simulations 
Table 3.3.3b presents the long run impacts of the cost differences on the 
assumption that these cost differences would have to be perceived to be 
likely to persist for a sufficiently long time (ie more than 10- 15 years) to 
influence plant location decisions.  If this assumption does not hold, then 
the model simulations may exaggerate the impacts likely to arise in practice. 
Discussions with chemical industry· economists suggested that the model 
simulations overstate the likely impacts on plant location decisions.  This 
suggests that there are trade barriers and other factors affecting relocations 
of plants, such as links with other industries, availability of industrial, 
financial and social infrastructures and inertia, which are not casted and 
reflected in the model so that the model simulations may exaggerate the 
impacts on the relocation of plants and market shares. 
The model does not allow for the effects of increasing competition from the 
rest of the world, about which the chemicals industry is most concerned 
although the market share of the rest of the world has currently only 
increased by 0.4%  between 1979- 1994 and imports to the EU from the rest 
of the world have not increased significantly recently. 
The model simulations had to be calibrated on 1985 data, which does not 
allow for the recent freer movement of goods and capital with the EU, 
especially since the Single Market.  This effect may have led the model to 
underestimate the impacts on competitiveness of differences in costs. 
(I) for a rniew of these studies SH Jaffe A 8, Peterson, S R. Stavins R flo;,  (1995) £nvironmrnW Re8ulations and the 
Coapetitiveneu of US  Manufactwins: What doa the mdence tell  a&s? journal of Economic Uterature, Vol  33,  March 
1995 pp 132 • 163. 
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3.3.3 
• 
It is evident that the model simulations have a number of limitations ..  most 
notably the model simulates the long run effects of cost differences which 
are assumed to be perceived to penist over a long time perio.l (of say 10 -15 
years) and the model does not reflect barriers to trade and other factors 
affecting firms' decisions on the relocation of plants. 
In view of these limitations, the findings should best be seen as useful 
indications of the likely direction of the changes rather than accurate 
predictions of quantitative effects.  Attention should not be focused on the 
numerical findings, but rather on the following insights .. that in a~-~ industry 
which is very competitive, with products which are close substitutes for each 
other, then relatively small differences in costs can lead to a more than 
proportional loss of market share. 
Impacts '!n Competitiveness of  Other Industries 
Methodology 
This section presents a qualitative analysis of the impacts of possible 
differences in envirorunentalliabilicy systems' costs on the competitiveness of 
other industries.  It covers the following industries: 
•  semi-finished wood products; 
•  electronics; 
•  pharmaceuticals; 
•  leather tanning; 
•  pulp, paper and board; 
•  mining. 
The analysis is based on: 
•  Data presented in Probst et al (1995)  (1) on the costs of Superfund for 
the mining, l~ber  and electronics industries in comparison with 
Superfund's costs for the chemicals industry (see Table 3.2c). 
•  Assumptions as to whether the costs of environmental liability systems for 
the leather tanning, pulp, paper and board industries are likely to be 
greater, less than or similar to the costs for the chemicals industry.  These 
assumptions were based on discussions with environmental insurance 
experts. 
•  Analysis of the degree of trade and international competitiol) in the 
markets for these industries to indicate the possible impacts of any 
differences in the costs of environmental liability systems on the 
competitiveness of these industries in Europe. 
Wood Processing and Semi-Finished Wood Products Industry 
The costs of the environmental liability provisions concerning contaminated 
sites in Superfund in the USA are estimated to be higher for the lumber and 
wood products industries than the chemicals (when represented as a % of 
(I) Probst et a)  (1995) Footing the Bill for the Superfund Clean up: Who pays and how?  The Brookings Institution and 
Resources for tht FuturE'. 
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value added) O>.  However, the impacts of these costs on the 
competitiveness of European products industry are likely to be lower than is 
the case for chemicals since the •cope for speci..llLed products reduces the 
competitiveness and elasticity of demand for this industry.  In addition, the 
main sources of imports of wood products to the EU (EFT  A and US) are 
likely to face environmental liability systems that are as strict or stricter than 
is likely to be the case for Europe.  However, European producers are likely 
to face increasing competition from South East Asian countries where 
environmental liability systems are expected to be less strict. 
Electronics 
The electronics industry has many similar characteristics to the chemicals 
industry.  Thus trade in electronics products is high and very competitive. 
There is a high degree of substitution between products of the industry in 
different countries and the price elasticity of demand is high.  In addition, 
the electronics industry is currently undertaking a high level of investment 
in new plants.  Hence any differences in costs of environmental liability 
systems for European countries might significantly affect their 
competitiveness and trade. 
However, the costs of the environmental liability provisions concerning 
contaminated sites in Superfund in the USA are estimated to be low for the 
electronics industry - representing only 0.1%  of value added.  This reflects 
the relatively clean and mature nature of this industry.  Consequently 
environmental liability systems are unlikely to have any significant impacts 
on the competitiveness of the European electronics industry. 
PharmaceutiCJ1ls 
The costs of environmental liability systems for the pharmaceuticals industry 
are assumed to be similar to or lower than those for the chemicals industry  .. 
However, the impacts on the competitiveness of the European 
pharmaceuticals industry is likely to be lower because international 
competition and elasticity of demand in this market is lower due to the 
following reasons: 
•  the high R&D intensity in this industry acts as a barrier to entry to new 
firms; 
•  the high R&D levels required to compete in this industry means that most 
of the competition in this high tech market comes from developed 
countries (eg USA, Japan) who are likely to face strict environmental 
liability systems; 
•  product differentiation; 
•  the influence of the Governments in the domestic markets in European 
countries. 
(I) The wood processing and semi-finished wood products industry (NACE classifications 461  and 462) is  taken here as 
beins the cl05e51  industry atesory to the 'lu•bt'r and wood products' industry for which Probst provide estimates of the 
costs of Suptrfund.  Probsr data ncludes furniture. 
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Leather Tanning 
The costs of environmental liability systems might be higher (as a % of value 
added) for the leather tanning industry than the basic chemicals industry 
because the leather tanning industry has been less subject to environmental 
regulations than the chemicals industry in the past and has not established 
as extensive environmental risk assessment and management programmes as 
the chemicals industry.  However, these costs are unlikely to affect 
significantly the competitiveness and market shares of this i~dustry since 
trade in leather tanning products is lower and the level of international 
competition (and elasticity of demand) is lower for the leather tanning 
market.  The economies of scale are less marked in the leather tanning 
industry and there are greater links between leather tanning and final users 
of leather, especially for the increasing high quality products. 
Pulp, Paper and Board 
The costs of environmental liability systems for the pulp, paper and board 
industries might be of a roughly similar level to those for the basic chemicals 
industry (when presented as a % of value added).  However, the impacts of 
these costs on the competitiveness of the European pulp, paper and board 
industry is likely to be lower than that shown above for chemicals since the 
major competitors to European producers (US and Canada, Sweden and 
Finland) are likely to face  environmental liability systems that are as strict or 
. stricter than those likely for European countries. 
Mining 
The costs of the environmental liability provisions concerning contaminated 
sites in Superfund in the USA are estimated to be higher for the mining 
industry than the chemicals industry (when represented as a % of value 
added).  However, in the case of coal mining, these costs are relatively low 
compared to the existing difference between production costs 'for EU 
countries compared with imports so that, in practice,  they are unlikely to 
affect significantly the competitiveness and market shares for this industry 
which are driven by other more important factors. 
3.3.4  Conclusions 
Existing liability systems in European countries are unlikely to have 
significant impacts on the competitiveness of European industries. 
In the absence of a common approach to environmental liability systems 
across Europe, there might in the future be further divergence between the 
environmental liability systems and their associated costs for different EU 
Member States.  In industries such as chemicals, which are very competitive 
and where the products of the industries in the various countries are close 
substitutes for each other, then relatively small differences in costs could lead 
to a more than proportional loss of market share.  However, the differences 
in costs due to environmental liability systems would have to be perceived to 
persist for a sufficiently long time (ie more than 10- 15 years) to influence 
plant location decisions. 
The impacts of environmental liability systems on competitiveness are likely 
to be lower for other industries compared with chemicals either because they 
are less subject to strong international competition (eg pharmaceuticals) or 
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environmental liability systems (eg pulp and paper and lumber and wood 
produces dlthough the latter industry may face increasing competition from 
South East Asia) or because the costs of environmental liability systems are 
low compared to value added (eg electronics). 
However, the above analysis and conclusions assumes that the -costs of the 
environmental liability system for a major polluting industry, such as 
chemicals, amount to a maximum of 2.4%  of value added in the strictest 
environmental liability system.  If certain European countries implement 
more extensive and stricter environmental liability systems to intemalise all 
environmental damage costs, then the resulting cost differences between 
countries would be higher and the impacts on the competitiveness of 
European industries might be larger. 
3.4  lMPUCATIONS FOR THE INSURANCE SECTOR 
3.4.1  Introduction 
The insurance sector is extremely important in developing a successful 
environmental liability system.  It has three main potential roles.  It 
guarantees financial cover for environmental damage costs.  It spreads the 
risk of compensation payments through pooling so that individual industrial 
companies will not face excessive financial burdens from a liability claim. 
Furthermore, through offering a specialised service related to the 
environmental management of the policyholder, insurance companies could 
provide incentives to policyholders to adopt pollution prevention measures to 
reduce future damage. 
The aims of this section are to assess: 
•  the implications for the ~urance  industry of an environmental liability 
system; 
•  the problems encountered in issuing such insurance cover and how 
insurers might react to an environmental liability system; 
•  the role that the insurance industry could play in instituting an effective 
environmental liability system. 
3.4.2  Environmental Liability Policies and Contract Components 
This section defines the main types of insurance policies concerning 
environmental liabilities and the mains terms of these policies that are used 
in the subsequent discussion of the implications of environmental liability 
systems for the insurance market. 
There are two types of insurance policy which include provisions for 
covering environmental liability.  They are General Liability (GL)  and 
Environmental Impairment Liability (ElL).  GL is a liability insurance policy 
which covers employers liability, public liability and product liability as a 
'package'.  An ElL policy is an individual environmental insurance policy 
which is written and adopted specifically in relation to potential 
environmental problems as opposed to general cover provided under GL 
policies which, in some cases, can also include environmental liabilities. 
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Within these policies insurers have options  regarding the exact specification 
of the insurance policies  they offer. 
Triggers  · 
Triggers are contract components which specify when an incident gives rise 
to a claim.  The  type of bigger determines the length of time under which 
insurers are liable to meet claims.  The two most commonly used types of 
biggers are termed occu"ence and claims TIUlde.  An occu"ence trigger specifies 
that a claim can be made at any time for an incident as long as the incident 
occurred under a policy.  A claims TIUlde bigger specifies that a claim must be 
made during the time a policy is held by the insured.  In general there has 
been a distinct move away from occu"ence based to claims made triggers since 
occu"ence  based policies can expose insurers to a long-tail of claims relating 
to incidents arising in a period covered by past policies but which become 
evident and are the subject of claims later due to the lag times in the· 
manifestation of pollution problems.  These claims were unpredictable and 
insurers are trying to reduce these uncertainties by moving to claims TIU1de 
triggers.  Claims made, in limiting the time period for making a claim, allows 
insurers to estimate better the frequency of claims' incidents as all claims 
have to come from a known number of existing policy holders.  However, 
claims made policies sometimes considered unlawful by the courts in some 
countries (eg France). 
Scope of cover 
Scope is usually restricted to third party, with the cause of the damage 
coming from specifically insured sites.  This is based on general civil liability 
practices.  Cause of damage is also defined and limited.  Causes of damage 
are divided into sudden and accidental or gradual.  Another distinction is 
whether the incident was unexpected or part of the course of normal 
operations.  .. 
Financial limits 
Insurers usually put financial limits on the sums covered either as a limit for 
an individual claim or for the total financial sums that can be claimed under 
the policy.  Limits will vary depending on the type of policy formulated  ~nd 
premium paid and the extent of risk.  Insurers will put lower limits on firms 
with high risk. 
3.4.3  Current Relationship Between General and Environmental Liability Policy. 
The GLand ElL policies presently overlap and the margins of difference 
between them vary between countries.  Table 3.4a compares the two policies 
and presents the areas of difference between them.  Most insurers in the UK 
and Germany Will insist that a firm has its GL policy and its ElL policy with 
the same insurer, to avoid double-counting and disputes as to who is 
responsible for the environmental liabilities and to lower transaction costs of 
issuing the policy  .. So when considering the insurance industry policies and 
contracts both general and environmental policies should be considered, 
especially as in most countries the latter is still extremely limited in demand. 
The overall trend in light of stricter environmental policies is to reduce GL 
obligations and move coverage of environmental liabilities into ElLs.  In most 
countries, insurance companies' GLs cover only sudden and accidental 
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needs to take out an ElL policy for named and audited sites.  Insurers are 
now seeking to go one step further tha. 1 offering additional environmental 
coverage in ElLs by isolating and excluding pollution insurance from their 
general policies. 
In attempting to reduce the potential environmental compensation 
obligations from GL policies many insurers may seek to deny coverage under 
previously issued GL policies.  To be able to successfully make a claim the 
insured will have to prove that the losslliability arose during the period of 
the policy and that the contract wording covered the specific type of event. 
Insurers will look very closely at the policy terms, conditions and exclusions 
and will deny coverage if the insured: failed to take all reasonable 
pr~cautions; deliberately caused the ~ollution; failed to disclose material facts 
and; are late in notifying the clahn. (  >  . 
Markets across Europe are now at different stages of offering cover for 
environmental damage.  The Comite Europeen Des Assurances (CEA) 
identifies four existi.ilg situa~ons in EU countries. 
•  total pollution exclusion from general liability with an optional s~charge 
for sudden and accidental damage; 
•  old general liability policies which did not make a distinction between 
sudden & accidental pollution and gradual pollution; 
•  general liability insurance covering sudden and accidental pollution but 
not gradual pollution damage; 
•  in addition to the above, environmental impairment liability policies are 
offered which pertain specifically to environmental risk and include 
gradual pollution damage ·(which is often offered through an insurance 
pool operated by a collective group of insurers in some countries). 
The demand for ElL policies to date in most European countries has been 
limited.  ElL premium income is very small in relation to the GL market.  ElL 
premium income accoUnts for less than 1%  of GL premium income in the 
UK, Italy and Spain, less than 2% in the Netherlands and about 4%  of GL 
premium income in Germany. 
The main trends identified across the countries are that: 
•  Under both GL and ElL policies insurers usually limit their liability to 
third party . 
•  Cover for ecological  to  the unowned environment is not available. 
•  A transition has occurred from 'occurrence' to 'claims made' policies.  This 
is to resolve the long tail liability problem. 
•  Gradual pollution may now be covered in an ElL policy. 
(I) Brian Sbftt, An lnsurt>r's Vit>w of tht>  1995 Environmt'nl Act. Fifth Environmt'nlal Insurance Conference, list of 
Uoyds Press. 
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Comparison of  Major Characteristics of Liability Policies in the European 
Countries Investigated 
General  Environmental  Key Differences of EIL 
Liability (GL)  Impairment Liability 
(ElL) 
Types of  sudden and  as CL but also  wider scope but specifically for 
covered  unintended;  gradual pollution and  pollution and contamination.  Air 
damage to  all discharges,  pollution damage will be difficult 
property,  including unforeseen  to prove.  Past damage excluded 
bodily injury  from permitted  (therefore requires audit) 
and the  discharges 
natural 
environment 
Claims basis  occurrence,  claims made  no retroactivity; avoids long tail of 
during period  claims since, if policy lapses, claim 
of insurance  cannot be brought after a short 
expiry period (30 days after the 
policy has expired in one case). 
This is a crucial change to make 
ElL more robust 
Whose damage  third  third party  provides specific cover pre'l.riously 
can be covered  party (I)  available in GL 
Extent of cover,  only cover firms with  no retrospectivity, applies to 
exclusions,  good environmental  named and audited sites 
limitation  management 
How risks are  no assessment  audit; desk study for  expertise in risk as!essmen  t is 
assessed  small risks, site visit  required 
for large risks 
Transaction costs  10-30%  of  25-40%  of premium  higher cost due to risk assessment 
as% of premium  premium  of named sites 
Evolution of Environmental Insurance Cover 
Insurance policy systems evolve based on past policy al)d claims experience 
and changing external forces.  The external forces are legal, jurisdictional and 
public consciousness.  Claims experience and external developments have 
made insurers reassess their initial service for covering environmental 
damage and rearrange the scope and price of such policies. 
Insurance companies are responding to two distinct concerns.  One is the 
increased vulnerability of insurance companies from old policy exposure for 
historic pollution.  The other is how insurance policies need to change to 
cope with stricter environmental liability. 
Historic Pollution Problems 
The insurance industry in Europe for a long time did not explicitly consider 
environmental liability.  Insurance companies, under general liability 
provisions, may be potentially liable for a series of claims for old pollution 
problems.  General Liability, due to its non-specific nature, made no special 
provisions or restrictions for irresponsible actions by firms regarding their 
Cl)  However, first  party damage is cove~  under Cl policies in  ~rmany. 
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scope of responsibility of the insurers.  Original cover was based on 
'occurrence' based biggers with no time limit, exposing insurers to a long-tail 
of claims.  Due to the 'occurrence' claims trigger insurers may become liable 
for past pollution of the insured.  Therefore where retroactive liability is 
established insurers now fear that they will face an onslaught of lawsuits 
and possible compensation payments directed at the insured companies for 
past contamination which the insurers unwittingly covered at no extra 
premium.  This historical experience has led insurers to be cautious about 
providing cover on environme~talliabilities. 
Future Pollution Cover 
Increasing awareness of environmental liabilities, accompanied by the 
development of stricter environmental legislations are part of the set of 
influential factors now altering insurers' coverage of environmental damage. 
This situation has led to some insurance companies developing specific 
environmental ins1J!ance provisions. 
Insurers now manage the process of offering environmental damage cover 
more carefully with greater risk assessment and focusing on clearly specified 
environmental risks where they can estimate the level of their potential 
liabilities and set premia accordingly.  Insurers offer this cover in 
Environmental Impairment Liability (ElL) policies.  ElL policies require 
individual environmental risk assessments and modify the elements of the 
policies, such as triggers, to restrict liability for insurers in the future.  They 
are not yet well established and still do not have a wide market base or 
standardized premia levels.  The number of ElL policies so far in place is low 
at present.  Discussions with the insurance industry indicated that insurers 
are, in general terms, unable to quantify the scope of the cover or the 
change in the size of premia under stricter liability regimes. 
Site audits are increasingly required before insurance is given to polluting 
industries.  These increased transaction costs are proportionally higher for 
small firms and might affect SMEs' capacity to purchase insurance. 
Insurance Pools 
In countries where the insurance industry is dominated by small insurance 
firms lacking resources to build new markets by themselves, insurers have 
come together and formed insurance pools specifically for environmental 
liability.  Through acting together the companies can share financial 
resources, environmental expertise and reduce risk.  Insurance contracts are 
developed by the companies under the supervision of the pool, which 
provides technical assistance, a reference contact and provides advice on 
special conditions to impose and assessment of the risks and costs related to 
specific sites.  The pool covers nearly all environmental insurance contracts 
though a few are still carried out by individual companies and are reinsured 
outside the pool. 
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Table 3.4b stows a clt.ar difference in the size of insurance markets with 
Germany and UK being significantly larger and more developed than the 
others.  Spain and the Netherlands have a particularly large number of 
insurance companies, considering the size of their markets.  This indicates 
that insurance companies in Spain and the Netherlands have, on average, 
smaller financial resources and thus will be more wary of taking financial 
risks.  Therefore insurance pools for environmental insurance are being 
developed in these two countries and also Italy, where the insurance 
industry is smaller and l~ss developed than in Germany and the UK. 
Table 3.4b  Size of  Insurance Markets in Countries Investigated 
Country  Number of Insurance  Total General Liability 
Companies  Premium Income (M ECU) 
Gennany  800  5,500 
UK  830  2,D70 
Italy  270  1,105 
Spain  410  850 
Netherlands  490  540 
Sourct: FEEM 
3.4.6  Economic Issues for Insurers 
This section provides a framework to understand the situation currently 
faced by the insurance companies with the new environmental liability 
insurance market. 
The insurer provides a commercial service to private enterprises by pooling 
their individual risks.  These risks would otherwise cause excessive financial 
hardship in the event of a pollution incident, if the costs of the incident had 
been borne by an individual firm.  The provision of this service depends on: 
•  risk spreading; 
•  risk assessment. 
Risk Spreading 
Sufficient amounts of policy holders taking up the cover are needed to 
spread risks.  This needs the ability to find a sufficiently large number of 
candidate firms.  The time, cost and uncertainty of gaining a sufficiently 
large pool of policyholders makes insurers cautious about venturing into 
new markets.  This holds particularly true for environmental liability 
insurance markets which in many countries is a very new market about 
which the insurers_ have little experience and expertise. 
Risk Assessme11t 
Premium rates need to be high enough to build up financial resources to 
cover potential compensation payment.  It is crucial to set appropriate 
premia for the insurance policies to be sustainable.  Insurers need to be able 
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appropriate premium level.  This requires case experience and clear valuation 
aiteria.  Without the.;e, future premium rates cannot be reliably calculated. 
Risk assessment requires questionnaires and site audits.  Risk assessments 
are key tools for insurers to filter out 'bad' risks and determine suitable 
premia levels for those companies with sound enough environmental 
management to be covered. 
Expertise is required when a policy is to be taken out and when a claim is 
made: to assess and value (environmental) risk and remediation possibilities; 
for verification of; and to establish causation and responsibility to determine 
the levels of compensation.  There are organisational costs associated with 
building up such expertise and carrying out site investigations for risk 
ass.essment.  The costs of this expertise will significantly add to transaction 
costs.  However, these transaction costs could be expected to decrease over 
time as expertise builds up.  The need for technical expertise in this area is 
very important for environmental liability insurance as environmental 
damage is not a traditional area of insurers' expertise. 
Summary 
The main problems faced by insurers in developing environmental liability 
insurance are: 
•  risk assessment; 
•  need for technical expertise; 
•  uncertainty of future claims; 
•  defining and selecting triggers; 
•  uncertainty concerning future cumulative risk; 
•  potentially high litigation costs in apportioning responsibility; 
•  high costs leading to high premia and tight margins which impede market 
growth. 
3.4. 7  Potential ElL Market 
There has so far been limited uptake of new policies designed to insure 
future pollution.  This is reflected in the limited growth of the EIL market, 
· although Germany is an exception where almost all policyholders of general 
·liability also have an EIL policy.  Germany, UK, Italy, Spain and the 
Netherlands all have ElL markets which are substantially smaller than their 
GL markets; ElL premium income in all countries is less than 5%  of their GL 
income. 
One of the reasons that insurers have been slow to expand their exposure in 
this market is that they are reluctant to cover unknown risks.  Insurance 
companies are also greatly influenced by the uncertainties still remaining in 
potential losses to be covered.  Uncertainty makes insurers' plans for 
covering environmental damage more conservative.  There is still a large 
degree of uncertainty regarding the cost of covering environmental damage. 
The uncertainty arises from: 
•  lack of a claims history; 
•  legislative changes; 
•  difficulties in predicting likely future public concern; 
•  level of restoration demanded; 
•  number of cases taken to court; 
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•  lack of technical expertise to underWrite risks; 
•  problems of valuing environmental damage. 
However, even when insurance companies offer environmental liability 
cover under EIL policies,  there is little demand for such ElL policies on the 
part of firms.  This is partly because some firms do not recognise the 
magnitude of their environmental liabilities that require cover and because 
·cover is not compulsory under existing laws.  Moreover, the premia for the 
ElL policies being offered are high and much higher than the premium rates 
for GL policies so that firms often prefer to stay under GL cover  . 
Transaction costs also influence the potential policyholder's decision whether 
or not it is economic to take out specific environmental cover when a choke 
is available.  This includes the transaction costs incurred by the insurer, 
which are included in the premia, and the transaction costs paid by the firms 
on, for example, the assessment of environmental liabilities.  The transaction 
costs as a percentage of premium will vary in proportion to the size of the 
plant or company being insured.  Smaller firms with lower premium needs 
will still have to carry out audits and thus have higher relative transaction 
costs.  In general, administration costs for GL range from 10 to 30%  of 
premium.  In comparison, administration costs for ElL range from 25-40%  of 
premium. 
The perspective of the industry is that good business opportunities do not 
exist in this market and will not for at least the short to medium term yet. 
Therefore a rapid expansion of the market cannot be expected in the short 
term.  The ElL insurance market will need considerable time to evolve and 
mature. 
Insurance Industry Views on Alternative Liability Systems 
At the moment in the UK, Germany and Spain, ElL insurance is not seen to 
be very attractive due to the difficulty in attaining profitability and existing 
scientific and other uncertainties concerning environmental liabilities. 
Insurers would be cautious about offering policies under stricter regimes.  If 
increased insurance coverage is desired for polluting firms then any decisions 
taken on what will be included in a future sbicter environmental liability 
system must take into account the views and financial interests of the 
insurance industry. 
The main elements considered are: 
•  retroactive liability; 
•  joint and several liability; 
•  compulsory insurance; 
•  covering ecological damage. 
Retroactive Liability 
Insurers are very concerned about the imposition of retroactive liability.  Old 
policies might leave insurers responsible for compensating past damage, 
which they had pre\jously not considered and allowed for in setting past 
premia so that insurers have not built up reserves to cover these damage 
costs.  Therefore, if retroactive liability is imposed and old policyholders are 
held liable for past  the insurers will be left paying the bill unless they find 
ERM  EcONOMICS  • EcONOMICS Of l....v.Biurt:  EC 0G XI 
74 supportable defences.  The potential liabilities for insurers regarding CERCLA 
in the US are large compared with their reserves. 
If  insurance companies are made to pay for exposed historic liability they 
may experience a significant drain on resources, such as in the US.  Their 
ability to pay claims may decrease which would adversely affect them 
through a drop in credit rating. 
To protect against retroactive liability they now will not cover historic 
damage in new polides.  This will not help them with old policies but will 
limit their responsibility for pollution occurring from now but which is not 
found for years to come.  However, in order to prove what pollution has 
occurred before and after the initiation of a policy contract a detailed site 
audit needs to be carried out. 
]oint and Several Liability 
Joint and several liability means that a polluter may be liable for m:ore  than 
the damage the polluter caused.  This difference in the value of damage 
caused and the amount for which an individual firm  would be liable would 
differ case by case depending on the situation of the other responsible 
parties and the extent to which the firm can recoup the costs of the 
environmental liabilities from other responsible parties..  Therefore it will not 
be possible for the insurance company to estimate the actual amount a 
company may be liable on the basis of a site audit and risk assessment of 
this company's environmental liabilities. 
Insurers would find it very difficult to price a policy under a liability regime 
in which financial liability could not be clearly related to the pollution risk of 
an individual firm or plant for which they are providing cover (and for 
which they receive premia).  The uncertainty would mean that insurers 
would therefore have to  increase the premia set. 
Compulsory Insurance 
Compulsory insurance might increase the number of firms requiring 
environmental insurance policies, which would give greater experience with 
such policies and thereby lead to the development of an extensive ElL 
market.  However, compulsory insurance provisions would raise many 
practical problems, which are exacerbated by the existing difficulties that 
constrain the development of ElL policies. 
Compulsory insurance is asymmetric.  Firms can be required to have 
insurance but individual insurers cannot be forced to provide cover.  Given 
the various types of damage and the many types of cover and the wide 
range of premia and conditions for policies that insurers may offer 
concerning such damage, it will be very difficult to specify in the regulations 
how the compulsory insurance provisions would apply to all these diverse 
cases.  Moreover, given the potential rise in total damage costs to be covered, 
insurers would need many years until claims experience and risk assessment 
were developed to be able to calculate appropriate premia levels and to cover 
all firms for the various types of environmental damage.  Cover might 
therefore be very restrictive.  Furthermore, firms not being able to obtain 
insurance would be legally forced out of business. 
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The experience of compulsory insurance in Germany exemplifies these 
specific difficulties·.  The arrangements, initiated in 199V2, to df'al with 
compulsory insurance are sti1 not complete.  It is estimated that it will take 
several more ye~s before compulsory insurance comes into force .. This delay 
is because of the as yet unresolved problems concerning how to  set legal 
requirements to prevent insurers offering insufficient financial limits and 
narrow scopes of damage for high risk firms. 
Covering Ecologiazl Damage 
Insurers do not usually cover ecological damage due to the uncertainties 
concerning the valuation of environmental damage where there is no specific 
injured party whose property rights have been damaged and who can seek 
compensation and pursue a claim.  U the public bodies pursue the claims for 
ecological damage, then the insurers may argue that  .such ecological d.amage 
has not been suffered by a readily identifiable third party and therefore are 
not covered under some insurance policies.  The  possibility of claims from 
NGOs might make it difficult for insurers to set appropriate premia rates 
because ecological damage is not covered under most existing legal systems 
in Europe so that insurers in Europe do not have much experience regarding 
claims from action groups for ecological damage on which to set premia. 
Insurers consider that rights of action for NGOs.might increase litigation for 
insurers which would be passed on to industry through higher premia. 
Thus ecological damage raises significant problems concerning the valuation 
of the damage and determining what should be done with the compensation 
paymenu. (since there are no identifiable victims that could receive the 
compensation).  ~tead  of covering compensation for such unquantifiable 
damage, it might be more feasible to cover restoration of ecological damage 
in cases where the ecological losses can be readily identified and quantified 
(eg level of fish kill) and estimates can be readily agreed for  cost-effective 
and reasonable measures to restore the damaged ecological asset.  .  An 
example of this is Section 161  of the Water Resources Act in the UK. 
3.4.9  Potential Role of the Insurance Sector 
Insurers take the initiative and control the direction and scope of the new 
policies they offer.  They have the option to offer. cover of a restrictive nature 
and thus leave companies without insurance and vulnerable to liability 
actions, to be self-financed. 
A tension exists between the insurers' reluctance to insure environmental 
risk and the need for financial resources to support environmental liability. 
Insurers will need to be encouraged to increase their cover under ElL policies 
in parallel with the development of future environmental liability systems. 
Compensation of 
Many companies (particularly SMEs) have restricted financial resources  to 
cope with liability ~nd thus need insurance.  Areas which lack insurance are 
not necessarily financially covered because firms can become insolvent and 
leave contaminated sites as orphan sites. 
Once a firm is insured, compensation is guaranteed for any environmental 
caused by the firm which fall under an insurers' responsibility.  This reduces 
the chances of victims going uncompensated. 
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At present, little data are available on the level of environmental damage 
currently covered by insurance policies.  Nevertheless, estimates from 
insuranc-~ brokers of payments made by insurers for environmental  in 
Germany suggest that environmental insurance policies in Germany 
currently cover less than 170 of total environmental damage costs. 
The insurance sector has a financial system which pools resources from 
potential polluters which can be used if  pollution eventually occurs.  This 
reduces the need for individual firms to save sufficient resources in case of 
pollution incidents and thus have to divert resources from other areas of 
investment  However, a disadvantage of involving insurers is that they 
become another player which can become involved in litigation in 
determining responsibility for compensation payments. 
Promoting Prevention 
Environmental insurance premia can provide signals to the market on costs 
of environmental damage.  At present risk assessments for environmental 
insurance policies cannot be. sufficiently detailed to indicate accurately  the 
potential damage costs.  Due to this problem, and lack of systematic methods 
of assessing risk, there are no systematic discounts offered in premia levels 
for ·policyholders that manage to lower their environmental risks.  Where 
offered, discounts are limited to no more than 10%  of premia  for well 
managed firms.  Therefore, policyholders do not have a cost-effective 
incentive to adopt pollution prevention measures to obtain lower premia. 
The self-insurance components of insurance contracts offer more incentive 
for firms to reduce environmental risk. 
Compulsory Insurance 
Compulsory insurance would prove problematic for potential industrial 
policyholders.  Insurance companies would have the right to tum down high 
risk companies which would then either ·have to close or incur high costs to 
achieve a satisfactory pollution prevention standards to be considered for 
insurance cover. 
Insurers would try to limit cover for high risk firms through narrowing 
scope of insurance offered (eg by imposing financial limits on the level of 
claims that can be made).  To ensure adequate cover was being offered to all 
firms the governing body would have to intervene with guidelines.  In 
Germany, where compulsory insurance was introduced on a limited scale, it 
is proving difficult to reach agreement over these guidelines. 
Conclusion 
Insurance ·companies could play a potentially very important part in the 
application of an environmental liability system since they can spread the 
costs of environmental risks over a large number of firms.  This risk 
spreading role is particularly important for small firms, for whom the costs of 
an environmental incident could be very high if it were to arise.  · Therefore 
it will be important to take account of the views and interests of the 
insurance sector to ensure the sustainable development of a wider 
· environmental liability system. 
Insurance companies are concerned about their exposure to past pollution 
problems which they have inadvertently covered under General Liability 
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insurance policies.  Insurance companies are therefore trying to limit their 
liability for environmental  and develop more focused Environmental 
Impairment Liability (ElL) pLlicies.  However, t~e demand for ElL policies is 
currently limited.  Considerable time is required for ElL markets to mature. 
Insurance companies need greater experience with handling environmental 
liabilities in order to be able to assess the risks better and set premia 
accordingly.  Consequently, this suggests that any development of 
environmental liability policies and systems needs to be gradual and 
incremental rather than radical so as to expand gradually the insurers' 
experience and expertise \:_:;nceming environmental liabilities . 
lMPUCATIONS FOR BANKS 
Introduction 
This section examines the implications·of environmental liability systems for 
the banks to show how environmental liability  might affect the level and 
cost of lending to firms, especially SMEs, and to indicate how the banks 
might respond to possible alternative environmental liability systems, 
including in particular proposals for compulsory financial security measures. 
3.5.2  Potential Implications of Environmental Liability Systems on Banks 
Banks have the following concerns about the potential implications of 
environmental liability systems, especially concerning contaminated sites, for 
their lending operations: 
•  Contamination problems may reduce the value of the collateral assets that 
the bank has taken as security for their loan. 
•  The banks are concerned that they might be held liable for environmental 
liabilities of a firm to which they lent money on the grounds that either 
they knowingly permitted the polluting activities in that they advised the 
firm on its environmental risk management and provided a loan to the 
firm or because the bank takes over and exercises a charge over the firm•s 
property assets. 
•  The high transaction costs of the diligence procedures that the banks 
would have to carry out for their lending operations so as to reduce these 
potential liabilities. 
•  The extra effects on SMEs of the environmental liability provisions and 
the costs of the due diligence procedures. 
•  The practical difficulties of compulsory financial security measures and 
their particular implications for SMEs. 
Environmental contamination of a property could reduce its value or render 
it unsaleable so that, where the loan was secured against the value of the 
property, the bank cannot recover its loan if the firm becomes bankrupt.  In 
the UK, there is a further problem that, if a borrower is bankrupt, the bank 
may not be able to investigate the potential environmental liability, in order 
to ensure that the liability was less than the value of the property, without 
first taking possession of the site.  This action might render the bank liable 
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Consequently, in the UK,  the banks will respond cautiously and write off 
the debt rather than risk taking on the environmental liabilities.  This could 
increase the bank's bad debts. 
lmpliCiltions for SMEs 
Nearly all loans for small firms (with turnover of less than ab<?ut lm ECU) 
are secured on the firms' assets .. usually the property.  The loan often 
amounts to a~ound two thirds of the value of the secured asset, but the 
value of the asset could be reduced by potential environmental liabilities. 
Consequently the envirc;>nmentalliability provisions could have greater 
impact on small firms since they could reduce small firms' capability to 
borrow. 
Loans for medium sized firms are normally secured on either the firm's 
property or debenttue assets.  Loans for large firms are often unsecured. 
Hence environmental liabilities will have less impact on borrowing by large 
firms. 
3.5.3  Banks' Response to Existing Environmental Liability Systems 
There is currently limited awareness of the existing environmental liability 
systems on the part of banks in Southern European countries such as Italy. 
One bank interviewed in Spain does not carry out environmental audits for 
loans.  Another bank in Spain, though, does require sit~ inspection of high 
risk companies (  eg chemicals) and, in deciding on loans for a firm, this bank 
takes account of what risks are covered under the firm's insurance policy. 
Banks in. the UK are to some extent more aware of the implications of 
existing environmental liability policies .. most notably concerning the 
provisions concerning contaminated land recently debated and enacted in 
the Environment Act in 1995. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) requires 
that financial intermediaries in Eastern European countries, such as 
Hungary, develop and implement procedures to assess the environmental 
risks and liabilities of a firm requiring an EBRD loan.  This is prompting the 
banks in these countries to develop simplified procedures for assessing 
environmental risks for their own loans to small industrial firms. 
Effects of Uncertainties Concerning Environmental Liability Systems 
It is difficult to quantify the impacts for the banks of environmental liability 
systems since this depends on the detailed design of the liability policies and 
how they will be implemented and interpreted in practice. 
Even where the banks are aware of the general environmental liability 
systems, they are highly uncertain as to how specific provisions will be 
interpreted and implemented in practice and therefore how these provisions 
will affect them.  These uncertainties are particularly pronounced where the 
courts will determine how the provisions will be interpreted. 
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The banks are uncertain abou~ the likely incidence of environmental  arising 
and the cost of these environmental liabilities due to their limited experience 
so far concerning the assessment and valuation of en\ironmentalliabiiities. 
These uncertainties concerning environmental liability systems are likely to 
increase banks' caution in lending to firms in major polluting industries, 
especially SMEs. 
For example, the impacts of the contaminated land provisions enacted in 1995 
in L'-:e UK depend fundamentally on how the fL~rthcoming guidance notes 
will spell out the way in which the provisions should be interpreted, 
especially whether the banks can be deemed to be liable for a firm's pollution 
because they 'knowingly permit' an act of pollution by lending money to the 
firm concerned and where they have assessed a firm's environmental risks 
and advised the firm on pollution measures.  The banks have been given 
assurances that they will not be liable.  But if there is remaining uncertainty 
about whether banks could become liable, then this could discourage banks 
from assessing the environmental risks of firms and from suggesting that the 
firms implement pollution prevention measures. 
UK banks are concerned that they have to take on ownership of a collateral 
asset in order to be able to carry out a site investigation to determine the 
scale and nature of environmental liabilities at a firm to whom they 
previously gave a loan secured pn this asset.  This can then discourage them 
from carrying out such investigations since the potential liabilities could 
exceed the value of the loan (see above).  Consequently there is considerable 
interest in recent initiatives such as that between the banks in Canada and 
the Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy, under which the banks 
would be allowed to investigate a site without incurring liability for the asset 
provided that they alert the authorities about the environmental risks of a 
property that they do not take on ownership Cl>. 
Due Diligence Procedures by Banks 
In response to environmental liability policies, it is possible that the banks 
may carry out a desk based simple screening of firms.  This could include a 
search of a register of past uses of the site and a simple short questionnaire 
to the firm about its environmental problems and management systems.  The 
banks interviewed suggested that this might cost about 300 - 500 ECU, which 
represents an increase of 30%  over the bank's current costs of processing a 
loan.  However, it is possible that these additional costs could be reduced as 
environmental risk rating services are developed and applied more 
extensively. 
Banks' ~esponses to Future Environmental Liability Systems 
A stricter environmental liability system might lead the banks to require a 
site investigation of a firm prior to granting a loan.  The costs of such 
investigation would represent a larger portion of the loan for a small firm (of 
about 2-5%  of the loan) than a medium sized firm (about 0.5-1% ).  Hence 
this could have a larger impact on small firms. 
(I) Ministry of &tvirornnent and Energy (1995), Studard Asreemenl Concerning Environmental Investigations. 
Ministl)' ot Environment and Energy of Province of Ontario, CANADA.  This initiitive is reported in the fwnci~ 
T..-es Environmental Uabllity Report, Aprilt995. 
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require that a firm takes out an insurance policy to cover the potential 
environmental liabilities for their collateral assets. 
During interviews for the country studies, leading banks in the UK, Spain 
and Hungary commented that stricter environmental liability policies may 
prompt them to reduce their lending to firms in environmentally risky 
industries.  The reduction in lending might particularly affect SMEs because 
bank loans to small firms are normally secured on the firm's assets - often 
the firm's property.  This will compound the existing financial risks of 
lending to Sl\~'Es which prompts banks to require collateral for such lending. 
3.5.5  Implications of  Specific Elements of  Future Environmental Liability Policies 
]oint llnd Severlll Liability 
Strict environmental liability systems involving joint and several liability for 
·past and future environmental  would create significant uncertainties for 
banks concerning-the size of the potential liabilities for the individual firms 
for whom they have provided loans since it creates unlimited liabilities for 
the firms. 
These uncertainties would be particularly significant if the banks are 
themselves considered joint and severally liable for the environmental  and a 
deep pocket liable to pay for these liabilities.  Such joint and several liability 
provisions would substantially reduce and might virtually stop the banks' 
propensity to lend to environmentally risky industries. 
Compulsory Financial Security 
Compulsory financial security is sometimes advocated so that a firm has to 
make separate provisions to pay for its environmental  and to ensure that a 
firm's bankruptcy does -not mean that the environmental liabilities are not  · 
covered, as has happened in the cases of 'orphan' contaminated sites for 
which there is no financially viable responsible party.  Such provisions are 
designed to reduce the need for compensation funds to cover environmental 
liabilities. 
Possible measures to provide financial security to pay for potential 
environmental liabilities include: 
•  the firm setting aside financial reserves to pay for potential environmental 
liabilities.  This would entail significant opportunity costs since the firm 
could otherwise have used these financial resources for other investments. 
•  the firm setting aside some of its assets (eg property or land) as a 
collateral similar to the ~ay  firms provide collateral assets for bank loans. 
However, the firm's property might itself be affected by the 
environmental liability systems concerning, for example, contaminated 
land, which would reduce its potential value and use as a collateral asset, 
and also its ability to use that security for other borrowing. 
•  the firm providing a bond to be financed by an outside financial 
institution. 
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Compulsory financial security (of any type) would severely res.trict firms' 
borrowing caparit:-·.  Providing collateral assets as security for environmental 
liabilities would reduce the firms' collateral assets needed to support other 
loans.  This would particularly affect small firms for whom loans are usually 
secured against collateral assets. 
Small firms' assets may already be used as security for existing loans so that 
small firms would particularly have to resort to the last type of financial 
security provisions above- paying for a bond provided by an outsid:· 
financial institution. 
There are considerable uncertainties about the actual level of a firm's 
environmental liabilities and hence the size of the financial security that an 
individual firm has to provide.  For example, if the highest possible level for 
the environmental liabilities was five times greater than the most likely level 
(on average) and if each individual firm had to provide compulsory financial 
security for the highest possible level of its environmental liabilities, then this 
would lead to the resources being set aside by each individual firm to pay for 
environmental liabilities being five times greater than would be the case if 
the environmental liabilities could be pooled (eg by insurance) so that the 
overall damage was covered and the financial provision for any individual 
firm would cover the likely (average) level of the liabilities.  Hence 
promoting the development of environmental insurance is more attractive 
than compulsory financial security.  Compulsory financial security for an 
individual firm's highest possible environmental liabilities would be 
particularly costly for small firms who have a smaller base over which to 
spread the environmental risks. 
Consequently it would be difficult and costly to implement compulsory 
financial security provisions. 
The scope for bonds might be small and the level of any bond$ for a small 
firm would have to be low since it would otherwise unduly restrict its 
investment capability.  The low level of any such bonds might not be 
sufficient to cover the possible environmental damage. 
Retrospective Liability 
Banks, like insurers, would be adversely affected by retrospective liability 
since this might reduce the value of collateral assets and the risks of bad 
debts.  Moreover, the banks have not allowed for the costs of such liabilities 
in their past lending practices and charges and have not taken any steps to 
limit their exposure through, for example, due diligence procedures. 
Conclusions 
Banks face  great uncertainties concerning specific provisions of current and 
future environmental liability systems, which could significantly affect 
the value of collateral assets for their loans to firms whose sites are found to 
be contaminated.  Compulsory financial security provisions would raise 
considerable practical difficulties. 
The implications for banks lending would be particularly significant in 
respect of small firms, for whom the bank's transaction costs of assessing the 
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firms are usually secured on collateral assets. 
3.6  lMPUCATIONS FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTR£PRISES (SMEs) 
3.6.1  lntTOduction 
A firm's strategic response to liability and compensation systems for 
environmental damage depends upon a number of company characteristics 
such as size, nature of production, technology, resources and management 
style.  SMEs are not only small in size but have their own distinct structure 
and business approach.  Limited access to resources makes SMEs slow to 
deal with environmental concerns.  However, SMEs can be flexible and 
'innovative. 
This section therefore foCu.ses on examining the critical sectors where SMEs 
have a particularly relevant share of total activity and identifying how 
elements of an environmental liability system will particularly effect SMEs. 
3.6.2  The Importance of  SMEs 
Characteristics 
SMEs are not simply smaller versions of large companie~. SMEs have certain 
intrinsic features, notably limited access to capital, technology and 
information, rendering them vulnerable to their economic and regulatory 
environment  These characteriStics increase levels of uncertainty for SMEs in 
managing environmental issues and reduces their capability to handle legal 
disputes and actions. 
SMEs are usually unaware of their ~nvironmental impact and do not 
implement enviro~ental management systems as extensively as many large 
companies.  Given their lack of awareness of environmental issues and 
relatively low media profile, it more likely that they will cause environmental 
damage as a result of ignorance.  While small firms do not usually have 
significant environmental impacts, a SME's impact can be proportionally 
greater than its size and SMEs' collective impact can thus be considerable. 
SMEs are now being prompted to alter environmental management practices 
because of their position in the supply-chain of production.  As the majority 
of SMEs are situated mid-supply chain, they have to meet the demands of 
larger C\,JStomers.  As environmental strategies are implemented by larger 
companies~ they are also requesting suppliers to meet environmental 
standards, mostly for their products, but also for their production processes. 
Contribution to EU Economies 
SMEs play an economically very important role in European economies. 
They make up the bulk of firms, employ the majority of workers in the 
private sector and generate the greatest proportion of revenue.  In the EC 
countries, SMEs (1-499 employees) account for approximately 70%  of private 
sector employment and turnover.  SMEs are a key element of European 
competitiveness and a crucial source of new employment. 
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The following categorisation of European countries can be identified in 
respect of whether their share of employment o1  s1nall firms (less than 100 
employees) is: 
•  less than the EU12 average - Belgium and Germany; 
•  approximately the EU12 average (49-55%) - France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the UK;. 
•  higher than EU12 average - Denmark, Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
Therefore any effects on SMEs will be more pronounced in the countries in 
the last group compared with the other two groups. 
Percentage of SMEs in Selected Sectors of Industry 
Sectors with higher compositions of SMEs will be more affected by the 
reactions of SMEs to environmental liability system provisions than sectors 
with low numbers of SMEs. 
Comparison of  SME contributions to industry sectors in selected countries 
(approx.  SMEs' m % of total employment of  eRCh sector) 
France  Germany  Italy  Spain  UK 
chemical  na  20  60  80  30 
minerals and oil  na  20  na  20  na 
refining 
food, drink and tobacco  15  80  80  80  35 
timber and wood  90  90  99  99  75 
furniture 
manufacture of paper  80  65  80  90  60 
products 
Table 3.6a shows that the paper products sector and the timber and wood 
sector have consistently high proportions of SMEs across the countries and 
will be extremely sensitive to the levels of productivity and profitability 
achieved by SMEs.  The chemicals sector has a much lower level of SME 
employment, except in Spain where SMEs still predominate.  Therefore the 
chemicals sector will be less adversely affected by problems for SMEs of a 
stricter environmental liability system. 
Environmental Liability Elements 
The components of an environmental liability system which may 
disproportionably affect SMEs are discussed below. 
]oint and Several  L~bility 
Under joint and several liability, any polluter may be held liable for the 
entire restoration cost and then seek compensation from other responsible 
(I) Small and medium firms  are defint'd as firms with less than 500 employees.  Small firms are defint'd as firms with less 
than 100 employees. 
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different consequences for SMEs: 
•  SMEs will face the risk of being held liable for pollution damage costs, 
considerably in excess of their financial resources.  This high liability will 
be extremely difficult for SMEs to plan for, and could be financially 
damaging. 
•  SMEs may avoid payments if the plaintiff decides to sue a responsible 
party with the largest financial assets rather than the major source of 
pollution.  Large corporations will bear the burden of this 'deep pockets' 
effect, although the large corporations can then try to seek compensation 
from SMEs for their share of the cost of the environmental. 
Joiilt and several liability promot~s  litigation between disputing potentially 
responsible parties.  The costs of this litigation are likely to be relatively 
greater for SMEs than the larger firms disputing claims. 
Financial Limits on Liability C,lllims 
Predetermined financial limits for liability claims reduce uncertainties for 
SMEs and facilitate financial planning.  However, the maximum amount 
could still be too high for some SMEs, thus producing an advantage solely to 
larger firms.  These limits can affect insurance levels which can already be 
costly for SMEs. 
SMEs' limited financial capability may need to be separately considered, and 
financial claim limits set in relation to their turnover.  However, this would 
leave more of the damage unremedied. 
Burden of Proof 
Reversing the burden of proof onto· polluting firms could be particularly 
problematic for SMEs.  They would have to acquire information about the 
pollution problems in order to find evidence to disprove the pollution claim. 
Lack of in-house information and expertise will make the acquisition of proof 
over pollution particularly difficult for SMEs. 
Retroactive Liability 
Retroactive liability will increase uncertainty for all firms.  Uncertainty over 
historic pollution may be particularly high for SMEs because they are often 
not aware of pollution problems that they caused decades ago due to their 
poor'  management systems and low levels of record keeping. 
Retroactive liability is likely to prove financially damaging to SMEs as it 
would expose them to liabilities potentially large pollution incidents~  In one 
notable court case, a small firm had previously contaminated an aquifer.  The 
court decision was that the company was not liable.  However, if retroactive 
liability had been valid and the company declared guilty the consequent 
compensation payment would have led to its bankruptcy. 
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3.6.4  Pt~rticulllr Concerns for SM£s 
Cost of Due Diligence 
Insurance companies and banks may require site audits before offering or 
provi~g  insurance or a loan.  Audits are costly and are required by both 
financial backers and future insurers as part of due diligence during mergers 
and acquisitions.  The additional costs to pay for legal advice, for verifying 
the existence of hidden liabilities, through audits, can be a large burden and 
inhibit SMEs expanding through acquisition strategies. 
There are different types of audits which can be carried out: 
•  Compliance audits are used to check the compliance with environmental 
regulations.  They are frequently just desk based. 
•  Due diligence audits are used for mergers, acquisitions and disinvestment. 
They involve at least a preliminary visit and if necessary a site 
investigation to identify hidden environmental liabilities  and assess their 
magnitude.  They can typically cost between 2,500 and 6,500 ECU. 
•  Management system audits focus on the analysis of management systems, 
examining company environmental policy, the development of an 
environmental protection  programme and the preparation of adequate 
pollution prevention procedures and systems.  This type of audit is more 
detailed than the others.  Certification for EMAS involves one type of 
integrated environmental audit.  The costs of the measures involved in 
achieving EMAS certification range from 12,500 to 100,000 EC:U.  SMEs 
will be at the lower end of this range. 
The cost of an audit depends on the level of detail required, the size of 
operations to be audited, the complexity of the production processes and the 
maturity of the audit market.  Some economies of scale, therefore, exist for 
audits, but the audit cost per output unit will certainly be higher for smaller 
firms. 
There are also costs associated with adopting pollution prevention measures 
after a site assessment.  A due diligence site investigation may be a SME's 
first environmental assessment.  Therefore it may identify significant 
measures needed to be adopted before financing or insurance is granted, if it 
is granted at all, although such assessment can also yield benefits for the 
firms. 
Risk Management Capability 
Risk management is difficult for SMEs for two reasons.  Firstly, in contrast to 
large firms, SMEs do not tend to have already established environmental risk 
assessments and management systems in place so that implementing such 
systems will entail an additional task for them. 
Secondly, SMEs are more vulnerable to environmental risks since they are 
not as diversified as large firms; frequently their activities relate to a single 
product or process.  caused by one process may therefore have a significant 
impact on their total costs.  SMEs will be more exposed in case of an 
incident.  Yet they have limited management capability for prevention. 
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UabiLty risks could lead banks to take a more conservative approach to 
valuing fixed assets as collateral for loans.  SMEs usually have Jess internal 
financial resources or other ways of raising financing than larger firms and 
banks tend to require small firms to provide collateral assets for loans. 
Therefore environmental liability systems might restrict SMEs' borrowing 
capacity which would result in lower investment. 
Compulsory financial security provisions would particularly affect small firms 
who would be in most need of a bond by an outside financial institution. 
Compulsory financial security provisions could therefore severely reduce the 
investment capability of small firms (see Section 3.5). 
Cost of insurance 
SMEs have a  greater need for insurance than many large firms.  They do not 
have the possibility- t~ share and pool risk among different products or sites 
within their ownership, which larger companies can do to their advantage. 
Also SMEs, due to their size, have little opportunity for self-insurance. 
Therefore any attempts to increase the environmental liability insurance 
market needs to take into consideration the high cost of insurance for SMEs. 
The insurance premia can be high for SMEs because premia include fixed 
transactions cost which will be relatively higher for SMEs than larger 
companies, in relation to firm turnover.  The fixed transaction costs include 
site assessments and implementation and administration of policy and 
handling claims.  The transaction costs typically range between 25 and 40 
percent of a premium. 
Compulsory insurance may have a large impact on SMEs.  Firms which 
cannot afford to reduce environmental risks sufficiently will not be offered 
insurance and will be forced to close. 
However, future specialisation in the insurance market, where some 
companies target SMEs, may lead to some reduction in the premia for SMEs. 
The development of the insurance pools may also be advantageous.  The 
insurance pools can develop policies suited for SMEs and support SMEs 
through disseminating information. 
3.6.5  Special Provisions for SMEs 
So far, national liability systems have few special provisions for SMEs.  Some 
exceptions exist in practice.  For example, in the UK where, under the Water 
Resources Act, the National Rivers Authority (NRA) does not pursue small 
polluters for the recovery of costs of restoring water courses damaged by 
small pollution incidents. 
The cost of compliance of environmental legislation can be very high for 
SMEs, due to limited resources and a lack of economies of scale.  However, if 
SMEs are polluting then they should be made to pay for clean up.  It is not 
necessarily desirable to reduce payment obligations for SMEs. 
Nevertheless, possible areas of assistance for SMEs include: reducing 
uncertainties to help with financial planning;  perhaps reduce excessive 
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financial obligations to prevent closures; and facilitating access to finance 
and insurance to ensure p ,tential for investment and financial protection. 
Policies which would particularly assist SMEs in these areas of uncertainty, 
excessive cost and financing are:  · 
•  Not putting the burden of proof on SMEs; 
•  Setting financial limits for claims; 
•  No compulsory financial security; 
•  Supporting risk assessment through subsidising site audits. 
However, the first three of these measures would result in accordingly 
higher burdens of environmental damage costs being paid by victims. 
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COMPENSA170N FUNDS 
lNTRODUCTION, 
A significant proportion of environmental damage costs may not be 
financially covered by a responsible party (polluter or insurer) under existing 
environmental liability systems.  These include situations where: the 
resr'lnsible party cannot be identified because,_ for example, the responsible 
party has gone bankrupt; an identified party is incapable of making the 
required compensation payments.  Compensation payments may also only be 
made in part, if financial limits are imposed on payments under an insurance 
policy.  Several European countries as well as the US and Japan now have 
established compensation funds to finance these gaps of accountability in the 
liability system.  The funds raise finances for the specific purposes of  -
compensation or restoration of environmental damage.  There are many 
alternative ways to raise, administer and allocate finances for such funds. 
Each element can have important implications for t}.le role the fund 
eventually plays. 
Section 4.2 first identifies when it might be appropriate for a compensation 
fund to cover environmental damage.  Section 4.3  reviews briefly experience 
with various compensation funds in selected countries and summarises the 
major characteristics of the various funds to identify the main options 
available for policy makers when developing a compensation fund system. 
The effectiveness of the existing compensation funds are then compared. 
Section 4.4 then assesses specific elements of existing compensation funds to 
identify lessons for the EC regarding the use of different arrangements for a 
compensation ~d. 
A two stage research process was carried out.  Current reports on 
compensation funds in France, Sweden, Netherlands, Japan and Germany 
were reviewed.  Then interviews were carried out with members of the 
Ministries of Environment in the Netherlands and Japan. 
POTENTIAL ROLE OF COMPENSATION FuNDS 
Compensation systems are complements to, and not a substitute for, liability 
systems.  They are to be used to cover environmental damage for which a 
liability system cannot find the responsible party or the responsible party 
cannot pay.  It therefore can act as a 'safety net' for victims who otherwise 
would have not been able to seek compensation.  The essential principle of a 
compensation fund is that  are remedied or victims compensated, financed 
from a fund which in turn is financed by a collective group of polluters 
rather than by the general population (through general taxes) or by the 
victims (where  go uncompensated). 
In doing so funds can also function as a warning system, since claims to the 
fund could alert the government to the n~ed to develop policy in other areas 
of environmental liability.  Increased claims would show increased pollution, 
increased gaps in the existing liability compensation system or that criteria 
allowed for claims to be made were too broad leading to too many claims 
being made. 
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•  ¥'here no liable party can be identified. 
•  Where the liabl~ party no longer exists or is not sufficiently solvent. 
•  Where a large number of polluters and/or victims are involved and the 
transaction costs of proving liability and securing compensation would be 
high. 
•  EmergenC)  cases where there is an urgent need to restore damage quickly 
due to direct danger to health, the state of the environment or viability of 
local enterJ>rises. 
•  Where insurance will not or does not cover environmental damage or 
where the compensation to be paid goes beyond the limit of the ~urance 
contract  This may include damage to the unowned environment since 
insurers have stated that they are unwilling to insure such damage due to 
uncertainties concerning their valuation.  It might also include 
environmental damage that is self-insured in cases where the self insured 
firms become bankrupt. 
These circumstances occur with sufficient frequency that significant amounts 
of damage may not be compensated.  The issue therefore, is to ascertain the 
feasibility and desirability of the scope and mechanics of compensation funds 
for dealing with these outstanding environmental . 
Conflict in the Role of Funds 
There is, however, a fundamental problem with the role and construction of 
a compensation fund.  Due to a fund's role of providing compensation or 
clean up when the responsible party cannot be identified or cannot pay, a 
conflict may arise between the goals of the government and the interest of 
firms. 
Governments wish to use compensation funds to: 
•  ensure all damage is compensated/restored; 
•  ensure victims are compensated; 
•  minimise claims on the public purse; 
•  be able to intervene with a fund if remediation is too slow or transaction 
costs are too high. 
These goals lead to funds being raised from a collective group of polluters 
instead of individual responsible parties. 
Firms in general do not prefer this means of payment and compensation. 
F~:  . 
•  accept the polluter pays principle, but do not want to pay for other 
peoples' (especially competitors') pollution; 
•  need efficient incentives for pollution prevention. 
The pooling mechanism for raising finances to pay for compensation or clean 
up may not achieve the necessary incentives for firms to increase pollution 
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prevention and may go against the polluter pays principle < 1>.  Examples of 
these problems can be seen in the compensation funds detailed in \.ht 
following section. 
Experiences with Existing Funds 
This section reviews experience with various compensation funds in EU 
countries and Japan to identify lessons regarding possible compensation 
systems  . 
Role 
There are two main systems in operation to cover: 
•  Diffuse pollution from many sources.  Examples include compensation 
systems for claims made from sufferers of air pollution.  The damage can 
either be to health (covered, for example, in the Japanese compensation 
fund) or private property (eg crops and car coatings covered in 
Netherlands' compensation fund).  These funds are used because there 
are usually large numbers of polluters and individual liable parties cannot 
be identified. 
•  Orphan sites.  This includes the restoration of  contaminated sites. 
French and German funds target orphan sites.  These funds are used as 
liable parties no longer exist or are not sufficiently solvent to finance clean 
up. 
There is also a compensation system in Japan for dealing with large 
accidental pollution cases.  In Japan the compensation fund aids firms in 
fulfilling compensation payments which become excessive due to large 
amounts of damage.  This fund is also used for water pollution incidents. 
For example, funds were allocated to cover claims from the Minimata disease 
incident. 
The Swedish syste_m is more general and claims can be made for any type of 
injury and damage to property.  This would include air and soil pollution. 
Source of Funds 
The means of collecting financing is a critical issue because: 
•  The extent to which a fund can restore environmental damage and 
compensate victims  depends on the level of funds that are collected. 
•  The source of financing dictates who is held accountable for the clean up 
carried out by the compensation fund. 
•  The type of financing will give different signals to industry. 
The types of finan~g  in operation are: 
•  insurance premia surcharge (Sweden); 
(I) This is similar to the moral huard issue in insurance.  Both situations arise due to the free rider problem in which an 
individual's activities that increues ils environmental damage cosls ha.s little or no effects on its own costs since the 
damage costs are sprqd over aU  polluters through the contributions to the compenwtion fund.  Similarly,  th~ bmefils of 
a &a's prevention measures lo redu~ its mviron•~ntal liabilities will be spread over all firms. 
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•  air pollution tax Oapan); 
•  fees from licenses for waste (Ge:-many); 
•  landfill tax (France). 
Air pollution tax is effectively an extra emissions charge on the parties 
causing the damage compensated by the fund.  Fees from licenses for waste 
and the landfill tax also both create an extra charge for waste producers. 
Like the air pollution tax, this creates an incentive for firms to reduce their 
emissions of these pollutants which can be ;ndirectly related to the 
environmental damage costs. 
If  the tax on polluting i.ltdustries is proportional to the amount each 
company pollutes then an incentive measure is introduced for companies to 
adopt measures to reduce the emission of the charged pollutant.  This type 
of tax is only possible if the polluting substance causing the damage settled 
by the fund can be identified, such as the sulphur dioxide emissions causing 
bronchitis in japan. 
A compensation fund can provide inefficient signals to industry when claims 
do not change in proportion to pollution prevention expenditures.  This may 
happen when damage occurs or becomes evident some time after the 
pollution incident.  In Japan the financial contribution by industry to the 
fund rose in spite of industry's substantial pollution control expenditures to 
reduce emissions.  Oaims increased due to the time lag in the worsening of 
health of the victims after the pollution occurred so that claims actually went 
up after pollution had decreased.  As a result of industry complaints about 
the rising contribution, the Government decided in 1988 to allow no 
additional patients to claim compensation from air pollution related illnesses. 
·Administration 
The possible arrangements in existence to organise fund activities are: 
•  central government body (Netherlands, France, Japan); 
•  regional government (Germany); 
•  private sector (France); 
•  insurance sector (Sweden); 
•  polluting firms (France). 
These bodies take care of raising finances, distribution of funds and 
execution of actions. 
Funds can be administer~d at a national scale, as in France, the Netherlands, 
Japan and Sweden, down to a regional and local scale as in Germany. 
The option of scale will affect which government department is responsible 
for the fund and where finances can be obtained.  It also can affect where 
fund money can be allocated.  Regional governing bodies will have more 
control over clean up within their region under a regional fund than 
equivalent regional govemme_nts will have under national funds. 
In the US, the Superfund reform package set out by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) proposes to move towards decentralisation and 
localisation of the administration of Superfund.  States will have more 
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Table 4.2a 
authority in the allocation of funds and communities will have more 
involvement in the whole process. 
In France the privately run compensation fund had a short life as companies 
had little incentive to voluntarily contribute to the fund.  In Germany, the 
fund involving private company contributions also broke down when the 
fund attempted to widen its scope and thus increase the financial 
responsibility of the private members. 
Tl:ere is also the option to have cooperation between public ana private 
agents such as in Germany and Sweden.  In Sweden, the existing system for 
collecting insurance premia was used to levy contributions to the fund so as 
to reduce the costs of administering the fund (1>.  In Germany, by requiring 
industry to contribute to the fund, the public authority reduced the need to 
raise finances through alternative taxation. 
Claims 
Fina.nciallimits can be imposed for every claim or on the total amount that 
can be claimed per year per person.  For example, Sweden has limits on 
payments per year.  However, like many other funds, due to its lack of 
activity (in this case, lack of claims compensated) the effectiveness of this 
policy cannot yet be determined.  Japan laid down guidelines as to how 
much benefit could be claimed for different ailments per person. 
Scale and Effectiveness of Existing Funds 
Table 4.2Jl summarises the different levels of finances of each fund. 
Finances and Payments of  Funds (ECU) 
France 
Sweden 
Netherlands {soil) 
Netherlands {air) 
Japan 
Germany 
Level (ECU) 
lOM/yr 
14M cumulative 
~45M/yr 
2.4M/yr 
688M/yr 
<27M/yr 
Compensation  Coriunents 
target of 669 sites- too early to tell 
none cleaned so far 
no claims paid so far  despite no outlay the· 
government felt it fills 
gaps in liability 
4.8M/yr restored 
2.4M/yr  small but needs based 
so appears to have a 
limited role to play 
~ 
79,(XX) patients in 1994  collects substantial 
collecting 688M/yr  finances 
2,(XX) remedial actions 
The Netherlands' soil fund was set up under the 1992 Soil Remediation Law 
to pay for the restoration of sites contaminated before 1975.  It raises a large 
amount.  The German fund has been active, carrying out a total of 2,000 
remedial actions at sites by 1993.  The rate of clean up by the French 
compensation fund has yet to show how effective their contaminated land 
(1) It insuranc• premia reflect pollution risk ~~~~~. this 1ppro1ch can also provide a m.chanism to relate compensatifm 
fund contributions to relative shares of poUution. 
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contaminated land can be extremely slow. 
With air pollution compensation funds the finance (after transaction costs 
such as administration and litigation) go directly to victims.  Both the 
Japanese and the Netherlands funds raise finances retrospectively on a needs 
based system.  In this way all validated compensation claims are satisfied by 
the funds.  The Japanese fund raises the largest amount of funds for 
compensation purposes.  It is a relatively generous fund giving victims on 
average 9,000 ECU per year which suggests that a fund can sometimes raise 
significant levels of financing to provide large compensation payments.  · 
4.2.2  Lessons Leamt 
Drawing on the experiences of existing compensation systems the most 
common fund options with their strengths and weaknesses are discussed 
below. 
Role 
A key issue is how to design '! system that has sufficient funds to 
compensate victims which otherwise could not find a liable party from 
whom to seek compensation. 
•  Past pollution problems 
Contaminated land funds raise financing from existing industry, such as the 
waste sector in France and Germany, to restore historic pollution problems in 
the form of orphan contaminated sites.  Over time the firms who caused the 
pollution cannot now be identified or have become insolvent.  Compensation 
funds therefore provide a financing bridge between current polluters and 
past pollution.  The current polluters, however, did not cause the past 
pollution and that sets a limit on the extent to which current polluters can 
fund the clean up of past pollution.  This type of approach conflicts with the 
polluter pays principle and fails to create incentives to prevent pollution in 
future. 
•  Multi-source pollution 
A fund for air pollution damage compensation appears appropriate in certain 
circumstances.  There is considerable difficulty for injured parties to prove 
precise causality of damage to a polluting party (such as a factory).  Proving 
which industrial sector causes the damage is easier than pin-pointing the 
individual factory emitting the damaging substance.  Also there may be more 
than one factory contributing to the pollution damage.  Whenever there are 
multiple _p.arties liable for damage a compensation fund may be more 
appropriate than individual action under an environmental liability system 
since a fund has the capacity to raise compensation from the collective 
parties involved (for example taxing a sector of industry).  Japan's fund is a 
good illustration of the way a fund for multi-source pollution can function 
using the government to tax polluting industry.  Financing the fund by an 
emissions tax creates incentives for preventing future emissions of the taxed 
pollutant (eg soli waste level) and is consistent with the polluter pays 
principle. 
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damage covered manifests itself after a long lag.  When lag times occur 
claims can be increasing even though industry has reduced pollution levels. 
In Japan, despite sulphur emission levels having dropped since the 1970s, 
claims kept rising in the 1980s.  Eventually the government, in 1988, had to 
halt additional claims being made.  The increasing claims lead to increased 
taxation on industry which then gave firms little inducement to reduce the 
pollution damage any further because the taxation was based on claims for 
damage caused by past indusbial pollution levels. 
A broadly based fund could also be used to restore ecological damage to the 
unowned environment where the damage is caused by many polluters and 
remediation would benefit a large population. 
Scale 
A local compensation fund will more equitably benefit the industry providing 
the finance it as it cleans up the local area.  However, the common trend 
among the other countries is to establish a special body under the central 
government which can then utilize nationally raised funds (taxes) and 
national structures for the collection of revenues to finance national clean up 
or compensation payments. 
Source of Funds 
The two main options for financing funds are: 
•  from public funds through general taxation irrespective of who causes the 
pollution; and 
•  restricting taxation to the sector causing the pollution.  In this situation 
the tax should be proportional to the amount of pollution the industry is 
producing. 
A sectorally based .taxation system to raise funds for compensation payments 
can provide an incentive for companies to adopt measures to reduce 
pollution if the tax is levied based on the level of a firm's pollution (such as 
sulphur emissions or waste production).  The reduction of pollution levels by 
Japanese industry in the 1970s because of the sulphur emissions tax is an 
example of how this system can work. 
This approach is more possible for air pollution than for contaminated land. 
This is because air pollution emissions from factories can be monitored and 
because the taxed emissions can to some extent be linked to the 
environmental damage.  Thus this combines a compensation fund to remedy 
the environmental damage costs with an economic instrument such as a 
pollution charge to finance the fund. 
For restoration of contaminated sites, linking polluters to the damage to be 
cleaned up is complex.  Orphan sites exist specifically because the polluter 
cannot be found.  Often the guilty industrial sector, such as mining, has 
since decreased in size.  Other taxable sectors, such as the waste sector, taxed 
in Germany and France for compensation funds, are not the sectors which 
caused the environmental damage. 
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An alternative to raising financing for compensation funds is to fund clean 
up through general taxation.  The difference would be that the destination of 
the fu&1d.;  would not be earmarked at the time the funds are raised.  Taxes 
would be pooled and the remediation measures would be part of other 
governmental environmental protection expenditures. <t>  This creates a 
financing mechanism for the fund but no incentives for prevention. 
Compensation of the environmental damage has to compete with alternative 
pressures on Government spending. 
Administration 
The breakdown of the two funds (in France and Germany) which relied on 
the active involvement of industry suggest that a compensation fund should 
be organised by a public body.  Levying contrlbutions to a compensation 
twld is an area which may need public authority involvement because firms 
are unwilling to volunteer contributions to a compensation fund. 
However, industry's involvement not only increases the amount of funds 
which can be raised but can. reduce administration costs for the government. 
For example, contributions to the compensation fund in Sweden are based 
on the system for collecting existing insurance premia payments. 
Claims Basis 
The basis of claims is important for the effectiveness of a fund.  The 
conditions for the validity of a claim need to be carefully selected but not too 
limited.  Japan's compensation fund had so many claimants that it became 
financially burdened and had to restrict further claims.  Sweden's 
compensation fund, on the other hand, defined what it considered a valid 
claim in such a limiting manner that few claims were made and so far none 
have been deemed valid. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Advantages of Compensation Funds 
The advantages of compensation funds are that they: 
•  Provide a mechanism for cleaning up environmental damage and/or 
compensating victims of environmental damage which might otherwise 
not be covered under a liability system either because the individual 
responsible party cannot be identified (eg orphan contaminated sites) or 
because the costs of the environmental liabilities would be excessive for an 
individual firm. 
•  Funds may intervene when remediation is too slow. 
•  Funds may avoid complicated cases of litigation involving high transaction 
costs between multiple parties and victims. 
•  A broadly based fund could also be used in restoring ecological damage to 
the unowned environment, where damage is caused by many polluters 
and remediation would benefit a large population. 
{ll 1f the fund is allowed to be in deficit at times, it 111ay also facilit&te  the gradual adjustment of contribution ntes over 
time and handlin1 of the laged effect of pollution. 
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Limitations of Compensation Funds 
The limitations of a compensation fund are: 
•  Industry may resist additional costs through compensation fund levies 
where it appears that they are paying for significant amounts of other 
firms' pollution. 
•  Under a compensation fund system the polluter pays principle is not 
adhered to and the mechanisms of finance may not lead to efficient 
incentives for firms to adopt pollution prevention measures and reduce 
their environmental liabilities.  With a compensation fund the individual 
polluter,  or even the same polluting sector of industry, does not precisely 
pay for the restoration of the  it caused as they are paid for by the fund. 
•  Even when polluters are targeted it is often difficult to ascertain a finn's 
levels of pollution and its contributions to the environmental damage and 
hence its appropriate contribution to the fund.  H the individual polluter 
can be precisely targeted, then a compensation fund is not needed since 
other ins~ents  (including liability system) may be more effective. 
However, in cases where there are sources whose emissions can be fairly 
easily monitored and related to the damage (eg air pollution), then taxes 
on these emissions to finance a compensation fund to remedy the damage 
can be appropriate and can provide an incentive for firms to prevent 
pollution. 
•  Compensation funds can give perverse signals to industry where the fund 
covers the total level of claims made by victims and where the damage 
becomes evident some time after the pollutants were emitted.  This can 
result in the level of claims rising and consequently the level of industries' 
contributions to the fund rising, while industries emissions .have already 
reduced due to their implementing pollution control measures.  Thus, 
having already incurred considerable expenditures to reduce their 
emissions, the industries are faced by rising contributions to the fund. 
•  There is potential for the 'safety net' role of a fund to be abused because 
victims seeking compensation may make a claim to a· fund instead of the 
polluting parties if the fund is an easier option for compensation than 
trying to prove individual liability. 
SCille 
Some of the evidence might suggest that funds are better implemented at 
smaller scales such as regional or national as opposed to EU-level because: 
•  Smaller scales allow funds to isolate the financing base to the polluting 
sectors of industry and facilitate the polluter pays principle which is 
desired by industry. 
•  A local clean up program allows the taxed industry to enjoy the localized 
benefits of the clean up they paid for. 
•  Verifying and administering claims at the local level establishes local 
involvement and is more likely to lead to the adoption of cost-effective 
restoration standards.  EU-level organisation would increase the amount 
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each different scale. 
However, it is not possible in this broad review to give full answers to many 
questions related to the effectiveness of compensation funds, such as the 
optimal scale of a fund.  It is also not evident whether there are economies 
of scale with transaction costs so that administration costs decrease with 
funds of a larger scale. 
In addition to a large variety in the financial capadty of funds there is also a 
large variety in the structural arrangements of the funds in each country. 
Methods of financing, fund administration and types of damage covered 
vary across the countries depending on national characteristics, such as the 
structure of administrative/political bodies and.the government's views on 
possible sources of finance for remedying and compensating environment 
damage. 
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A6 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Audit: a physical assessment of a site's exist:illg and potential environmental 
pollution, and liabilities.  Audits can vary in purpose and detail of 
investigation. 
Benefit Transfer:  where the results of a valuation of environmental damage 
costs or benefits in one 1ituation is applied to value the environmental 
damage costs or benefits in another situation. 
Burden of proof: is a legislative provision which prescribes which party (victin& 
or polluter) must provide evidence of whether pollution caused a specific 
damage to occur, when a claim is put forward. 
Capital expenditures: investments made for a fixed  asset such as equipment. 
Claims  made:  an insurance policy trigger prescribing that the insurance 
company will only settle a claim made during the time an insurance policy is 
held by the insured. 
Compulsory financial security: a firm must cover its environmental liabilities by 
putting up an asset or financing a bond in case of due payments or 
bankruptcy. 
Contingent valuation method (CVM):  value is estimated from surveys where 
users and non-users are asked directly for their willingness to pay for the 
changes in the quality of an environmental asset. 
Deep  pocket syndrome:  under joint and several liability a claim. for costs of 
total cleanup can be brought against any one of the responsible parties. 
Often a victim will bring the claim against the party with the greatest 
financial resources (the deep pocket). 
Development risks:  The risks that a substance might be found to create 
environmental hazards, as a result of scientific advances in knowledge, after 
they had previously been considered safe. 
Dose response:  the relationship between the emissions of a pollutant and its 
physical impacts (eg the extent of tree or crop damage). 
Due diligence:  an audit to assess the state and level of environmental 
liabilities. 
Ecological damage:  when damage occurs to components of an ecosystem (eg 
loss of a species). 
Environmental liability:  when pollution from a party causes damage for which 
it legally would have to pay to compensate the victim or remedy the damage. 
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A7 Environmental Impairment Lillbility insurance where an insurance policy covers  _ 
specific environmental liabilities from a plant. 
Environmental expenditures: expenditures of firms with reference to the 
management of environmental problems or media (soil, air, water). 
Environmental valuation:  calculating through a specified methodology a 
monetary value of an environmental asset. 
Fault based liability:  where the polluter has  to be contravening a specific 
environmental standard set by the au!horities before the polluter can be 
liable for the damage. 
to a specific standard by the victim before the polluter can be liable for the 
damage. 
Financial limits: the maximum an insurer is liable under the insurance policy 
and will compensate the insured.  It may be expressed as 'per accident', 'per 
event', 'per occurrence' or 'per aru:tum'. 
First party damage:  when damage occurs to the polluter's own property or 
assets. 
First  verifiJJble loss:  an insurance policy trigger which prescribes that an 
insurance company will only settle a claim that is made when damage is first 
noticed and if it  is covered by a policy. 
Forum  shopping:  where the (multiple) parties are based in various countries 
and where the victim searches for the jurisdiction with the most favourable 
regime in which to bring the claim. 
Generalliabili.ty (GL)  insurance: a  li~bility insurance policy which covers 
employers liability, public liability and products liability as a 'package'. 
Hedonic pricing methods: a technique for valuing an environmental good on 
the basis of differences in the prices or rents for properties and land in areas 
with different environmental pollution levels. 
Insurance claim:  when the insured or the insured's beneficiary seeks payment 
from the insurer for damage covered by the insurance contract. 
Insurance premium:  the price of insurance protection for a specified risk for a 
specific period of time. 
]oint and several liability:  a legislative provision which allows a compensation 
(either by a victim for damage incurred or a public authority for costs 
incurred from remediation actions) to be sought for the total damage or 
cleanup cost from any one of the responsible parties regardless of the 
proportion of the party's involvement in the pollution.  This party can then 
seek compensation from the other responsible parties where possible. 
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AS Occurrence: an insurance policy trigger prescribing that an insurance 
company will only settle claims made anytime for an inc" dent as long as the 
incident occurred under an insurance policy. 
Orpluzn sites:  contaminated land sites where there is no identifiable 
responsible party for the contamination or an identified party is no longer 
capable of financing site remediation due to insolvency. 
F'.::llution  control expenditures:  both investment and current expenditure that 
is directly aimed at the prevention, reduction and elimination of pollution or 
nuisances that could have a harmful effect on the environment. 
Proportionate liability:  this is a legislative provision so that responsible parties 
are only liable for the proportion of the damage which they caused: . 
Residual damage:  the reduction in environmental quality remaining after site 
cleanup has taken place or from emissions that take place after the firm has 
implemented pollution control measures and complied with the 
environmental standards. 
Responsible party: an entity (such as an individual, a firm or a public sector 
body) which produced the pollution that caused specific and identified 
damage. 
Retrospective liability: same as retroactive liability 
Retroactive liability:  a legislative provision which allows compensation to be 
sought for damage caused by past pollution. 
Rights of action:  this is a legislative provision which determines what type of 
party eg victim, interest group or public authority, can put forward a 
compensation claim against a responsible party. 
Superfund:  Introduced in .1980 in US to make parties responSible for 
contaminating sites pay for their dean up.  Also known as CERCLA: The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. 
Strict liability:  this is a legislative provision which makes polluters liable for 
environmental damage they cause, regardless of whether they were 
complying with the prevailing environmental standards. 
Third party damage:  when damage occurs to the assets of a party. which did. 
not produce the pollution causing the damage. 
.  , 
Transaction  costs:  these are costs which are associated with an activity but do 
not directly contribute to it.  These can include litigation, administration and 
site assessment costs. 
Trigger:  an incident which gives rise to a claim.  In an insurance contract it is 
the component that specifies under what cirC\l?'stances a claim can be 
validly made. 
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A9 Type 1  environmental damllge costs: are defined for the purposes of this study 
·as environmental damage costs which can be fairly readily and reliably 
valued using more tangible valuation techniques such as estimates of the 
costs of restoring the damage or the level of defensive expenditures incw-red 
as a result of the pollution or the market value of the physical impacts of the 
pollution estimated on the basis of dose response function. 
Type 11 environmental dllmllge costs: are defined for the purposes of this study 
as environmental damage costs which are normally valued by other 
techniques such as hedonic pricing methods or consumer surveys, such as 
contingent valuation methods.  These valuation techniques are more difficult 
and involve greater uncertainties and potential for disputes, partly due to 
their greater subjective nature. 
Unowned environment: territory which is not classed as private property and 
thus lies in the public domain.  It includes natural habitats and species. 
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I ABBREVIATIONS 
BENELUX: Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg 
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act introduced in 1980 in the US - also known as Superfund.  It was 
designed to make parties responsible for contaminating sites pay for their 
dean up. 
CVM:  Contingent Valuation Methodology 
OM: Deutsch Marks 
EC:  European Commission_ 
EBRD:  European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
EFT A:  European Free Trade Agreement 
ElL:  Environmental Impairment Liability 
ELS:  Environmental Liability System 
EMAS:  Eco Management Audit Scheme 
EPA:  Environmental Protection Agency (US) 
ERECO:  European Economic Research and Advisory Consortium 
EU:  European Union 
SEAP:  The Fifth Environmental Action Programme of the EU 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GL:  General Liability 
NGOs: Non Governmental Organisations 
NRA:  National Rlvers Authority (UK) 
NIMBY:  Not In My Back Yard 
NOAA:  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
R&D:  Research and Development 
EcONOMIC'S  OF  WlLrTY: EC  DG  XI 
All SMEs: Small and Medium Size Entreprises 
UmweltHG: The law on environmental damage in Germany enacted in 1991. 
W1P: Willingness To Pay 
EcONOMICS  OF  Lil.siUTY: EC  DC  XI 
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Annex B 
·Summary of Current 
Environmental Liability 
Laws in Selected European 
Countries 
[To be provided upon receipt of summary 
table from legal study] • 
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Annex C 
Environmental Damage 
Cost Estimates in (Former) 
·West Germany • 
Table C.1  presen~ estimates of environmental damage costs for the former 
West Germany.  This U:  b.ned on a short review of some available published 
studies.  There is a lack of consistency of these studies in terms of their scope 
and valuation methodologies and the form in which the valuations are 
presented.  As far as possible, overlaps between the various independent 
studies have been removed and the studies' findings have been converted 
into as  consistent as possible a set of.estimates, which are presented in 1992 
prices.  But it has proved difficult to provide a perfectly comprehensive and 
precise set of estimates.  This table and analysis is designed to highligrt 
specific issues concerning categories of environmental damage costs that are 
relevant to policy making concerning environmental liability systems. 
The estimates have been broken down into the following environmental 
damage categories which ar:e relevant for policy making concerning·. 
environmental liability systems either because existing environmental liability 
policies focus on certain categories or because the merits and feasibility of 
environmental liability systems can vary between these categories. 
•  By environmental media into which the pollutants are emitted (air, water, 
soil/land) since existing environmental liability systems have tended to 
focus on discharges to specific environmental media such as  contaminated 
soil and water pollution. 
•  The type of environmental damage or receptor that is affected by the 
pollutant (eg damage to human health, forests, natural habitats) since 
some existing environmental liability systems (eg in Germany) focus on 
damages to human health and property (eg buildings).  Insurers are 
reluctant to provide insurance for damages to ecology and natural 
habitats (ecological damages). 
In addition, Table  C.1  distinguishes two types of environmental damage costs 
in respect of the techniques that have been commonly applied for valuing 
the environmental damage costs.  These are defined as follows: 
•  Type I are the environmental damages that have been valued in monetary 
terms using estimates of restoration cost or effects on defensive 
expenditures or values of marketable outputs where the changes in these 
outputs have been derived from dose response relationships or from 
estimates of defensive expenditures incurred as a result of the pollution. 
Table  C.1  indicates that these Type I damage costs account -f.or about one 
third of the total environmental damage costs. 
•  Type II  are the environmental damage valuations derived on the basis of 
other techniques (eg consumer survey techniques such as  contingent 
valuation).  There are less estimates available on these environmental 
damage costs, which are more subjective and subject to  greater 
uncertainties than the type I damage valuation techniques. 
The estimates for  noise includes valuations from willing to pay (WTP) studies 
on road traffic, rail traffic, air traffic noise and noise from factories, plus 
estimates of costs of illnesses associated with noise from road and air traffic. 
EcoNOMIO OF  LwmJTY,  VoL 1:  EC  DG  Xl 
Cl It does not include damage (eg hearing loss) from noise in the workplace.  It  ,. 
also does not include defensive ~xpenditures by victims (eg expenditures on 
double glazing}.  The estimates tor the value of environmental damage costs 
for noise for Germany appear higher than the estimates that have· been 
derived by other studies.  Thus Tinch  (J) estimates that the costs of traffic 
noise pollution in the UK amount to about 0.4 - 0.7%  of GOP.  It is not dear 
if this difference is due to differences in the methodologies adopted by the 
different studies or differences in noise levels and valuations. 
Table C.1  highlights the lack of available data on environmental damage costs 
for many types of damage - these items are denoted as NE in Table C.1. 
Important gaps concern waste disposal and type n damage cost estimates for 
the impacts of air and water pollution on human welfare and habitats and 
ecological damages and the impacts of air pollutants on historic buildings. 
(I) Tinch R (1995) n~  Valulion of Enviroaacatal ExteraaliUa.  bport prepart"d for lhe Oeputment of TranspoR. 
ERM EcONOMICS  EcONOMICS  Of l..aAB:l.m,  VOL  1:  EC  DG  XI 
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1.1 
PREFACE 
This report presents topic papers that were prepared as part of a study 
carried out by ERM Economics for the European Commission DG  XI  on: 
I 
. Economic aspects of liability systems and joint compensation systems for  · 
remedying environmental dtltnilge. 
Environmental Liability System  (ELS)  is the term used where civil law (and 
sometimes administrative law) provides for pollution victims to bring claims 
for  against polluters.  If polluters are found to be liable for the damage, they 
will then be required to compensate the victims or remedy the damage. 
Compensation Funds are usually designed to  operat~ when polluters can not 
be identified or can not pay to remedy the damage. The compensation fund 
then either compensates victims or pays to remedy the damage. The fund is 
financed by a collective group of polluters. 
Study Team 
ERM Economics' core team was supported in this work by a large. team of 
contributors including Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) of Italy and by 
researchers from the Universities of Bonn and Dortmund in Germany. The 
main inputs to the study of these and other contributors are shown below.: 
ERM Economics(Overall project tnilnagement,  UK country analysis,  US  review) 
Professor Helmut Karl, University of Bonn (Gertnllny country analysis) 
Professor Ingo Heinz, University of Dortmund (Estimates of environmental 
damage costs).  · 
• Dr Sven Erichsen, Jauch & Hubener (German  insurance industry) 
Dr Roberto Malaman and Dr Domenico Siniscalco, FEEM, (Italy country 
analysis,  small and medium sized enterprises) 
TAU Consultora Ambiental (Spain  country a.nalysis) 
ERM Hungary (Hungary country analysis) 
ERM Italy (firm  interviews in Italy) 
Mr Ted Buijs, Oranjewoud (Insurance industry, compensation funds and 
Netherlands country analysis) 
Professor Alistair Ulph (Simulations of industrial competitiveness) 
Professor David Pearce (Valuation of environmental damage) 
Dr Anthony Heyes (Economic analysis of policy instruments, future environmental 
damage).  · 
AI.MS OF THE STUDY 
This study was designed to analyse the economic effects of civil liability and 
joint compensation systems for remedying environmental damage, with a 
view to providing material on the basis of which the EurC?pean Commission 
can develop its policy in this field.  It focuses on the economic issues.  A 
parallel study was undertaken to examine the legal issues. 
ERM  EcONOMICS  EcONOMICS OF  l&ABIUJY, Vot II:  EC  DG  XI 1.2 
The study addresses the following issues: 
•  What are the economic implications of extending the use of 
environmental liability systems and/or compensation funds? 
•  What are the main economic effects of action and non-action of the EU 
regarding civil liability for environmental damage? 
•  What are the economic costs and benefits of alternative types of liability 
systems and compensation funds? 
REsEARCH METHODS 
. The study has been carried by a multi-disciplinary team drawn from several 
countries, and followed four principle lines of research: 
•  Existing studies; reviewing existing economic studies and experience in 
selected EU (and some non-EU) countries. 
•  Interviews and country analyses;  undertaking interviews with key economic 
actors (firms, insurance companies and banks) in selected countries. 
Interviews 
The research focused on five  countries selected to be representative. of the 
range of approaches to environmental protection and stages of development 
of liability systems in Europe.  These countries were: 
•  Germany; 
•  Italy; 
•  Spain; 
•  UK; 
•  •  Hungary. 
Specific research was also carried out in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, 
France and Japan, and the US  exp~rience of Superfund was also  reviewed~ 
Interviews were carried out with 16 insurance companies, 7 banks and 63 
industrial firms in the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain and Hungary to assess the 
costs and implications of existing environmental liability systems and to seek 
views on current and possible future liability systems and compensation 
funds.  The industrial interviews, covered the following sectors: 
•  chemicals, petrochemicals, oil production and refining; 
•  pulp and paper; 
•  pharmaceuticals; 
•  leather tanning; 
•  electronics; 
•  wood treatment; 
•  mining; 
•  iron and metals. 
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• CONTENTS 
This Volume II to the Main  Report presents topic papers on tne following 
issues of particular concern for this study: 
1  Valuation of enviro~ental damage costs 
2  Impacts of environmental liability systems on the competitiveness of 
industry. 
3  Economic implications for the insurance sector of covering 
environmental damage 
4  Implications for small and medium sized entreprises (SMEs) 
5  Compensation funds 
6  Review of Economic Implications of Supe~und in the US 
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1.1 
INIRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION AND 0BJECTWES OF TOPIC PAPER 
Sound and uncontroversial environmental valuation techniques are ideally 
desired for the implementation of an environmental liability system.  An 
Environmental liability systems involves actual financial payments. 
Consequently, doubts about the robustness of the underpinning valuation 
techniques creates the potential for costly disputes, although the 
implementation of an environmental liability systems could itself significantly 
increase the application and robustness of techniques to value environmental 
damage - as has occurred in the US. 
The valuation of environmental damage costs both for individual cases and 
at the aggregate level (see Section  2.1  of the Main Report) concerns the main 
parties involved in making key decisions concerning an environmental 
liability systems: 
•  the Courts who determine the appropriate the level for the damage costs; 
•  the authorities who would have to determine the appropriate level for the 
environmental damage costs to be recovered from polluters (in 
administrative liability cases); 
•  the firms who would have to determine the level of their environmental 
liabilities and the extent to which they should implement pollution 
prevention measures to reduce these liabilities; 
•  the insurers who would have to  determine the extent of their possible 
exposure for environmental liabilities so as to determine whether it is 
worthwhile for them to offer insurance and, if so, the appropriate level of 
premia to set for such policies; 
•  the banks who would have to determine: the extent of environmental 
liabilities for firms  to  whom they provide loans and their effect on the 
bank's bad debts; and also whether the banks would provide bonds for 
the environmental liabilities of firms; 
•  the victims who need to know the level of environmental damage costs to 
press for. 
This topic paper therefore examines the existing techniques for valuing 
various types of environmental damage costs with respect to  their adequacy 
for the implementation of environmental liability systems. 
In addition, this topic paper examines briefly any variations in the valuation 
techniques that are commonly applied in different European countries so as 
to indicate how an EU  wide environmental liability system could be 
consistently applied across the EU. 
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1.1 1.2  CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING VALUATION TECHNIQUES  . 
A key issue for the effective and efficient operation of a liability and 
compensation system for remedying environmental damage is how adequate 
are the existing available techniques for determining a monetary valuation 
for the environmental damage costs in question. 
Criteria for assessing the adequacy of existing valuation techniques to fulfil 
this role are: 
•  Robustness of the valuations and hence the scope for disputes.  This 
concerns the following issues: 
•  The validity of the assumptions that have to be made concerning key 
variables on which data are lacking. 
•  To what extent different valuations have been or can be produced by 
the plaiiltiffs and victims due to differences in approaches, 
methodologies, data and assumptions; and hence what is the incentive 
for both parties to incur transaction costs in commissioning separate 
studies and critiques of each other's studies. 
•  Extent of disputes or consensus about the appropriate approach and 
methodology for valuing the environmental damage costs. 
•  Public acceptance of the valuations. 
•  Acceptance of the techniques by the courts. 
•  Practicability in terms of availability of data. 
•  Costs of acquiring data and applying the valuation techniques. 
Whereas some valuation techniques may be appropriate for determining 
approximately the significance of environmental damage to input into the 
environmental policy making process, their application· for an environmental 
liability system entails much stricter tests in respect of the criteria outlined 
above. 
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2.1 
• 
REVIEW OF TECHNIQUES FOR VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
COSTS 
TECHNIQUES FOR  VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE COSTS 
Major possible types of environmental damage costs are use values which 
include: 
•  Losses of economic outputs such as reduction in yields in agriculture or 
forestry due to air pollution. 
•  Extra defensive ·expenditures incurred by individuals or firms such as 
increased expenditures on repainting or replacing materials damaged by 
air pollution or expenditure incurred to prevent damage arising (eg 
moving stock animals away from a polluted site). 
•  User damage costs such as lower or impaired recreation benefits due to 
water pollution or damage to forests caused by air pollution or destruction 
of natural habitats. 
In addition, there can be non-use values which include: 
•  Welfare losses to individuals who do rtot currently use the affected 
environment but derive welfare benefits from having the option of doing 
so or from knowing about the quality of the environmental assets 
(existence values). Such non-use values were particularly significant in the 
case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill since few people would actually visit the 
affected area (Prince William Sound in Alaska) but nonetheless expressed 
a high valuation for the damage costs to this remote area. 
•  Intrinsic valuations of damage to the natural environment for its own 
sake rather than the above valuations which concern losses of human 
welfare arising from damage to environmental assets. 
The uncertainties and difficulties of valuation become progressively greater 
as one moves down the above list of possible types of environmental damage 
costs. 
The four main steps invqlved in the valuation of environmental damage 
costs include: 
•  identifying and estimating the level of the discharges of the pollutants 
that caused the damage; 
•  converting the discharges into ambient concentration levels of the 
pollutants; 
•  assessing the physical impacts of these ambient concentrations through 
the use of dose response relationships; 
ERM  EcoNOMICS  EcoNOMICS  OF  LiABILm', VoL 11: EC DG Xl 
1.3 •  assessing the economic valuation (and significance) of these impacts. 
The lack of information, uncertainties and sc.~pe for controversy are more 
pronounced as one moves towards the ,last step. 
The techniques for the economic valuation of environmental damage costs 
include: 
•  Estimating the costs of restoring the damaged environmental asset.  It is 
relatively easy to obtain such cost estimates.  However, this technique 
does not estimate the value of the damaged environmental asset as such, 
which might be more or less than the costs of its restoration.  Hence it 
should really only be used when it is not feasible to obtain a proper 
valuation of the asset in question.  In addition, this technique raises 
important and difficult issues concerning definition of the standards to 
which the asset should be restored since using a cost-effective fitness for 
use standard entails much lower costs than restoring the environment to 
its original condition (1),  which can be difficult to specify. 
•  Estimating the defensive expenditures incurred as a result of the 
pollutants (eg the costs of protecting, cleaning, repairing or repl~cing the 
affected assets such as materials and buildings). 
•  Market based approaches which apply existing market prices to the 
physical impacts estimated through dose response relationships (eg 
changes in yields of agricultural.crops or timber due to air pollution). 
These valuation techniques can be fairly readily applied to cierive directly 
tangible estimates of damage costs for certain types of environmental 
damage, although considerable uncertainties and potential for disputes still 
remain concerning the estimates.  These environmental damage costs are 
termed type I environmental damage costs in Section 2.2.2 of the main report. 
In addition, there are the following types of techniques for valuing 
environmental damage costs which involve greater uncertainties and 
difficulties - these are  t~rmed type II environmental damage costs in Section 
2.2.2 of the main report. 
•  Travel costs methods which have been used to assess impacts on 
recreation where the extra travel costs that consumers pay to visit a 
recreation site, instead of an alternative, are used to estimate the value of 
damage costs to this site (eg water pollution at a lake). 
•  Hedonic pricing methods where the differences in prices or rents for 
properties and land in areas with different environmental pollution levels 
(eg noise or air _pollution) are analysed to indicate the value of damage 
costs from these pollutants. 
(I) BratUe/IRI  (1995)  Assessment of Cost Savings Resulting from  Implementation of the CMA Remedy Selection 
Approach.  Report prepared for the Chemical Manufacturers Association, USA. 
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• 
I 
I •  Analysis of wage differentials for workers in environmentally risky 
oc~pations.  · 
•  Surveys where users and non-users are asked either directly for their 
willingness to pay for the changes in the quality of an environmental 
asset (eg loss of a natural habitat, damage to a lake or river) (contingent 
valuation methods (CVM))  or their willingness to pay estimates are 
derived from their responses to questions about their relative preferences 
for the environmental impacts (  eg noise or air pollution emissions from 
traffic) compared with an item involving a monetary payment (eg fares) 
(stated preference techniques). 
•  Benefit transfer methods where the valuations derived from any of the 
above studies for other situations are applied to the particular case. 
Navrud and Pruckner (1996)  (I) review the existing studies involving the 
above valuation techniques and found that some hedonic pricing studies 
were carried out in Europe and the US in the 70s and early 80s, but that 
there has since been a move away from hedonic pricing and travel cost 
techniques towards contingent valuation methods. 
They also state that benefit transfer methods compound the uncertainties 
due to potential for disputes about the valuations made in the original study 
and its applicability to the case in question.  They conclude that benefit 
transfer is best suited for deriving ball park estimates to guide policy 
development, but that their use is not defensible for environmental liability 
cases (Navrud and Pruckner (1996)  p9).  Consequently, original damage 
valuation studies are likely to be needed for environmental liability cases 
entailing considerable transaction costs. 
Table 2.1a identifies some possible techniques for valuing the environmental 
damage cost categories examined in Annex C of the Main Report (see Table 
CJ) and highlights some issues regarding the current state of the art in their 
application.  · 
•  The valua-tion techniques have been most extensively applied for the 
traditional pollutants (eg acid rain) on which there is  a body of experience 
and data on their application. 
•  The least knowledge, experience and data are available on the main 
emerging pollution problems (such as health impacts of chronic toxic 
water and air pollutants) about which there is  currently the greatest 
uncertainty and concern. 
(I) Navrud, S,  Pruckner, G J (1996) Environmenbl Valuation -To use or not to  lL<>e?  A comparative study of the United 
Sbtes and Europe.  Forthcoming in  Environmental and Resources Economics. 
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a
l
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
l
i
f
e
?
 
H
e
a
l
h
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
P
a
r
t
i
t
w
.
e
 
M
a
t
t
e
r
,
 
P
e
a
r
c
e
 
A
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
C
r
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
(
1
9
9
6
)
 
U
n
c
e
r
t
a
l
r
t
l
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
d
s
p
u
t
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
d
i
n
g
s
;
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
s
 
8
e
n
e
f
l
 
o
f
 
A
e
O
O
c
i
n
g
 
S
0
1
 
e
n
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
,
 
E
C
O
T
E
C
 
F
a
i
t
y
 
w
e
i
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
s
h
e
d
;
 
n
e
e
d
 
l
n
v
e
r
t
o
r
y
 
o
f
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
 
(
 
1
9
9
4
)
.
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d
;
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
r
t
i
e
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
d
o
s
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
r
e
l
c
O
l
n
s
h
i
p
s
 
f
o
r
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
p
o
l
u
t
c
n
s
 
O
t
m
a
n
 
C
~
a
l
 
S
t
u
d
y
,
 
W
i
l
l
i
s
 
(
1
9
9
4
)
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
O
z
o
n
e
 
o
n
 
W
h
e
a
t
,
 
B
r
o
w
n
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
6
)
.
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
A
m
o
c
o
 
C
a
d
i
z
 
o
l
 
s
p
i
l
l
 
(
B
o
n
n
i
e
u
x
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
i
n
e
l
l
i
 
(
1
9
9
1
)
)
 
S
e
e
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
 
o
f
 
i
t
e
r
p
r
e
t
i
n
g
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
.
 
F
a
i
t
y
 
w
e
t
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
s
h
e
d
;
 
U
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
i
e
s
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
d
o
s
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
r
~
h
i
p
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
p
o
l
u
t
a
r
t
s
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
d
a
t
a
 
o
n
 
t
o
u
r
i
s
m
 
(
v
i
s
l
o
r
 
r
u
n
b
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
s
)
 
s
o
 
t
h
a
 
s
u
r
r
o
g
a
t
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
n
e
e
d
e
d
 
(
b
r
e
a
d
 
c
o
n
s
L
m
p
t
i
o
n
)
;
 
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
 
.
o
f
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
n
g
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
o
f
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
a
b
s
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
o
~
 
s
p
i
n
.
 
D
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
n
g
 
e
x
t
e
n
t
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
;
 
D
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
-
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
j
u
s
t
 
i
n
c
r
e
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
l
.
J
'
e
s
 
o
r
 
s
h
o
r
t
 
o
r
 
l
o
n
g
 
r
u
n
 
m
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
a
d
d
•
i
o
n
a
l
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
u
s
e
d
.
 •
 
R
e
c
e
p
t
o
r
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
P
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
V
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
T
e
c
f
v
l
i
q
u
e
 
E
x
a
m
p
l
e
 
A
d
e
q
u
a
c
y
 
L
a
n
d
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
r
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
s
o
i
l
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
r
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
s
i
t
e
s
 
D
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
{
?
u
s
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
s
t
-
(
C
a
r
r
e
r
a
 
a
n
d
 
R
o
b
e
r
t
i
e
l
l
o
 
(
 
1
9
9
3
)
)
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
t
n
e
s
s
 
f
o
r
 
u
s
e
 
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
)
:
 
V
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
s
i
t
e
s
 
n
e
e
d
i
n
g
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
;
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
r
t
 
d
a
t
a
 
o
n
 
s
i
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
c
o
s
t
s
.
 
C
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
~
e
r
s
 
W
T
P
 
S
l
l
f
V
e
y
S
 
N
i
t
r
a
t
e
 
P
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
,
 
H
a
n
l
e
y
 
1
9
8
9
.
 
U
s
u
a
l
 
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
C
V
M
 
a
p
p
l
e
s
.
 
M
m
 
s
t
u
d
y
,
 
P
r
e
s
s
 
1
9
9
5
.
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
r
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
a
q
u
i
f
e
r
 
o
r
 
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
w
a
t
e
r
 
C
a
m
b
r
i
d
g
e
 
W
a
t
e
r
 
C
o
 
v
s
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
C
o
u
n
t
i
e
s
 
N
o
 
d
i
s
p
u
t
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
f
 
c
l
a
i
m
 
a
n
d
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
s
u
p
p
l
y
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
L
e
a
l
h
e
r
 
o
f
 
r
e
m
e
d
y
i
n
g
 
c
o
r
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
a
q
u
i
f
e
r
 
W
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
a
l
t
e
m
6
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
c
o
s
t
-
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
f
o
r
 
C
h
e
n
i
c
a
l
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
r
s
 
~
e
 
a
v
a
l
a
b
l
e
 
(
e
g
 
a
l
e
m
a
t
i
v
e
 
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
s
)
;
 
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
o
s
t
-
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
t
r
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
d
e
t
e
m
i
n
a
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
r
t
t
r
i
y
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
~
r
f
\
J
l
d
 
s
l
e
s
 
~
-
F
o
r
e
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
v
e
o
o
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
D
o
s
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
r
e
t
e
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
s
,
 
p
l
u
s
 
v
a
k
a
i
o
o
 
b
y
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
t
o
 
F
o
r
e
s
t
s
 
I
n
 
E
l
l
'
o
p
e
 
F
a
i
r
t
t
 
w
e
i
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
s
h
e
d
;
 
f
r
o
m
 
d
e
t
e
r
i
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
r
e
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
d
u
e
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
t
V
1
d
 
t
o
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
 
o
f
 
d
e
t
e
m
0
1
g
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
 
a
i
r
 
p
o
h
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
e
g
o
n
e
 
p
r
o
f
l
:
s
 
p
r
o
f
t
s
 
w
l
h
o
d
 
a
i
 
p
o
b
i
o
n
;
 
l
o
n
g
 
l
a
g
s
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
p
o
l
u
t
a
t
s
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
 
t
r
e
e
s
;
 
d
i
s
p
l
j
e
s
 
a
b
<
U
 
d
o
s
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
s
.
 
R
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
S
t
n
e
y
s
 
o
f
 
v
i
s
l
o
r
s
'
 
v
i
e
w
s
 
o
n
 
i
n
p
a
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
W
T
P
 
R
e
c
r
e
c
6
l
n
a
l
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
F
o
r
e
s
t
s
,
 
W
i
l
l
i
s
 
a
n
d
 
S
e
e
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
f
o
r
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
s
 
r
e
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
 
b
u
l
d
i
1
g
s
 
t
o
 
p
r
e
v
e
r
t
 
t
h
e
m
 
B
e
n
s
o
n
 
(
1
9
9
1
)
 
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
c
o
s
t
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
 
O
t
t
o
 
H
e
d
o
n
i
c
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
M
e
t
h
o
d
 
G
c
.
r
o
d
 
a
n
d
 
W
l
l
s
 
(
1
9
9
1
)
 
M
e
r
1
o
 
a
n
d
 
S
i
g
n
o
r
e
l
l
i
 
(
1
9
9
0
)
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
m
e
d
y
i
l
g
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
 
(
e
g
 
r
e
p
l
a
r
t
 
t
r
e
e
s
)
 
f
a
l
r
t
t
 
e
a
s
y
 
t
o
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
;
 
t
u
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
d
s
p
t
f
e
s
 
o
r
 
r
e
c
r
e
c
m
g
 
a
 
f
o
r
e
s
t
 
o
r
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
 
e
l
s
e
w
h
e
r
e
 
a
b
c
J
t
j
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
r
e
a
s
o
n
<
t
b
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
m
o
s
t
 
c
o
s
t
-
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
;
 
A
r
e
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
 
t
r
e
e
s
 
a
n
 
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
 
s
u
b
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
?
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
o
n
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
f
o
r
e
s
t
 
N
o
n
-
u
s
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
o
p
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
s
 
o
f
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
N
o
r
f
o
l
k
 
F
o
r
e
s
t
 
(
f
o
r
t
h
c
o
m
i
n
g
)
 
B
a
t
e
m
a
n
.
 
S
e
e
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
f
o
r
 
S
l
i
'
V
e
y
s
 
o
f
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
;
 
F
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
L
o
s
t
 
y
i
e
l
d
S
/
c
a
t
c
h
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
E
C
O
T
E
C
 
{
1
9
9
4
)
.
 
F
a
i
r
1
y
 
S
l
r
a
i
g
t
t
 
f
o
r
w
a
r
d
,
 
b
d
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
 
o
f
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
i
n
g
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
;
 
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
 
o
f
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
p
o
s
l
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
f
i
s
h
i
n
g
 R
e
c
e
p
t
o
r
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
W
a
t
e
r
 
s
u
p
p
l
y
 
E
x
t
r
a
 
w
a
t
e
r
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
r
t
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
b
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
b
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
c
i
d
 
l
o
s
s
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
m
e
d
y
i
n
g
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 
t
o
 
w
a
t
e
r
 
c
o
u
r
s
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
w
a
t
e
r
 
p
o
h
i
o
n
 
i
l
c
i
d
e
n
t
 
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
r
e
s
t
o
r
e
d
 
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
k
J
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
n
-
u
s
e
r
s
'
 
v
a
k
J
e
s
 
P
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
V
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
T
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
e
x
i
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
W
T
P
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
s
t
o
c
k
i
l
g
 
r
i
v
e
r
,
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
m
e
d
i
a
l
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
s
 
o
f
 
u
s
e
r
S
/
V
i
s
l
o
r
s
 
t
o
 
n
a
t
\
J
'
a
l
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
T
c
u
i
s
m
 
a
n
d
 
u
s
e
r
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
s
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
I
m
p
a
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
t
o
t
l
i
s
m
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
s
 
o
f
 
u
s
e
r
s
 
M
a
c
M
i
a
n
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
1
9
9
4
.
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
1
6
1
 
o
f
 
W
a
t
e
r
 
R
e
s
<
U
c
e
s
 
A
c
t
 
i
1
 
U
K
;
 
N
R
A
'
s
 
g
u
i
d
a
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
s
 
l
q
)
a
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
A
m
o
c
o
 
C
a
<
i
z
 
(
B
o
m
i
e
u
x
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
i
n
n
e
l
 
(
 
1
9
9
1
 
)
)
 
F
o
o
t
n
o
t
e
:
 
W
T
P
 
=
 
w
h
a
t
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
w
i
l
l
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
p
a
y
 
t
o
 
s
e
c
u
r
e
 
o
r
 
p
r
e
v
e
n
t
 
a
n
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
-
W
T
P
 
u
s
u
a
l
l
y
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
b
'
f
 
S
l
i
V
e
y
s
 
o
f
 
i
l
d
t
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
.
 
A
d
e
q
u
a
c
y
 
N
R
A
'
s
 
g
U
d
a
n
c
e
 
f
d
a
t
e
s
 
c
o
s
t
 
r
e
c
o
v
e
r
y
;
 
t
u
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
o
n
 
e
n
v
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
p
o
b
i
o
n
 
i
l
c
i
d
e
f
t
;
 
d
s
p
c
t
e
s
 
a
b
o
t
.
t
 
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
s
t
o
c
k
e
d
 
f
i
s
h
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•
 •  The long time lags before many current pollutants create perceived 
da~age (eg increased deaths or illnesses) increase the uncertainties and 
disputes about damage costs and the difficulties of valuing them. 
•  Lack of baseline data, especially on environmental conditions before the 
incident, makes it difficult to assess the damage caused by an incident. 
There are uncertainties concerning the survey techniques, such as contingent 
valuation, to determine individuals' willingness to pay for the remediation of 
intangible environmental damage costs such as damage to the natural 
environment.  These uncertainties concern: 
•  whether the respondents can adequately comprehend the changes in 
environmental conditions; 
•  whether the questioner providing information on the environmental 
conditions biases the respondents' views; 
•  the specific manner in which the questions are posed; 
•  how respondents have interpreted these questions; 
•  which specific aspects of the environmental conditions that respondents 
are giving valuations; 
•  how respondents have interpreted the questions; 
•  possible biases in respondents' valuation such as over estimating the value 
where they think they will not in fact have to  pay (free rider issues); 
•  whether the sample is representative and how the findings should be 
interpreted and grossed up.  · 
Moreover, the value of these intangible environmental damage costs are 
essentially determined by the public preferences which are difficult to 
anticipate.  Public concern about environmental damage, especially for 
damage to natural habitats, is likely to keep rising in the future as incomes 
rise and with increasing pressures on a declining stock of natural habitats. 
As  a result, it would be difficult for insurers to anticipate and predict what 
the public's preferences and valuations will be and hence what could be 
their liabilities for ecological damage due to a pollution incident that might 
arise some time in the future. 
Table  2.1 b presents US  data showing that different studies yield estimates for 
the same environmental good that vary significantly by up to a factor of 
three.  This is due to  differences in the valuation techniques adopted (eg 
CVM or travel cost method(TCM)) and differences in the assumptions (eg for 
value of time for leisure trips).  Very few  studies in Europe have applied 
more than one technique to a problem.  One study in Italy found that TCM 
and CVM  gave similar figures for the value of recreational benefits at a lake. 
ERM  EcONOMICS  EcONOMICS OF  LIABILrTY,  VOL II: EC DC XJ 
1.9 Table 2.1b  Differences in Values Given by Different Studies 
CVM Results 
Study  Commodity  Value 
Knetsch&  Recreation Days  $1.71  per 
Davies, 1966  household per 
day 
Bishop and  Hunting Days  $21  per permit 
Heberlein, 1979 
Desvouges,  Water quality 
Smith  improvements: 
&McGivney, 1983 
loss of use  $21.41 
boatable to  $12.26 
fishable 
boatable to  $29.64 
swimmable 
Seller, Stoll &  Boat Permit to: 
Chavas, 1984 
Lake Conroe  $39.38 
Lake Livingston  $35.21 
Lake Houston 
$13.01 
Thayer, 1981  Recreation Site  Population value 
per household 
per day 
$2.54 
Brookshire et al.,  Air quality  Monthly value 
1982  improvements: 
poor to  fair  $14.54 
fair  to good  $20.31 
Brookshire et al.,  Natural hazard  $47 per month 
1985  information 
Source: Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze, 1986. 
Note:  TCM  =  travel cost method 
VOT =  value of time 
HPM  =  hedonic pricing method 
ERM  EcoNOMICS 
1.10 
Indirect Market Study 
Method  Value 
TCM  $1.66  per 
household per 
day 
TCM 
value of time 
(V01) =0  $11 
VOT=V4 median  $28 
income 
VOT=median  $45 
income 
TCM 
$82.65 
$7.01 
$14.71 
TCM 
$32.06 
$102.09 
$13.81 
Site Substitution  Population value 
per household 
per day 
$2.04 
HPM  Monthly value 
$45.92 
$59.09 
HPM  $37 per month 
EcoNOMICS OF  LiABILITY,  VoL II:  EC  DG  XI 
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2.2 
Valuations based on what individuals are willing to pay (WTP)  for 
enviro'Ull.ental benefits or the prevention of environmental damage costs 
tend to be less than what individuals are willing to accept (WTA) in 
compensation for environmental damage costs, the discrepancy is larger 
where the damaged environmental asset is scarce and has fewer substitutes. 
Whether WTP or WTA is appropriate depends on the prevailing property 
and legal rights and the individuals' perceptions. of their environmef\tal 
rights. 
Navrud and Pruckner (1996)  review the experience in Europe with 
environmental valuation and suggests that there are large differences across 
Europe in people's preferences towards environmental protection.  This is 
due if!. part to differences in income levels and environmental conditions. 
Differences in people's environmental preferences and valuations due to 
these factors would not affect the efficiency and effectiveness of 
environmental liability systems.  One potential advantage of  ~n 
Environmental liability systems is  that it could provide a mechanism for 
raising environmental standards in those locations where the individuals 
concerned are most concerned about the environmental damage costs,. 
However, the differences across Europe in people's preferences and 
val~ations also fundamentally differ due to differences in the availability of 
information on the state of the environment and their knowledge and 
perceptions of the environmental damage.  Therefore better information is 
needed on environmental conditions.  Differences in individual's knowledge 
and perception mean that an Environmental liability systems based on civil 
liability would lead to greater clean up and pollution prevention in countries 
where the individuals are more aware of the damage and also where the 
individuals (or the environmental groups) are more likely to take legal action. 
These countries are likely to be those with already higher environmental 
standards (eg Germany, UK).  Hence there is unlikely to be an even 
application of environmental liability systems across Europe, especially if 
there are differences in the acceptance of valuation techniques across Europe 
(see below). 
CURRENT PRACTICE WITH VALUATION TECHNIQUES IN EUROPE 
Valuation techniques have been much less extensively applied in Europe 
than is  the case in the US  (1).  Experience with applying valuation  . 
techniques is currently more limited in Europe, especially in Cohesion 
(IJ For a review of valuation studies in Europe see: 
Georgiou, S (1994),  UK Studies of th~ Economic Valu.ation of Environm~ntal Impacts.  Review prepared for the 
Department of the Environment. 
Navrud, S,  Pruckner, G J (1996)  Environmenul Valu.ation -To use or not to use?  A  comparativ~ study of the United 
States and Europe.  Forthcoming in Environmental and Resources Economics. 
Navrud, S (ed) (1992) Pricing the European Environment.  Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Merlo, M,  Della Puppa, F, (1994),  Public ~nefit Valu.ation in Italy.  A review of forestry and farming applications.  In 
Budgaard, A,  Bateman, I,  Merlo, M, (eds) Identification and Valuation of Public Benefits from  Farming and Countryside 
Stewardship. 
For a review of contingent valuation studies see: 
Carson N,  Wright R T ],  Alberini A,  Flores N,  (1995):  A bibliography of Contingent Valuation Studies and Papers. 
Natural Resource Damage As.-;.essment  Inc. 
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1.11 countries although some valuation studies have been carried out over the 
last few years in Spain and Portugal. 
There is a lack of scientific and economic data in Europe concerning 
emissions  levels~ ambient environmental conditions, scientific dose response 
relationships and the economic valuation of (marginal) changes in the levels 
of these impacts ..  CORINE provides data on air emissions (1>,  but there is a 
lack of consistent data on water pollution, wastes and contaminated sites. 
A number of valuation studies have been carried out in Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden, UK and France on, for example, the impacts of air 
pollutants such as S02 on human health, forests, agricultural and buildings. 
Most of this work has built on scientific analysis of dose response 
relationships.  Many of the existing studies have applied market based 
techniques such as estimates of additional costs of repairing damage to 
buildings. 
Interest and application of Contingent Valuation methods has occurred later 
in Europe than in the US, but the number of CV studies has increased 
significantly over the last few years - mostly in the UK, Norway and 
Sweden. 
Table 2.2a shows the number of the various types of valuation studies that 
have been carried out in UK, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Finland, 
Norway and Spain.  These countries were selected to cover the different 
countries in the EU.  The scandinavian countries were included to  cover the 
new entrants to the EU (Finland and Sweden) and because valuation 
techniques have been extensively applied in Norway and Sweden.  Tables 
2.2b-h detail the specific environmental impacts that have been valued by 
specific techniques in studies in each of these countries.  A study is  defined 
as the application of an economic valuation technique that follows standard 
valuation guidelines (eg the NOAA guideline on CVM)  <
2
> that yield 
monetary estimates for the valuation of the environmental damage or 
benefits.  The dose response studies often provide the scientific basis to 
estimate the physical impacts which are then valued using one of the other 
economic valuation techniques s~own  in these tables.  Tables  2.2a-h  are based 
on a review prepared by EFTEC of existing valuation studies in Europe.  This 
review is considered to  provide a representative coverage of the existing 
studies. 
Valuation studies have been most extensively applied in the UK, Sweden and 
Norway.  In particular, contingent valuation and stated preference 
1  techniques have been much more extensively applied in these European 
Countries than in Germany, the Netherlands and in Southern and Eastern 
Europe.  In Germany and Netherlands, market based and replacement cost 
valuation of physical impacts from dose response studies are used relatively 
more often than the other valuation techniques such as CVM. 
(I) Eurostat (1995)  Europe's Environment: Sutistical Compendium for the Dobris Assessment 
(2) Arrow, K Solow, R,  Portney, P R,  Leamer, E,E, Radner, R,  Schuman, H, (1993).  Report of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration Panel on Contingent Valuation.  58  Federal Register, 4601-4614. 
ERM  EcONOMICS  EcoNOMICS oF  LiABILllY, VoL II:  EC  DG  XI 
1.12 •
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
2
a
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
i
n
 
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
D
o
s
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
H
e
d
o
n
i
c
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
(
e
g
 
c
o
s
t
s
/
 
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
!
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
l
o
s
t
 
a
v
e
r
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
d
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
S
)
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
U
K
 
2
1
 
9
 
2
 
7
 
2
1
 
4
0
 
1
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
8
 
3
 
2
 
3
 
7
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
5
 
2
 
3
 
1
 
1
 
5
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
4
 
2
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
 
1
 
1
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
 
6
 
2
 
3
0
 
1
 
7
 
1
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
 
N
o
r
w
a
y
 
4
 
8
 
3
 
2
6
 
1
0
 
S
p
a
i
n
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
(
a
l
s
o
 
f
o
r
 
d
a
t
a
 
i
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
s
 
2
.
2
b
 
-
h
)
:
 
E
F
T
E
C
 T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
2
b
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
U
K
 
R
e
c
e
p
t
o
r
!
f
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
D
o
s
e
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
s
t
s
/
 
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
H
e
d
o
n
i
c
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
(
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
a
v
e
r
t
i
v
e
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
/
 
l
o
s
t
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
)
 
s
t
a
t
e
d
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
 
4
 
1
 
M
o
r
b
i
d
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
:
 
4
 
3
 
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
M
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
/
r
e
s
t
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
5
 
2
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
3
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
p
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
2
 
1
 
1
 
L
a
n
d
 
C
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
q
u
i
f
e
r
s
 
1
 
F
o
r
e
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
t
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
3
 
3
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
t
r
e
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
R
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
,
 
n
o
n
-
6
 
7
 
5
 
u
s
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
F
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
L
o
s
t
 
y
i
e
l
d
s
/
c
a
t
c
h
 
1
 
N
o
i
s
e
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
o
a
d
 
t
r
a
f
f
i
c
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
3
 
3
 
1
 
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
i
m
i
n
g
 
a
c
i
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
l
a
k
e
s
'
 
2
 
2
 
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
s
t
o
r
e
d
 
C
o
a
s
t
a
l
 
Z
o
n
e
s
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
V
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
9
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
I
n
l
a
n
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
w
a
y
s
 
2
 
7
 
B
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
N
a
t
u
r
e
/
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
/
l
a
n
d
s
c
a
p
e
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
7
 
1
1
 
l
o
s
s
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
2
1
 
9
 
2
 
7
 
2
1
 
4
0
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
.
 
•
 .
v
 
•
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
2
c
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
i
n
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
R
e
c
e
p
t
o
r
!
f
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
D
o
s
e
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
H
e
d
o
n
i
c
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
(
v
a
l
u
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
/
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
/
 
o
f
 
l
o
s
t
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
}
 
a
v
e
r
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
d
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
 
2
 
1
 
M
o
r
b
i
d
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
:
 
1
 
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
o
r
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
2
 
2
 
1
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
V
r
e
s
t
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
p
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
1
 
1
 
L
a
n
d
 
C
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
q
u
i
f
e
r
s
 
F
o
r
e
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
t
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
1
 
2
 
t
r
e
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
a
i
r
 
p
o
U
u
t
i
o
n
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
,
 
n
o
n
·
u
s
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
F
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
L
o
s
t
 
y
i
e
l
d
s
/
c
a
t
c
h
 
N
o
i
s
e
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
o
a
d
 
t
r
a
f
f
i
c
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
2
 
2
 
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
i
m
i
n
g
 
a
c
i
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
l
a
k
e
s
1
 
1
 
.
 
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
r
e
s
t
o
r
e
d
 
C
o
a
s
t
a
l
 
Z
o
n
e
s
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
I
n
l
a
n
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
w
a
y
s
 
1
 
1
 
B
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
N
a
t
u
r
e
/
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
/
 
l
a
n
d
s
c
a
p
e
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
2
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
8
 
3
 
2
 
.
 
3
 
7
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
t
r
a
m
f
e
r
r
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
 T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
2
d
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
i
n
 
T
h
e
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
R
e
c
e
p
t
o
r
/
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
D
o
s
e
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
H
e
d
o
n
i
c
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
.
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
(
v
a
l
u
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
/
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
/
 
o
f
 
l
o
s
t
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
)
 
a
v
e
r
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
d
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
 
1
 
M
o
r
b
i
d
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
:
 
1
 
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
o
r
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
1
 
1
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
/
r
e
s
t
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
1
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
p
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
1
 
1
 
L
a
n
d
 
C
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
q
u
i
f
e
r
s
 
F
o
r
e
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
 
1
 
d
e
t
e
r
i
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
r
e
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
a
i
r
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
1
 
1
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
,
 
n
o
n
-
u
s
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
F
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
L
o
s
t
 
y
i
e
l
d
s
/
c
a
t
c
h
 
N
o
i
s
e
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
o
a
d
 
t
r
a
f
f
i
c
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
1
 
1
 
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
i
m
i
n
g
 
a
c
i
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
l
a
k
e
s
'
 
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
r
e
s
t
o
r
e
d
 
C
o
a
s
t
a
l
 
Z
o
n
e
s
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
V
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
I
n
l
a
n
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
w
a
y
s
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
B
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
N
a
t
u
r
e
/
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
/
 
l
a
n
d
s
c
a
p
e
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
5
 
2
 
3
 
1
 
5
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
r
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
 
•
 .
 
.
.
.
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
2
e
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
i
n
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
 
R
e
c
e
p
t
o
r
!
f
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
D
o
s
e
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
H
e
d
o
n
i
c
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
(
v
a
l
u
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
/
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
/
 
o
f
 
l
o
s
t
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
)
 
a
v
e
r
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
d
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
 
1
 
6
 
M
o
r
b
i
d
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
:
 
1
 
1
 
6
 
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
o
r
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
1
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
/
r
e
s
t
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
p
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
L
a
n
d
 
C
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
q
u
i
f
e
r
s
 
F
o
r
e
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
 
d
e
t
e
r
i
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
r
e
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
a
i
r
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
8
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
,
 
n
o
n
-
u
s
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
m
e
n
t
i
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
F
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
L
o
s
t
 
y
i
e
l
d
s
/
c
a
t
c
h
 
1
 
N
o
i
s
e
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
o
a
d
 
t
r
a
f
f
i
c
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
i
m
i
n
g
 
a
c
i
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
l
a
k
e
s
 
1
 
b
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
r
e
s
t
o
r
e
d
 
C
o
a
s
t
a
l
 
Z
o
n
e
s
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
V
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
I
n
l
a
n
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
w
a
y
s
 
N
a
t
u
r
e
/
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
/
 
l
a
n
d
s
c
a
p
e
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
1
 
1
0
 
T
o
t
a
l
.
 
6
 
2
 
3
0
 T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
2
f
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
i
n
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
 
R
e
c
e
p
t
o
r
!
f
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
L
a
n
d
 
F
o
r
e
s
t
s
 
F
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
 
M
o
r
b
i
d
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
:
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
o
r
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
/
r
e
s
t
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
p
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
C
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
q
u
i
f
e
r
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
d
e
t
e
r
i
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
r
e
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
a
i
r
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
,
 
n
o
n
-
u
s
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
m
e
n
t
i
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
L
o
s
t
 
y
i
e
l
d
s
/
c
a
t
c
h
 
N
o
i
s
e
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
o
a
d
 
t
r
a
f
f
i
c
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
i
m
i
n
g
 
e
~
c
i
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
l
a
k
e
s
 
b
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
J
o
s
s
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
r
e
s
t
o
r
e
d
 
C
o
a
s
t
a
l
 
Z
o
n
e
s
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
V
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
v
a
t
u
e
 
I
n
l
a
n
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
w
a
y
s
 
N
a
t
u
r
e
/
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
/
 
l
a
n
d
s
c
a
p
e
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
D
o
s
e
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
(
v
a
l
u
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
/
 
o
f
 
l
o
s
t
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
)
 
a
v
e
r
t
i
v
e
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
H
e
d
o
n
i
c
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
1
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
/
 
s
t
a
t
e
d
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
2
 
1
 
4
 
7
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
1
 T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
2
g
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
E
n
r
:
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
i
n
 
N
o
r
w
a
y
 
R
e
c
e
p
t
o
r
!
f
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
D
o
s
e
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
-
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
H
e
d
o
n
i
c
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
(
v
a
l
u
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
/
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
/
 
o
f
 
l
o
s
t
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
)
 
a
v
e
r
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
d
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
 
1
 
2
 
M
o
r
b
i
d
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
:
 
1
 
2
 
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
o
r
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
1
 
1
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
/
r
e
s
t
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
3
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
p
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
1
 
L
a
n
d
 
C
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
q
u
i
f
e
r
s
 
F
o
r
e
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
d
e
t
e
r
i
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
r
e
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
a
i
r
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
.
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
9
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
,
 
n
o
n
-
u
s
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
m
e
n
t
i
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
F
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
L
o
s
t
 
y
i
e
l
d
s
/
c
a
t
c
h
 
N
o
i
s
e
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
o
a
d
 
t
r
a
f
f
i
c
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
2
 
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
i
m
i
n
g
 
a
c
i
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
l
a
k
e
s
 
b
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
r
e
s
t
o
r
e
d
 
C
o
a
s
t
a
i
 
Z
o
n
e
s
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
V
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
I
n
l
a
n
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
w
a
y
s
 
8
 
1
 
8
 
N
a
t
u
r
e
/
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
/
 
l
a
n
d
s
c
a
p
e
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
1
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
4
 
8
 
3
 
2
6
 T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
2
h
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
C
o
a
t
s
 
I
n
 
S
p
a
i
n
 
R
e
c
e
p
t
o
r
!
f
 
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
H
u
m
a
n
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
L
a
n
d
 
F
o
r
e
s
l
c
;
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
 
M
o
r
b
i
d
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
:
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
o
r
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
)
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
V
r
e
s
t
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
p
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
C
o
n
t
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
q
u
i
f
e
r
s
 
L
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
d
e
t
e
r
i
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
r
e
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
a
i
r
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
,
 
n
o
n
-
u
s
e
r
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
m
e
n
t
i
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
F
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
L
o
s
t
 
y
i
e
l
d
s
/
c
a
t
c
h
 
N
o
i
s
e
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
r
o
a
d
 
t
r
a
f
f
i
c
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
l
i
m
i
n
g
 
a
c
i
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
l
a
k
e
s
 
,
 
b
i
o
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
r
e
s
t
o
r
e
d
 
C
o
a
s
t
a
l
 
Z
o
n
e
s
 
r
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
V
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
I
n
l
a
n
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
w
a
y
s
 
N
a
t
u
r
e
/
 
w
i
l
d
l
i
f
e
/
 
l
a
n
d
s
c
a
p
e
 
a
m
e
n
i
t
y
 
l
o
s
s
 
D
o
s
e
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
T
r
a
v
e
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
H
e
d
o
n
i
c
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
O
t
h
e
r
s
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
(
v
a
l
u
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
/
 
p
r
i
c
i
n
g
 
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
/
 
o
f
 
l
o
s
t
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
)
 
a
v
e
r
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
d
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
u
r
 
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
5
 
5
 
1
0
 J. 
Valuation techniques have so far not been extensively applied in Southern 
and Eastet n European countries.  These marked differences in the 
application of environmental valuation techniques between individual EU 
countries are largely due to the lack of expertise in Southern and Eastern 
European countries to apply such techniques, and possibly also a preference 
in Germany to focus on valuing the more tangible and less uncertain 
environmental damage costs. 
Tables 2.2c and 2.2d suggest that, in Germany and the Netherlands, attention 
has focused on the more tangible environmental damage costs (  eg loss of 
agricultural output, costs of repairing damaged materials etc).  These were 
defined as type I environmental damage costs in Section i2 of the main 
report which suggests that they account for about one third of total 
environmental damage costs.  Consequently, substantial differences in the 
environmental damage costs covered by environmental liability. systems 
might arise due to the differences in the present application of the valuation 
techniques in Germany and the Netherlands as compared with other 
European countries such as the UK or Sweden where there is  greater use of 
CVM. 
Some efforts have been made to promote valuation of environmental damage 
costs.  For example, the UK's Department of the Environment (1991, 1994) 
has published guidance for Government Departments to promote application 
of various environmental valuation techniques (t).  The National Rivers 
Authority has prepared guidelines for the recovery of costs of remedying a 
water pollution incident <2>.  This includes standard costs for items such as 
analyses, fish restocking and time of personnel. 
Increased application of valuation techniques in European countries is 
needed to develop the greater experience and data needed to  underpin an 
environmental liability system. 
The European Community's Fifth Environmental Action Programme  <
3
> 
recommends that a community cost-benefit methodology should be drawn 
up for application to all projects and policies with an environmental 
dimension.  There are differences in Member States' current practices and 
experience regarding the alternative valuation techniques.  Adoption of best 
practice appears necessary to achieve a consistent application of techniques 
across member states.  However under the prevailing situation, it would 
probably not be effective to require simply the adoption of best practice. 
Therefore as  a first step it appears fruitful and necessary to encourage the 
adoption of best practice by collating and sharing available experience on the 
application of valuation techniques in European countries, developing .and 
promulgating  best practice guidelines for the performance of valuation 
(I) Department of the Environment (1991),  Policy Appraisal and the Environment: A guide for Government 
Departments.  HMSO, London 
(2)  National Rivers Authority (1995)  Pollution Incident Cost Recording and Recovery in the Northumbria and Yorkshim-
Region of the NRA - A guide for Environment Protection Staff 
(3)  European Commission (1993) Towards SusLtinability: A European Community Programme of Policy and Action in 
Relation to the Environment and SusLtinable Development 
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studies and promoting the development of expertise to carry out such studies 
(eg by training and technical assistance and financial assistance). 
I 
APPLICATION OF VALUATION TECHNIQUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY CASES 
US Experience 
Valuation techniques have for many years been applied much more 
extensively in the US  than in Europe.  The greater expertise in the US is 
partly related to the greater interest in environmental valuation in the US. 
Thus Executive order 12291  of 1981, for instance, required that a formal 
regulatory impact analysis be carried out of the costs and benefits of policies 
or regulations imposing significant costs. 
Interest and experience in valuing environmental impacts in the USA has 
been increased by the passage of CERCLA.  Importantly, in tandem with the 
implementation of CERCLA, considerable efforts were made in the US  to 
develop and promulgate best practice guidance on valuation methodologies. 
This included the work of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA)  <t>.  A specific Government Department - the 
Department of Interior - was responsible for promoting the assessments of 
environmental damage costs and promulgating regulations for the 
assessment of natural resource damage costs under CERCLA. 
The Department of the Interior (DOl) has also specified that e~tensive 
assessments should only be carried out for major pollution incidents  ..  These 
should be based on restoration or replacement costs and the diminution of 
use values where restoration is not cost-effective.  For minor oil spills, the 
DOl specify that simplified assessments should be followed based on the 
Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine 
Environments (NRDAM/CME) since in such minor cases, the costs of a full 
assessment can exceed by a factor of eight the detectable damage costs. 
Annex A presents a hierarchy of techniques for valuing' damage costs to 
natural resources that the US Department of Interior developed.  This 
expressed a preference for the use of market prices to value the losses or, 
where market prices are not appropriate, then to apply the uniform appraisal 
methodology used for federal land acquisition.  Only for those types of. 
environmental damage costs, such as non-use and option values, should 
contingent valuation (CVM)  techniques be applied.  The DOl's hierarchy of 
techniques led to a dispute about the suitability of CVM. 
The Exxon Valdez oil spill created further disputes about the validity of using 
CVM to value the damage costs, especially in respect of non-use values. 
Exxon's consultants presented theoretical and empirical studies stating that 
CVM  did not yield consistent, reliable and unbiased estimates for non-use 
values, which should therefore be omitted from the damage cost assessment. 
(I) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (1994)  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Natural Resource Damage 
Assessments.  59  Federal Register 1062, January 7 1994. 
ERM  EcoNOMICS  EcoNOMICS  oF  UABILTTY,  VoL II:  EC  DG  XI 
1.22 
I 2.3.2 
Consequently a panel headed by Professors Arrow and Solow was set up to 
advise NOAA on the use of CVM.  This panPl concluded that CVM studies 
can produce estimates reliable enough to be the starting point of a judicial 
process of damage assessment, including lost passive-use values where they 
are applied carefully (1).  The Panel drew up guidelines for carrying out 
reliable CVM studies that should be followed as closely as  possible. 
NOAA published in January 1994 proposed regulations on natural resource 
damage assessment < 2>,  which reiterate the Panel's recommendations, but 
also proposed that the willingness to pay estimates from a CVM should be 
reduced by 50%  because the hypothetical WTP estimates reported by CVM 
surveys overstate what individuals would actually be willing to pay in 
practice.  NOAA is still seeking comments on this proposal. 
Existing Liability Cases 
Recent environmental liability cases have revealed substantial differences 
between the damage costs estimates made by the plaintiffs and those by the 
defendants.  The size of these differences gives each party a strong in~entive 
to carry out their own damage valuations and scrutinise those of the other 
parties, which can entail significant transaction costs. 
The differences in the valuations were largely due to differences in the 
assumptions used in the analysis rather than disagreements regarding the 
basic valuation techniques and methodologies. 
Boxes 2.3a and 2.3b present two examples to illustrate the scale, nature and 
source of such differences in the valuations. 
(I) Arrow, K Solow, R,  Portney, P R,  Leamer, E,E,  Radner, R,  Schuman, H, (1993).  Report of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration Panel on Contingent Valuation.  58  Federal Register, 4601-4614.  . 
(2)  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (1994)  Noli« of Proposed Rulema.king: Natural Resource Damage 
ASHSsments.  59 Federal Register 1062, January 7 1994. 
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The tailings pond of the ldarado mining complex contaminated with hexavelant chromium 
two municipal wat~r supply wells, a river, a reservoir and several properties.  The defendants 
valued the damages at less than $0.5m;  while the plaintiffs' (the state of Colorado) valued the 
damages at some 16-40 times higher at between $8m and $40m plus an additional $100m for 
past damages.  The reasons for these differences were: 
•  The plaintiffs used the estimates of the costs of surface treatment of the contaminated 
water to yield a damage value of $3-Sm;  while the defendant argued that the costs of 
drilling new wells would be $205k.  This raised questions about the true opportunity 
costs of this alternative water supply and whether -this alternative well might become 
contaminated by pollutants from the mine at some time in the future. 
•  The plaintiff used experience from a similar case in Utah to argue that the soil 
contamination would reduce property values by 10-15%  which amounted to $2m in 
total; while the defendant argued that the soil contamination could be overcome by 
covering with new top soil at a cost of $275k.  This then raises questions about: the cost-
effectiveness of the treatment options; whether the defendant's option would effectively 
clean up the contamination and the perceptions on this of the local residents and 
property market 
•  The plaintiff estimated the lost recreational benefits at the reservoir by multiplying the 
US  Forest Service's standard value for trout fishing  ($14-22 per day) by an estimate of 
the potential additional fishing activity on the reservoir if it had not been contaminated. 
This yielded total fishing damages of $0.9- 1.4m.  The defendant disputed this estimate 
of the potential fishing activity and argued that any potential fishing activity at the 
damaged reservoir should be valued at users' marginal benefit of fishing ·at this 
reservoir instead of alternative sites  (about 7cts per day) which yielded an estimate of 
the damages of $14k. 
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I 
Amoco Cadiz 
In 1978,  the supertanker Amoco Cadiz ran aground in a storm discharging 220,000  tonnes of 
crude oil, of which about 35%  came ashore damaging 200 miles of the coast of North 
Brittany.  Compensation claims were brought against the company (Amoco) by the French 
Government for the recovery of the clean up costs by local authorities, businesses and 
associations.  These claims raised  the following implrtant issues concerning the valuation of 
environmental damages: 
•  The court only pennitted the French Government to recover the additional incremental 
expenses incurred by the armed forces and not for the costs of their time and 
equipment used for the clean up operations; 
•  No data were available on tourist levels to enable firm estimation of the impacts of the 
oil spills on tourism.  Consequently the plaintiffs used flour deliveries to derive 
surrogate measures of changes in tourism levels due to  the oil spill on the grounds that 
bread production correlated well with the number of people staying in the area. TIUs 
was multiplied by an estimate for the value of a visitor day to estimate the total 
reduction in tourist expenditures at 503m francs.  The defendants used economic models 
to estimate loss of profits for the tourist industry to exceed 124m french francs.  The 
court rejected the defendants' method of estimating lost tourist revenue and decided 
on a total claim of 2.2m french francs for losses to  the tourist industry. 
•  The plaintiffs compared tourist profits in 1978 with those in the previous year.  This 
was about twice a5  high as  the estimates by the defendant who compared the profits in 
1978 with the average of the profits in 1979 and 1977.  The court agreed with the latter 
approach, even though the plaintiffs argued that losses to  the tourist industry were still 
apparent in 1979 and amounted to about one quarter of the losses incurred in 1978. 
•  Estimates of the losses to the fishing industry were disputed on the grounds that 
overfishing was taking place before the oil spill. 
•  There were disputes about how long the effects of the oil spill on the tourist industry 
and oyster production persisted. 
•  The court only compensated the League for the Protection of Birds (LPO) for the costs 
of their small restocking programme.  The court rejected the defendants' claims for 
other ecological damages based on estimates of biomass affected and a proposed 
restoration programme- the latter on the grounds that the expenditures had not 
actually been incurred.  , 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In environmental liability cases, the techniques used for valuing 
environmental damage costs are subject to considerable scrutiny.  This 
scrutiny is much more demanding than occurs in general environmental 
policy making since actual financial payments are at stake in the liability 
cases. 
The existing liability cases reveal wide divergences between the damage 
valuations made by the opposing parties.  These are due to differences in the 
assumptions made in estimating the costs (eg whether the most cost-effective 
remediation option has been casted, estimates of number of people affected). 
Such assumptions often have to be made due to the lack of data on the 
appropriate variables such as baseline economic and environmental 
conditions. 
The difficulties surrounding the valuation of environmental damage c9sts are 
particularly marked in respect of: 
•  chronic pollutants (eg gradual releases of toxic air or water pollutants). 
•  ecological damage and other intangible  environmental damage. 
The following types of environmental damage costs have the greatest 
potential of being able to be valued: 
•  acute pollution incidents such as water polluti0n accidents, rather than 
chronic pollution; 
•  expenditures resulting from the environmental damage (eg costs of 
replacing or repainting damaged assets); 
•  costs of restoring ecological assets damaged by the pollution incidents (eg 
restocking a river after a fish kill as in Section 161  of the Water Resources 
Act in the UK). 
In the last two cases, however, the cost estimates do not represent the value 
of the environmental damage costs as such.  If this approach is used, it raises 
issues concerning the de~tion of the standard to which to restore the 
damaged environmental asset since restoration of the damaged asset to its 
original or natural state may be very expensive and may not be worthwhile. 
Current experience with the practical application of valuation techniques in 
European countries is  more limited than that in the USA, where CERCLA 
was introduced in tandem with great efforts to promulgate best practice 
regarding valuation techniques, and where the implementation of CERCLA 
has increased the use of techniques to value environmental impacts. 
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of the required s~pporting information is unlikely at present to be able to 
provide valuations reliable enough to support an efficient environmental 
liability system in Europe.  The disputes concerning the valuations could 
I 
result in considerable transaction costs by each party. 
The uncertainties concerning the valuation of environmental liabilities are a 
barrier to the effective and efficient development at present of an 
environmental liability systems.  Due to these uncertainties, firms, insurers 
and banks and would be unlikely to undertake an efficient level of 
prevention measures under an Environmental liability systems. On account 
of these uncertainties, insurers are not currently willing to provide insurance 
cover for ecological damage to the unowned natural environment. 
There are some differences in the extent and manner in which 
environmental valuation techniques are currently accepted and applied in 
practice in EU countries.  Such differences could limit the extent to which an 
environmental liability systems could be evenly applied at present 
throughout the EU.  Thus, some countries (eg Germany and the 
Netherlands), focus on using market based techniques to value the more 
tangible environmental damage costs (eg costs of restoring buildings 
damaged by air pollution, lost agricultural outputs).  Such valuation 
techniques could only cover less than one third of the total environmental 
damage costs.  Contingent Valuation Method$ (CVM)  to value the other 
more intangible environmental damage costs (eg loss of recreation and non-
user benefits) raise considerable uncertainties and methodological and 
empirical difficulties.  They are less accepted and used less extensively in 
some European countries (eg Germany, Netherlands) than in others (eg UK, 
Sweden). 
Increased use of valuation techniques in European countries is needed to 
develop the greater experience with environmental valuatiqn techniques and 
data needed to underpin an environmental liability system. 
These differences are largely due to lack of expertise in Southern and Eastern 
European countries to apply the various valuation techniques and possibly 
also a preference in Germany to focus on valuing the more tangible and less 
uncertain environmental damage costs. 
Developing a common approach to environmental valuations would seem 
worthwhile given the advances in the theory and practice of valuing 
environmental damage costs that have been achieved over the last decade, 
although it does raise issues concerning the differences in views between 
Member States regarding the appropriateness of the alternative valuation 
techniques. 
For all the difficulties, though, an even application of an environmental 
liability system in the EU does require the development of common 
guidelines for the assessment of environmental damage and for the 
applicability of the different techniques in different circumstances. 
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1.28 Therefore  it would appear fruitful now to encourage the adoption of best 
practice by: 
•  collating and sharing available experience on the application of valuation 
techniques in European countries; 
•  developing and promulgating a framework for assessing environmental 
damage costs with best practice guidelines for the application of  · 
environmental valuation techniques in their appropriate circumstances; 
•  promoting the development of expertise to carry out such techniques 
especially in Southern European countries (  eg support for training and 
technical assistance). 
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Annex A 
US Department of Interior 
Hierarchy and 
Classification of Methods 
for Measuring 
Environmental Damage Annex A 
L 
US Department of  Interior Hierarchy and Clas$ification of  Methods for 
Measuring Environmental Damage costs 
Type of Method  Method  Definition 
Cost estimating methodologies 
1.  Restoration cost  Application of accounting and 
engineering principles to derive 
actual costs to restore, rehabilitate, 
replace, and/or acquire equivalent 
resources. 
Lost  use and nonuse valuation 
methodologies 
1.  Market-based  Market  Use of existing market prices 
for resource to measure dimi-
nution in quantities due to 
the damage. 
Appraisal  Where market exists for exist-
ing or similar resources, 
measurement of difference with 
and without damage. 
2.  Related markets/revealed  Travel Cost  For recreational resources 
preference  where travel costs to  the site are 
used to estimate the values of the 
site. 
Hedonic pricing  For resource services that are 
important attributes of mar-
keted resources, such as water 
quality for shoreline property, 
effect of change in environmental 
quality on property prices. 
3.  Hypothetical markets  Contingent valuation  Responses of survey participants 
in a hypothetical questionnaire on 
the values associated with the 
changes in environmental quality. 
4.  Benefit Transfer  All methods  Use of valuation results from a 
comparable situation based on 
any of the above methods. 
Unit day value  Use of preassigned dollar values 
per day for recreational use of 
similar resources. 
Source: US  Department of the Interior (DOl) (1991) 
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1.1 
1.1.1 
INTRODUCTION 
OBJECTWE 
Aim of Topic Paper on Competitiveness 
The aim of this topic paper on competitiveness is to assess the impacts on the 
competitiveness of European industries of: 
•  differences between the existing liability systems of individual European 
Member states; 
•  differences in possible environmental liability systems if som!? European 
countries implement stricter environmental liability systems while others 
do not, in the absence of EU action. 
Interviews with industry indicate that the existing liability systems in 
European countries do not entail significantly increased costs for European 
industries and hence are unlikely to impair the competitiveness of European 
industries. 
Consequently, this paper focuses on the second objective.  This objective is 
tackled by simulations of scenarios with different levels of costs of 
environmental liability systems in different European counbies.  These 
scenarios are analysed with respect to the existing strict environmental 
liability system in the USA and the existing liability systems in other OECD 
counbies, while it is assumed that the rest of the world has no 
environmental liability system and no associated costs. 
1.1.2  Objective of the Simulations 
This topic paper is based on some simulations of the impacts of 
environmental liability systems in different European and other countries on 
the competitiveness of the chemical industry.  It uses a simulation model of 
the chemical industry developed by Professor Tony Venables and Professor 
Alistair Ulph at the University of Southampton in the UK. 
The objectives of these simulations are to: 
•  provide insights into the impacts on the competitiveness of the chemicals 
industry of different levels of stringency of environmental liability systems 
in different European and other countries; 
•  provide the basis for a qualitative analysis of the impacts on the 
competitiveness of other European industries of existing and alternative 
environmental liability systems. 
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2.1 1.2  OUTUNE OF PAPER 
Section 2.1  describes briefly the model used.  Section 2.2 sets out the policy 
scenario and  as~timptions used in the simulations presented in this paper. 
Section 3 presents the findings of these simulations for the chemicals 
industry. 
Section 4 presents a qualitative analysis and commentary of the impacts of 
environmental liability systems for the leather tanning, pulp, paper and 
board, semi-finished wood products, pharmaceuticals, electronics  and coal 
mining indus  tries. 
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2.1 
MEnlO  DO  LOGY 
THE MODEL 
The model focuses on inter-sectoral linkages betWeen different sectors qf 
industry.  In each sector there will be a number of firms (or plants) located 
in different countries, each firm producing a different variety of the same 
product (ie  there is product differentiation).  Within each sector firms 
compete with each other in setting the price of their product (so there is 
imperfect competition with firms competing by price (Bertrand competition)). 
In each country there is demand for the output of the sector; firms can sell 
either in the domestic market or in any of the foreign markets, although if 
they sell in foreign markets they have to incur transport costs (more 
generally trade costs).  On the cost side firms have to incur costs of setting 
up plants and there are economies of scale in production.  Although we 
assume that there is imperfect competition, so that firms are able to exploit 
market power to raise prices above marginal cost, we consider a long-run 
equilibrium in the industry; ie  we assume that there is free entry and exit of 
firms (plants) so that in each country the number of plants is set so that 
firms just make a normal rate of return on their capital investment. 
The distinguishing feature of this model is that the sectors of industry are 
linked to each other through an input-output structure of production.  The 
demand for the output of a particular sector in any one country is thus 
made up of two elements - final demand and intermediate demand (ie 
demand by firms in other sectors who use this product as an input into their 
production).  The implication of this is that the decisions on where plants in 
one sector locate depends upon the location decisions of plants in related 
sectors.  To see this, suppose that in a particular sector a new plant moves 
into a particular country; that will have three effects: 
(i)  first there is the usual effect that it will make that sector more 
competitive in that country and drive down the price of that sector's 
output in that country and hence drive down the profits of other firms 
in the same sector, discouraging any further entry; 
(ii)  but that will now have a second effect - namely that by lowering the 
price of that sector's output, it will lower the costs of production of· 
firms in other sectors which use this sector's output as an input to 
their production; that will raise the profits of those firms and make it 
more attractive for firms in such sectors to move into this country; 
(iii)  there will be a further effect: when the original firm moves into a 
country, that will also increase the  (intermediate) demand for the 
outpu_ts of other sectors which this firm uses as an input; that will raise 
the profits of these firms and hence attract entry of firms in these 
sectors. 
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2.3 Thus there are complex inter-linkages between the location decisions of firms 
in difff"rf"llt sectors, with a tendency towards agglomeration - ie firms want to 
locate close to their markets and close to their sources of supply, so there are 
benefits from firms in different sectors locating close to each other. 
The model allows for all these interactions.  The model has been calibrated to 
data on the chemical industry.  Since the model was developed in the early 
90s, and had to use consistent published data on trade, production, input-
output structure etc for all the major countries of the world, the most recent 
such data we could obtain was data for 1985. 
To study the impact of environmental liabilities on the chemical industry, we 
assume that different countries impose different levels of liabilities on firms 
in the basic chemical and other chemicals sector and hence those firms face 
different increases in their costs of production.  The baseline situation is the 
pattern of production and plant location that prevailed in 1985 when, while 
CERCLA was enacted in the USA in 1980, in Europe there were few 
environmental liability policies with little or no impacts on costs. 
We compare this baseline with the situation that would prevail after the cost 
increases were imposed, assuming that these cost differences prevailed for a 
sufficiently long period of time that the chemical industry could adjust both 
its pattern of production and.'its pattern of plant locations.  The model thus 
traces out the long-run effect of such cost differences. 
Impact Mechanisms Covered in the Model Simulations 
To  understand what goes on it is  useful to trace the steps in two stages: 
Stage 1 
Firms in the basic chemical industry will face an increase in their operating 
costs and so they will be forced to raise the price of their products, both in 
their domestic market and in all the foreign markets in. which they trade (the 
functional form used for demand means that when firms set prices to 
maximise profits they use a simple price-cost mark-up rule).  This increase in 
price means they will lose some market share to their competitors in each of 
their markets.  The extent to which this happens depends on: 
•  the original increase in costs and hence price; 
•  the extent to which rival firms in any particular market are also forced to 
raise their price because of increase in their costs; 
•  the degree to which the different varieties produced by each firm are 
substitutes for each other (this will determine the elasticity of demand for 
the product of each firm). 
In the simulations presented here we have assumed that  the chemical 
industry is  fairly competitive and therefore the products of different 
producers are close substitutes for each other. 
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Stage 2 
The effects outlined in stage 1 will affect the operating profits of producers in 
different countries, lowering the operating profits of producers who face 
relatively high increases in costs and hence relatively large reductions in 
market share.  This now affects the location decisions of producers, 
essentially inducing fewer firms  to locate in countries which have relatively 
lower operating profits. (It is important to be clear that the model is a 
comparative static one, so it does not actually trace through the dynamic 
process by which existing firms might leave a sector in a particular country). 
These location decisions in the basic chemical sector have complex spillover 
effects into the location decisions in the other chemicals sector through the 
inter-sectoral linkages spelt out above, and these in turn have further feed 
back effects on the 'location decisions in basic chemicals. 
One final point should be noted.  The rest of the world sector is rather large 
(it has about 75%  of the initial market share in basic chemicals).  Because the 
data for this sector is rather poor, the output and number of firms in this 
sector were held constant in the simulations. 
Definition of the Chemicals Industry 
The simulations presented in this paper are for basic chemicals (NACE code 
251  & 255).  The findings for other chemi~als (t) are similar to those 
presented here for basic chemicals. 
POUCY SCENARIOS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Definition of Country Groups 
Since we wanted to study the impact of environmental liabilities on 
international competition both within the EC (which was the 12-country EC 
of 1985) and between the EC and. the rest of the world we used the 
following classification of countries: 
•  Germany; 
•  France; 
•  Italy; 
•  UK and Ireland; 
•  EC South, (Spain, Portugal and Greece); 
•  EC North (Benelux, Denmark); 
•  US  & Canada; 
•  Japan; 
•  Australia and New Zealand; and 
•  Rest of the World. 
(I) Other chemicals includes: Chemical products, used  principally in  industry and agriculture, essential oils and 
perfumes, soaps, synthetic detergents, perfumes and toilet preparations (NACE codes 256,  258,  259);  pharmaceuticals 
(NACE code 257);  rubber products and rt>pairing of lyres (NACE code 481  & 482);  processing of plastics (NACE code 483). 
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2.5 2.2.2  Scenario of  Future Liability Systems 
The simulations are based on the following five  different levels of stringency 
of environmental liability systems in the following five  groups of countries: 
•  Group I comprises U.S.  and Canada, for whom it is assumed that the 
environmental liability systems are as strict as Superfund but cover all 
environmental damage; 
•  Group II comprises Italy and EC North.  This corresponds to the countries 
who have signed up to the Lugano Convention; 
•  Group III comprises Germany, France, U.K. and Ireland, Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand.  These are the countries who are adopting their own 
national policies, at a moderate level of impact; 
•  Group IV comprises EC South.  These countries have fairly limited 
environmental liability systems that are below the level of stringency 
currently undertaken by the group III countries; 
•  Group V comprises the rest of the World.  These countries are assumed to 
do nothing about environmental liabilities, and so incur no additional 
costs over the baseline. 
The above scenario is largely based on countries' existing environmental 
liability systems.  However, it also includes in the second group countries 
who have said they will sign up to the Lugano Convention.  Hence it is 
designed to reflect likely environmental liability systems in the near future in 
the absence of EU wide action.  It aims to pick up the effect of some 
European countries implementing the Lugano Convention while others do 
not; since the research for the country studies suggests that this might lead 
to greater potential distortion of the competitiveness of industries in these 
respective countries than would arise under the existing environmental 
liability systems currently in place in European countries. 
2.2.3  Assumptions on Costs of Environmental Liability Systems for Chemicals 
Industry 
Model simulations have been carried out for the following three main 
scenarios: 
•  Case H is a scenario of the costs of environmental liability systems for the 
chemicals industry expressed as a % of the industry's value added.  This 
assumes that the increased costs fall  on both labour and capital. 
•  Case K is  this same scenario of the costs of environmental liability systems 
for the chemicals industry but with the costs expressed as a % increase in 
capital costs for the chemicals industry.  This employs the more extreme 
assumption that the increase in costs is borne solely by increased costs of 
capital equipment.  Table 2.2.3a  shows these estimates of the % increase in 
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the costs of capital equipment assumed in Case K alongside the costs 
expressed as % of value added in Case H. 
•  Case L is a scenario of slightly lower estimates for the costs of 
environmental liability systems for the chemicals industry, expressed as a 
% of the industry's value added. 
Case Hand K are based on an initial analysis of possible costs of future 
liability systems, derived from the US Superfund experience. 
Case L represents lower cost estimates that were derived after discussions 
with the EC and further analysis of the available data. This is similar to the 
earlier run, except that the costs (as  % of value added) for the US and 
Canada for case L are lower (2%  rather than 2.4%). We have based our 
analysis on the estimates of the costs for the chemicals industry of 
Superfund (1).  These costs were then extrapolated to estimate the costs for 
the chemicals industry of a strict liability system covering all environmental 
damage costs.  Annex A details the assumptions behind the estimation of the 
cost estimates used in case L.  All these cases H, K and L are reported here 
to give as much analysis as possible of the available simulations. 
We have assumed that countries in group I face  twice the increase in costs of 
those in group II, those in group II face  twice the increase in costs of 
countries in group III, and countries in group III face  twice the increase in 
costs of those in group IV, and countries in group V face no costs of 
environmental liability systems. 
These assumptions are designed to simulate the effects of possible differences 
in costs for various countries.  Discussions with the chemicals industry 
indicated that these cost levels are a useful basis for our analysis . 
(I) Probst et al  (1995)  Footing the Bill for Su~rfund Clean up: Who pays and how?  The Brookings Institute and 
Resources for the Future 
ERM ECONOMICS  EcONOMICS  OF  WIUTY VOL  II:  EC DG  XJ 
2.7 Table 2.2.3a  Assumptions for % Increase in Costs Due to Environmental Liability Systems 
2.2.4 
Country/Bloc  Case H: % Increase in Costs  Case  K:  % Increase in Cost& of 
of Value Added  Capital 
Germany  0.6  3.0 
France  0.6  3.0 
Italy  1.2  6.0 
EC South  0.3  1.5 
EC North  1.2  6.0 
UK and Ireland  0.6  3.0 
US and Canada  24  12.0 
Japan  0.6  3.0 
Australia and NZ  0.6  3.0 
Rest of the World  0.0  0.0 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Table 2.2.4a outlines the assumptions used in the simulations for the costs of 
environmental liability systems in the various countries identified above. 
We have carried out sensitivity analyses for the high and low cases H and L 
above with the following different assumptions for the levels of costs of 
environmental liability systems in the various countries: 
•  The policy cases Hand L, which are represented as case Hl and Lt. 
•  Cases H2 and L2 is a case of differential European policies' simulation. 
This is  the same as case Hl and Ll respectively, but with the market 
shares of all non-EU countries kept constant (as in the baseline data in 
the model). 
•  Cases H3 and L3 is a run with the costs for EC North under Lugano 
increased so that they are the same as under the stricter Superfund 
scenario, as for Group I countries.  However, we have not increased the 
costs for Italy on the grounds that the convention would not be enforced 
to this extent in Italy. 
•  Cases H4 and I4 is  the same as cases H3 and I3 respectively, but with the 
market shares of all  non-EU countries kept constant (as in the baseline 
data in the model).  These cases (and cases H2 and 12)  are designed to 
simulate the effects on intra-EU trade and competitiveness of differences 
between European countries' costs of environmental liability systems. 
Thus in total eight simulations have been analysed for the two main cases H 
and L.  These are summarised in Table 2.2.4a. 
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2.8 Table 2.2.4a  Summary of  Assumptions for Costs of Liability Systems for Chemicals 
Industry (as  % of value added) in Simulation Cases Analysed 
~  CASE 
Country  H1  H2  H3  H4  L1  L2  L3  L4 
Germany  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5'  0.5  0.5  Q.5 
France  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Italy  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1  1  1  1 
EC South  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25 
EC North  1.2  1.2  24  24  1  1  2  2 
UK&  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Ireland 
us &  2.4  c<•l  2.4  c  2  c  2  c 
Canada 
Japan  0.6  c  0.6  c  0.5  c  0.5  c 
Australia  0.6  c  0.6  c  0.5  c  -0.5  c 
and New 
Zealand 
Rest of  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
the world 
(1)  C =  constant market shares. as in baseline of model. 
ERM  EcoNOMICS  EcONOMICS OF  LIABILITY v  OL II:  EC  DG  XI 
2.9 I 
ERM  ECoNOMICS  EcONOMICS OF  UAsii.JJY VOl. II: EC DC XI 
2.10 3 
3.1 
Table 3.1a 
FINDINGS OF mE SIMULATIONS 
FINDINGS OF mE SIM.ULATIONS 
The results of the simulations for Case Hl and Case K are shown in Tables 
3.1a and 3.1b respectively in terms of the % change in market share and 
number of plants arising from the implementation of environmental liability 
systems for the basic chemicals sector.  These tables represent relative losses 
of market share.  Thus, in case Hl, EC South's market share rises from 2%  to 
2.08%  of world trade - an absolute rise of 0.08 percentage points but a 
relative rise of 4%. 
In both tables we show the market share and number of plants of each 
country before the imposition of environmental liabilities, after  the 
imposition of environmental liabilities and the % difference between the two. 
Note that the number of plants is treated as a real number not an integer, 
although in the base case scenario the model was calibrated to data where 
the number of plants were integers.  This means that the change in the 
number of plants needs to be interpreted carefully as reflecting changes in 
cost pressures on decisions on plant locations rather than in changes in 
numbers of plants as such.  For the results presented here the only 
significant effect would be the loss of a plant in the US in Case Hl. 
Impact of Environmental Liabilities - Case Hl. 
Country  Market Share(%)  Number of Plants 
Before  After  % Change  ·Before  After  %Change 
Germany  2.9  3.00  3.6  18  18.40  2.0 
France  1.3  1.21  -7.0  9  8.55  -5.0 
Italy  1.8  1.80  0.0  12  12.00  0.0 
EC South  2.0  2.08  4.0  13  13.39  3.0 
EC  North  2.0  2.00  0.0  12  12.00  0.0 
UK&I.  5.4  5.40  0.0  34  34.00  0.0 
us & c.  2.0  1.82  -9.0  12  10.80  -10.00 
Japan  4.0  4.10  2.6  24  24.48  2.0 
A.  &N.Z.  1.0  1.03  3.0  7  7.10  1.4 
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2.11 Table 3.1b  Impact of Environmental Liabilities - Case K 
Country  Market Share (%)  Number of Plants 
Before  After  % Change  Before  After  %Change 
Germany  29  294  1.5  18  18.02  0.1 
France  1.3  1.30  0.0  9  9.00  0.0 
Italy  1.8  1.80  0.0  12  12.00  0.0 
EC South  2.0  200  0.0  13  13.00  0.0 
EC North  2.0  2.00  0.0  12  12.00  0.0 
UK &  I.  5.4  5.30  -1.9  34  33.97  -0.1 
us & c.  20  1.96  -2.0  12  11.88  -1.0 
Japan  4.0  4.00  0.0  24  24.00  0.0 
A.  & N.Z  1.0  1.00  0.0  7  7.00  0.0 
Direction of Impacts 
Tile direction of the changes is broadly what one would expect: eg for Case 
Hl, the US and Canada have the biggest increase in costs and·have the 
biggest loss in market share, principally to Japan and Germany.  Within the 
EC, EC South has the smallest increase in costs and so gains market share. 
While these changes in market shares can be readily underst~od in terms of 
changes in costs, it is important to remember that what also matters are the 
trade linkages between countries, and this can explain other changes in 
market share.  Thus the fact that France's market share falls while 
Germany's market share rises, despite the two countries having the same 
cost increases, is due to changes in market shares elsewhere.  The loss of 
market share in the US and Canada has adverse effects on France's market 
share, reflecting French inputs to US production; on the other hand 
Germany gains, reflecting the fact that they are in direct competition with 
the US and France, so their loss is Germany's gain. 
It is worth noting that the results are strikingly different from an earlier set 
of simulations where Japan, Australia and New Zealand had a lower increase 
in costs (equal to EC South); those simulations produced a much more 
dramatic set of changes, with the US  and Canada losing 40%  of their market 
share, with bigger increases for both the non-EC OECD countries and 
Germany, with the latter effect having further impacts on market shares 
within the EC.  The contrast between those results and the ones presented 
here suggests that the US chemical industry is  particularly vulnerable to 
competition from the Pacific Rim countries. 
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Size of Impacts 
The size of the changes in market share may appear rather large given the 
relatively low increases in costs; eg in case Hl the increase in U.S.  value 
added costs are only 1.2- 2.1%  higher than its European or Pacific Rim 
competitors, yet it loses nearly 10%  of its market share. There are a number 
of reasons for this. 
•  The chemical industry is very competitive, ie there are large numbers of 
producers and products of different producers are dose substitutes for 
each other.  This means that demand elasticities are high; small 
differences in costs and hence price can have large effects on outputs. 
•  There are some ·small number effects - ie if a country has a small initial 
market share then a small absolute change in market share ·may give a 
large relative change (this would apply to France). 
•  We are modelling long-run changes in the industry, so we allow for firms 
to relocate.  Obviously these effects would only arise over a long p~riod 
(say 10- 15 years), and only then if the differential in costs was 
maintained. 
•  The model is partial, in that it assumes there is no response to factor 
prices (eg wages) as firms relocate and hence employment falls.  In the 
long-run this is unrealistic.  The effecf of the partial analysis is to make 
small cost changes have a larger effect than would be true in practice. 
Comparing cases Hand Kit can be seen that increases in costs of value 
added (case H) have a bigger effect on market shares than increases in costs 
of capital (case I<).  The reason is straightforward.  If the costs falls  only on 
capital (case K),  that will affect profitability and location decisions; but it will 
not affect operating costs, and so will not affect output decisions directly. 
On the other hand increases in value added costs (case H) will increase both 
capital costs and operating costs; the latter acts like a tax on output -
reducing output which \\·ill in turn also affect profitability and choice of 
location.  Thus an increase in costs of capital affect output only indirectly 
through location and plant decisions, while an increase in value added costs 
affects output both directly and indirectly. 
Are the changes  in  market share of the magnitude shown by the simulations likely? 
Table 3.1 c presents data on trends in shares of world output for chemicals. 
This includes all chemical products, including not only basic chemicals but 
also other chemicals, manmade fibres and photographic materials.  Hence the 
absolute numbers are not directly comparable with the figures for basic 
chemicals presented in Tables  3.1 a and 3.1 b.  Nevertheless the percenta·ge 
changes in market shares in the last column can be compared with the 
percentage changes in market shares in the simulations in Tables 3.1a and 
3.1 b.  This shows that the model simulations for the changes in the market 
shares due to the costs of environmental liability systems are of a smaller 
magnitude than the overall changes that actually occurred (due to all 
economic factors) during the period 1979 - 1994.  Nevertheless, the model 
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size modelled here would have to persist for a long period (ie over 10 years) 
in order for tht. simulated market share changes to occur. 
This latter point is of some importance, since it is also clear from Table 3.1c 
that, with the exception of Japan, the changes in market shares for  the 
different country blocs have been quite large and going in different 
directions over shorter five-year periods.  For example, within the overall, 
loss of market share for the USA of -0.7%  (absolute) over the period 79-94 
there was an increase in market share of 2.5%  between 1979-84, followed by 
a loss of 2.8%  over the period 1984-89, and a final further loss of 0.4%  over 
the period 1989-94.  Oearly there have been many factors affecting actual 
market shares, some positive some negative, so the long-term trend in actual 
market shares is likely to be rather damped.  The nature of the exercise 
carried out in the simulations, where only one factor is assumed to affect 
costs over a long period of time, is thus likely to produce the appearance of 
exaggerated effects in comparison with historical data. 
Discussions with the chemicals industry emphasised the importance of future 
competition from the Far East.  In the model simulations, the market share of 
the rest of the world has been kept constant.  But the implementa~on of 
environmental liability systems in European and other OECD countries could 
be expected to lead to some increase in the market share of the rest of the 
world.  Hence the simulations may understate this aspect of the impacts on 
the competitiveness of the chemicals industry in Europe and other OECD 
countries. 
The simulations indicate greater impacts of environmental policies on 
competitiveness and market shares than do other time series and cross 
country regression studies which show either smalf or statistically 
insignificant effects - see the review in Jaffe et al (1995)  (1>.  This may be 
partly because of the difficulties of providing consistent data on the costs of 
environmental policies for the regression analyses and also separating out 
the effect of other changes over the time period in question.  Nevertheless, 
the review by Jaffe et al highlights that differences in the stringency and 
costs of the environmental policies may in fact have little influence on 
industries' decisions on investments in new plant.  In the interviews for the 
country studies, the multinational companies said that they would base these 
decisions on the latest  environmental standards - one company stated that 
this would be based on standards that are roughly mid-way between the 
latest standards in the US  and Europe. 
(I) Jaffe A B,  Peterson, S R Portney P R. Stavins R N,  (1995) Environmrntal Rrgulationa and lhr Coaprtitiveaaa of US 
Manufacturing: Wh•l does thr rvidrnce trll ua?  Journal of Economic Literature, Vol  33, MaKh 1995  pp 132 - 163. 
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3.2 
• 
Trends in Countries' Market Shares in Chemicals m (in  %) 
Market Share (%)  Change 79-94 
Country  74  79  84  89  94  Absolute  Relative 
change in  change in 
% points  %points 
UK  3.0%  3.1%  23%  2.5%  25%  -0.6%  -20.4% 
Western Europe  18.4%  17.6%  14.5%  16.1%  15.5%  -21%  -11.8% 
(excl  UK) 
USA  16.5%  16.1%  18.6%  15.8%  15.4%  -0.7%  -4.4% 
Japan  7.1%  7.3%  7.7%  9.1%  10.5%  +3.2%  44.3% 
Rest of the  55.0%  55.9%  56.9%  56.3%  56.1%  +0.2%  0.4% 
World 
Source:  ICI 
LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL SIMULATIONS 
It is important to emphasise that the results of the  modelling exercise carried 
out above should be treated with caution for the following reasons: 
(i) The model is designed to focus on intersectorallinkages, and employs a 
sectoral disaggregation which is rather coarse. 
(ii)  It is likely to exaggerate the impact on the competitiveness of 
environmental liability policies for the reasons outlined above, particularly 
because it is being assumed that the cost differences in Table 2.2.4a are  . 
expected to be maintained over a sufficiently long period of time to influence 
plant location decisions.  Moreover, the predicted changes in market shares 
for the US are relatively large compared with actual changes that have 
occurred over the last 15 years. 
(iii) Discussion with economists in the chemicals industry suggested that the 
model simulations overstate the likely changes in the number of plants, 
which are relatively large compared with those that have actually occurred 
over the last 10 years.  Moreover, Jaffe et al  (1995)  < 2
> review available 
studies and found little direct evidence of the stringency of environmental 
regulations having significant effects on plant location choices (see section 
3.1  above).  This implies that there are other factors and barriers affecting 
decisions on the relocation of plants which are not costed and reflected in 
(ll This includes chemical products under the International Standard Industrial Classifications 351  and 351, which 
include basic chemicals, fertilisers, pesticides, synthetic resins, plastics, man-made fibres, paints and varnishes, 
pharmaceuticals, soaps, cleaning preparations and toiletries.  In  addition, the table includes photographic materials. 
(Z) Jaffe A 8, Peterson, S R Portney P R, Stavins R N, (1995) Environmental Regulations and the Coapditiveaeu of US 
Manufacturing: What don the evidence tell  ua7  Journal of Economic Literature, Vol  33,  March 1995 pp 132- 163. 
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the model so that the model will overstate the impacts on the location of 
plants and market shares. 
(iv) The model simulations do not allow for the effects of increasing 
competition from the rest of world - most notably the Far East - about which 
the chemicals industry is most concerned.  Hence the simulations may 
understate the extent to which environmental liability systems in Europe and 
other OECD countries could impair the competitiveness of the chemicals 
industry in these countries compared to the newly industrialising countries 
in the Far East. 
(v) The model is calibrated on 1985 data which to some extent will already 
take into account the costs for cleaning up contaminated land under 
CERCLA which was enacted in 1980.  Therefore the additional costs for the 
USA under our liability policies scenarios may overstate the impacts on the 
market share of the US chemical industry.  Consequently we have carried 
out sensitivity analyses focusing on differences between EU countries and 
which keep constant the market shares of non EU countries (see Section 3.3 
below). 
FINDINGS OF THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
This section reports the results of the additional simulations, which were 
described in Section 2.2.4 and summarised in Table 2.2.4a. 
Table 3.3a presents the percentage changes in market shares for the eight 
cases identified in Table 2.2.4a.  Obviously the results for H1  are the same as 
was presented in Table 3.1a,  but are reproduced here for ease of comparison. 
Cases Ll-L4, where the costs are about 10%  lower than the costs in case H1-
H4, simply scales down the effect of the cost increases on market shares; the 
change is not proportional, as would be expected- in models with scale 
economies, changes in market share are likely to be proportionately larger 
than the increase in costs.  · 
The effect of holding constant the market shares of non-EU countries is quite 
striking (L2 and H2).  The negative impact on France's market sha:r:e 
disappears, indicating that the trade links with the US are important; and 
that in turn scales down the gains to Germany.  This shows that to some 
extent the market share changes for EU countries in previous simulations 
may be driven by the trade links with non-EU members; the small difference 
in costs between EU  members in L2 and H2 have little impact on market 
shares.  Note that the results presented show some gains in market shares, 
but no losses.  This is just because the changes in market shares are not 
significant at one decimal point. 
The effect of raising the costs of EC  North in line with those for US and 
Canada also has a striking effect (L3 and H3);  relative to the base case, not 
surprisingly EC  North now loses market share; but they are losing it mainly 
to the US  and Japan, since the US loss of market share in the base cases is 
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almost eliminated in case L3 and they have a slight gain in case H3; again 
this has important implications for France, which, as in the previ Jc; case, no 
longer loses market share, and there are consequent implications for 
Germany.  · 
Finally, the increase in costs for EC North but with constant market shares 
for non-EU countries (cases U  and H4) yields essentially negligible effects on 
market shares for EU members. 
%Change in Market Shares for Scenarios H1-H4,  L1-L4 
Country  CASE 
Hl  H2  H3  H4  Ll  L2  L3  LA 
Germany  3.6  1.3  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.7  0.0  0.0 
France  -7.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -4.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Italy  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6 
EC South  4.0  5.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.9  0.0  0.0 
EC  North  0.0  0.0  -5.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -3.0  0.0 
UK&I  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
us & c  -9.0  c<•>  -0.5  c  -5.0  c  -0.4  c 
Japan  26  c  3.0  c  2.9  c  1.5  c 
A&NZ  3.0  c  0.0  c  0.4  c  0.0  c 
(1)  C =  Constant market shares as in baseline model 
Further Limitations of the Model  Simulations and Sensitivity Analyses 
It is possible that the model findings above understate the impacts on 
competitiveness of differences in costs of liability systems between European 
Countries since they are based on 1985 trade and cost data which do not 
allow for the recent freer movement of goods and capital within the EU, 
especially since the single market.  Thus intra-EC trade in chemicals 
increased by about 47%  between 1985-1992; while extra-EC exports and 
imports increased by 15%  and 48%  respectively.  If the model was calibrated 
to current data, then it would show larger impacts for the scenarios focusing 
·on differences between EU countries. 
Another reason is  that the simulations focusing on European differences 
(cases H2 and H4 and L2 and L4) reduce the  number of countries whose 
market shares can change and this reduces the extent to which increases in 
costs can affect the market shares of remaining countries since there are 
fewer countries to expand output if one country incurs extra costs and 
contracts its output. 
It may appear strange that a doubling of the cost increase for EC North 
countries has so little impacts in the simulation looking only at EU countries 
(cases H4 and L4);  while it has a significant effect when the non-EU OECD 
countries are included.  This is due to the two reservations noted above. 
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On balance the .model probably overstates the impacts. The reason is that the 
kind of arguments about forward and backward linkages which are 
emphasised in the model apply to more than just the sectors of the chemical 
industry, but more widely to other sectors of the economy as well, including 
financial markets, the availability of pools of skilled labour likely to be found 
in other high technology industries. While there are obviously exceptions 
such as South-East Asian Tiger countries, in general countries in the rest of 
the world are unlikely to have the kind of industrial and financial structures 
which would make location of chemical plants in those countries as 
attractive as in other OECD countries, other things being equal. Therefore 
the barriers to the movement of plants to rest of the world countries are 
likely to be rather greater than is the case of movements of a plant from one 
EU country to another or to other OECD countries. 
In view of the limitations of the model, attention should not be focused on 
the numerical findings of the model simulations but rather on the following 
insights they give.  The basic message still appears valid - that in an 
industry which is very competitive, and where the products of the. indtiStries 
in the various countries are close substitutes for each other, then relatively 
small differences in costs can have significant effects on loss of market share. 
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4.1 
4.2 
IMPACTS ON COMPETITWENESS OF OTIIE~  INDUSTRIES 
ASSUMPTIONS ON COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILI7Y SYSTEMS FOR OTHER 
INDUSTRIES 
Table 4.1a presents approximate estimates for the costs of liability systems for 
other industries which have been derived on the basis of various 
assumptions as to whether the costs for these industries would be relatively 
less or more than those for chemicals (expressed as a % of value added). 
This is designed to input into the qualitative analysis and commentary in this 
Section 4 on the impacts of liability systems on the competitiveness of these 
industries.  Annex A outlines the assumptions behind these relative costings. 
LEATHER TANNING 
The assumptions on the increase in costs in the Leather Tanning industry 
from environmental liabilities were set out in Table 4.1a  which shows that the 
cost increases are calculated to be twice those used in the simulations for the 
chemical industry.  However there are a number of important features of the 
tanning industry which make it very different from the chemical industry. 
There are no significant economies of scale in tanning- there are over 3000 
tanneries in the EC.  This implies that plants tend to be located close to final 
users eg footwear, clothing, furniture.  This is reinforced by a very strong 
national and regional concentration of tanneries - Italy accounts for 60%  of 
EC output and 90%  of Italian sole leather comes from just five  centres. 
There has been a long-term decline in the consumption and production of 
leather in the EC.  From 1985 to  1993  consumption has fallen from 7051m 
ecu to 6150m ecu, while production has fallen from 7341m ecu to 6500m  e~. 
This probably reflects a loss of competitiveness in the shoe industry to 
developing countries and eastern Europe (India and Pakistan account for 
30%  of extra-EC imports of finished leather).  Despite this, trade in leather 
has remained steady, with extra-EC exports, at 1100m ecu in 1993 virtually 
unchanged from the figure of 1  087m ecu in 1985, and the trade balance 
rising from 300m ecu in 1985 to 350m ecu in 1993.  Intra-EC trade has also 
stayed virtually constant - 1253m ecu in 1985, 1200m ecu in 1993  < 1>. 
(I) All  the data  presented are in  current prices. 
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 4.3 
A number of points emerge from these figures.  The leather industry has a 
relatively low trade intensity (exports are only about 15%  of production and 
imports are 12%  of consumption) compared to the chemical industry.  This is 
because of the low degree of scale economies and the close linkage with the 
final users of leather.  While there clearly has been some loss of market 
share by final users this has not been matched by a comparable loss of 
export markets for leather.  This is probably be~ause, while the EC  ~as lost 
final output, and hence leather production, in the bulk market, there has 
been a growth of demand for the higher quality leather produced by EC, 
particularly tied to the EC's leading role in fashion design. 
What all this suggests is that the EC leather tanning industry faces low 
elasticity of demand for its product.  The EC is estimated to suffer a cost 
disadvantage for fiilished leather of about 20%  relative to Argentina or India, 
(due mainly to differences in costs of hides- environmental costs account for 
only about 2-4%  of cost differences), yet as noted  the EC has maintained a 
fairly constant level of exports.  What will be relevant will be not the 
increase in the cost of leather itself, but any resulting increase in the cost of 
production of bulk leather goods like shoes, and hence any further loss of 
EC market share in the markets which incorporate finished leather.  To the 
extent that the EC has already lost much of that market to foreign 
competition, then the EC may be able to maintain its remaining market share 
due to the higher quality of its product, and in particular the links to other 
sectors, such as high fashion goods. 
In summary, the tanning industry might face larger cost increases than the 
chemical industry, and hence larger cost differentials, which might have 
greater impacts on the international competitiveness of the European leather 
tanning industry.  However, the market for leather products is not as 
internationally competitive as that for chemicals so that the impacts of 
environmental liability systems on the international competitiveness of the 
European leather tanning industry might be less than that for chemicals. 
PULP, PAPER AND BOARD 
From Table 4.1a it can be seen that the cost increases for this sector from 
environmental liabilities are of the same order of magnitude as for the 
chemical industry.  However, for a number of reasons we believe that the 
impact of environmental liabilities on EC industry is likely to be less than for 
the chemical industry.  To understand this it is  useful to consider a number 
of salient features of the industry. 
In the period 1983-92, extra-EC exports of paper, pulp and board have grown 
faster than extra-EC imports (8.8%  p.a. compared to 5.5%  p.a.), although in 
the last five  years the two rates of growth have been more or less equal 
(6.0%  and 5.7%  respectively).  Despite this the EC's trade balance has got 
steadily worse in absolute terms.  In 1992 extra-EC imports were 14.5 m ecu 
(about 30%  'Of EC consumption) while extra-EC exports were only 2.7 m ecu, 
less than 10%  of EC  production. ·While EC exports are widely spread 
through the world (60.6%  went to Rest of the World in 1992), EC imports are 
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much more concentrated - 55%  from Sweden and Finland, 21%  from US and 
Canada. 
It is fairly clear ~hy  the EC is at a competitive disadvantage in this industry. 
First, there is the obviotis comparative advantage of countries like Sweden, 
Finland and Canada of having abundant land for growing timber, the main 
input to the pulping process, and given costs of transporting timber, it clearly 
makes sense to locate pulp mills close to this important input.  Second, but 
closely related, the EC's major sources of imports have been able to develop 
economies of scale in the production of pulp, paper and board; mills in US 
and EFT A countries are bigger than EC mills; 75%  of EC mills are non-
integrated and have a capacity less than 50,000 tonnes; 60%  of EFTA mills 
are integrated, with a capacity greater than 50,000 tonnes.  The EC has been 
following a restructuring strategy, partly of  building bigger mills, but partly 
also moving out of the bulk market for pulp paper and board into more 
specialised products, such as carbonless paper, thermal paper and 
watermarked paper. 
From this account of the industry there are two reasons why the cost 
increases envisaged for the pulp paper and board industry is likely to have 
much less impact on this industry than on chemicals.  First, the EC is not a 
major exporter and so is unlikely to lose, much in foreign markets; on the 
other hand the EC's major competitors in the home market (US and Canada, 
Sweden .and Finland, are likely to be faced with at least as great an increase 
in costs as the EC (we assume that EFTA are likely to face cost increases 
comparable to EC North). By contrast, in the case of chemicals we argued 
that much of the competition for the EC is likely to come from countries in 
the Pacific Rim.  Second, it is likely that the restructuring strategy of the pulp 
paper and board industry will give it some protection from increased costs-
they will be offset to some extent by the move to increase scale economies 
and the move to niche markets will provide lower elasticities of demand for 
EC products. 
SEMI-FINISHED WOOD PRODUCTS 
This sector is very similar to the paper, pulp and board sector just discussed. 
The scale of cost increases is similar to that fat the chemical industry and 
only slightly higher than for pulp paper and board industry.  The EC has 
been running a steady trade deficit, despite extra-EC exports growing slightly 
faster than extra-EC imports over the period 1983-92 (3.0%  and 2.7% 
respectively).  In 1992 extra-EC imports were 2.1m ecu, about 29%  of EC 
consumption, while extra-EC exports were only O.Sm ecu, just above 5%  of 
EC production.  Again our major sources of imports were EFTA  (34.4%) and 
US  (18.8% ), although it is also importing significant amounts from Rest of 
the World (34% ), especially plywood from South-East Asia;  our exports were 
also fairly concentrated (EFTA 54%), suggesting considerable intra-industry 
trade.  Economies of scale are again important in production, although the 
degree of intra-industry trade with EFTA suggests that the EC is at less of a 
competitive disadvantage here than in the pulp paper and board sector. 
Again EC specialises in certain areas, like the production of  oriented strand 
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board (OSB)  which is a new product, or particleboard and medium density 
fibreboard (MDF), while facing substantial foreign competition in standard 
bulk products like plyboard. 
For the reasons given in the previous section, we believe that this sector is 
unlikely to be seriously disadvantaged by the imposition of environmental 
regulation- our major competitors are likely to be facing similar or larger cost 
increases (although is somewhat less true in this sector because of 
competition from SE Asia), and the production of specialised products again 
reduces the elasticity of demand for EC products. 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
The increases in the costs of the pharmaceuticals industry as a result of 
environmental liabilities are likely to be similar or lower than those for the 
chemical industry as a whole. There are a number of reasons why the 
industry is likely to be less affected in terms of international competitiveness 
than the chemical industry more generally.  We first set out some salient 
characteristics of the industry, before drawing conclusions for 
competitiveness. 
Note first that the industry is relatively concentrated - the ten largest 
companies account for 22%  of the market. One reason for this is the very 
high level of R&D expenditure required in the pharmaceutical industry  -
11%  of turnover is for R&D, which is about the highest R&D/turnover ratio 
in industry.  Since there are significant economies of scale, and more 
importantly scope, in R&D  this explains the relatively high degree of 
concentration. This has the important implication that there are significant 
barriers to entry in the pharmaceutical industry, provided by this heavy 
investment in R&D and the protection provided by patents on new drugs. 
The EC remains the world's most significant producer of pharmaceuticals 
(one third higher than USA and double Japan); moreover the EC is 
maintaining this advantage over the USA and Japan - since 1987 the EC has 
expanded production by 44%, the US and Japan by 8%  and 17%  respectively. 
The EC also remains a healthy net exporter of pharmaceuticals- in 1992 the 
EC production of 68.6b ecu of pharmaceuticals was consumed yielding a 
trade surplus of 4.9b ecu; extra EC exports were 10.6b ecu, and intra-EC 
trade 9.9b ecu (current prices).  However, it should be noted that over the 
period 1983-92 extra EC imports grew at 5.4%  p.a. while extra EC exports 
grew at only 2.6%  p.a. so while the trade balance grew in absolute terms, it 
contracted slightly  in relative terms.  On the other hand intra-EC trade has 
tripled over the period 1983-92.  Exports are widely dispersed, with more 
than half exports going to developing countries, while imports are highly 
concentrated - the USA and EFT A countries account for 85%  of imports. 
As can be seen from the above figures, the industry is  not as trade intensive 
as the chemical industry - extra-EC exports account for only about 15%  of 
EC  production with intra EC  trade of a similar scale. This is explained by the 
regulated nature of the pharmaceutical industry; both for  prescription 
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medicines and for 'over the counter' (OTC) medicines, individual countries 
have national regulations and consumer preferences which have tended to 
favour locally prod·Liccd drugs. Attempts by national governments to cut· the 
cost of drugs, for example by using generic rather than specific prescriptions, 
may alter this picture and expose national drug companies to greater foreign 
competition. 
We can now summarise what this implies for the impact of environmental 
liabilities on international competitiveness. There are four reasons why we 
believe that the impact of the cost differences shown in Table 4.1a  will have a 
smaller impact in pharamaceuticals than in chemicals more generally. 
(i)  The high degree of R&D intensity provides a barrier to entry which 
provides some protection to companies faced  with cost increases imposed by 
environmental liabilities. 
(ii)  This is particularly important when it is recognised that the high R&D 
intensity means that our major competitors are other advanced nations, such 
, as the USA and Japan, and the former will have even higher cost increases 
then the EC while the latter may have a similar cost increase to many of the 
EC countries.  Competition from developing countries is much less  relevant 
than in the chemical industry. 
(iii)  High R&D intensity also leads to a high degree of product 
differentiation, with specific drugs being protected through pa.tents from 
competition from close substitutes.  This is reflected in the significant extent 
of intra-industry trade, with nations trading the drugs for which they have 
been successful in R&D.  What this implies is that there is a relatively low 
degree of substitution between individual pharmaceutical products, and 
hence a relatively low demand elasticity. Again this means that countries are 
less vulnerable to cost differentials. 
(iv) Finally, the regulated nature of the industry, exacerbating preferences for 
locally produced drugs, reinforces a low elasticity of demand for individual 
pharmaceutical products and further reduces the vulnerability of 
international competitiveness to cost differences. 
For all these reasons we believe that while the pharmaceutical industry will 
face  similar increases in costs to the chemical industry, it will experience a 
smaller loss of international competitiveness. 
ELECTRONICS 
Table 4.1 a shows that the cost increases predicted in electronics as a result of 
environmental liabilities are the smallest of all the industries studied, being 
only a quarter of those for chemicals.  This reflects the "clean• nature of the 
industry.  Obviously the impact on international competitiveness of 
environmental liabilities will be correspondingly lower than for the chemical 
industry.  But in our view this is  the only reason why the impact is likely to 
be smaller; in other respects the electronics industry has many of the 
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characteristics of the chemical industry·, as the .following description of the 
industry suggests. 
First the electronics industry is significantly open to international trade.  In 
1992 extra-EC exports amounted to about 20%  of EC production, (32.2b ecu 
out of 171.2b ecu) while intra-EC imports amounted to about 30%  of EC 
consumption (57.2b ecu out of 196.1  b ecu).  Intra-EC trade accounted for a 
further SSb ecu. 
The industry has experienced very rapid development, reflecting the impact 
of modern technology, with EC consumption and production growing at 
6.5%  and 6.2%  p.a. over 1983-92; over the same period extra-EC exports and 
imports grew at 6.9%  and 7.2%  p.a  ..  The result of these different growth 
rates is that the traae deficit has tripled from 8b ecu to 25b ecu over this 
period.  This has been accompanied by an erosion of 10%  in the terms of 
trade between EC and non-EC countries; this is consistent with the net trade 
balance being quite sensitive to the terms of trade. Of particular concern has 
been the growth of imports from the NIC's, with the share of imports from 
the USA, Japan and EFT A decreasing (from 78.2%  in 1987 to 67.3%  in 1992). 
The electronics industry is currently undertaking a high level of investment 
in new plants.  Therefore environmental liability systems might affect where 
these new investments are located, especially for inward investment.  During 
the interviews for the UK country, a multi-national foreign company said 
that they had decided to locate all their new plants in the UK, partly because 
of their greater confidence and certainty about the environmental policies 
(including environmental liability policies) in the UK.  However, this was 
more to do with the greater confidence that the policies would be reasonably 
implemented rather than the stringency of the policies as such. 
In short, the electronics industry, like the chemical industry, and especially 
basic chemicals, is a very competitive industry internationally, with a high 
degree of substitution between products and hence a high elasticity of 
demand for products. This makes international trade sensitive to cost 
differences.  It is only because the cost differences induced by environmental 
liabilities are small that the competitive impacts are also likely to be small. 
MINING (HARD COAL) 
This section examines ~ng  of hard coal.  We assume that the cost 
increases induced by environmental liabilities for coal mining are the same as 
those for mining shown in Table 4.1 a ie  about two-thirds larger than those 
for the chemical industry. 
It is difficult to be precise about the potential impact of these cost increases 
on the hard coal industry of the EC since many of the influences on the 
industry in recent years have come from political rather than economic 
considerations. It is likely that these considerations will continue. 
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2.25 From 1983 to 1992 EC consumption of hard coal remained relatively constant 
at between 300 and 320 m tonnes; but production has fallen steadily, from 
260.3 m tonnes in 1980 to 183.4 p.a. in 1992.  The  ba~ar.ce between 
consumption and production has beet) met from rising imports, with the 
USA being the inain supplier, providing over one third of EC imports, with 
South Africa and Australia providing another 20.8%  and 15.6%  respectively. 
Extra-EC exports have been  trivial  ~nd declining (from 16. 9m tonnes in 1980 
to 5.7m tonnes in 1992).  Intra-EC trade in coal has also been small and has 
fallen sharply, from 17.2 m tonnes in 1980 to 4.4 m tonnes in 1992. 
The principal cause of these trends has been the uneconomic nature of EC 
production, mainly because only about 10%  of EC coal comes from open-cast 
mines, compared to 50%  in Australia, 60%  in USA and 85% in Canada.  On 
the other hand, economic pressures have not always had full sway.  The 
European coal and steel community (ECSC)  has allowed some forms of state 
aid to the coal mining industry; in addition 66%  of coal production is used 
for thermal power stations, which are often state owned in the EC and, as in 
the UK until recently, there have been requirements on such power stations 
to use domestically produced coal. The phasing out of such direct and 
indirect support to domestic coal industries has had a major impact on 
domestic coal production, as seen most starkly in the UK.  It is  pre~cted that 
by 2000, EC production of hard coal will fall  to 115 m tonnes, with imports 
accounting for 69%  of consumption. 
Against this background, the cost differences induced by environmental 
liabilities are unlikely to play a significant factor. EC domestic coal 
production is already uncompetitive in many areas and how fast it is 
replaced by foreign imports will depend on the political process of opening 
up the market, especially for power station coal, to foreign competition, and 
the construction of facilities for importing coal.  Of course, given the high 
costs of transporting coal relative to pit head costs, there will be some inland 
power stations and other users who will continue to find it cheaper to buy 
from local mines rather than import.  There may be some slight protection 
from the fact that the USA  will face  a greater increase in costs due to 
environmental liabilities than will EC member states, but this difference, of 
2%, is unlikely to have any significant impact. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Existing liability systems in European countries are unlikely to have 
significant impacts on the competitiveness of European industries. 
In the absence of a common approach to environmental liability systems 
across Europe, there might in the future be divergences between the 
environmental liability systems and their associated costs for different EU 
Member States.  In industries such as chemicals which are very competitive 
and where the products of the industries in the various countries are dose 
substitutes for each other, then relatively small differences in costs could lead 
to a more than proportional loss of market share.  However, the differences 
in costs due to environmental liability systems would have to be perceived to 
persist for a sufficiently long time (ie more than 10 - 15 years) to influence 
plant location decisions. 
Environmental liability systems might entail higher costs for other indusbies 
such as the leather tanning, lumber and mining industries, which may affect 
their international competitiveness.  However, in comparison with the 
implications for the chemicals industry, the impacts of environmental liability 
systems on competitiveness of other industries are likely to be lower because: 
their markets are less subject to strong international competition (eg 
pharmaceuticals); or because the main competing countries are likely to be 
subject environmental liability systems that are as strict or stricter as those 
being considered in European countries (eg pulp and paper and lumber 
although the latter industry may face increasing competition from South East 
Asia); or because the costs of environmental liability systems are low as a 
proportion of value added (eg electronics).  . 
However, the above analysis and conclusions assumes that the costs of the 
environmental liability system for a major polluting industry, such as 
chemicals, amount to  a maximum of 2.4%  of value added in the strictest 
environmental liability system.  If certain European countries implemented 
more extensive and stricter environmental liability systems to intemalise all 
environmental damage costs, then the resulting cost differences between 
countries would be  higher and the impacts on the competitiveness of 
European industries would be larger. 
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Annex A 
Assumptions behind Cost 
Estimates Used for Model 
Simulations 1 
1.1 
ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND COST ESTIMATES l!SED FOR MODEL 
SIMULATIONS 
This annex details the assumptions behind the cost estimates for the model 
simulations presented  for the various countries for the chemicals industry in 
Table 2.2.4a and for other industries in Table 4.1a. 
CHEMICALS INDUSTRY 
The estimates of the costs of the environmental liability systems for the 
chemicals industry·are based on the following methodology: 
•  Available estimates in Probst (t) for the costs of Superfund for the 
chemicals industry in the USA. 
•  Extension of these data on clean up costs under Superfund to estimate the 
liability costs of all environmental damage for the chemicals industry. 
Costs of Superfund for  the Chemicals industry in the USA 
The annual costs of Superfund for the chemicals industry comprise: 
•  Chemical industry's total responsible party costs for aJU;lual transaction 
and clean up costs for contaminated sites (Probst (1995), p 50)  $492m 
•  Contributions to the trust fund to pay for EPA's costs for orphan sites 
through the chemical feedstock tax (Probst (1995), p 56)  $286m 
•  Contributions to the trust fund through petroleum tax, corporate 
environmental income tax <
2>. 
$150m 
Total annual costs of Superfund for the chemical industry in USA  $928m 
This represents about 0.7%  of this industry's value added. 
Extension  to cover other environmental damage costs 
The estimates of the cos~ of treating contaminated land have been extended 
to derive estimates of all environmental damage costs for the chemicals by 
applying an extension factor of the total environmental damage costs divided 
by the costs of treating contaminated land.  The detailed data for the former 
West Germany (in Table  C1  of Annex C of the main report) have been itsed to 
derive the following extension factors: 
(I) Probst et al(1995) Footing the Bill for  Su~rfund clean up:  Who pays and how?  The Brookings Institute and 
Resources for the Future. 
(l) This is based on the figures in Probst (1995),  Figure 4.2 (p 76)  which indicate that the direct and indirect costs for ~ 
inorganic and organic chemicals, chemicals and allied chemicals industries of the petroleum and corporate 
environmental income tax  repi'E'S('nl  more than half of the costs of the chemical feedstock tax. 
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environmental damage costs divided by the costs of cleaning up 
contaminated sites plus the less readily monetised costs of contaminated 
soil.  This yi~lds an extension factor, of about 6. 
•  However, there is considerable uncertainty over the damage costs 
estimates for the less readily monetised items.  Dividing the more reliable 
estimates for the readily monetised environmental damage costs by the 
costs of deaning up contaminated sites yields an extension factor of about 
2. 
In addition, according to US  EPA data <t>  on the distribution of the total 
direct compliance costs of pollution control, the costs associated with land 
represent about 27%  of the total costs  concerning all media (eg air, water 
etc) in the US.  This yields an extension factor of 3.7. 
This yields an extension factor of between 2-6, with an average of 4. 
In addition, the following considerations have been taken into account: 
•  it may be difficult to assign liabilities for some of these other 
environmental damage costs - some of the air and water pollution damage 
costs are due to diffuse sources; 
•  the chemical industry's contribution to these other environmental damage. 
costs may be proportionately less than its contribution to contaminated 
soil.  The chemicals ""dustry accounts for about 35%  of the total 
responsible party costs for treating contaminated sites under Superfund, 
but about 22%  of total pollution control expenditures. < 2>. 
•  The estimates of the costs for the chemicals industry under Superfund 
(given above) include not only the costs of cleaning up contaminated 
sites, but also the industry's transaction costs arising under this policy. 
These considerations suggest that the extension factor should be at the lower 
end of the above range.  Consequently we have used an extension factor of 
about 3,  to indicate that the total environmental liability costs for the 
chemicals industry under a liability regime as strict as Superfund but 
covering all environmental damage costs would amount to about 2%  of the 
industry's value added.  This figure has been used for the essentially 
illustrative simulations of the impacts of these costs on the chemical 
industry's international competitiveness. 
This basic sensitivity case therefore comprises: 
(I) A Jaffee et a1(1995),  EnvironmE'nlal  RE'gulation and thE'  CompetitivE'nE'SS of US  Manufacturing:  What does the US 
evidE'nce  IE'll  us, Journal of Economic Lit<'ratur<', March  1995. 
(2) This is  based  on thE'  estimates of industries' E'Xpenditures on pollution control for  thE'  UK given in OECD(l993) 
Pollution Abate•ent and Control Expenditures in OECD countries, OECD Environment Monographs NO '75, OECD 
Paris. 
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•  A strict environmental liability scenario (taken as being as strict as 
Superfund) for Group I countries for which the costs for the chemicals 
industry would represent about 2%  of value added. 
•  The costs for the Lugano Convention group II countries are assumed to 
be half the costs of for Group I. 
•  The costs of existing liability systems in Group· III countries (UK, France, 
Germany, Japan, Australia and NZ) are assumed to be half the costs for 
Group II countries. 
•  The costs for Group IV countries with weaker existing liability systems 
(Southern European countries)  are assumed to entail costs half of those 
for Group III  countries. 
•  Rest of the world has no liability system entailing no costs. 
DERIVATION OF RELATWE COST ESTIMATES FOR  OTHER INDUSTRIES 
The estimates for the other industries are only intended to present 
approximate indications of the relative costs for these industries compared 
with chemicals, which are used to input into a qualitative assessment of 
whether the impacts on competitiveness are likely to be greater or less than 
those indicated by the model simulations for chemicals. 
The relative factors have been derived on the basis of the estimates in 
Probst (l) for the costs of the clean up of contaminated sites under 
Superfund for the other industries compared with the costs for the chemicals 
industry - see Table A.J. 
(I) Probst et al(1995) Footing the Bill for the Superfund clean up:  Who pays and how?  The Brookings institution and 
Resources for the future. 
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2.A3 Table A.1  Relative Costs of  Clean up of  Contaminated Sites under SuperFund for Various 
Industries compared with Chemicals 
Industry  Costs of clean up  Relative costs  Amended  Costs for all 
as% of value  compared with  Relative cost  environmental 
added  chemicals  factor  liabilities as % of 
value added 
under scenario C 
Chemicals  0.4%  (I)  1  1  2% 
Mining  0.7%  1.75  1.5  3% 
Wood products  0.5%  1.25  1.25  25% 
(exd furniture 
mfr) 
Petroleum  0.3%  0.75  0.75  1.5% 
Electronics  0.1%  0.25  0.25  0.5% 
Leather tanning  2  2  4% 
Pulp and paper  1  2% 
Source: Probst et al (1995) 
OECD < 2
> estimates (for UK and Germany) that pollution control 
expenditures of the leatht~r tanning industries are roughly do4ble those of 
the chemicals industry when presented as %of those industries' turnover. 
Consequently we have assumed that the environmental liability costs for the 
leather tanning industry (when expressed as a % of value added) are about 
double those of the chemicals industry - ie 4%  under the strict 
Environmental liability systems for Group I countries. 
The above relative castings were discussed with an environmental insurance 
expert who considered that it was reasonable to assume that the leather 
tanning industry's environmental liabilities could be do_uble  those of the 
chemicals industry (when expressed as a % of value added) since the 
chemicals industry has been fairly well regulated in the past and has 
implemented considerable prevention measures while the leather industry 
has not been subject to such extensive environmental regulations in the past. 
He suggested that the costs of all environmental liabilities for the pulp and 
paper industry would be roughly similar to those for the chemicals industry. 
He also considered that the figures from Probst gave reasonable relative 
factors for the other industries.  He also suggested that the environmental 
liabilities of the pharmaceuticals industry are likely to be similar to or lower 
than those for the chemicals industry as  a whole. 
(I) Tllblt 22.b pl't"St'nts  the t>Siimates  for  ju~t the clean up of contaminated silt'S by rt>Sponsible  puties (ie  it does not 
include contributions to the Tru~l Fund) 
(2)  OECD(1993) Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditures in OECD Countries, OECD Environmt>nt Monographs 
No 75, OECD, Paris. 
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2.A4 However, the data for Superfund liabilities for mining may overestimate 
slightly the costs of all environmental liabilities for mining, since the mining 
indusnys contribution to the costs of cleaning up contaminated sites is likely 
to be proportionately greater than its contribution for other types of 
environmental damage costs.  Therefore we have reduced slightly the costs 
of all environmental liabilities for mining for a strict Environmental liability 
system for Group I countries to be 3%  of value added. 
The costs for these industries for the other groups of countries/scenarios 
have been derived in the same way as for chemicals to yield the cost 
estimates shown in Table 4.1 a. 
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1.2 
INTRODUCTION 
The insurance sector is extremely important in developing successful 
environmental liability legislation.  It has three major potential roles.  It 
guarantees financial cover for environmental damage costs.  It spreads the 
risk of compensation payments through pooling so that individual industrial 
companies will not face excessive financial burdens from a liability claim. 
Furthermore, through offering a specialised service related to the 
environmental management of the policyholder, insurance companies could 
provide incentives to policyholders to adopt pollution prevention measures to 
reduce future dam~ge. 
OB]ECI'WES 
The objectives of this paper are to assess: 
•  the specific implications for the insurance industry of an environmental 
liability system (Sections 2.1.3,  3.1, 3.2,  4.1  and 4.2); 
•  how the insurance industry in the selected countries varies and is affected 
differently by an environmental liability system (Section  4.1); 
•  the problems encountered in issuing such insurance cover (Sections 3.1  and 
4.2); 
•  how the problems can be overcome (Sections 3.2 and 4.2); 
•  the role that the insurance industry could play in instituting an effective 
environmental liability system (Section 5.2). 
RESEARCH UNDERTAKEN 
A two-pronged research programme was undertaken involving a literature 
survey and a series of interviews in selected European countries, covering 
insurance companies (see Annex A) and industrial firms. 
The countries investigated are Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, and Hungary.  In 
the Netherlands the insurance pool was also interviewed. 
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2.1.1 
ECONOMIC ISSUES FOR INSURANCE COVER 
This section provides a framework to  understand the situation currently 
faced by the insurance companies with development of the new 
environmental liability insurance market.  The section first explains insurance 
companies' general economic considerations in providing cover for specified 
risk.  It then discusses the specific environmental factors relating to 
environmental liability insurance contracts. 
TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
Financial Issues 
Risk Spreading 
The insurer provides a commercial service to private enterprises by pooling 
their individual risks.  These risks would otherwise cause excessive financial 
hardship in the event of a pollution incident, if the incident had been borne 
by an individual firm.  The insurer makes a profit from this service if total 
outlays, over time, are less then the total pooled premia (after allowing for 
investment income and administration costs).  The provision of this service 
depends on: 
•  premia being high enough to build up capacity to cover potential 
compensation payments; 
•  sufficient numbers of policy holders taking up the cover to spread risks, 
so  that compensation payments can be distributed from among pooled 
policy premia <1>;and 
•  Insurers being able to predict compensation payments (amount and 
frequency) to calculate minimum reserve pool and balance cash flow. 
This requires case experience and dear valuation criteria.  Without these 
future claims premia cannot be calculated (and will take on the 
characteristics of a bet). 
Competition 
The degree of competition in a market affects insurers' behaviour and ability 
to  offer cover in the following ways: 
•  Those companies with significant exposures to  an area of claims will 
suffer major drains on reserves and thus be competitively disadvantaged 
relative to  those with little historic exposure in that area. 
(I) Andre D Hellebuyck, Beware of Triggers! A Paper on Freedom of Contract in Liability Insurance, in New Liabilities & 
Challenges for Industry in Europe, 5th European Conference of Companies Lawyers, 1994. 
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3.3 •  Tight markets put pressure on insurance companies to lower premia to 
attract customers. 
•  Reduced margins for profit and resenve building decreases the capacity of 
insurers to offer full cover, through reducing financial limits available. 
These factors play an important role in the environmental liability insurance 
market.  The first point has already happened in the US  (see Annex D)  with 
environmental liability exposure on old policies (see Section 3.1 ).  The second 
point is occurring currently in Europe and is a complex issue affecting the 
development of the environmental liability insurance market (see Section 3.2). 
The third point could happen under certain scenarios (see Section 4.2.3). 
2.1.2  Implementation Issues 
Collectivity 
Collectivity is the process of building up capacity to spread risk sufficiently. 
So whilst risk spreading is an internal financial strategy, collectivity involves 
the physical process of securing policyholders and premia.  In order to 
maintain profits for the insurance industry the ability to find a sufficiently 
large number of candidate firms is necessary. 
This process is  particularly important and difficult when trying to develop 
and secure a new market.  To build up a market insurers need .to ascertain 
requirements of potential policy holders, through: 
•  information gathering using existing client base; 
•  proactive marketing. 
These all incur high costs and add to future transaction costs to be recovered 
in future premia. 
The time, financial expense and uncertainty of gaining a. sufficiently large 
pool of policyholders makes insurers cautious about venturing into new 
markets.  This holds true for environmental liability insurance markets, 
which is evidenced throughout the paper. 
Expertise 
Expertise is needed both when a policy is  to be taken out and when a claim 
is  made: 
•  to assess and value (environmental) risk and remediation possibilities; 
•  for verification of damage, and to establish causation and responsibility to 
determine the levels of compensation. 
There are organisational costs associated with  building up such expertise 
and carrying out site investigations for risk assessment.  This can be 
developed either in-house or by sub-contracting.  This expertise will 
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significantly add to transaction costs.  However, this cost decreases over time 
as expertise builds up. 
Building up such expertise could lead to specialization in the market place as 
different risks are insured by different insurers. An alternative is to pool 
expertise among different insurers. 
The requirement for technical expertise is very important for environmental 
liability insurance as environmental damage is not a traditional area of 
insurers' expertise (see Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.4). 
Moral Hazard and Self Selection 
The insured know more about risks than insurers, especially in the new area 
of environmental damage with little claims history, there is  a concern so that 
only high risk firm~ will seek insurance.  This will push up premia and 
discourage low risk firms from seeking insurance.  Once insured the firms 
may have less incentive to adopt pollution prevention measures knowing 
that they are financially covered in case of damage.  However, the 
prevention incentive is still there to some degree as any damage caused will 
lead to an increased premium upon policy· renewal. 
Contract Components 
Insurers have options in exactly what they offer to cover regarding: 
•  Types of damage - cause of damage, eg sudden & accidental vs gradual, 
normal operations vs unexpected; 
•  Financial limits - maximum predetermined payout for a claim; 
•  Size of excess- the amount per claim to be paid by the insured; 
•  Triggers - how and when a claim made is deemed valid. 
These are explained in further detail in Section 4.1. 
2.1.3  Characteristics of Environmental Insurance Problems 
Incorporating environmental characteristics into insurance systems and 
policies is particularly difficult.  The main problems are lack of claims 
experience and the physical characteristics of pollution problems leading to 
uncertainty in predicting future claims and debate over causality which in 
turn leads to litigation.  These problems are expanded on below. 
Claims  Experience 
The spread of claims over time will define premia.  Premia are based on past 
claims history and predictions of the probability of future claims occurring 
and the scale of damage costs.  In general, insurance requires a pattern of 
claims history, preferably high frequency and low magnitude. 
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calculations.  Also· the events tend to be high magnitude and low frequency 
which make calculations and cover more difficult.  Furthermore there is 
uncertainty ovet:' what value will be placed on environmental damage costs 
making scale of future claims difficult to estimate. 
Litigation Matters 
There is still lack of agreement on the definition of certain environmental 
concepts and terms such as point and timing of causality of environmental 
damage.  These areas of controversy allow room for interpretation, which 
leads to litigation between potentially responsible parties trying to shift the 
financial burden off themselves. 
Box 2.1a below is an example of a typical chain of events during a pollution 
incident.  It highlights the root of the problems in defining: 
•  triggers; 
•  cause of damage: 
•  sudden and accidental; 
•  gradual; 
•  unexpected; 
•  in the course of normal operations; 
•  at what stage of the chain of events, shown in Box 2.1a, can or should a 
claim be made?  Occurrence, first observation and claims made are 
different types of triggers.  Each one would lead (and possibly arises on a 
different policy) to a claim at a  different~tage and point in time; 
•  what is the cause of the damage?  Is it sudden and accidental because 
there is a rupture, or is it gradual because the substance slowly leaks. into 
the soil and migrates over time into groundwater?  Is it unexpected, 
because it is a rupture, or could it be argued to be part of normal 
operations because the cause of the rupture was corrosion of the tank 
which should have been checked by the polluter? 
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•  a pre-condition setting the ground for the future problem eg corrosion of an 
underground storage tank  · 
•  the cause of the escape of a pollutant eg.  the rupture of the tank 
the actual escape of the pollutant into the environment eg.  the leakage of fuel oil 
•  the (often not perceived) presence of the pollutant in the environment eg.  the presence 
of the fuel oil in the soil 
•  the changing situation of the pollution condition eg.  the migration of the fuel via the 
groundwater to adjacent land 
•  the occurrence of a legally relevant loss eg.  property damage to  the adjacent land 
the manifestation of such loss eg.  the damage associated with fuel contamination 
becoming noticeable 
•  a claim being made or a cleanup mandated by the government 
Time LAgs 
Time lags between an incident and the manifestation of damage will make it 
more difficult to predict projected rates for gradual pollution incidents and 
set appropriate premia. 
Cumulative Risk 
If a certain substance in widespread use were discovered in the future to 
have harmful consequences, then the whole industry using the substance 
would be affected.  This would provoke an enormous number of claims. 
This could lead to financial difficulties, particularly for smaller insurers.  This 
risk is one of the major reasons why insurers tend to limit their exposure for 
environmental lia bill ties. 
Summary 
The section shows what factors affect the successful functioning of insurance 
markets.  These basic principles are used in the following analysis to  gauge 
the insurers' reactions and practices to a changing environmental liability 
insurance market.  It is evident that there are many difficulties associated 
with environmental liability insurance.  The main problems faced by insurers 
in developing a market are: 
•  risk assessment: 
•  need for technical expertise; 
(I) Wilhelm Zeller, Cologne Reinsurance Company, Pollution Liability Exposure, How to get off the 'Sudden and 
Accidental' Timebomb? 
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•  uncertainty of future claims; 
•  defining anj selecting triggers; 
•  exposure to different types of cause of damage; 
•  high costs lead to high premia and tight margins which. impede market 
growth. 
OTHER ACTORS 
Reinsurers 
To cover themselves against financial loss, insurance companies reinsure 
their policies.  This acts as a further mechanism for insurers to spread the 
risks.  Reinsurers therefore become involved in covering environmental 
liability when they reinsure inslirance policies covering environmental 
damage costs.  Reinsurers have the option whether to accept covering such 
policies.  Therefore, reinsu.rers will play an important part in influencing 
insurance practices because if the policies are viewed as entailing excessive 
liabilities the reinsurers will not reinsure. 
Reinsurers have two procedures to assess and reinsure insurance policies. 
First they reinsure through a treaty mechanism.  They will reinsure all of an 
insurers' policies in one package, conditional on them falling  ~thin  certain 
defined parameters selected to limit risk.  For individual policies falling 
beyond these criteria, individual risk assessment will be carried out to 
determine the conditions of reinsurance for them, if at all.  The latter process 
is termed facultative  reinsurance. 
In Germany, reinsurers play a particularly important role in environmental 
liability insurance.  The reinsurance market takes most of the risk with only 
a limited amount of risk being retained by the direct insurers, especially with 
regard to  the insurance of the larger industrial companles.  Due to  the 
shrinkage of reinsurance capacity over recent years and losses indemnified 
under GL policies having been large, the reinsurers have exerted significant 
pressure and significantly influenced insurers to change the wording of 
liability policies. 
In Hungary environmental risks are usually retained by the insurance 
company and not reinsured.  Some individual cases are subject to facultative 
reinsurance. 
In Italy there was no possibility to reinsure environmental liability contracts 
with existing reinsurance companies.  This added to risk and might have 
been influential in the formation of the insurance Pool. 
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Professional Indemnity (PI)  underwriters are also vulnerable to 
environmental liability.  When contamination is found at a site the new 
owners may try to place the liability for them on those parties giving them 
advice when purchasing the land/asset.  The insurers - PI underwriters - will 
then be called to cover the compensation payments payable. 
Professional Indemnity exposure will arise for < 1>: 
•  planning authorities who granted negligent planning consent; 
•  valuers and surveyors who failed  to take pollution into account; 
•  those who invested funds in land now found to be contaminated; 
•  solicitors involved in the sale, purchase or transfer of contaminated land; 
•  accountants who described land as assets without knowing its 
environmental condition. 
This exposure could be significant if retroactive liability is in place. 
Summary 
•  Reinsurers have similar strategies to insurers in trying to calculate and 
reduce risk.  This can limit insurers' actions if reinsurers take a more 
conservative position, in their risk analysis, and decide not to cover 
specific policies. 
•  Insurers are not the only sector exposed to environmental liability.  Costs 
of reinsurance and PI underwriters sectors should also be included in 
considering the implications of environmental liability legislation. 
(I) Brian Street, ECS,  Lloyds Environmental Uability Insurance conference 
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3.1 
THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE COVER 
Insurance policy systems evolve based on past policy and claims experience 
and changing external forces.  The external forces are legal, jurisdictional and 
public consciousness.  External developments have made insurers reasse.ss 
their initial service for covering environmental damage and rearrange the 
scope and price of such policies.  Markets across Europe are now at different 
stages of offering cover for environmental damage.  The Comite European 
Des Assurances (CEA) identifies four existing situations in EU countries. 
•  Old general liability policies which did not make a distinction between 
sudden and accidental pollution and gradual pollution. 
•  Total pollution exclusion from general liability with an optional surcharge 
for sudden and accidental damage. 
•  General liability insurance covering sudden and accidental pollution but 
not gradual pollution damage. 
•  In addition to the above, environmental impairment liability policies are 
offered which pertain specifically to environmental risk and include 
gradual pollution damage (which is often offered through an insurance 
pool). 
This section describes how these forms of environmental cover developed, 
why these original services changed and what state countries are in now. 
HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY POUCY 
General Liability 
General Liability, due to its non-specific nature, made no special provisions 
or restrictions for irresponsible actions by firms regarding their ensuing 
pollution damage.  Sudden and accidental pollution was deemed part of 
general accident liability cover.  Gradual pollution though was not covered. 
Original cover was based on occurrence based triggers with no time limit, 
exposing insurers to a long-tail of claims.  This means, that if, for example, 
damage was discovered now which had first occurred in 1975, the insurance 
company providing cover in 1975 would be liable. 
Wording was not careful enough to restrict the scope of responsibility of the 
insurers.  Furthermore, no additional premium was required for this 
environmental cover. 
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Until the 1980s and in many cases the 1990s, insurance companies took no 
special note of environmental liabilities  (1>.  They inadvertently 
incorporated cover for environmental pollution problems along with other 
damage and costs incurred by firms, under general liability policies. 
Although certain environmental liability regulations existed such as the 
German Water Resources Act, dating back to the 1960s <
2>,  environmental 
liability was not a major legal issue before 1980 and the enactment of 
CERCLA.  From the beginning of the 1980s German insurers faced some 
environmental claims.  This coverage was also for first party damage. During 
the 1980s significant costs from environmental liability developed in the US, 
and even there it was initially limited and only grew as more problems of 
damage were realized.  It was only in the late 1980s that US insurers were 
confronted with compensation claims by companies trying to avoid cleanup 
payments. 
In the early 1990s other countries such as UK developed specific 
environmental policies which have liability elements <
3>.  The Spanish 
legislative system still does not have a specific environmental liability 
legislation.  Liability for environmental problems falls directly under what is 
encompassed by general liability law.  Hungary has the least stringent 
liability system although an environmental liability policy is  under 
development.  Thus the insurance industry in Europe for a long time did not 
explicitly consider environmental liability.  Increasing awarene~s of 
environmental liabilities, accompanied by the development of stricter 
environmental legislations are part of the set of factors now altering insurers' 
coverage of environmental damage. 
Insurance companies, under general liability provisions, left themselves 
potentially liable for a whole host of pollution problems. Due to the 
occurrence trigger <
4
> used to determine where claims can be made, insurers 
are liable for past pollution of the insured.  Therefore where retroactive 
liability is established, insurers now fear that they will face an onslaught of 
lawsuits and possible compensation payments directed at the insured 
companies for past contamination covered unwittingly at no extra premium. 
This historical experience makes insurers nervous about providing cover on 
environmental liabilities and has led to their exclusion under current General 
Liability (GL)  policies. 
However, there is  a potential growth market of industrial companies desiring 
environmental protection, resulting from stricter environmental liability laws. 
{IJ  For some sectors, eg chemicals, policy change started to occur in the 1970s. 
{2)  Insurers were influenced by UmweltHG (land) and WHG (water).  They are now also influenced by the stricter 
liability provisions of 1991  UHG environmental policy.  The UHG  broadened the concept of strict liability and 
introduced a slight facilitation of the burden of proof in favour of the plaintiff. 
<3)  Water Resources Act (1991) and the contaminated land provisions of the Environment Bill  (1995)  in  the UK and the 
Environmental Protection Act (1%9) and the Environmental Damage Act (1986)  in Sweden. 
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There is an opportunity for insurers to create and develop additional services 
to cover environmental damage that are or may be liable for compensation. 
This situation has led to some insurance companies developing specific 
environmental insurance provisions. 
The following three response options have been applied by the insurance 
industry.  These responses vary depending on national characteristics: 
•  form a pool of environmental insurers such as in Italy, Spain, Netherlands 
and France; 
•  form across the board policy guidelines for all insurers such as in 
Germany; 
•  individual company strategies such as in the UK. 
In the latter two cases individual insurance companies were large enough to 
set up their own environmental insurance policies.  In the first case, there 
are many small insurance companies and hence benefits from setting up an 
insurance pool to handle environmental liabilities. 
Insurance Pools 
In countries where the insurance industry is dominated by small insurance 
firms lacking resources to build new markets by themselves, insurers have 
come together and formed insurance pools specifically for environmental 
liability.  Through acting together the companies can share financial 
resources, environmental expertise and reduce risk.  In Italy, for example, 
insurance contracts are developed by the companies under the supervision of 
the pool, which provides technical assistance, a reference contract and 
provides advice on special conditions to impose, and assessment of the risks 
and costs related to specific sites.  The pool covers nearly all environmental 
insurance contracts though a few are still carried out by individual 
companies and are reinsured outside the pool. 
Pools have been established at different times in Europe.  The Netherlands 
has the oldest pool, established 10 years ago, whilst the Spanish and French 
pools were only established in 1994 (discussed further in Section  4.1.6). 
Environmental Impairment  Liability 
The tighter environmental legislation and exposure of industrial firms 
described above has led to the small but growing demand for Environmental 
Impairment Liability (ElL)  policies.  These policies are individual 
environmental insurance policies which are written and adopted in relation 
to potential environmental problems as opposed to general provisions for 
property and health damage.  They are not yet well established a·nd still do 
not have a wide market base or standardized premia levels.  They require 
individual environmental risk assessments to calculate appropriate premia 
rates which will cover their future compensation payouts for claints.  They 
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also modify policy elements, such as triggers used, to restrict liability for the 
insurers in the future, unlike the old GL policies which were open-ended. 
CURRENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
POUCY 
In general, in this transitional period, insurers are reacting to the changing 
environmental context as set out above, by offering rn·o concurrent 
insurance policies under general liability and specific environmental liability. 
These policies presently overlap and the margins of difference between them 
vary between countries.  Most insurers in the UK and Germany will insist 
that a firm has its GL policy and its ElL policy with the same insurer.  This is 
for both financial and administrative reasons.  Unlike GL, ElL is currently 
not a profitable service therefore insurers are only prepared to offer ElL 
when they can also obtain GL business.  If the GL policy for a firm was held 
by one insurance company and the ElL policy by another, then there might 
be disputes as to who is responsible for the environmental liabilities. 
Therefore to avoid such disputes and to lower transaction costs of issuing 
the policy, an insurer prefers to hold both GLand ElL policies.  When 
considering the insurance policies and contracts, both general liability (GL) 
and environmental impairment liability (ElL) policies should therefore be 
considered together, especially as in most countries the demand for ElL 
policies is still extremely limited. 
In most countries insurance companies' GL policies cover only sudden and 
accidental pollution. - In the UK, in 1991, the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI) issued a policy guidance to UK insurers to exclude all liability in respect 
of pollution other than where caused by a sudden, unintended  and 
unexpected event.  Therefore, if a manufacturer wants gradual pollution 
covered he must take out an ElL policy for named and audited sites.  This is 
now common practice across the countries investigated (apart from 
Hungary).  Further items that companies might want coverage for in the 
future will probably be included in an ElL policy instead of extended GL 
policies. 
The overall trend in light of stricter environmental policies is to reduce GL 
environmental obligations and move coverage of environmental liabilities 
into ElLs.  Insurers are now seeking to go one step further than offering 
additional environmental coverage in ElLs by isolating and excluding 
pollution insurance from their general policies.  In the UK 'write back' 
clauses are made to specify that all pollution-related damage is excluded 
except certain identified items which are written back into the policy. 
In attempting to reduce the potential environmental compensation 
obligations from GL policies, many insurers in the UK may seek to deny 
coverage of environmental liabilities under GL policies issued prior to April 
1991.  To be able to make a claim successfully the insured will have to prove 
that the loss/liability arose during the period of the policy and that the 
contract wording covered the specific type of event.  Insurers will look very· 
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closely at the policy terms, conditions and exclusions and will deny coverage 
if the insured: failed to take all reasonable precautions; deliberately caused 
the pollution; failed to disclose material facts, or are late in notifying the 
claim.  (l) 
Germany, Italy and France are good examples of insurance sectors that have 
moved to a more restrictive environmental insurance policy. 
In Germany the insurers developed a new ElL-insurance policy which covers 
environmental liability EIL in response to the new environmental liability 
law (UmweltHG) enacted in 1991  and existing growing exposure.  This is to 
replace the old insurance policies covering environmental legislation.  The 
former general liability coverage was very broad (especially for claims caused 
by substances harmful to water under Water Resources Act (WHG)).  It 
encompassed, to a large extent, cleanup costs of insured's own ·premises, ie 
first party damage that are in principle not covered by liability insurance. 
This cover caused large losses in insurers' portfolios.  Furthermore, wording 
of insurance contracts led to serious problems in the handling of claims by 
the insurers.  Insurers would therefore have taken action without the 
introduction of the UHG to limit their exposure from WHG policies.  Those 
changes would probably have been limited to WHG policies whereas the 
new UHG led to the development of a completely new policy. 
In the 1970s Italian insurance companies excluded the tenn pollution from 
GL policies.  In 1979 certain companies started ElL policies.  These later 
cooperated. and came together to form in 1980 an insurance pool, Pool per 
l'Assurazione R.C.  da  lnquinamento (see Section 4.1.6 for more details on the 
pool). 
In 1994 French insurers decided to stop coveii.ng pollution under general 
liability policy.  They instead formed an insurance pool, Assurpol, which 
delivers cover for sudden and accidental and/or gradual pollution (see Section 
4.1.6). 
Tables 3.2a summarizes the different cover offered in the selected countries 
for past GL and current ElL policies to highlight the changes that have 
occurred. 
The main trends identified in the table are that: 
•  under both policies insurers limit their liability to  third party damage; 
•  cover for damage to the unowned environment is still not available; 
•  a transition has occurred from 'occurrence' to 'claims made' policies.  This 
is to resolve the long tail liability problem; and 
(I) Brian Street, An Insurer's View of the 1995 Environment Act, Fifth  Environmental Insurance Conference, list of 
Uoyds Press. 
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•  gradual pollution is now covered in an ElL policy, although this is still 
limited to pollution events outside the normal operations of business. 
Table 3.2b shows the differences in manket size between GL and EIL policies 
offered across the countries.  The table shows that ElL premium income is 
very small in relation to the GL market.  The UK, Italy and Spain have an 
EIL premium income which is less than 1%  of GL premium income. 
Germany has the highest relative EIL premium income which is still less 
than 5%  the size of GL premium income; 
Premium income of  GL and ElL policies (m ECU) 
Total GL 
premium 
income 
Total ElL 
premium 
income 
Conclusion 
UK 
950 
<1 
'; 
Germany  Italy 
5500  1100 
210  9.5 
Spain  Netherlands 
850  540 
<1  8 
The insurers, due to poorly written past policies and changing legislation, 
have found themselves over-exposed to liability claims.  In rea~on  to this 
they are now restricting cover offered under general liability.  In addition to 
this polluting industries are more aware of their environmental risk.  These 
factors have led to the emergence of a new environmentally specific 
insurance cover offered in conjunction with, and in addition to, general 
liability cover. 
However, the demand for ElL policies to date in most of thf! countries has 
been limited.  Another inhibiting factor in the development of EIL markets is 
that the premia for EIL policies being offered are high and much higher than 
premium rates for GL policies, so that firms would prefer to stay under GL 
cover.  The lack of demand is partly because firms do not recognise the 
magnitude of the environmental liabilities that require cover and because 
cover is not compulsory under existing laws. 
Germany is an exception where almost all policyholders of general liability 
also have an EIL  policy.  In Germany, where environmental legislation is 
stricter than in the other countries and was developed earlier, companies are 
more aware of the need for covering environmental liabilities, particularly 
due to the environmental liability law (Umwelt HG) passed in 1991.  This is 
reflected in the higher number of ElL policies purchased in Germany. 
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4.1 
4.1.1 
COMPARISON OF INSURANCE STRATEGIES FOR COVERING 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIARILI1Y 
The insurance industries in Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, Hungary and the 
Netherlands were investigated at finn level to ascertain the industry's 
existing environmental liability policy operations and how they feel the 
market could develop under stricter environmental liability systems. (l) 
Information for Sweden and France was gathered from secondary sources. 
The two sub-sections, in Section 4, examine insurers' current behaviour and 
their views on future changes in the market. 
CURRENT PRACTICES AND KEY ISSUES 
Introduction 
This section provides a comparative analysis of the country findings to 
identify the major trends and variations across the insurance sectors in the 
selected countries.  The country information shows examples of the specific 
elements of ElL cover offered by insurance companies.  These country 
specific examples construct a picture of the relationship between 
environmental liability legislation and insurance behaviour.  For each section 
information for each country is presented where available. < 2) 
Contract Components 
Triggers 
The trigger is the element of an insurance policy which determine.s the 
length of time under which insurers are contracted to respect claims. 
Under occurrence triggers, claims can be made anytime after a pollution 
incident occurs even if the policy has since concluded, as long as  the incident 
occurred during policy cover.  Claims  made means that the claim has to be 
made whilst policy cover is in operation. 
In Germany the new ElL policy stimulated a new definition of the insurance 
'trigger to first  verifiable discovery of loss, where a claim must be made when 
the damage is  first noticed.  Damage must be proven to have occurred but 
the cause of the damage need not be recognisable at that moment.  This first 
verijipble discovery of loss  trigger is  applicable in Germany and France where 
there are established and long lasting relationships between a firm and its 
insurance company < 3). 
(IJ  Insurance pools were interviewed in Italy, Spain and Netherlands 
(2) Where no data are available countries are omitted from  the discussion 
(3)  Hellebuyck A,  D, (1994) Beware of Triggen~! A paper on Freedom of Contract in Liability Insurance, in New 
Liabilities and Challenges in Europe; proceedings of 5th European Conference of Company Lawyers.  Kluwer, 
Antwerpen.  ISBN  Kluwer 90-6321-926-1. 
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In general there has been a distinct move away ftor...t  occurrence based to 
claims made triggers.  This is to reduce the long-tails of claims.  Delayed 
claims were very common due to the lags common in the manifestation of 
pollution problems after the occurrence of an incident.  These claims were 
unpredictable and insurers achieve more certainty with cl~  based triggers. 
However, there has been a recent decision in the French courts to make the 
'claims made' triggers void.  This required insurers to revert back to 
occurrence based triggers.  The ruling shows that elements of contracts can 
be overturned and thus uncertainty over future claims remains high.  Such 
judicial decisions make insurers more hesitant to pursue enVironmental 
liability insurance policies. 
Scope of cover 
Cover is usually restricted to third party damage.  This is based on general 
civil liability practices. 
In Germany the new ElL policy (UHG) is more restrictive in its coverage than 
the former broad policy.  In relation to what used to be insured, insurers 
now only guarantee cover for 40%  of sudden and accidental damage caused 
to soil or water, and only 20%  of damage caused by contaminated sites. 
In the UK insurers are trying to restrict the scope of cover for past policies. 
In order to restrict claims for past pollution British insurers are using a third 
party defence.  The insurers claim that they are only liable for damage to 
third party property and not for the sites of the insured (first party). 
Insurers have declared that damage must come from injured parties through 
the court system and not from cleanup requirements made by regulatory 
bodies.  For example insurers say that if a Local Authority (LAs) serves a 
notice to a firm to clean up its site, this is not third party damage and 
therefore they argue that the firm is not insured. 
In Sweden, despite the existence of Environmental Liability Insurance, two of 
the largest insurance companies have extended the Standard Business 
Liability cover to include all environmental damage, except for pure 
economic loss.  However, this extended coverage is only offered to 
companies who do not present specific environmental hazards.  The cover is 
not available to companies which require a permit or an application for an 
activity under the Environmental Protection Act. 
Financial limits 
The financial limit is  the maximum amount of compensation an insurer will 
offer for a claim, regardless of the size of the damage.  Normally this ceiling 
is  not reached.  It is only used to prevent insurers becoming liable for huge 
sums of money if one of the firms insured created a disaster, such as an oil 
spill.  So although most claims do not exceed the predetermined financial 
limits, the limit is  a valuable element in containing insurers' potential liability 
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and  preventing insurers having to pay out excessive compensation 
payments. 
These limits will vary depending on the type of policy formulated and 
premium paid.  The limits stated are for a standard premium - they may be 
higher if desired by policyholders, but they will be accompanied by higher 
premia. 
A wide range of financial limits are evident across the various countries. 
Some illustrative example are given below. 
In the UK the average financial limit to liability insurance compensation is 6 
million ECU  (£5 million) per claim. 
In Sweden  the maximum coverage under standard policy is fairly low, 
ranging between 0.6-1.2 million ECU (SEK 5 -10 million). 
In Germany insurance cover is available up to several hundred million ECU. 
However, usually insured limits range between 1 and 11  million ECU .(2 and 
20 million DM) for medium-sized enterprises, and even a limit of 21  million 
ECU (40 million DM) is a rare case. 
In Hungary limits are low.  They are generally 6000 ECU (Forint 1 million) for 
property damage and 120,000 ECU (Forint 20 million) for personal injuries. 
In Italy financial limits vary between policies and are higher for Pool than 
non-Pool members.  Pool limits for environmental insurance are 9.7 million 
ECU  (20 billion Lire) per claim and 24 million ECU (50 billion Lire) for 
pollution accidents.  This compares to only 0.24 - 2.4 million ECU (500 million 
- 5 billion Lire) limits by Pool insurers for covering sudden and accidental 
pollution under general liability and 0.24- 0.5 million ECU  (500 million - 1 
billion Lire) limits by non-Pool members. 
In the Netherlands  compensation is up to 7.2 million ECU for ElL.  This is 
much less than compensation payments under general liability.  So far claims 
settled have ranged from 4,800 to 380,000 ECU. 
Premia 
It is dearly important for both insurers and firms  that premia appropriate for 
the sustainability of ElL are set.  The premia will be affected by what type 
and mode of damage is covered ie potential payout.  In turn the size of the 
premia offered will affect market size as it will influence the level of interest 
by firms in attaining ElL cover as opposed to self-insurance or, where. 
possible, retaining GL cover.  Any special provisions such as premia 
discounts for adopting pollution prevention measures might also influence 
firm (manufacturer) behaviour. 
In Germany the main factors influencing the size of premia issued are the size 
of the plant, the type of plant (as regards liability situation and permit 
requirements) and the individual assessment of the underwriter. 
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relation to the former general liability and WHG coverage. The increase is 
due to increased awareness of environmental liabilities and transacbon costs 
of risk assessmerts and administering the contracts. 
In the UK premia vary by the size of the firm but are typically 600 ECU per 
year for small firms and 12,000 ECU for large firms. 
, 
In Italy the Pool's premium range is approximately 1,500-50,000 ECU  (3-100 
million Lire).  A discount of 30%  is offered if gradual pollution is excluded 
from the environmental policy. 
At present in Spain the Pool has 18 contracts worth 9 million pesetas which 
is equivalent to an average of just over 3,000 ECU premium per policy.  This 
premium level is low in relation to the number of claims being made and the 
outflow of compensation payments.  Insurance companies are thus losing 
money in this area.  However, they are trying to increase this environmental 
market and may have set premia low on purpose to attract custom. (t) 
In Germany and the UK premia are_ influenced only to a small extent by 
pollution prevention and measures put in place by a particular policy holder. 
Implementation of specific safety measures does not generally lead to 
substantial reductions in premia, and seldom more than by 10%.  This means 
that any prevention measures made in order to gain such a discount would 
most likely not be cost-effective as most measures are more expensive than 
the small discount offered.  However, the companies need to undertake 
prevention measures to reach an acceptable level of environmental 
management required to obtain ElL cover. 
In Hungary there are no specific environmental premia.  Insurers' policies 
concerning environmental liability are under preparation, and as yet there is 
no practice in this field.  There are no specific discounts for preventative 
measures.  However, between 5 and 10%  premium reductions may be 
offered based on a subjective assessment of risk. 
Risk Assessment 
Risk assessments are key tools for insurers to filter out "bad" risks and 
determine suitable premia levels for those companies with sound enough 
environmental management to be covered. 
In Germany in the early 1980s under the WHG-policy (for the Water 
Resources Act)  cleanup of a contaminated site was nearly always over 55,000 
ECU  (100,000 DM) and insurers suffered enormous losses  becaus~ these high 
cleanup costs had not been initially calculated into the premia.  Underwriters 
had underestimated the magnitude of the problem.  This was in part because 
the scientific knowledge on the toxicity of substances was not sufficient to 
indicate all the potential damage. 
(I) Low premia could also be because risks were underestimated when formulating appropriate premia levels. 
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measures.  The risk assessment procedures take into account the differing 
legal liability situation of each plant.  The UHG identifies plants considered 
most dangerous to the environment.  These are the plants which are 
prioritised by insurers for examination. 
The policy holders have to fill in a detailed ques.tionnaire on their 
environmental risk situation.  On the basis of these questionnaires insurers 
will carry out inspections of at least 30%  of insured plants.  The outcome will 
usually be insurance experts proposing prevention measures to the potential 
clients.  Only 5%  of the proposed prevention measures will be officially 
binding.  However, usual practice is for companies to adopt even the non-
binding recommendations. 
Risk assessments can thus take the following forms: 
•  questionnaires to be filled  out by the manufacturer (1); 
•  site audit carried out by environmental consultants: 
•  paid directly by potential policyholder; 
•  paid by insurer and cost to be included in premium; 
•  rating and weighting system based on information gathered. 
In Spain  the insurance pool has a developed process of risk assessment.  This 
is a three part risk valuation procedure: 
•  Risk associated with dangerous substances and processes.  They assess aspects 
such as the storage of products, mobility of substances etc. In order to 
determine risks they require companies t6 complete a questionnaire and 
carry out an inspection for those areas where uncertainty remains. 
•  Environmental risk.  They ascertain the state of the environment 
surrounding the site to be insured to estimate the potential magnitude of 
damage that could amount if pollution problems occurred and to estimate 
the costs to decontaminate such pollution to restore the environment to 
acceptable levels. 
•  Company activities.  The insurers assess the pollution prevention measures 
adopted by the company combined with its overall environmental 
management attitude.  Also past pollution incidents by the company are 
taken into account.  However, the insurers do not consider the economic 
status (insolvency potential) of the potential policy holder <
2>. 
In Hungary insurance companies have no in-house capability to assess 
envirorunental risks so  they request the services of environmental 
consultants. 
(t) This can often be  the final hurdle to obtain insurance without verification.  This is because if  a claim was made and 
upon investigation of the incident the insurer found that the initial questionnaire responses were false  then the policy 
would be invalid. 
(2) This could have important implications in case of foreclosure and changes of ownership. 
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Experience shows that it is critical to assess accurately potential costs and 
calculate contingency reserves in case unexpected results occur due to 
insufficient scientific knowledge. 
Risk assessments are still in the initial stages of development.  They still rely 
on subjective risk assessments and include much uncertainty.  This has led 
to different levels of premia offered by different insurers for firms (of similar 
size) with similar levels of risk  There was also uncertainty amongst insurers 
over how much prevention measures would lead to lower premia. 
Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs occur for both the insured and insurer.  The transaction 
costs of the insurer are incorporated into the premium.  The transaction costs 
cover the following activities: 
•  risk assessment procedures before cover is given; 
•  administration of drawing up policies; 
•  handling claims; 
•  litigation over whether the insured party is liable for the environmental 
damage costs, or litigation over determining their share 
•  litigation over whether environmental liability is covered by the insurance 
policy; 
•  marketing costs. 
The legal transaction costs are exceptionally high in the US  due to the high 
amount of legal disputes mainly concerning the joint and several liability 
provisions in Superfund.  The Rand Survey (t) of the experience of US 
Insurers regarding Superfund found that legal  transaction costs made up a 
large proportion of insurers' total costs.  The Rand Survey fotind that the 
legal transaction costs in their study were split roughly equally between: the 
costs of disputes as to whether the insured firm is liable for the damage and 
if so, determining their share; and the cost of disputes as to whether the 
environmental damage is  covered under the insurance .policy. 
Transaction costs will influence the potential policyholder's decision on 
whether or not it is economic to take out specific environmental cover when 
a choice is available.  The transaction costs as a percentage of premium will 
vary in proportion to the size of the plant or company being insured. 
Smaller firms with lower premium needs will still have to  carry out audits 
and thus have higher relative transaction costs.  However, it is difficult to 
arrive at concrete figures as transaction costs on the side of the insured arise 
in different departments of the firms, are not calculated separately, and also 
vary widely. 
As the market develops, insurers will build up expertise in-house for 
assessing environmental risks as they grow accustomed to dealing with 
specific industries and their associated environmental risks.  Risk assessments 
ttl Acton, JP  Dixon L,S, (1995) Superfund and Transaction Costs:  The Experience of lnsurt>rs and Very large Industrial 
Firms.  Report by RAND, The Institute for Civil Justice.  ISBN  0-8330-1239-8 
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should become routine, less time consuming and hence less costly.  This will 
eventually lead to a reduction in premium levels. 
In Germany  transa~on costs under the new EIL policy (UHG) have risen 
considerably in comparison to former liability coverage (about 10% ).  This is 
because the ElL policy (UHG) requires a site audit upto 30%  of the time. 
In Germany transaction costs of ElL (UHG) policies for the insurers amount 
to approximately 40%  of the premia.  This includes marketing costs. 
Transaction costs for policy holders are estimated to be around 2%  of their 
premium per annum.  This includes premium negotiation, administration in 
making sure all plants are insured, providing risk informa·tion to insurers 
and handling claims. Total transaction costs are usually between 40 and 45% 
of total environmental liability premia. 
In the UK transaction costs under GLare 10-15%  of premia.  This increased 
for ElLs to 25-35%  of premia.  Such transaction costs could prove barriers for 
SMEs desiring EIL cover. 
In Italy transaction costs are approximately 40%  of net premium income. 
This is in comparison to roughly 30%  for general liability policies. 
In Spain  transaction costs of insurers for ElL insurance policies are around 
20%  for internal expenses and 10%  for external expenses (brokerage).  This 
totals approximately 30%  of premia levels. 
In the Netherlands  potential clients are required to carry out a risk assessment 
at their own expense.  When a client decides to purchase a policy, insurers 
will bear part of the costs of the risk assessment by offering a 20%  premium 
reduction for the first year.  This discount is then excluded in subsequent 
years. 
It is evident that there are differences between the countries for the 
proportion of premia accounted for by transaction costs.  However, the 
differences are not that great, ranging from between 30 and 40%  of premium 
levels.  The differences are based on different amounts of administration, 
litigation and costs of site audits.  Litigation, as seen in the US with 
Superfund, is the area of the greatest potential cost and transaction cost 
variation. 
The high cost of transaction activities which increases premia levels acts as a 
disincentive for firms to take up such policies.  Because a high proportion of 
these transaction costs are fixed  costs, such as site audits, transaction costs 
will be relatively higher for smaller size policies.  This will act as a greater 
disincentive for SMEs considering taking up such cover. 
4.1.4  SMEs 
Insurance companies can provide a useful service for SMEs by spreading the 
risks of environmental damage costs from individual incidents which would 
otherwise be excessive for an individual small firm.  However, some of the 
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their total insurance costs.  Insurance cover may therefore be particularly 
costly for SMEs discouraging its uptake.  This is particularly problematic as 
SMEs are least equipped with resources to deal with pollution incidents. 
In Germany insurers do not differentiate UHG insurance according to the size 
of the enterprise.  Premiums do differ slightly according to the size of the 
policyholder, with larger companies with more plants having lower premium 
per plant.  The smaller firms have greater difficulty in implementing 
prevention measures. 
In Italy,  30%  of the Pool contracts are for companies whose turnover is 
under 5 million ECU. 
In Spain  the insurance pool targets SMEs for coverage as they have the 
greatest difficulty dealing with environmental liability. 
In the Netherlands,  to date, 40,000 policies have been for SMEs as opposed to 
only 100 for large companies. 
So in some countries like the Netherlands and Spain it is mostly SMEs which 
take out ElL insurance, whilst in other countries such as the UK and Italy it 
is mostly large firms  which take out ElL insurance. 
4.1.5  Claims 
Sudden  & Accidental vs Gradual Pollution 
Experience in Germany provides an opportunity to analyse the breakdown 
of environmental damage claims to understand the respective financial 
importance of different environmental hazards for insurance companies.  The 
tables below show associated costs for these different types of insurance 
through claims paid.  Actual damage amounts may have been much higher, 
as some cases were settled either because liability could not be proven or 
insurance cover was questioned. 
Table 4.1a shows the share of claims attributed to soil and water pollution 
compared to other causes of environmental damage for two leading 
insurance companies and a large insurance broker.  It shows that damage to 
soil and water (through both sudden and accidental and gradual pollution) 
are by far the most important in terms of both number of associated claims 
and compensation amounts, accounting for nearly 75%  of all environmental 
claims settled. 
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Damage Class  Number Caused  Number Caused  Claims  Percentage 
by Accidents  by Normal  Amounts  of total 
Operations  (m ECU)  amount 
Sudden and accidental  6,177  0  388  22 
damage to soil and water 
Contaminated  2  2,026  888  50 
sites/gradual pollution to 
soil and water 
Air pollution  23  2  114  7 
Fire and Explosion  7  0  166  9 
Other  4  0  204  12 
Total  6,213  2,028  1,759  100 
Sourct:  HDI,  Allianz and Jauch  & Hubener  <tl 
Table 4.1.5a also shows that although the number of claims for gradual 
pollution was one third of the claims for sudden pollution incidents, the 
amount of the claims for gradual pollution was twice as large. 
Table 4.1.5b focuses further on these different financial consequences between 
the sudden and gradual pollution incident claims. 
The companies examined show the same relative differences in size, with the 
average amount of gradual claims being six times larger than average claims 
for sudden damage. 
HDI has the highest difference in claim amoimts between sudden and 
accidental and gradual claims.  Its total gradual claims amount is 200% 
greater than for sudden pollution incidents. 
This claims experience from Germany indicates that insurers offering gradual 
pollution damage cover should expect significant increases in claims for the 
ElL policies.  If the German figures are representative of the different claim 
amounts between sudden and accidental and gradual pollution then insurers 
may expect additional claims of between 50 and 200%. 
(I) Allianz is  the leading German insurer, HOI  is a leading insurer for industrial risk, J&H  is  a large insurance broker. 
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4.1.6 
Statistics of WHG-policy-claims < 1> 
Company  No. of  .  No. of  Ave  Ave amount  Total  Total 
sudden  gradual  amoutit of  of gradual  sudden  gradual 
claims  claims  sudden  claims (OOOs  claims  claims 
claims  ECU)  amount (m  amount 
(~  ECU)  ECU)  (m ECU) 
HOI  1194 (64%)  682 (36%)  28  179  33  122 
Allianz  4,895 (79%)  1,288 (21%)  13  78  63  100 
J&HCZl  N/A (46%)  N/A (32%)  44  628  N/A  N/A 
Insurance Pools 
The insurance pools bring insurance companies together to share financial 
resources, environmental expertise and reduce individual risk.  This is 
especially important for the countries with a predominance of small 
insurance firms.  Pools have been set up in Italy, Spain and the 
Netherlands < 3>. 
Italy 
· Insurance companies in Italy in 1980 came together to form an insurance 
pool, Pool per l'Assicurazione da  Inquinamento. 
In the early 1980s the pool attempted to carry out detailed risk assessments 
but did not manage to develop a systematic pricing model for their 
environmental premia.  The pool will in most cases conduct an inspection 
through one of its own experts.  Two thirds of this cost is financed by the 
pool, with the remaining third being borne by the policyholder. 
The total amount of premia paid by Italian firms for environmental liability 
insurance is low, amounting to approximately 9.5  milli~n ECU pa.  However, 
premia income has increased substantially since 1988. 
Spain 
The insurance pool in Spain is very recent (1994)  and limited.  So far there 
are only 18 policies taken out, totalling 54,000 ECU.  However the pool 
members expect large amounts of premium income growth based on 
expected market demand, with a target of 9 million ECU in premium income 
per year being collected within the next four years. 
(I) The claims are for the period 1980-1993 
<2l  J&H data is as a percentage of overall environmental claims 
(3) A Pool has also been set up in France but this has not been investigated. 
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Netherlands 
The insurance pool in the Netherlands is well established.  It is ten years old 
and has a reinsurance pool.  However, it has experienced a stagnant market 
for its services for several years and is now totally restructuring its ElL 
policy.  The new policies will take effect in 1996. 
The total premium income is 8 million ECU per annum.  The cost of · 
organisation and pool administration is 600,000 ECU per year.  This leaves 
current pool coverage capacity for environmental liability between 7.2-7.8 
million ECU; 40%  of this is reinsured.  The net profit yielded is 950,000 ECU 
which is then divided by the 58 member insurance companies within the 
pool.  This is a  pro~t level of 12%  of premium income. 
The reasons that the pool has such small business is because there is not 
enough distinction in the cover offered between general liability policies and 
the environmental policies offered by the pool.  The restructuring of the 
pool's policies is aimed to alter this by, for example, including gradual 
pollution in environmental liability policies and excluding any pollution from 
general liability policy. 
Country Comparison 
Table 4.1.6a summarises the current capacity and procedures of the insurance 
pools developed in Italy, Spain and Netherlands. 
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Italy  Spain  Netherlands 
ElL policy since  1979  1994  1984 
Sudden in GL  no  yes  yes 
No.  of members in  78  24  52 
pool 
No. of reinsurers  n/a  6  n/a 
Limit available per  24m ECU  6m ECU  8.5m ECU 
claim 
Trigger  claims made  first verifiable  occurrence 
notification, and 
claims made 
Premium Income p.a.  9.2m ECU  54,000 ECU  8mECU 
Development targets  maifltenance  growth - target of 9m  total review 
for  the p<Xll  ECU by year 2,000 
No. of policies to date  2,000  18  50,000 
No. of sites covered  6,000  nla  nla 
Av.  premia  4,600  3,000  160 
(ECU per policy) 
Questionnaires  yes  yes  nla 
Site surveys required  yes  yes  yes 
Through these pools, insurance companies can come together and set up 
standard procedures such as for conducting site inspections.  The Italian pool 
has its own environmental risk experts.  Such sharing of resources and 
expertise should lead to a reduction in transaction costs for individual 
policies. 
Although transaction costs in Italy appear similar to other countries at 38%, 
compared to 25-35%  in UK and 40%  in Germany, without the Pool the 
transaction costs may have been much higher due to national insurance 
characteristics (such as high administrative costs).  Indeed when comparing 
the relative difference in transaction costs between general and 
environmental liability policies within a country there is a significant trend. 
In the UK general liability transaction costs are 10-15%  whilst for ElL policies 
transaction costs are 25-35%, approximately 100%  larger.  In Italy 
environmental transaction costs as a percentage of premium are only 25% 
greater than for general liability (see Section 4.1.3). 
Another advantage of a Pool is that risk is shared by the insurers.  Reduced 
risk makes the environmental policy market more appealing to insurers. 
This is  particularly important at the early stages of market development 
when the risk of underestimating premia, through lack of prior experience, is 
so high. 
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makes the insurance companies vulnerable to systemic risk.  If something 
has been overlooked, such as guarding against retroactive liability claims, 
then all companies in the Pool will be exposed, and the finances of the whole 
industry could suffer.  By having individual policies, systemic risk could be 
restricted to only parts of the insurance industry. 
The same holds true for basing inswance policy on assumed future 
environmental policies.  Insurers are now guessing government moves and 
acting in accordance with their views on likely developments in government 
policies and developments in the market.  If this is wrong then some 
companies will win and some lose.  Under a unified Pool policy there is the 
possibility that all could lose if regulation takes an unexpected turn and 
safety provisions did not exist. 
4.1. 7  Role of  Insurance for Promoting Prevention Measures 
Insurers promote prevention measures through: 
•  not providing insurance cover if risks of environmental damage are too 
high; 
•  require that certain prevention measures be carried out if cover is to be 
provided; 
•  offering lower premia for companies with lower assessed environmental 
risks; 
•  setting financial limits which will be lowered for companies with higher 
risk; 
•  excess payments which will still necessitate the polluting firm to pay the 
first portion of the claim. 
Insurers, wary about taking on new risks,' only offer ElL cover to companies 
with low risks.  This initial filtering out process of high risk companies 
prevents badly environmentally managed firms gaining insurance cover.  If 
these companies want insurance they need to make substantial efforts to 
increase pollution prevention processes and adopt a proactive environmental 
management approach to show insurers they are serious about reducing 
environmental risk. 
Risk assessment for pollution cover is still quite subjective and hence insurers 
are not able to calculate reliably the reduction in premia when certain risk 
management measures are adopted.  Country experience indicates that, at 
present, discounts in premium for a company adopting specific pollution 
prevention measures is limited.  In Germany and UK if a policyholder adopts 
specific safety measures it can generally only expect a maximum of a 10% 
premium reduction when a new policy is issued.  Therefore there is minimal 
financial incentive, at present, for firms to expend on such provisions and 
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'· this does not make prevention measures undertaken for this reason cost-
effective. 
Insurers can provide expertise in the area of pollution prevention once their 
experience in the area grows.  Suggestions are often n1ade by insurers after 
site audits take place.  This occurs in Germany and, although the suggestions 
are non-binding as stated in Section 4.1.2, the measures are often adopted by 
the potential policyholder.  However, insurers are reluctant to take the main 
role of enforcing prevention measures.  Regulators are better placed to do 
this. 
If premia are altered significantly in succeeding years based on claims then 
policyholders could be continually stimulated to maintain a low level of 
environmental risk. 
In fact, the Italian Pool Inquinamento does not renew policies automatically 
each year.  The Pool demands a new set of risk information before deciding 
on renewing a contract.  This safety mechanism will prevent industry 
policyholders from reducing prevention measures and most probably will 
encourage them to consider pollution prevention measures. 
The self-insurance components of a contract are greater incentives than 
premia discounts for companies to reduce their risks.  Differences in financial 
limits can lead to large differences in payments by a company if a large 
pollution incident occurs.  Being able to attain high financialliplits may be 
good reason for maintaining sound environmental management. 
Finally, insurance is only one of many factors giving incentives to firms to 
reduce their risk.  By itself it appears to have a negligible impact on firms but 
acting in conjunction with other factors such as cost savings or regulations it 
can increase the incentive package for firms to reduce risk.  Its role, 
therefore, has to be considered as a complement to the other influences 
already in place. 
4.1.8  Insurance capacity in relation to environmental damage 
This section estimates how much existing national environmental damage is 
covered by the insurance capacity built up for ElL policies in the various 
countries.  The premium income (less transaction costs) is assumed to be 
available for compensation payments and thus represents the amount of 
financing potentially available for compensating liable environmental damage 
costs.  Insurance only needs to be available for environmental damage which 
falls  under a liability system.  As liability systems only cover a portion of 
environmental damage costs, usually property and health, insurance 
premium should not be expected to be equivalent to total environmental 
damage costs. 
The following section compares current total ElL premium income for 
Germany and Italy with national annual environmental damage 'costs and 
then estimates the relation between potential total ElL premium income for 
UK and Spain with national annual environmental damage costs (see 
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valuation paper for an explanation of the damage costs used) to show what 
proportion of environmental damage costs are covered by environmental 
insurance policies. 
Current  ElL Cover as a Percentage of Environmental  Damage 
In Germany UHG-policy premium income is 208 million ECU (382 million 
OM) per annum. This is compared to total annual environmental damage 
costs of 16 billion ECU for (monetary) or 109 billion ECU (for both monetary 
and non-monetary) (30 or 200 billion OM).  This means that only 1.4%  of 
quantifiable environmental damage costs are covered by insurance premium 
or 0.2%  of all envir?nmental damage costs. 
Deducting the 101  million ECU {160 million OM)  that go to transaction costs, 
then the percentage of damage covered drops to less than 1%  and less than 
0.1%, respectively. 
In Italy the pool has a capacity of 9.2 million ECU {19 billion Lire in 1993) 
compared to total annual environmental damage costs of 7.2 billion ECU 
{15,000 billion Lire).  So environmental insurance covers only 0.1%  of 
environmental damages costs.  Even if the ElL income ever matched the GL 
income of the Pool {2,405 billion Lire) the amount of potential compensation 
would still only cover 16%  of environm~ntal damage costs. 
In the US insurance premia covers 17%  of Superfund cleanup costs.  Annual 
cleanup costs are approximately $2 billion (t) and premium volume for 
pollution liability is $340 million < 2>. 
Potential ElL Cover as Percentage of Environmental  Damage Costs 
In the UK initial calculations were made in an attempt to compare levels of 
insurance coverage if all firms were covered by existing ElL products, to total 
environmental damage costs estimated for the UK. 
Using the following assumptions: 
•  all small firms  pay a premium of 800 ECU 
•  all large firms pay a premium of 12000 ECU 
•  transaction .costs of insurers are 30% 
It is estimated that at current premia levels total premia income would come 
to 200 million ECU if all firms potentially affected by liability provisions 
purchased ElL insurance <
3>.  This only comes to 2%  of the estimated total 
damage in the UK.  · 
(J) Probst et al. 
CZl  Chipman, N (1993), Submission of Comments on the Communication from  The Commission to the Council and 
Parliament: Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage.  Sedgwick Group pic, 1993. 
(3) Assuming there are approximately 200,000 small firms who might be affected by the liability provisions and need 
insurance cover (10-499 employees), and 10,000 large firms. 
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In Spain the Pool is expected to grow to a premium income of 9 million ECU. 
Total cleanup costs of contaminated land alone in Spain are estimated to be 
13 billion ECU.  This means that if the target is met then less than 0.1%  of 
contaminated la.nd' cleanup needs would be covered through insurance 
annually. 
The conclusion from these estimates is that insurance cover is very limited in 
relation to existing environmental damage.  A massive expansion would be 
required for insurance to cover a significant part of damage.  It could take 
many years for capacity to grow to this extent. 
INDUSTRY VIEWS ON ALTERNATIVE LIABIUTY SYSTEMS 
At the moment in the UK, Germany and Spain, EIL insurance is not seen to 
be very attractive and insurers would be cautious about offering policies 
under stricter environmental liability regimes.  Insurers would probably 
follow the German example of the UGH-policy and restrict cover in reaction 
to broadened strict liability under law.  Some elements will present greater 
difficulties for cover and others will increase the potential costs being 
covered. 
The main elements considered are: 
•  retroactive liability; 
•  joint and several liability; 
t  compulsory insurance; 
•  covering ecological damage. 
4.2.1  Retroactive Liability 
Insurers are extremely concerned about the iinposition of retroactive liability. 
Old policies leave insurers potentially responsible for compensating past 
damage.  Therefore if retroactive liability is imposed and old policyholders 
are held liable for past damage the insurers will get left paying the bill unless 
they find supportable defences.  These liabilities are potentially enormous as 
seen in the US (see Annex D). 
If insurance companies are made to pay for exposed historic liability they 
may experience a significant drain on resources, such as in the US.  Their 
ability to pay claims may decrease and this would adversely affect them 
through a drop in credit rating. 
The insurers will also need to re-evaluate internal reserve capacity needs and 
build them up in light of exposure under retroactive liability. 
To protect against retroactive liability they now will not cover historic 
damage in new policies.  Claims made means that insurers will limit their 
responsibility for pollution occurring from now but which is not found for 
years to come.  They will only be responsible if the company still has a policy 
when the claim is made.  However, in order to prove what pollution has 
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occurred before and after the initiation of a policy contract a detailed site 
audit needs to be carried out, to assess past damage costs that would not be 
covered in a new policy. 
4.2.2  Joint and Several Liability 
Joint and several means that each polluter may b~ liable for the total ~amage 
irrespective of the actual share of pollution they caused.  Many times it iS  the 
largest companies which are targeted to recover the damage costs as they 
have more financial resources.  The liable company then may try to recoup 
the costs of the environmental liabilities from the other responsible parties. 
This problem is commonly referred to as the 'deep pockets' syndrome.  The 
firm with the highest insurance cover would become the 'deep pocket', so 
insurers and firms would have incentives to impose financial limits. 
The difference between value of damage caused and amount liable would 
vary case by case depending on the situation of the other responsible parties. 
Therefore there would be no method of estimating the actual amount a 
company may be liable for even if its potential damage costs could be 
assessed. 
Insurers would find it very difficult to price a policy under a liability regime 
in which financial liability could not be clearly related to the pollution risk of 
an individual firm or plant for which they are providing cover (and for 
which they receive premia).  The uncertainty would mean that the premia 
could not be appropriately set.  Insurers would have to overestimate 
liabilities m  case, through joint and several liability, a policyholder was 
unexpectedly found liable for someone else's damage.  This would increase 
the premia set. 
4.2.3  Compulsory Insurance 
Compulsory insurance is  asymmetric. Firms can be required to have 
insurance but individual insurers cannot be forced to provide cover.  Given 
the potential rise of total damage costs and the various types of damage and 
many types of cover, it would be difficult for insurers to calculate 
appropriate premia levels and to cover all firms for many years until claims 
experience and risk assessment were developed.  Cover would have to be 
very restrictive.  Furthermore, firms not being able to obtain insurance 
would be legally forced out of business. 
Insuring every industrial company with all their varied types of activities and 
damage costs and subsequent policy components and premia would be very 
difficult and thus expensive.  Assessing all risks would be time consuming.  It 
would take a long time to build up a claims history for all types of activity 
and damage costs.  Insurers would try to limit scope of cover for high risk 
firms.  This would require the governing body to step in and set standard 
operating procedures to ensure adequate cover of every firm.  Insurers 
would otherwise set financial limits for the environmental damage costs 
covered at low levels.  However, if high financial limits were required by 
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(and probably excessively so) and could bear particularly heavily on SMEs. 
The German experience exemplifies these specific difficulties of mandatory 
insurance.  The ordinance under UHG, initiated in 1991/2, to deal with 
compulsory insurance is still not complete. It is  estimated that it will take 
several more years before it comes into force.  This delay is because it has 
not resolved the problem of setting legal requirements to prevent insurers 
offering insufficient financial limits and narrow scopes of damage for high 
risk firms seeking compulsory insurance. 
Due to uncertainties in environmental damage costs compulsory insurance in 
this area would be completely different from compulsory insurance for other 
areas like motor vehicles, where risk is regular and known. 
It would be many years before the insurance industry would be prepared 
and capable to offer cover to all firms for all types of environmental damage 
and, without this, compulsory insurance is not workable. 
4.2.4  Covering Ecological Damage 
Ecological damage includes: 
•  owned environment; 
•  unowned environment; 
•  natural resources depletion. 
Damage to the owned environment is covered under property damage. 
Insurers do not cover damage to the unowned environment. 
Ecological damage creates difficulties because of: 
•  quantifying loss; 
•  valuation problems; 
•  diffuse sources of pollution; 
•  proving causality; 
•  identifying victims; 
•  how to compensate. 
Quantifying Loss and Problems of Valuation 
Ecological damage covers loss of both measurable and unquantifiable 
elements of environmental damage.  Physical assets such as fish and tree 
populations have market values which can act as a proxy for loss value. 
However, there can be damage to other ecological components such as a 
species, habitats or ecosystems which cannot be approximated through 
market prices.  Such valuation is highly subjective and uncertain.  It also 
depends on whether loss value or replacement costs are calculated (see Topic 
Paper 1 on  Valuation of Environmental  Damage Costs).  There is also the 
. problem of irreversible damage which makes valuation more complicated. 
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One of the reasons why insurers do not cover ecological damage is due to 
the uncertainties corcerning the valuation of such damage which makes it 
difficult for them to determine appropriate premia rates.  Another reason is 
because the ecological assets are unowned.  This raises questions about who 
can make a claim for such ecological damage and to whom should the 
compensation be paid. 
For compensation payments a valuation system is needed for ecological 
elements.  A potential way to do this is to set up predetermined financial 
limits for liability upon damaging specific aspects of an ecosystem.  Whatever 
the number placed on ecosystem components consistency would be needed 
for insurance calculations of potential loss. 
Proof of Causation  · 
For the victims or claimants a major problem is proving causation of damage 
to large unowned areas due to diffuse sources of pollution and claims 
requiring many steps to prove causality. 
Increase in  Litigation and Rights of Action 
The problem with ecological damage to the unowned environment is  that 
there is no individual or direct victim who can then seek liability.  Therefore 
action groups might be given rights to seek compensation for damage to the 
unowned environment.  Insurers though·  are apprehensive of a liability 
provision to allow environmental groups to sue companies for ecological 
damage to the unowned environment since they fear that this would lead to 
increased litigation and claims for insurers which would be passed on to 
industry through higher premia. 
There are two ways to  compensat~ for ecological damage.  One is through 
compensation payments and the other is through restoration of the damage. 
Compensation payments are not very practical because of the following 
questions: 
•  who has the right to sue? 
•  who keeps the payment from won claims? 
•  who decides what happens to the payment? 
•  how can losses be valued with any consistency? 
It would be more feasible for an insurer to cover restoration of measurable 
and quantifiable ecological loss, if a reasonable estimate can be agreed on a 
cost-effective restoration programme.  The financial cost of restoration is 
more objective and predictable and so easier for insurers to cover.  Guidance 
would be needed for the required levels of restoration as  there would be 
dispute over suitable levels.  For example if a woodland is damaged, would it 
be acceptable to replace it with young trees, as opposed to the mature trees 
damaged by the pollution?  The issue becomes more complex for irreversible 
damage. 
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There are also cases where parts of the damaged ecological assets are owned 
by individuals, ~uch as animals through hunting or fishing rights.  These 
cases may become an area for claims and litigation.  In Germany, for 
example, fishermen who had paid for fishing licenses and thus paid for the 
right to catch fish,sought and received compensation when a river's 
decreased water quality due to pollution led to a decrease in fish 
populations. 
4.2.5  Access to Information 
Access to information raises issues arise concerning: who should have rights; 
what information should be released; and when should access to the 
information be allowed (before or after the start of litigation). 
Insurers do not like the idea of the development of public registers listing 
pollution incidents of firms and sites where there might be potential pollution 
problems since this can raise excessive and unnecessary fears amongst the 
public about "potential" problems ..  This has led to concern by insurers that 
"ambulance chasing" law firms would encourage local residents to .claim 
damage to health or property against those with potential for causing the 
pollution. (t)  · 
(t) Brian Street, ECS, 5th Environmental Insurance Conference, Uoyds of London Press 1995. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILI1Y ON INSURERS 
There are two distinct effects.  One is the increas~d vulnerability of 
insurance companies from old policy exposure for historic pollution.  The 
other is how insurance policy is changing to cope with stricter 
environmental liability. 
Historic Pollution Problems 
Insurance companies, under general liability provisions, left themselves 
potentially liable for a large amount of claims for old pollution problems. Due 
to the occurrence claims trigger; insurers may become liable for past 
pollution of the insured.  Therefore where retroactive liability is established, 
insurers now fear that they will face an onslaught of lawsuits and possible 
compensation payments directed at the insured companies for their past 
contamination which the insurers unwittingly covered at no extra premium. 
This historical experience has led insurers to be cautious about providing 
cover on environmental liabilities. 
The role insurance companies can play in current and future liability 
coverage may depend, in part, on how much of their financial resources will 
be used to  pay for past liabilities not built into old insurance premia (as in 
the US). 
Future Pollution  Cover 
Insurers now manage the process of offering environmental damage cover 
more carefully under an Environmental Impairment Liability (ElL) insurance 
policy.  This involves greater risk assessment and focusing on clearly 
specified environmental risks so that insurers can estimate better the level of 
their potential liabilities and set premia accordingly. 
To address the problems of a long tail of claims now being experienced due 
to the occurrence claims' trigger potential in previous general liability 
policies, the insurers are trying to move from 'occurrence' to 'claims made' 
policies.  Occurrence based policies limit the time period for which a 
policyholder can file  a claim to the duration of the policy. 
Gradual pollution as well as sudden and accidental pollution can be covered 
under ElL policies. 
Cover for ecological damage to the unowned environment is still not 
available, and it is  not expected to become available in the near future. 
Site audits are increasingly required before insurance is  given to polluting 
industries.  These increase transaction costs and can affect SMEs' capacity to 
purchase insurance. Site audits can be useful for the insured to assess and 
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understand their environmental risks and also to prompt them to implement 
pollution prevention measures. 
Overall, insurers are unable to quantify the scope of the cover they will 
provide, or the change in the size of premia, under stJ1cter liability regimes. 
Potential ElL Market 
There has so far been limited uptake of new ElL policies designed to insure 
future pollution.  This is reflected in the limited growth of the ElL market, 
except for Germany. 
One reason is that insurers have been slow to expand their exposure in this 
market since they are reluctant to cover unknown risk.  Insurance companies 
are also greatly influenced by the uncertainties still remaining in potential 
losses to be covered.  Uncertainty makes insurers' plans for covering 
environmental damage more conservative.  There is still a large degree of 
uncertainty regarding the cost of covering environmental damage.  The 
uncertainty arises from: 
•  lack of a claims history; 
•  legal changes; 
•  difficulties in predicting likely future public concern: 
•  level of restoration demanded; 
•  number of cases taken to court; 
•  lack of technical expertise to underwrite risks; 
•  valuation problems of environmental damage; 
•  inability to foresee hazards not recognised at present, especially in relation 
to gradual or chronic pollution. 
However, even when insurance companies offer environmental liability 
cover, many firms are not aware of the magnitude of their environmental 
liabilities, and consider that obtaining the policy is not needed or worth the 
additional premia costs. 
The perspective of the industry is that good business opportunities do not 
currently exist in this market for at least the short to medium term. 
Therefore a rapid expansion of the market cannot be expected, and much 
time will be required for the market to evolve and mature sustainably. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR A  FUTURE  ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILIIY POLICY 
Insurance companies have the option to offer cover where this is 
commercially attractive to them and conversely not do so where this is not 
commercially attractive. 
Many companies (particularly SMEs) have restricted financial resources to 
cope with liability and thus need insurance.  Areas which lack insurance are 
not necessarily financially covered because firms can become insolvent. 
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A tension exists between the insurers' reluctance to insure environmental 
risk and the need for financial resources to support environmental liability. 
Thus for the effective and sustainable development of environmental 
insurance cover, the developments in environmental liability policies should 
be strict enough to stimulate a market for ElL so that insurance companies 
will offer a wide enough scope of cover to provide compensation for a 
substantial portion of environmental damage, but not too demanding or 
uncertain since this might deter insurance companies from developing ElL 
policies and expanding the ElL market. 
Potential Role of the Insurance Sector 
If insurance coverage is desired for polluting firms then any decisions taken 
on what will be included in a future more rigorous environmental liability 
system should take into account the views and financial interests of the 
insurance industry, which can limit its coverage in accordance with its 
perception of the severity of the system to be instituted and its associated 
potential costs to industry. 
Compensation of Damage 
The insurance sector is a financial system which pools resources from 
potential polluters to provide for remediation if pollution eventually occurs. 
This reduces the need for individual firms to save sufficient resources in case 
of pollution incidents and thus have to divert resources from other areas of 
investment. 
A disadvantage is that insurers become another player which can become 
involved in litigation in determining responsibility for compensation 
payments. 
Promoting Prevention 
Environmental insurance premia can provide signals to the market on costs 
of environmental damage.  At present risk assessment for environmental 
liability insurance policies cannot be sufficiently detailed to indicate 
accurately the true damage costs.  Due to this problem, and lack of 
systematic methods of assessing risk, there are no systematic discounts 
offered in premia levels for policyholders lowering environmental risk 
Where offered, discounts are limited to no more than 10%  of premia for well 
managed firms.  Therefore, policyholders do not have a strong incentive to 
adopt pollution prevention measures to obtain lower premia. 
5.2.2  Compulsory Insurance 
Compulsory insurance would prove problematic for potential industrial 
policyholders.  Insurance companies could turn down high risk companies 
which would then either have to close or incur a large financial burden of 
achieving satisfactory pollution prevention standards to be considered for 
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through reducing· the financial limits offered.  To ensure adequate cover was 
being offered to all firms the governing body would have to intervene with 
guidelines specifying what form of compulsory insurance had to be provided 
at what premia.  This would be difficult to achieve.  Thus in Germany, 
where compulsory insurance was introduced on a limited scale, it is proving 
difficult to reach agreement over these guidelines. 
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GLOSSARY 
civil liability:  an individual in their pr!vate capacity can incur legal liability 
which can be either a breach of criminal law or breach of civil law.  Civil 
liability may arise through tort or contract.  Tort includes negligence, trespass 
and nuisance.  Tort is the breach of civil duty imposed by law and owed to 
one's fellow citizen generally. 
general liability:  this is a liability insurance policy, which cover employer's 
liability, public liability and products liability as a 'package' 
a claim:  when the insured or the insured's beneficiary seeks payment from 
the insurer for damage covered by the insurance contract 
premium:  the price of insurance protection for a specified risk for a specified 
period of time 
. net premium  income:  this is the premium after discounts have been deducted 
premium  income:  total revenue received by the insurer from all premia 
collected 
financial  limit:  the maximum the insurer is liable under insurance and will 
compensate the insured.  It may be expressed as 'per accident', 'per event', 
'per occurrence' or 'per annum'. 
time limit:  the maximum .amount of time allowed after a policy terminates or 
an incident occurs for a claim still to be made 
trigger:  an incident that gives rise to a claim.  In an insurance contract it is 
the component that specifies under what circumstances a claim can be 
validly made; possible triggers include: 
•  claims  made:  a claim must be made during the time a policy is  held by the 
insured 
•  occurrence:  a claim can be made anytime for an incident as long as the 
incident occurred under a policy 
•  first  verifiable loss:  a claim must be made when damage is first noticed and 
if it is covered by a  p~licy 
reserve capacity:  the amount of capital insurers need to  save in case of 
compensation obligations 
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The Insurance Fund Option i 
f 
A unique system was put in place by the Swedish government for using the 
insurance system as an administrative mechanism to levy contributions to a 
compensation fund. 
Swedish  Environmental  Damage Insurance Regulation 
In Sweden a person who has suffered an injury or damage to his property 
can not obtain compensation under the 1986 Environment Damage Act if  it is 
impossible to ascertain who is responsible, or those responsible are insolvent, 
or if the right to claim compensation is 'statute-barred'.  In order to remedy 
the problem of having unidentifiable or insolvent polluters the government 
decided to set up a fund system. 
Initially the government wanted to set up a government fund, financed by 
taxes and levies on certain hazardous substances.  However industry resisted 
a tax-financed arrangement for the fund.  The solution was to set up an 
insurance scheme, The Environmental Damage Insurance, regulated by 
amendments to the Environmental Protection Act, ss 65-69 (1988:924) .and in 
the Ordinance on Environmental Damage Insurance (1989:365).  The 
legislation came into force in July 1989. 
Structure 
The consequent insurance scheme is subsidiary only and the claimant must 
claim compensation from the responsible parties wherever possible.  For 
property damage it only deals with disturbance occurring after July 1989 (ie 
not retroactive). 
The insurance is compulsory for companies who ca.rry out hazardous 
activities to the environment, defined by the requirement of a permit or an 
application under the Environment Protection Act, or according to the 
directives issued under the Act.  Those companies performing such activities 
are obliged to contribute to the compensation fund through levies approved 
by the government.  It was decided to make the insurance compulsory as it 
was too difficult to distinguish which companies carrying out the dangerous 
activities were causing the environmental damage and. which were not. 
The Environmental Damage Insurance (EDI)  is run by a consortium 
(Miljoskadekonsortiet) consisting of five insurance companies.  The financial 
limits payed by this consortium are SEK 5 million for bodily injury 
compensation and SEK 50 million for property damage per claim.  A total of 
SEK 200 million can be claimed for in one year for any type of damage. 
Results 
Since its establishment in 1989 SEK 120 million have been paid into the 
scheme. By February 1993 the Consortium only received 27 clain1s. And as of 
this year no compensation payments have yet been made.  None of the 
claims made were deemed valid under the insurance scheme. 
ERM ECONOMICS  EcoNoMICs  oF  LtABIUTY,  VoL II:  EC  DG  XI 
3.Cl Due to this zero outlay of funds the purpose of the Fund was called into 
question and in 1992 a government commission W?S established to evaluate 
the scheme.  Its conclusion was that despite the lack o.  compensation 
payments, the scheme did play a critical role in filling serious gaps in the 
compensation and cleanup system.  The Commission also recommended an 
extension of the EDI in the form of a separate Decontamination Insurance 
for a new area called 'assistance costs'. 
'Assistance costs' are to clean up when commercial operations are halted due 
to lack of funds and hazardous waste and other material such as process 
chemicals are left behind.  The EDI does not cover costs of such disposal or 
decontamination.  They so far have been financed by appropriated funds 
administered by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency.  However, 
the increased number of bankruptcies in recent years has created an urgent 
need for more funds. 
The Commission felt that an insurance scheme was the best mechanism for 
administering contributions to ·a compensation fund since there was already 
in place a system for handling payments under insurance policies. 
The Decontamination Insurance scheme is currently under consideration and 
has not yet been established.  Nevertheless this potential scheme aiong with 
the existing EDI, shows an alternative use and potential administrative role 
of insurance in seeking the restoration of sites under a joint compensation 
fund. 
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US  Experience 
-I ' 
t 
t 
The US Experience 
The US experience m provides a good example of how historic pollution 
has presented insurers with a series of claims from polluters which could 
prove to be a large financial burden on the insurance companies.  The 
situation is not yet dear because the majority of the insurers' costs have 
been on litigation over disputes between the insurers and the insure~ over 
financial responsibility for the pollution.  ·  · 
The process began in the mid-1980s when policyholders started filing suits to 
force their insurers to pay for cleanup required in some cases by the 
government.  Insurers also received claims by people who lived near the 
polluted sites for bodily injury. 
The liability faced by the insurance industry stems largely from the property 
insurance sold decades ago to big businesses, including chemical and 
fertilizer makers who have subsequently contaminated soils and 
groundwater. 
Insurers generally argued that the policies they sold did not cover 
environmental claims and have thus vigorously litigated policyholders' 
claims. 
Many of the environmental reserves insurers have made to date have been 
simply to pay for litigation costs, not cleanup.  88%  of cash paid out by 
insurers on Superfund-related claims from 1986-1991  was spent on defending 
policyholders and on litigation with policyholders to decide on cleanup 
responsibility. The high proportion of outlays spent on coverage disputes 
and defence costs reflects the fact that litigation precedes cleanup.  Once 
remediation is underway to a fuller extent this proportion can be expected to 
fall.  (l)  Indeed, there is much uncertainty over future litigation costs.  Amy 
Bouska of the actuarial firm Tillinghast has speculated (in testimony to 
Congress in 1990)  that insurers' litigation costs could fall in a range as wide 
as $30 billion to $300 billion (based on overall cleanup costs of the Superfund 
program estimated at $100 billion to $700 billion). (
3
) 
Recently, as  many cases near trial stage after years of investigation, a 
number of out of court settlements have been reached.  Such settlements can 
provide a framework for insurers to calculate their potential payouts. 
Another repercussion of the heavy financial burden of these environmental 
claims is  that the rating agencies and regulators are pressurising the 
insurance industry in general, to  come up with at least a ballpark estimate of 
the compensation problem which is  estimated to be between $30 and $100 
billion for the US insurance industry. 
(I) Leslie Scism, The Wall Street Journal Europe, July 14-15, 1995. 
(2)  James Capel, US  Environmental Liabilities- who insured who 1946/69 
(3) James Capel, US  Environmental Liabilities - who insured who, 1946169 
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external and one is internal to an insurance company.  The first is the 
companys reputation based on its ability to pay  .. The second, which is 
related, is the companys financial status and need to build up its reserves to 
cover these new liabilities. 
Alan Levin, a managing director of Standard & Poor's Ratings Group, heads 
an insurance-rating unit that has lowered the claims-paying-ability ratings of 
numerous insurers in 1995, partly because of the burden they face from 
pollution claims.  He states that "We don't pretend to know what the correct 
number is, but we do believe that, within a reasonable range of estimates, 
we can identify what the exposure is for both the industry and for many 
companies." 
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. agrees with this and has valued its additional 
environmental liability at around $1  billion.  In response they have decided 
to increase their pre-tax reserves by $750 million -nearly tripling its 
environmental reserves to $1.2 billion.  It is also purchasing a reinsurance 
policy of $335 million which will provide it with additional protection.  Such 
financial investments severely affected Aetna's 1995 earnings, leading to a 
reported loss of $488 million, after tax. 
This period of environmental claims has come at a time of strong competition 
within the insurance industry.  Environmental liability payments cannot be 
held accountable for the losses now being experienced by the insurance 
companies but it is adding to the financial strain of covering reserves, 
particularly for some of the weaker companies. 
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3.02 Annex E 
Characteristics of the 
Insurance Industry in 
Different .Countries t 
I 
This Annex provides background information .on the size and characteristics 
of the insuranr.e ~ectors for the main countries investigated.  The parent 
insurance markets are shown to indicate the relative sizes the environmental 
markets are operating within.  Also  the size of the insurance sector shows 
how many potential insurance players there are for the environmental 
insurance market. 
Insurance Markets in EU Countries 
Country  Total insurance premia as%  Number of insurance 
ofGDP  companies 
Germany  7  798 
UK  12  828 
France  8  599 
Italy  3  274 
Netherlands  8  491 
Spain  4  408 
Belgium  5  266 
Sweden  6  na 
Austria  6  na 
Denmark  5  235 
Norway  5  na 
Ireland  9  (/7 
Portugal  4  85 
Greece  2  151 
Luxembourg  6  73 
UK 
The UK insurance industry is the largest in Europe.  ~ross premium income 
for both General liability and Employers' liability policies in 1993 was 3.4 
billion ECU (£2.86 billion).  General Liability policies account for about 60% 
of this total. 
There are several hundred insurance companies.  However, four major 
companies (General Accident, Commercial Union, Royal  ~nd Sun Alliance) 
dominate the sector.  They account for 60%  of the total insurance market in 
the UK.  (t) 
Insurance companies all have General Liability (GL)  policies and now some 
have introduced specific Environmental Insurance Liability (ElL)  policies. 
The market for ElL is in its infancy, even though the first firm started 
(l) This refers to these companies' shares of total premia for all  insurance policies including General Liability, Employers 
liability, motor insurance, household and other insurance policies. 
ERM ECONOMICS  EcoNOMICS oF  LIABILITY,  VoL II:  EC DG  XI 
3.El operating five years ago.  There are only five  UK-based insurers now 
offering specific ElL policies hut it is thought that less than 50 policies have 
actually been written (with a total premia of less than 0.6m ECU  (£0.5 
million), compat:ed to several hundred thousand GL policies with premia 
totalling 950m  ECU (£790 million).  It appears that most UK industrial 
companies think that GL policies cover their needs, and have not yet 
identified their uncovered liabilities. 
Germany 
The German liability insurance market's premium income in 1993 was 5.5 
billion ECU (10,124 million DM).  Commercial liability insurance accounts for 
about 60%.  Overall profits are small. 
The German liability insurance market for industrial risks is dominated by a 
group of ten insurers. 
Premia income for ElL  (UHG) policies is 382 million DM per annum.  This is 
around 5%  of total general liability premium income. 
Italy 
The Italian insurance market is small both in absolute terms (compared to 
other European countries) and relative to  national economic levels. 
Liability premia income is  the lowest in Europe except for Greece.  Out of 
. the 300 insurance companies in Italy, 15%  of the insurance companies are 
branches of foreign companies and 30%  of the national companies are 
directly controlled by foreign companies.  So there is a large international 
influence in the Italian insurance sector.  190 insurance companies provide 
liability insurance. 
Spain 
Competitive forces in Spain have led to a concentration in the insurance 
indtistry in Spain.  Between 1980 and 1987 the number of insurance 
companies decreased by 30%.  This trend is still continuing currently.  As  of 
1994 there were 436 insurance firms in Spain.  Six of these are reinsurers. 
88%  of the insurance companies are Spanish with the rest being under 
foreign ownership. 
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INIRODUCTION 
A firm's strategic response to liability and compensation systems for 
environmental damage depends upon a number of company characteristics 
such as size, nature of production, technology, resources and management 
style.  SMEs are not only small in size but have their own distinct structure 
and business approach. (t)  Limited access to resources makes SMEs slow 
to deal with environmental concerns.  However, SMEs can be flexible and 
innovative. 
The report has three main components: 
The first part examines the critical sectors where SMEs have a particularly 
relevant share of total activity.  Annexes B and C,  and the accompanying 
Appendix A, provide detailed statistical information on different sizes of 
SMEs' share of specific industrial sectors' employment for EU15 countries 
(where possible).  Section 2 summarizes these findings and identifies th.e 
sectors of industry in specific countries where SMEs predominate and hence 
which will be most affected if SMEs incur disproportionate additional costs 
from an environmental liability system. 
Section 3 identifies how specific elements of an environmental liability system 
may particularly affect SMEs. 
Section 4 discusses how certain costs associated with an environmental 
liability system will impact upon SMEs . 
(I) The definition for SMEs used in this report is  firms with 1-499 employees. 
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2.1 
I 
2.2 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SMES 
CHARACTERISTICS 
SMEs are not simply smaller versions of large companies.  SMEs have certain 
intrinsic features, notably limited access to capital, technology and 
information, rendering them vulnerable to their economic and regulatory 
environment.  These characteristics increase levels of uncertainty for SMEs in 
handling environmental issues and reduces their capability to face  a high 
amount of litigation in court. 
SMEs are often not aware of their environmental impact and do not 
implement environmental management  systems as extensively as do many 
large companies.  While micro enterprises (under 10 employees) do not-
usually have significant environmental impacts, a SME's impact can be 
proportionally greater than its size and SMEs' collective impact can be 
considerable.  Given their lack of awareness of environmental issues and 
relatively low media profile, SMEs may cause environmental damage as a 
result of ignorance. 
SMEs are now being prompted to alter their environmental management 
practices because of their position in the supply-chain of production.  As  the 
majority of SMEs are situated mid-supply chain, they have to meet the 
demands of larger customers.  As  environmental strategies are implemented 
by larger companies, these companies are also requesting suppliers to meet 
environmental standards, mostly for their prpducts, but also for their 
production processes.  In some cases, SMEs can respond flexibly and 
innovatively to  these requests.  · 
CONTRIBUTION TO  EU ECONOMIES 
SMEs  play an economically important role in European economies.  They 
make up the bulk of firms, employ the majority of workers in the private 
sector and generate the greatest proportion of revenue.  In the 12 EU 
Member States, SMEs account for approximately 70%  of private sector 
employment and turnover.  SMEs are a key element of European 
competitiveness and a crucial source of new employment. 
The following groupings of European countries (t) can be identified in 
respect of the share of employment made up by small firms  (less  than 100 
employees): 
•  less than the EU12 average- Belgium and Germany; 
(I) Data were not available for Ireland or Greece. 
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Table 2.3a 
•  approximately the EU12 average (49-55%) - France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the UK; 
•  higher than the EU12 average - Denmark, Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
Therefore, any effects on SMEs will be more pronounced in the countries in 
the last group compared with the other two groups. 
PERCENTAGE OF SMES IN SEUCTED SECI'ORS OF INDUSTRY 
Sectors with higher compositions of SMEs will be more affected by the 
reactions of SMEs to environmental liability system provisions than sectors 
with low numbers of SMEs. 
Comparison of  SME Contributions to Industry Sectors in Selected Countries 
(  approx.  % of  employment of each sector) 
Industrial Sector  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  UK 
Chemical  N/A  20  60  80  30 
Minerals and Oil  N/A  20  N/A  20  N/A 
Refining 
Food, Drink and  75  80  80  80  ,35 
Tobacco 
Timber and Wood  90  90  99  99  75 
Furniture 
Manufacture of Paper  80  65  80  90  60 
Products 
Note:  N/  A =  not available 
Source:  Annex C (Tables 3.1a, 3.2a, 3.4a, 3.5a and 3.6a) 
Table 2.3a above shows that the paper products sector ~nd the timber and 
wood sector have consistently high proportions of SMEs across the countries 
and will be extremely sensitive to SME levels of productivity and profitability. 
The chemicals sector has a much lower level of SME em.ployment, except in 
Spain where SMEs still predominate.  Therefore, the chemicals sector may be 
less adversely affected by problems for SMEs of a stricter environmental 
liability system. 
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3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
IMPUCATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILIIY SYSTEMS FOR SMES 
INTRODUCTION 
There are cases of SMEs being responsible for significant pollution incidents. 
The firm interviews found cases of mainly minor incidents involving little 
environmental damage, but some significant accidents were also mentioned. 
SMEs could be even more polluting than large companies because of their 
higher density in some local areas. 
Currently, under national environmental liability policies, there are few 
special provisions made for SMEs.  However, there are components of an 
environmental liability system which may disproportionably affect SMEs. 
]OINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
Under joint and several liability, any polluter may be held liable for the 
entire restoration cost and then seek compensation from other responsible 
parties, regardless of their degree of involvement.  This could lead to two 
different consequences for SMEs: 
•  SMEs will face  the risk of being held liable for pollution damage costs, 
considerably in excess of their financial resources.  This ·will be extremely 
difficult to plan for, and could be financially damaging. 
•  SMEs may avoid payments if the plaintiff decides to sue a responsible 
party with the largest financial assets rather than the major source of 
pollution.  Large corporations will bear the burden of this 'deep pockets' 
effect, although the large corporations can then try to seek compensation 
from SMEs for their share of the cost of the environmental damage. 
Joint and several liability promotes litigation between disputing potentially 
responsible parties.  The costs of this litigation can be proportionally higher 
for SMEs than the larger firms disputing the claims, relative to their turnover 
and financial reserves. 
FINANCIAL LIMITS ON LIABILITY CLAIMS 
Predetermined financial limits for liability claims reduces uncertainties for 
SMEs and facilitates financial planning.  However, the maximum amount 
could still be too high for some SMEs, thus producing an advantage solely to 
larger firms.  These limits can affect insurance levels which can already be 
costly for SMEs.  Moreover, it could lead to artificial constructions; like large, 
hazardous firms creating small firms with a view to limit their liability risk. 
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3.5 
SMEs' limited financial capability may need to be separately considered, and 
financial claim liniits set in relation to their turnov.er.  However, this would 
leave more of the damage unrestored. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Strict liability requires the defendant to prove his innocence.  Such a system 
could be particularly problematic for SMEs.  They would have to acquire 
information about the pollution problems in order to find evidence to 
disprove the pollution claim.  Lack of in-house technology will make the 
acquisition of proof over pollution particularly difficult. 
RETROACTIVE LIABILITY 
Retroactive liability will increase uncertainty for all firms.  Uncertainty over 
historic pollution may be particularly high for an SME because it is often not 
aware of pollution problems that they caused decades ago.  Lack of 
awareness is sometimes due to inappropriate management systems and low 
levels of record keeping in SMEs.  . 
Retroactive liability could prove financially damaging to SMEs as it will 
expose potentially large pollution incidents.  There was a case where a small 
firm had previously contaminated a portion of groundwater.  The court 
decision was that the company was not liable.  However, if retroactive 
liability had been valid and the company declared guilty, the consequent 
compensation payment would have led to its bankruptcy. 
3.6  PARTICULAR CONCERNS FOR SMEs 
3.6.1  Cost of  Due Diligence 
Insurance companies and banks may require site audits before providing 
insurance or a loan.  Audits are costly and are required by both financial 
backers and future insurers as part of due diligence during mergers and 
acquisitions, and possibly also when loans are sought.  The additional costs 
to pay for legal advice and to carry out audits to verify the existence of 
hidden liabilities can be a large burden and inhibit SMEs expanding through 
acquisition strategies. 
There are different types of audits which can be carried out: 
•  Compliance audits are used to check the compliance with environmental 
regulations.  They are frequently just desk based. 
•  Due diligence audits are used for mergers, acquisitions and disinvestment. 
They involve at least a preliminary site visit and, if necessary, a site 
investigation.  The purpose is to identify hidden environmental liabilities 
and then assess their magnitude.  They can typically cost between 2,500 
and 6,500 ECU. 
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•  Management system audits focus on the analysis of management systems, 
ex~minin~ company environmental policy, the development of 
environmental programme and the preparation of adequate pollution 
prevention procedures and systems.  This type of audit is more detailed 
than the others.  Certification for EMAS involves one type of integrated 
environmental audit.  The costs of measures involved in achieving EMAS 
certification range from 12,500 to 100,000 ECU.  SMEs will be at the lower 
end of this range. 
The cost of an audit depends on the level of detail required, the size of 
operations to be audited, the complexity of the production processes and the 
maturity of the audit market.  Some economies of scale exist for audits but 
the audit cost per output unit will certainly be higher for smaller firms. 
There are also costs associated with adopting pollution prevention measures 
after a site assessment.  A due diligence site investigation may be an SME's 
first environmental assessment; it may identify significant measures needed 
to be adopted before financing or insurance is granted, if at all. 
Risk Management Capability 
Risk management is difficult for SMEs for two reasons.  Firstly, due to lack 
of environmental monitoring, SMEs may not be aware of current 
environmental liabilities.  They will need to pay to carry out site inspections 
to ascertain environmental risks.  In contrast to large firms, SMEs do not 
tend to have already established environmental risk assessments and 
management systems in place so that implementing such systems will entail 
an additional and costly task for them.  However, such assessments can also 
identify efficient pollution prevention optioflS for the small firms some of· 
which may be economically beneficial through, for example, savings in raw 
materials and energy.  · 
Secondly, SMEs are more vulnerable to environmental risks since they are · 
not as diversified as large firms;  frequently their activities relate to a single 
product or process.  Damage caused by one process may therefore have a 
significant impact on their total costs.  SMEs will be more exposed in case of 
an incident and so have to be more careful in managing risk; yet they have 
limited management capability for prevention. 
Access to Finance 
Liability risks coUld lead banks to take a more conservative approach to 
valuing fixed assets as collateral for loans.  SMEs usually have less internal 
financial capacity or other ways of raising financing than larger firms and 
banks tend to require small firms to provide collateral for loans.  Therefore, 
environmental liability systems might restrict SMEs' borrowing capacity 
which would result in lower investment. 
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4.7 Compulsory financial security provisions would particularly affect small firms 
who would be in most need of a bond by an outside financial institution. 
Compulsory financial !.e,..uity could severely reduce the investment 
capability of small.firms. 
3.6.4  Cost of  Insurance 
3.7 
SMEs have a greater need for insurance than many large firms.  They do not 
have the possibility to share and pool risk among different products or sites 
within their ownership, which larger companies can do to their advantage. 
Also, SMEs, due to their size, have little opportunity for self-insurance. 
Therefore, any attempts to increase the environmental liability insurance 
market needs to take into consideration the high cost of inSurance to SMEs. 
The problem is that insurance premia for SMEs can be very high.  This is 
because premia include a fixed cost which will be relatively higher for SMEs 
than larger companies, in relation to firm turnover.  The fixed  transaction 
costs include site assessments and implementation and administration of 
policy and handling claims.  The transaction costs typically range between 25 
and 40 percent of the insurance premium. 
Compulsory insurance may have a large impact on SMEs.  Firms which 
cannot afford to reduce environmental risks sufficiently will not be offered 
insurance and will be forced to close. 
However, future specialisation in the insurance market, where some 
companies target SMEs, may lead to some reduction in premia for SMEs. 
The development of the insurance pools may also be advantageous.  The 
insurance pools can develop policies suited for SMEs and support SMEs 
through disseminating information. 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR SMEs 
So far, national liability systems have few special provisions for SMEs.  Some 
exceptions exist as in the UK where, under the Water Resources Act, small 
incidents are not pursued for recovery costs. 
The cost of compliance of environmental legislation can be very high for 
SMEs, due to limited resources and a lack of economies of scale.  However, if 
SMEs are polluting then they should be made to pay for clean up.  It is not 
necessarily desirable to make special exemptions that reduce payment 
obligations of SMEs.  Moreover, the risk assessment and management 
systems that firms implement in response to environmental liability systems 
can lead them to identify economically worthwhile measures (eg savings in 
raw materials and energy). 
Possible areas of assistance to SMEs could include: reducing uncertainties to 
help with financial planning;  perhaps reducing excessive financial 
obligations to prevent closures; and facilitating access to finance and 
insurance to ensure potential for investment and financial protection. 
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4.8 Specific measures which would particularly assist SMEs in these areas of 
uncertainty, excessive cost and financing are· 
•  Taking the burden of proof off SMEs; 
•  Setting financial limits for claims; 
•  No compulsory financial security for insurance; 
•  Supporting risk assessment eg through subsidising site audits. 
However, the first three of these would result in accordingly higher burdens 
on victims or the environment. 
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ANNEXA 
NACE INDUSTRY SECTORS INCLUDED IN THIS REPORT 
1VACEC/ass  DEFINITION 
1  Energy and ·water 
11  extraction and briquetting of solid fuels 
12  coke ovens 
13 
14 
15 
16 
extraction of  petroleum and natural gas 
mineral oil refining 
nuclear fuels industry 
production &  distribution of electricity, gas, steam, hot water 
2  Extraction &  processing of non energy producing minerals and derived  products; 
chemical industry 
21  extraction and preparation of metalliferous ores 
22  production and preliminary processing of me.tals 
24 
25 
26 
extraction of minerals (other than metalliferous and energy producing); peat 
manufacture of  non-metallic mineral products 
chemical industry 
man-made fibres industry 
3  l\tletal manufacture; mechanical, electrical and instrument engineering 
31  manufacture of metal articles (except mech., elec., instruments, vehicles) 
32 
..,.., 
.).) 
35 
36 
mechanical engineering 
manufacture of  office and data processing machinery 
manufacture of motor vehicles, parts and accessories 
manufacture of  other means of transport 
4  Other manufacturing industries 
41142  food, drink & tobacco industry 
43 
44 
45 
textile industry 
leather and leather goods industry (except footwear and clothing l 
foot\\ear and clothing 46 
47 
48 
49 
timber and wooden furniture 
manufacture of  paper & paper products: printing and publishing 
processing of  rubber &  plastics 
other manufacturing industries • 
Annex B 
SMEs in European 
Countries This Annex B presents data on the importance of SMEs in different 
European countries. 
Data Sources and Methodology 
Data for the quantitative sections of this report were supplied by the 
European Statistical System on  SMEs <t>,  a joint initiative of DG  XXIII at the 
European Commission and Eurostat.  Where possible, all 15 Member ·states 
of the European Union are considered.  However, due to the recent 
incorporation of Sweden, Austria and Finland, there are significant 
difficulties in comparing data because of diverse data collection and 
classification conventions.  Unless otherwise stated, European level 
observations refer to the year 1990 and therefore the new countries are not 
included in these statistics. 
Within the industrial sector < 2>, i.e.  the segment of the economy which is 
most directly implicated in pollution control measures, the NACE 
classification system was used (as established by Eurostat in 1970).  Where 
national classification systems do not correspond with the NACE system, the 
difference is noted.  Annex A contains a complete list of relevant NACE 2-
digit codes and their definitions. 
Data sources vary in their use of "total" or "paid" employment; the former 
includes self-employed and unpaid family workers while the latter is 
normally implied in references to number of employees.  Due to the 
schematic nature of the quantitative analysis presented bel.ow, such 
differences in country data sets have been ignored. 
Enterprises can be classified as micro, small, medium and large according to 
the number of employees.  The most commonly used classification for SMEs, 
according to EurostaVOG XXIII (3), broadly uses the term SME for firms 
with under 500 employees.  This can be further subdivided as follows: 
•  micro (under 10 employees) 
•  small (1 0-99 employees) 
•  medium (100-499 employees). 
In the detailed sectoral analysis section of this study, medium-sized firms  are 
further subdivided into two groups (100-199 and 200-499).  The large firm 
segment is also included, for comparative purposes, and is made-up of all 
firms  with 500 employees or more.  It is important to keep in mind that this 
subdivision is purely a convention and does not necessarily correspond to 
common practice among EU countries where multiple definitions are found, 
depending on the context.  Turnover, balance sheet total and degree of 
financial autonomy are also potentially valid criteria but uniform data is not 
<
1>  Data up to  1991  supplied  on  diskette,  latest release  in June  1995. 
<2l  According to  NACE  2-dig~s classification,  the  industrial sector includes the  energy  and  water .. the extraction  and 
processing  and the  manufacturing sectors. 
(3)  See  Enterprises in  Europe- Third Report  (Volume 1/Descriptive Anatysis),  European Commission-Eurostat,  Luxembourg, 
1994 
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4.B1 currently available.  For further information on data compilation conventions 
and methodology, please refer to footnote 2 (pp. xxvi-xxviii). 
Comments on Methodology 
The relevance of SMEs for environmental damage is unknown because 
existing data about quantitative emissions do not enable conclusions to be 
drawn on the relationship between per-unit emission and company size. 
On the basis of existing information, we have tried to assess as far as 
possible the relevance of SMEs for pollution.  For this purpose, employment 
data by company size are analysed in the following paragraphs, suggesting 
that this data can approximate SME's contribution to total emissions. 
Calculations are then made under the assumption that similar technologies 
are applied in the firms of each sector, and that pollution is proportionate to 
the number of people employed. 
Under these assumptions, figures on employment shares that will be 
presented henceforward can be considered to represent pollution shares. 
Turnover or value added figures cannot be used for this purpose because 
much data is lacking or not comparable between the different com:ttries. 
Overview of Structural Statistics 
In 1990, the economies of the 12 EC Member States contained about 14M 
enterprises and employed 64%  of the active population (i.e.  employed plus 
unemployed) of 92M persons.  Of these, 99.8%  were SMEs  (1-499 employees), 
accounting for 69%  of private sector employment and turnover. 
Table B1: EUR12 Enterprises by Number of Units, Employment and Turnover 
(1990) 
0  0  0 
(NO.  EMPLOYEES)  FIRMS  EMPLOYMENT  TURNOVER 
The micro sector (under 10 employees) accounted for approximately 93%  of 
all enterprises, small firms (10-99 employees) under 7%, and medium sized 
units about 0.5%.  While large firms (500+  employees) numbered 12,000 (less 
than 0.1%  of firms), this segment accounted for a significant share of total 
employment and revenues.  The situation is summarised in Table  B.1. 
The four main EU. economies, Germany, France, the UK and Italy, together 
account for 67%  of European enterprises and 75%  of total employment. 
Spain accounts for 17%  and 11%  respectively; Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, 
and Luxembourg together make up most of the remainder (1 0%  enterprises, 
8%  employment).  Germany, with a tendency towards larger firms, has the 
highest share of employment (23%)  while the number of enterprises is  15% 
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4.B2 of the EUR12 total.  Conversely, Italy has 21.5%  of EUR12 firms but comes 
third in share of employees (15.7% ). 
A similar picture is displayed when average employment per enterprise is 
considered.  The average for the EUR12 is 12 employees.  Italy has the lowest 
number of employees with 7, followed by the UK, Portugal and Spain (8, 9, 
and 10 employees per firm respectively).  Germany, Belgium, France, 
Denmark, Luxembourg and The Netherlands have above average 
employment per finn, ranging from 13 to 18 persons for Germany and The 
Netherlands respectively, with the other countries placed within this range. 
Table B.2: Private Sector Employment by Firms' Size in Europe (1990) 
Taking the European SME sector in the widest sense (all firms with under 
500 employees), 99.8%  of companies fit into this category, accounting for 
around 69%  of total employment and turnover.  The situation for individual 
countries within the EUR12 ranges from 80%  employment (Denmark, Spain 
and Portugal) to 63%  in Germany and 66%  in both F_rance  and the UK (see 
Table  B.2).  Looking at the weighting of small firms  (<100 employees) in 
terms of share of total employment, EU countries can be split into three 
.  groups, relative to the average for EUR12: 
Less than EUR12 average (  <49%) - Belgium, Germany, Austria and Sweden; 
About EUR12 average (49-55%)  - FraiU:e, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and 
the UK; 
Higher than the EUR12 average (60% +)-Denmark, Spain, Italy,. and 
Portugal. 
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The Industrial Sector 
Within the industrial sector, the segment of the economy which is most 
directly implicated in pollution control measures, the NACE classification 
system was used.  37.2%  of total employment (accounting for 17.5%  of 
European firms) and 41.1%  of revenues fall into NACE categories 1-4, which 
represent the industrial sector. 
The country breakdown is presented in Table  B.3  for the share of industry in 
the whole economy.  Figures  B.1  and B.2 illustrate the breakdown in terms of 
company size for EUR12 as a whole.  Micro enterprises figure much more 
heavily outside the industrial sector, i.e. in the construction; distribution and 
other service sectors (1).  SMEs, however, are relatively less significant in 
these other sectors in terms of number of enterprises (20%  for industry, 5.0-
7.4%  for the other sectors) although the difference is less marked in terms of 
share of total employment (46.5%  for industry; 43.4-45.9%  for the others). 
Table B.3: Share of Industry in the Whole Economy by Country, 1990 
<
1
>  Micro enterprises figure  much  more  heavily  in the  construction,  distribution  and  other  service  sectors than  in the 
industry  sector,  namely  ranging from  93-95% units  and  40-51%  employment  compared with  80%  units  and  13% 
employment for industry. 
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Figure B.1:  Breakdown of Industrial Enterprises by Number  (EUR12,  1990) 
Source: FEEM, elaboration from Eurostat data 
Figure  B.2:  Breakdown of Industrial  Employment  (EUR12,  1990) 
Source: FEEM, elaboration from Eurostat data 
IIIIl mlao 79.6% 
•  smaJI18.2% 
•  medium 1.8% 
•  large 0.4o/e 
a micro 13% 
0  small 26.5% 
•  medlum20% 
III!llarge 40.5% 
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4.B5 Germany and Portugal have higher percentages for the industrial sector, 
compared with the general classification.  Germany has a 17%  share of 
EUR12 industrial firms and :J,S'fh  of industrial employment (d. 23%  overall). 
For Portugal, the industrial sector fi~es are 5.3%  firms and 3.6% 
•  I 
employment.  France, Italy, Denmark and Luxembourg exhibit similar shares 
for industry whereas in the UK and in Belgium, industry features less due to 
the importance of the service sector i? these countries. 
Table  B.4 shows the relative importance of industry among EUR12 countries. 
It can be seen that Germany and France have relatively higher shares of 
industrial employment than number of firms  whereas in Italy, the UK, Spain 
and Portugal the situation is reversed.  This is also reflected in a ranking of 
the main European economies by size class for Industry (NACE classes 1-4). 
Italy comes first in the micro and small segments in terms of number of firms 
and employees.  Germany is first for all criteria in the medium and large 
firms segment.  France comes second for all variables in the medium 
segment.  The UK is third in medium but second in the large segment. 
The overall importance of industry in the various size classes is compared to 
the USA in Table  B.S.  In terms of number of units, the European industrial 
sector has a stronger weighting than the USA in the micro size class only. 
However, ~th  regard to share of total employment, industrial micro and 
SMEs in EUR12 play a relatively more significant role than in the USA, 
where large firms account for the majority of industrial employment (over 
60%). 
Table B.5: Size Class Breakdown for Industry, USA and EUR12 (1990) 
(<10)  (10-99)  (100-499)  (>500) 
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Annex C 
SMEs in Sectors in 
EurC?pean Countries 
• COUNTRY SECTORAL ANALYSIS 
This Annex C presents data on the importance of SMEs in various sectors in 
different European countries.  The principal analysis is based on share of total 
employment, rather than number of enterprises or turnover per category, as 
this was considered to be the most transferable criterion across differing 
national situations.  Other information is provided where necessary. 
Data were provided by the European Statistical System on  SMEs.  The year 
1991  is used where possible and unless otherwise stated in the tables.  All 
Italian data are for the year 1989.  German data up to 1990 refer to the 
former Federal Republic of Germany (including West Berlin); thereafter 
unified data are used.  Certain comparisons and breakdown analyses are not 
possible due to overlapping sectoral classifications adopted by some national 
statistical bodies.  Neither Greece nor Austria, for example, provide data on 
micro enterprises.  Italy does not provide data on zero employees enterprises, 
which are represented by independent professions.  Sweden has combined 
data for NACE 1 and 2 for micro and small firms categories. 
Industry Overview in Terms of Employees 
Looking at the NACE industry sectors 1-4 (see Annex A), the energy and 
water sector (NACE 1) is predominantly made up of larger firms, in terms of 
share of total employment, for all European states (see Table C.l).  The 
percentage of employment in enterprises with over 500 employees ranges 
from over 90%  in France, the UK and Portugal, to about 80% in Germany, 
Italy and Spain and to 40% in Ireland, Austria and Finland (see Appendix  A 
Table A.1). 
The extraction and processing sector (NACE 2) is still predominantly made 
up of larger firms.  However, this predominance is not as wide as in the first 
sector.  The percentage of employment in firms with over 500 employees 
ranges from around 65%  in Germany, the UK and Belgium, to around 30%. 
in Italy, Spain and Portugal, to only 20%  of Greece.  On the other hand, 
there is a light prevalence of employment in enterprises with 10 to 200 
employees in Italy (44%)  and Spain (43%) and a more marked prevalence in 
Ireland (60%) (see Appendix A Table A.2).  · 
As  regards the metal manufacturing sector (NACE 3), it is not possible to 
find a common element which characterises most of the European countries. 
On one hand, there is a clear prevalence of employment in larger firms in 
some States, like Germany (60% ), Sweden (55%), the UK  (52%) and France 
(52%).  On the other, there is a predominance of employment in SMEs in 
Italy and Spain.  There are some countries, namely Portugal and Denmark, 
where both SMEs and larger Companies account for around 50%  of 
employment (see Appendix A Table A.3). 
The other manufacturing sector (NACE 4) is predominantly made up of 
SMEs for all European States, except for the UK  (larger firms:  55%).  The 
percentage of employment in enterprises with 10 to  99 employees is  around 
35-45%  for most of the countries.  In Italy, there is  a clearer predominance of 
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4.C1 SMEs i.e about 50%  of employment is' found in firms  with 10 to 99 
employees, employees in micro firms are 25%  of the total, and firms with 100 
to 499 employees account for 16%  ot the total (see Appendix A Table A.4). 
Looking at the overall NACE industry sectors 1-4, it is easier to comprehend 
the distribution of firms by country.  Employment in larger firms with over 
500 employees is predominant in the UK (58%) and in Germany (52%), and is 
also important in Austria (43%) and Belgium (42% ).  On the other hand, 
employees in SMEs are prevalent in all the other European Countries. In 
Italy (44%)  and in Spain (37%)  there is a prevalence of small firms with 10-99 
employees.  Including micro enterprises in the SMEs definition, all the 
European Countries, except for the UK and Germany, present a prevalence 
of employment in smaller firms in the industrial sector. 
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 .  Overview of Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK 
This section reviews the characteristics of SMEs in the industrial sectors, 
focusing on in~vidual countries.  Looking at NACE industry sectors 1-4 and 
using the above mentioned analysis, we have considered the firms' 
quantitative distribution in four countries, namely, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the UK.  Tables  C.l - C.4  present data on the shares of total employment by 
firms of various sizes in the main sectors in each of these countries. 
Germany 
In Germany, the energy and water sector's employment (NACE 1) is 
predominantly concentrated in larger firms (83% ).  For example, the 
percentage of employment in enterprises employing more than 500 persons 
in the extraction and briquetting of solid fuel sector (NACE  11) is 98%, and 
in the mineral oil refining sector it is greater than 80%. 
The extraction and processing sector (NACE 2) is made up predominantly of 
employment in larger firms, i.e. 69%.  In sector NACE 25, the chemical 
industry, employment in larger firms accounts for 78%  of total employment. 
The NACE 3 sector, metal manufacture, shows a prevalence of larger firms, 
60%.  Conversely, employment in the manufacture of office and data 
processing, of motor vehicles, and of other means of transportation sectors 
(NACE 33, 35 and 36), ranges from between 77%  to 92%.  The German 
manufacture of metal articles (NACE 31) is predominantly represented by 
employment in SMEs.  When one includes micro firms in the definition of 
SMEs, these firms account for more than 70%  of employment, similar to Italy 
and Spain where more than 90%  of these firms account for total 
employment.  In the UK, these firms account for 60%  of employment.  For 
NACE 3, Italy and Spain are characterised by a large share of persons 
employed in SMEs, the UK the lowest share, and Germany 'is in between. 
With regard to the other manufacturing industries sector (NACE 4) it is not 
possible to find a dear predominance in the firms quantitative distribution. 
The small firms section is slightly prevalent, namely, 34%.  In the food, drink 
and tobacco industry, the leather, the footwear and clothing sectors (NACE 
4V42, 44 and 46)  the prevalence of small firms ranges from 40%  to 49%. 
Only the processing of rubber and plastics sector (NACE 48)  exhibits a large 
share of larger firms, 43%  (see Appendix A Table A.S). 
Italy 
In Italy, as in most European Countries, the NACE 1 sector is predominantly 
made up of employment in firms with above 500 persons, i.e.  75%  of total 
employment in the sector.  Conversely, the extraction and processing, metal 
manufacture and the other manufacturing sectors (NACE 2,  3 and 4)  are 
characterised by fewer smaller firms.  In the NACE 4 sector, 47%  of firms 
have between 10-99 employees; 20%  of firms have less than 10 employees; 
20%  of firms are medium sized; and 10%  are larger firms. 
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4.C4 The extraction and processing and the metal manufacturing sectors present 
similar distributions of employment in SMEs and larger firms.  In NACE 2, 
employees in enterprises with 10 to 99 employees account for 35%  of the 
total and the larger firms account for 32%  of the total.  SMEs' employment, 
including micro firms, accounts for around 70% .·  It is worth noticing that the 
share of employment in larger firms in the chemical Italian industry sector 
(NACE 25) is 40%, nearly half the size of the German one, whereas small 
firms alone (10 to 99 employees) account for 28%. 
In NACE 3, 34%  of firms have between 10 to 99 employees and 33%  of firms 
have more than 500 employees.  SMEs  total, including the micro firms, 
account for more than 65%.  The manufacture of metal articles and the 
mechanical engineering sectors have a prevalence of small firms, 49%  and 
43%  respectively, the highest share in the European countries.  The other 
activities (the manufacture of office and data processing, of motor vehicles, 
and of other means of transport sectors) are predominantly made up of 
larger firms.  The percentage of firms with greater than 500 employees is 
more than 70%. 
The other manufacturing industries sector presents the highest prevalence of 
employment in smaller firms in Europe.  The enterprises with 10 to 99 
employees account for 47%  of employment, where SMEs total, including 
micro firms, represent more than 90%  of employment in the sector.  Micro 
firms are Widely diffused (26% ), especially in the timber and wooden 
furniture sector (NACE 46)  where they account for 46%  (see Appendix A Table 
A.6). 
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 Spain 
In Spain the percentage of employment in larger firms in the NACE 1 sector 
is 71%, the low~st of the four examined countries.  In the extraction and 
processing sector (NACE 2), employment in enterprises with 10 to 99 
employees is 33%, ranging from 14%  in the extraction and preparation of 
metalliferous or~s sector (NACE 21)  to above 55%  in the extraction of 
minerals sector (NACE 23).  Larger firms account for 26%  of employment. 
The chemical industry sector (NACE 25) presents a  similar distribution for 
the five size categories, with a slight prevalence (29%)  of firms with 10 to 99 
employees. 
The metal manufacture sector (NACE 3) is predominantly made up of 
employment in SMEs.  When one includes micro firms, SMEs' employment 
is more than 70%  of the total.  With regard to the manufacture of motor 
vehicles and other means of transportation sectors (NACE 35 and 36), there 
is a prevalence of larger firms, 49%  and 67%  respectively. 
The other manufacturing industry sector (NACE 4) presents an clear 
predominance of employment in SMEs. Including micro firms, SMEs account 
for around 90%.  For example, the percentage of larger firms in the timber 
and wooden sector (less than 1%) is negligible and is the lowest of the four 
European Countries (see Appendix A Table A.7). 
These findings about the Spanish sectoral distribution, show similarities with 
Italy, i.e the same prevalence of SMEs in the same industrial sectors, and 
differences with Germany and the UK. 
UK 
While Spain and Italy present a large number of persons employed in SMEs, 
this is not the case in the UK.  The UK is made up predominantly of larger 
firms in all the industrial sectors.  In the NACE 1 sector, firms with at least 
500 employees account for 91%; in NACE 2 these firms account for 65%; in 
NACE 3 for 52%;  and in NACE 4 for 45%, the highest share in all  European 
countries. 
The chemical industry sector (NACE 25) is predominantly made up of 
employment in larger firms (69%) but the German share is still the highest. 
SMEs, micro firms excluded, account only for around 25%. 
The percentage of employment in SMEs in the NACE 4 sector is not as high 
as in the other European countries.  For example, micro firms account for 
18%, SMEs for around 30%  and, conversely, larger firms present the largest 
share, accounting for 45%.  The UK is the only European country where the 
food, drinks and tobacco (NACE 4V42)  and the textile industries (NACE 43) 
are predominantly made up of larger firms:  firms employing more than 500 
employees account for 64%  and 54%  of the total respectively (see Appendix A 
Table A.B). 
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4.C8 Polluting Industries 
This section aims at describing the proffie of SMEs in eight polluting 
industrial sectors, focusing on the five largest European countries: France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK and comparing, where possible, with the 
EUR12 countries average. 
Comparable European data are only available at NACE two digits level and 
even at this level there are many gaps or non comparable figures.  In the 
context of this constraint, we selected the sectors most sensitive to 
environmental liability policy.  Selected sectors are very similar to industries 
affected by UHF in Germany. 
The industrial sectors analysed are: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
chemical 
mineral and oil refining 
extraction and preparation of metalliferous ores 
production and preliminary processing of metals 
food, drink and tobacco industry 
timber and wooden furniture 
manufacture of paper products 
processing of rubber and plastics  . 
For each of these sectors and for each country, a brief review and an 
accompanying table is provided, indicating shares of total employment. 
The Chemical Sector 
It is worth noticing the chemical industry se.ctor (NACE 25), as it is subje·ct to 
risk from several types of environmental damage. 
Table C.6 shows that in Germany, the sector is predominantly made up of 
larger firms, i.e. around 80%  of employees are employed in firms with more 
than 500 employees.  The same occurs in the UK where around 70%  of 
employees are in larger firms. Conversely, Italy and Spain present a 
prevalence of SMEs in the chemical sector; SMEs acco.unt for around the 
60%  in Italy and for 70%  in Spain. 
Taking into account the total number of employees per country, other 
considerations follow.  The total employment in the chemical sector in the 
UK, in Italy and in Spain is similar (between 200,000 to 260,000 employees). 
Conversely, in Germany the chemical sector is larger, employing about 
620,000 persons.  French data are not available. 
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4.C9 Table C.6:  The Chemical Sector (NACE 25), (1990) 
R12 
avg. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
• EU-12 average data on NACE 25/26. 
The Mineral and Oil Refming Sector (NACE 14) 
Total employment numbers in the five  countries are similar, potentially 
permitting comparison between the firms' distribution but the data are not 
readily comparable and much data is unavailable, except for Spain and 
Germany. 
Table C.7 shows that Spain and Germany both have a prevalence of larger 
firms with more than 500 employees, namely 81%  and 83%  of  the total 
employment share. 
Table C. 7:  The Mineral and Oil Refining Sector (NACE 14), (1990) 
ERMANY  UK  E  R12 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Extraction and Preparation of Metalliferous Ores Sector and the Production 
and Preliminary Processing of Metals (NACE 21/22) 
Data for NACE sectors 21  and 22 have been aggregated in Table C.8 because 
disaggregated data are available only for some of the countries analysed. 
German extraction and preparation of metalliferous ores, and the production 
and preliminary processing of metals sectors present a clear prevalence of 
employment in firms with more than 500 employees (around 83% ). 
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I 
The Spanish case is different, with the larger firms accounting for 55%  of 
total employment in the sector, which is less than the German share, even if 
it represents almost half the ~n~ployment distribution. 
Table C.S:  The Extraction and Preparation of  Metalliferous Ores and the 
Production and Preliminary Processing of  Metals (NACE 21/22), (1990) 
y 
12. 
avg. 
The  French,  the  British  and  the  Spanish  cases  present  a  prevalence  of 
employment in larger firms.  In France and the UK, 75% and 71% of employees 
respectively are working in large firms.  · 
The Food, Drinks and Tobacco Industry 
Looking at the food, drinks and tobacco industry sector, the total employment 
numbers seem to  be  different across  countries  (see  Table  C.8).  France and 
Germany, have a similar number of total employees, namely 604,824 and 733,694 
respectively.  Italy,  Spain  and  the  UK  have  339,414,  388,464  and  453,980 
employees respectively. 
When one includes micro firms, SMEs account for around 75%  of employment 
in France and more than 80%  in Germany. 
The UK shows a clear prevalence in employment in larger firms which account 
for more than 64%  of total employment, while in Italy and Spain they account 
only for 20%. 
This confirms the British trend; i.e even in this NACE 4 manufacturing sector, 
where all the other countries in Europe present a prevalence of SMEs, the UK 
still has most employees in larger firms. 
Table C.S:  The Food,  Drinks and Tobacco Industry (NACE 41/42),  (1990) 
12 
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4.C11 The Timber and Wooden Furniture Sector 
The timber and wooden furniture sector pr~sents a prevalence of SMEs in all 
the  European Countries (see  Table  C.9).  For  the  EUR12  countries  average, 
employment in SMEs accounts for more than 90%.  In the UK,  SMEs account 
for 75%  of the total compared with around 90% _in  Germany, more than 92% 
in France and 97-99%  in Italy and Spain. 
Table C.9: The Timber and Wooden Furniture Sector (NACE 46),  (1990) 
R12 
The Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products Sector 
Table C.1 0 shows that France, Italy and Spain present a predominance of SMEs; 
they account for  77%  in France, 81%  in Italy and more than 90%  in Spain. 
SMEs  are prevalent in Germany and the UK  too,' but to  a lesser extent.  In 
Germany, SMEs account for 66%  and in the UK for 57%. 
Table C.10: Manufacture of  Paper and Paper Products (NACE 47), (1990) 
The Processing of Rubber and Plastics Sector 
12 
avg. 
Table  C.11  shows  that,  in Germany,  larger  firms  account  for  43%  of  total 
employment in the sector. 
In  the  other four  European Countries SMEs  are  prevalent but to  different 
extents.  The biggest share is in Italy  where around 85%  of  employees  are 
employed in SMEs.  In Spain, SMEs, including micro firms, account for about 
70%.  In France and Germany SMEs, including micro, account for 67%  and 58% 
of SMEs  respectively.  In contrast, the UK shows a prevalence of larger firms, 
which account for 55%  of total employment. 
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t 
Table C.11:  The Processing of  Rubber and Plastics Sector (NACE 48), (1990) 
12 
Comparing to the European 12 Countries average, it  is worth noticing that Italy 
and Spain present, as usual, a much wider prevalence of employment in SMEs 
than all the other Countries. 
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1.1 
1.2 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
A significant proportion of environmental damage costs are not financially 
covered by a responsible party (polluter or insurer) under existing 
environmental liability systems.  These include situations where: the 
responsible party cannot be identified because, for example, the responsible 
party has gone bankrupt; an identified party is incapable of making the 
required compensation payments.  Compensation payments may also only be 
made in part, if financial limits are imposed on payments under an insurance 
policy.  Several European countries as well as the US  and Japan now have 
established compensation funds to finance these gaps of accountability in the 
liability system.  Th·e funds raise finances for the specific purposes of 
compensation or restoration of environmental damage.  Within a fund there 
are many options to raise, administer and allocate finances.  Each element 
can have important implications for the role the fund eventually plays. 
OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this topic paper are to: 
•  identify when it might be appropriate for a compensation fund to cover 
environmental damage 
•  summarize the major characteristics of the various funds to identify the 
main options available for policy makers when developing a compensation 
fund system 
•  compare the effectiveness of the existing compensation funds 
•  assess the specific elements of existing compensation funds to identify 
lessons for the EC  regarding the use of different arrangements for a 
compensation fund. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
A two stage research process was carried out.  All current reports on 
compensation funds in France, Sweden, Netherlands, Japan and Germany 
were reviewed.  Then interviews were carried out with members of the 
ministries of environment in the Netherlands and Japan. 
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POTENI1AL ROLE OF COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 
Compensation systems are complements to, and not a substitute for, liability 
systems.  They are used to cover environmental damage for which a liability 
system cannot find a responsible party or the responsible party cannot pay. 
It therefore can act as a 'safety net' for victims who otherwise would have 
not been able to seek compensation.  The essential principle of a 
compensation fund is that damage is remedied or victims compensated, 
financed from a fund which in turn is financed by a collective group of 
polluters rather than by the general population (through general taxes) or by 
the victims (where damage go uncompensated). 
In doing so funds can also function as a warning system, since· claims to the 
fund could alert the government to the need to develop policy in other areas 
of environmental liability.  Increased claims would show increased pollution, 
increased gaps in the existing liability compensation system or that criteria 
allowed for claims to be made were too broad leading to too many claims 
being made. 
The possible circumstances where gaps might arise and a compensation fund 
is appropriate include: 
•  ·where no liable party can be identified. 
•  Where the liable party no longer exists or is not sufficiently solvent. 
•  Where a large number of polluters and/or victims are involved and the 
transaction costs of proving liability would be high. 
•  Emergency cases where there is an urgent need to restore damage quickly 
due to direct danger to health or state of the environment or viability of 
local enterprises. 
•  Where insurance is not available to cover environmental damage.  This 
may include ecological damage since insurers have stated that they are 
unwilling to insure damage due to uncertainties concerning their 
valuation.  It might also include environmental damage that is self-insured 
in cases where the self-insured firms become bankrupt. 
These circumstances occur with enough frequency that significant amounts 
of damage accumulate which are not compensated.  The environmental 
insurance market, for instance, currently accounts for less than 1%  of. 
environmental damage costs in European countries (see topic  paper 3 on 
insurance). 
Hence there are large outstanding environmental damage costs not covered 
within environmental liability systems.  The issue therefore, is  to ascertain 
the feasibility and desirability of the scope and mechanics of compensation 
funds for dealing with these outstanding environmental damage. 
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5.3 Conflict  in the Role of Funds 
There is, however, a fundamental problem with the role and construction of 
a compensation fund.  Due to a fund's role of providing compensation or 
cleanup when the responsible party cannot be identified or cannot pay, a 
conflict may arise between the goals of the government and the interest of 
firms. 
Governments wish to use compensation funds to: 
•  ensure all damage is restored; 
•  ensure victims are compensated; 
•  minimise claims on the public purse; 
•  be able to intervene with a fund if remediation is too slow or transaction 
costs are too high. 
These goals lead to funds being raised from a collective group of polluters 
instead of individual responsible parties. 
Firms in general do not prefer this means of payment and compensation. 
Firms: 
•  accept the polluter pays principle (PPP) but do not want to pay for other 
peoples' (especially competitors') pollution; 
•  need efficient incentives for pollution prevention. 
The pooling mechanism for raising finances to pay for compensation or 
cleanup may not achieve the necessary incentives for firms to increase 
pollution prevention and may go against the PPP.  Examples of these 
problems can be seen in the compensation funds detailed in the following 
section. 
Such conflicts may limit the capacity of a fund to raise .finances and thus 
restrict its ability to fulfil its role in compensating outstanding damage. 
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3.1 
3.2 
ASSESSMENI OF EXISTING COMPENSATION FUNDS 
This section reviews experience with various compensation funds in EU 
countries and Japan where they are most developed and assesses their 
desirability and efficiency to identify lessons regarding compensation 
systems.  · 
CRITERIA FOR  APPRAISING COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 
The precise functions, goals and reasons for operation of each fund have to 
be identified in order to make assessments about their effectiveness and 
success. 
Criteria for assessing options for financing the compensation funds include: 
•  Efficiency and effects on firms' incentives - does the financing 
mechanism provide an incentive for firms to implement prevention 
measures? 
•  How firms are likely to respond to the financing of the system. 
•  Reliability and uncertainty over the level of funds needed and the 
contribution rate. 
•  Transaction costs of raising the revenue and administering the fund. 
•  Polluter pays principle - that the costs of restoring the environmental 
damage are borne by the firms causing the damage and not the 
government. 
•  Effectiveness of the compensation fund in remedying the 
environmental damage costs and compensating victims 
FUNDS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
This section carries out a comparative analysis of experience of existing 
compensation systems in terms of the elements of compensation systems 
outlined in the terms of reference.  The analysis covers funds in European 
countries, as well as Japan where there is a well established compensation 
fund. 
3.2.1  France 
Goals 
The purpose and scope of compensation funds in France are to cleanup 
contaminated land at orphan sites.  Contaminated land has been identified as 
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5.5 a large environmental problem.  It was estimated in 1994 that comprehensive 
cleanup of the sites would cost 100 million francs  <t> in total. 
In an effort to otfset pressure by government for cleanup of their own 
contaminated land sites many of the largest companies in France joined 
together in the early 1990s to form a trust fund to contribute to the cleanup 
of orphan sites  ... 
Financial and Administrative Arrangements 
The first, private trust fund was composed of, and privately administered by, 
around 60 companies.  In 1992, 25 million FF were made available for orphan 
site cleanup.  This only rose to 29 million FF by 1994 when the program was 
eventually curtailed.  Because the fund was set up to relieve pressure from 
the Government on polluting firms to clean up their own contamination the 
level of the fund was not based on the level of cleanup needed but the 
minimal levels polluters thought was acceptable to keep the Government 
satisfied. 
However, participation in this funq did not achieve the initial goal of easing 
government pressure.  Companies were still being pressured by the 
government to clean up their own sites.  This led to a lack of interest by the 
companies involved and they eventually decided not to divert more 
resources to cleaning up orphan sites.  <
2
>  This led to the termination of the 
fund. 
To replace the dissolved fund the government expanded the 1992 Law 92-646 
by introducing a 20 FF per tonne landfill tax on municipal waste.  Then the 
1995 Law 95/101  extended the scope of this tax to include industrial and 
hazardous waste and raised the tax to 25 FF per tonne.  This established 
annual finances for a publicly administered compensation fund.  The taxes 
for this fund raise a total of 65 million FF per year. < 3
> 
The tax is  to be raised by 5 FF each year until 1998.  By 1998 the tax level will 
be 40 FF per ton.  It will then remain at this level thereafter in the following 
years < 4>.  A 40 FF per ton tax would lead to a nominal increase to 104 
million FF  <S>.  This would then attain the estimated 100 million FF needed 
per annum to cleanup contaminated sites. 
In order to administer the tax for the fund the government set up ADEME 
(Agency for Management of Environmental Waste and Energy), a 
government agency.  The agency will administer the funds to clean up <
6
> 
669 orphan sites which have been identified as critically contaminated. 
(I) Pierre Bechmann, Partner,·Clitford Chance Environment Group, Paris, wFrance:  Development in Contaminated Land 
Programmew 5th Environmental Insurance Conference, Uoyds Ust Press, 1995. 
(Z)  Pierre Bechman 
(3)  Pierre Bechmann 
<•>  UK Waste Management Ltd (1995),  Response to the UK Government's Consultation Paper on a Landfill Tax. 
(5) This is calculated on the assumption that the tax base  will be the same size. 
< 6> UK  Waste Management Ltd, Response to the Government's Landfill Tax Consultation Paper, 1995 
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5.6 3.2.2 
Results 
No sites have so far been cleaned up because the fund has started so 
recently. 
Conclusion 
Industry does not have much of an incentive to administer and contribute to 
the compensation fund. 
A landfill tax may be a suitable method of raising finances to support ~ 
orphan site compensation fund. 
It is too early to determine if this nationally run contaminated land cleanup 
program will be effective. 
Sweden m 
Goals 
In Sweden a person who has suffered an injury or damage to his property 
cannot obtain compensation under the 1986 Environment Damage Act if it is 
not possible to ascertain who is responsible for the damage or if those 
responsible are insolvent.  In order to overcome the problem of having 
unidentifiable or insolvent polluters the government decided to set up a fund 
system. 
The fund is a safety net with the claimant having first to try to claim 
compensation from the responsible parties wherever possible.  It also has a 
limit for how far back it will accept claims.  For property damage it only 
deals with disturbance occurring after July 1989 when the provisions 
regulating the insurance scheme took effect. 
Financial and Administrative Arrangements 
A unique compensation system has been established using the insurance 
sector.  Initially the government wanted to set up a government fund, 
financed by taxes and levies on certain hazardous substances.  However 
industry resisted such taxes.  The solution was to set up an insurance 
scheme, The Environmental Damage Insurance, regulated by amendments to 
the Environmental Protection Act, ss 65-69 (1988:924) and in the Ordinance 
on Environmental Damage Insurance (1989:365).  The legislation came into 
force in July 1989.  The subsequent insurance fund was called the 
Environmental Damage Insurance Fund (EDIF).  It is run by a consortium 
(Miljoskadekonsortiet) consisting of five insurance companies. 
The insurance is compulsory for companies who carry out activities 
hazardous to the environment, defined by the requirement of a permit or an 
(I) R Lundstrom, Scandinavia: A New Driving Force for Environmental Liability in  the EU,  5th Environmental Insurance 
Conference, 1995. 
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5.7 application under the Environment Protection Act or according to the 
directives issued under the Act.  Those companies .. nerforming such activities 
are obliged to contribute to the compensation fund through additional 
insurance levies on premia approved by the government. However, by 
targeting only certain types of firms for additional insurance premia, 
contributors to the Fund relate fairly well to the original industries that 
caused the damage.  There is no incentive for pollution prevention within 
this system as such pollution prevention measures do not lead to a decrease 
in the additional insurance premium. 
Compensation is paid out on a claims made bas~.  The financial limits paid 
by this consortium are 580,000 ECU (SEK 5 million) for bodily injury 
compensation and 5.8 million ECU (SEK 50 million) for property damage per 
claim.  A total of 23 million ECU (SEK 200 million) can be claimed for in one 
year for any type of damage.  The compensation payments for claims are 
drawn from reserves of 14 million ECU (SEK 120 million) which have been 
paid into the scheme between 1989 and 1993. 
Results 
However, by February 1993 the Consortium only received 27 claims.  None 
of the claims made were deemed compensatable under the insurance scheme. 
As of this year, therefore, no compensation payments have yet been made. 
Due to this zero outlay of funds the purpose of the fund was .called into 
question and in 1992 a government commission was established to evaluate 
the scheme.  This concluded that despite the lack of compensation payments 
made, the fund plays a critical role in filling serious gaps in the cleaning up 
of, and compensating for, environmental damage.  The Commission also 
recommended an extension of the EDI in the form of a separate 
Decontamination Insurance for a new area called 'assistance costs'. 
'Assistance costs' are to dean up sites where commercial operations are 
halted due to insolvency so that hazardous waste and pther material such as 
process  chemical~_ are left behind.  The EDI does not cover costs of such 
disposal or decontamination.  They so far have been financed by 
appropriated funds administered by the Swedish Envir~nment Protection 
Agency.  However, the increased number of bankruptcies in recent years has 
created an urgent need for more funds. 
The Commission felt that an insurance scheme was the best mechanism for 
administering contributions due to its financing, loss adjustment and 
administration characteristics and since there was already an insurance 
system in place.  An existing insurance system allows the use of the already 
established administrative system for collecting premia and thus can reduce 
transaction costs. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
The fund reduces administration costs by using an existing system of 
collecting finances to collect additional finances for a compensation fund. 
However, so far, the Swedish fund has not compensated any claims. 
3.2.3  Netherlands m 
In the Netherlands there are two compensation funds operating.  One is for 
contaminated soil restoration and one is for air pollution damage 
compensation. 
Soil clean  up 
The fund for soil cleanup falls under the 1992 Soil Remediation Law.  The 
government determined that it was unjustifiable to make companies pay for 
clean up of contamination problems about which the companies were 
unaware when the contamination took place.  Therefore clean up of 
contamination prior to 1975 is being paid by the state, financed by general 
taxes.  So far the cost is approximately 145 million ECU per year, achieving 
benefits of clean soil valued at approximately 4.8 million ECU· per year. 
Air pollution fund 
The Air Pollution Fund is also required by law.  Its role is to be a net to 
catch problem cases that slip through civil law regulation.  The Fund is to 
complement civil law by compensating for damage caused by sudden air 
pollution incidents causing unacceptably high damage when: there are no 
liable parties; the identified liable parties do not exist any more or are not 
sufficiently solvent to finance damage restoration; the transaction costs of 
securing liability payments would be very high (decided in a subjective 
manner); and there is no insurance coverage. 
The government first seeks to make liable parties pay for cleanup.  If this 
cannot be done then the fund will attempt restoration.  If restoration cannot 
occur then the fund provides compensation.  The fund covers compensation 
for;  health, crops, car coatings, cattle and buildings.  Compensation claims, 
however, are mostly for  damage to crops and car coatings (80 to 90% of the 
claims). 
The fund initially raised. capital from taxing fuel used by companies (and 
thus air polluters).  In 1992 the government moved away from this and 
started raising funds from general taxation.  At present the taxes raise the 
annual sum of 2.4 million ECU.  This amount is based on the average. annual 
value of claims from the previous five years' record of claims.  So current 
needs are not based on total restoration costs but on past claims on the 
Fund.  The funds are administered by the Minister of Environmental 
Management, with the annual capacity of the fund being held at the Dutch 
Bank. 
Ill Source:interview with Ministry of Environment, Netherlands 
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5.9 Priorities are given for claims for restoration of all damage irrespective of 
costs.  However the possibilities for restoration are limited (due to irreversible 
damage eg crop death) and only 20%  of the payments are' used for 
restoration cos~.  The rest of the claim's, when damage cannot be restored, 
go to compensation payments. 
There are three administrative costs associated with this compensation 
system: 
•  The organisational and administration costs are 70,000 ECU per year or 
3%  of annual Fund capacity. 
•  The assessment costs for claims carried out by experts amount to an 
additional 48,000 ECU per year or 2%  of the Fund capacity. 
•  Legal costs amount to approximately an additional 24,000 ECU or a 
further 1%  of the Fund capacity.  These costs are the results of two 
activities: the owner of the Fund (ie Dutch authorities) taking a claiming 
party to court; recourse by the injured party taking the Fund to court to 
settle a claim when disagreement occurs over the allocated amount 
decided by the Fund. 
Claims over the last 5 years have on average been 2.4 million ECU per 
annum.  Transaction costs identified above account for 0.15 million ECU (6% 
per annum of fund capacity).  So 9 million ECU has gone to compensate 
injured parties and 2.2 million ECU to restoring damage over the last five 
years. 
This fund plays a valuable role in providing on average 2.4 million ECU per 
year in compensation, mainly for private property damage which otherwise 
would have gone uncompensated or which would have entailed large 
transaction costs under an environmental liability system.  · 
3.2.4  Japan 
Goals 
The Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation and Prevention Law 
was enacted in 1973 to compensate residents whose heath has been damaged 
by pollution.  This is in addition to compensation payable to victims by 
polluters under civil law. 
Its major goal is to provide an administrative, non-judicial system of 
compensating victims of environmental pollution.  The Central Advisory 
Council on Environmental Pollution Control Measures argued that to require 
each victim seeking compensation for health injuries to file  a lawsuit in court 
would be too burdensome.  Thus, the Council recommended an extra-
judicial, administrative structure to oversee compensation payments. (t) 
(I) Michio Hashimoto, The Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law 
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Under the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation and Prevention 
Law there are two types of human health damage which can be 
compensated under the funds: 
•  Class 1 is exposure to significant atmospheric pollution which frequently 
causes a major disease such as chronic bronchitis, but where the 
relationship between the disease and its poss~ble pollution source .is not 
obvious.  It is this type of damage which takes up nearly all of the ft.ind's 
resources. 
•  Class 2 is exposure to the significant atmospheric pollution or water 
pollution which causes particular disease damage from specific pollution 
incidents. This includes for example, Minimata disease.  The relationship 
between pollutants and disease should be clear.  The instances where the 
fund is  used are extremely limited because usually all expenses for 
compensation is collected directly from the liable companies. 
Within these areas of damage the Fund covers accidental, gradual, 
cumulative and past (retroactive) pollution problems. 
Class  1 Damage:  Chronic Health  Damage from  Air Pollution 
Financial and Administrative Arrangements 
In order to pay for the claims allowed under the above provisions the 
government raises funds on an annual basis.  The Law attempts to fund the 
entire costs of the compensation program, e)(:cept for administration.  For 
Class 1 areas the Law imposes 80%  of the financial burden on sulphur 
polluting firms based on the estimate that they contribute to 80%  of air 
pollution.  This is in the form of a pollution levy for factories discharging 
502 at levels exceeding the standard specified by the Law. 
The remaining 20%  of the total collected funds for compensation is financed 
by the national tax on the purchase of new cars.  This national tax was not 
increased to provide for the Fund but part of the existing amount is diverted 
into the Fund. 
The 80:20 split has been fixed since 1973 despite increases in the number of 
cars and the decrease in industrial contribution to pollution, which has 
changed the percentage industry contributes to air pollution. 
The industry tax is proportional to the excess emissions produced above a 
specified standard for new and existing plants.  This potentially could act as 
an incentive to industries to lower pollution to produce emissions below the 
set level and thus avoid paying into the Compensation Fund. 
Companies with factories in urban areas pay more tax than sites in rural 
areas.  This is based on the fact that the urban areas are more polluted and 
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5.11 more populated and have higher incidents of bronchitis.  More polluted cities 
are taxed more than less polluted cities.  In 1985 the unit levy for Osaka was 
25 ECU (3,300 yen) per SOx Nm
3
•  The levy for Tokyo was 15 ECU {2,000 
yen) per SOx Nm3 and non-designated areas eg rural areas only had levies 
of 1.5 ECU (200 yen) per unit. 
These tax rates have led to levels of compensation of 688 million ECU (90,891 
million yen) per year in 1995.  This is lower than the peak amount of claims 
of 751  million ECU (99,197 million yen) in 1985, but much higher than the 
initial level of claims of  152 million ECU (20,053 million yen) in 1975. 
However, the tax rates are not fixed and are based on the required capacity 
of the Fund.  This is determined retrospectively, based on the compensation 
requirements during the year.  The amount of taxes are then levied 
accordingly to attain the paid out level.  As of 1994 there were 78,682 patients 
receiving compensation payments for medical care.  So average claims 
benefits per year as of 1995 were 8,744 ECU per person. 
In order to organise and administer these large inflows and outflows of the 
fund a special government organisation was set up.  This is called the 
Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation and Prevention Association. 
This  allocates funds to the local Prefectural governments which then 
distributes payments to the patients.  The responsibility for certifying claims 
falls on Local Authorities.  They certify claims of persons if they have lived 
in the polluted area for over three years and have evidence of bronchitis (as 
verified by a doctor). 
Results 
The compensation amounts increased annually at a substantial rate until 
1988.  At this point the government changed the claims policy. for the fund. 
It was decided to allow no more patients suffering from S02 related diseases 
to claim compensation payments.  But annual compensation payments to 
existing sufferers is continued.  There was a small subsequent reduction of 
payments between 1994 and 1995, reflecting existing p~tients either 
recovering and thus not requiring further compensation, or patients dying. 
The decision taken in 1988 to halt further claims was based on a weakness in 
the compensation system.  The fund was initially set up in 1973 due to the 
excessive industrial pollution and poor air quality.  In the 1980s industry 
made concerted efforts to reduce pollution.  The claims, though, kept 
increasing up until 1988 because of the lag time for consequences of 
pollution to manifest itself and for injured parties to become aware of the 
possibilities to claim for compensation. 
So despite the heavily polluting industries of the 1970s having significantly 
reduced emission levels through pollution control, by the late 1980s, the 
industry was be~g  obliged to increase their financial contributions to a 
growing fund.  Therefore industry began to complain because they were 
caught in a situation where after increasing expenditure for pollution control 
they were still having their taxation rate increased to match the growing 
amount of claims. 
ERM  EcoNOMICS  EcoNoMICS OF  l..JABILITY,  VoL II:  EC  DG  XI 
. 5.12 Therefore the scheme was not providing the correct signals for industry to 
adopt pollution prevention measures.  Industry would not be deterred from 
polluting as the Fund pays for damage caused by both past and present 
pollution and both collective and individual actions to reduce pollution did 
not seem to reduce their contributions to the fund. 
At an individual level, even if an individual firm's total payment went down 
because of reduced emissions, if the Fund's claims increased then total tax 
needs also went up as the Fund is financed on a needs basis.  The individual 
tax rate would then rise accordingly as the tax was apportioned between all 
indus  trial firms. 
At a collective level the incentive to reduce pollution was reduced because of 
the lag time of the manifestation of polluted related diseases. 
A weakness of a needs based fund where financing is related to the number 
of claims and not the amount of pollution the supposed polluters are 
producing is  that the polluters are given perverse signals about the effects of 
adopting pollution prevention measures. 
Conclusion 
The fund was very effective in raising finances and compensating victims. 
This is facilitated when there is one specific polluting substance such as 502 
dearly causing the damage, even when there are multiple polluting sources. 
The fund ran into problems because of the time delay in pollution damage 
manifesting itself approximately 10 years after the pollution was at its peak. 
So claims were increasing as pollution levels decreased.  Because the fund 
was claims based the system led to perverse signals for industry; despite 
reducing pollution, industry's contributions to the compensation fund 
increased. 
3.2.5  Germany 
Germany has developed three different types of compensation systems for 
restoration of contaminated land.  They are a tax system, a licensing system 
and a co-operation system.  Table 3.2a summarises the main features of these 
compensation funds.  Each fund is operated at a regional level in order to 
ensure that the financing of the cleanup is transferred to the groups with a 
supposed connection to the pollution. 
The Funds are used when: 
•  the polluter cannot pay; 
•  individual civil liability does not work; 
•  public liability does not collect sufficient financial resources for restoration. 
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The tax system is in operation in Hessen.  It is small and collected 50 million 
DM between 1990 and 1992, procured by a waste tax calculated on the basis 
of the amount of private household waste.  The tax was raised equally by 
the land and provincial governments.  Despite the regional scale this method 
does not have a direct financial link with polluters as waste production does 
not correspond to causing past damage. 
Licensing system 
A compensation system based on licenses for handling special wastes is 
based in the Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW) area.  The Fund raises money 
through diverting 70%  of fees raised from licenses required in NR  W.  The 
licenses are necessary to get permission to handle special waste.  The 
revenue from the license payments, which will reach 50 million OM, is then 
handed over to the Land.  The Land then transfers the necessary financial 
resources to the public-law corporation established by the Fund to deal with 
restoration of contaminated sites. 
By 1993 the Fund had performed 2,000 remedial actions supported by 308 
million OM.  · 
Whilst collecting funds for restoration, this financing system does not 
achieve other economic and environmental goals.  The licensees do not 
suffer from the cost of license as they pass the additional cost on to the 
waste producer.  However, the cost is not sufficient to act as a financial 
incentive for waste producers to reduce waste through preventative 
measures and thus avoid the license cost.  Furthermore the waste producers 
are not responsible for past land contamination. 
Co-operation system 
Co-operation systems involve the sharing of costs of environmental 
restoration between industry and government.  There are several different 
co-operation systems in different regions in Germany, operating at a small 
scale, collecting approximately 5-15 million OM per year.  Industry 
contributes to these schemes because by doing so the federal state 
government delays legislation initiatives for pollution which could be more 
expensive for industry than current arrangements. 
One of these co-operation models is operated in the Bundesland Rhineland-
Palatinate area to deal with inherited environmental problems mainly from a . 
small group of chemical companies.  It was initially only used when the 
polluters were found liable but could not pay the whole amount required. 
The fund acted as a financing bridge for restoration needs. 
The restoration operation is based on the co-operation between enterprises 
and regional administrative bodies.  They become partners with equal rights 
by agreements which are legally non-obligatory.  The procedure usually 
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starts with the establishment of a private corporation solely for  the 
restoration prPcedure.  · 
In 1986 the federal state government, the regional administration bodies and 
regional industry concluded an agreement of co-operation.  They set up a 
private corporation (called GBS) which was responsible for the 
implementation of the restoration. 
After polluters are sought for payment for cleanup, the remaining costs of 
eliminating environmental damage are paid equally by the Land and GBS. 
By 1990 the Fund capacity was 50 million DM with industry paying 6.25 
million DM through an extra charge on the taxes on special waste. 
The federal state government tried in 1993 to include funding for cases 
where no liable party could be found.  This meant that the fund would not 
only act as a financing bridge for restoration needs but also finance the 
cleanup of orphan sites, previously excluded from its scope of responsibilities. 
Industry consequently cancelled the co-operation agreement because they 
felt this expanded scope of activity would impose too great a responsibility 
on the Fund and thus ultimately too large a financial burden on them.  The 
cancellation of the agreement by industry meant the termination of the fund. 
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4.1 
Table 4.1a 
EVALUATION OF COMPENSATION FUNDS AND THEIR ELEMENIS 
This final section summarizes the major characteristics of the various fund to 
identify the main options available for policy makers when developing a 
compensation fund system.  The options are  the~ analysed in light of_ the 
appraisal criteria to yield lessons about the scope and form of compensation 
funds.  Where a best choice option is not straightforward or apparent, the 
various relationships and influential factors are discussed. 
FUND RESULTS 
Table 4.1a summarizes the scale of funding of the various funds. 
Finances and Payments of  Funds (ECU) 
France 
Sweden 
Netherlands (soil) 
Netherlands (air) 
Japan 
Germany 
Level (ECU) 
lOWyr 
14M cumulative 
145Wyr 
24Wyr 
688Wyr 
<27M/yr 
Compensation  Comments 
target of 669 sites - too early to  tell 
none cleaned so far 
no claims paid so far  despite no zero outlay 
the government felt it 
fills  gaps 
4.8Wyr restored 
2.4Wyr  ,  small but needs based 
so appears to have a 
limited role to  play 
79,000 patients in 1994  collects a large 
collecting 688Wyr  amount of finances 
2,000 remedial actions 
The Netherlands' soil fund raises a large amount but its results have been 
relatively small.  The German fund has been active, carrying out cleaning up 
a total of 2,000 remedial actions by 1993.  In the US experience shows that 
the cleanup process of contaminated land can be extremely slow, largely due 
to lengthy litigation processes, disputing financial responsibilities of parties, 
which delay the implementation bf clean-up measures. 
With air pollution compensation funds the financial contributions after 
transaction costs (administration and litigation) go  directly to victims.  Both 
the Japanese and the Netherlands funds raise finances retrospectively on a 
needs based system.  In this way all validated compensation claims are 
satisfied by the funds.  The Japanese fund raises the largest amount of funds 
for compensation purposes.  It provides victims with, on average, 9,000 ECU 
per year. 
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The elements in the existing funds are compared below. 
Role 
There are two main systems in operation to cove.r: 
(i)  Diffuse pollution from many sources.  Examples include: 
compensation systems for claims made from sufferers of air pollution. 
The damage can either be to health (covered in the Japanese 
compensation fund) or private property (crops and car coatings covered 
in Netherlands' compensation fund). 
(ii)  Orphan Sites.  This includes: restoring contaminated land sites.  French 
and German funds target orphan sites.  These funds are used as liable 
parties no longer exist or are not sufficiently solvent to finance 
cleanup. 
There is also a compensation system in Japan for dealing with large 
accidental pollution cases, eg the Minimata case.  In Japan the compensation 
fund pays compensation when there are high costs from environmental 
damage and companies would otherwise face excessive liabilities.  This fund 
is also used for water pollution incidents.  For example, funds were allocated 
to cover claims from the Minimata disease incident. 
The Swedish system is more general and claims can be made for any type of 
injury and damage to property.  This would include air and soil pollution. 
The role of all of these funds is  to fill  gaps and act as a safety net either for 
damage compensation claims or restoration actions. 
Source of Funds 
Collecting financing is a critical issue because: 
•  The extent to which the fund can restore environmental damage and 
compensate victim depends on the level of funds that are collected. 
•  The source of financing dictates who is held accountable for the cleanup 
carried out by the compensation fund. 
•  The type of financing will give different signals to industry. 
The types of financing in operation are: 
•  insurance premia (Sweden) 
•  general tax (Netherlands) 
•  air pollution tax Qapan) 
•  fees from licenses for waste (Germany) 
•  landfill tax (France) 
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An insurance premium surcharge acts like a tax on the companies targeted 
for  th~ surcharge. 
The air pollution tax is effectively an extra emissions charge on the parties 
causing the damage compensated by the fund.  Fees from licences from 
waste and the landfill tax also both create an extra charge for waste 
producers.  Like the air pollution tax, this creates an incentive for firms to 
reduce their generation of these pollutants which can be indirectly related to 
the environmental damage costs . 
If the tax on polluting industries is proportional to the amount each 
company pollutes then an incentive measure is introduced for companies to 
adopt measures to reduce the emission of the charged pollutant.  This type 
of tax is only possible if the polluting substance causing the damage settled 
by the fund can be identified, such as the sulphur dioxide emissions causing 
bronchitis in Japan. 
A compensation fund can provide perverse signals to industry when claims 
do not change in proportion to pollution prevention expenditures.  This may 
happen when damage occurs or becomes evident some time after the 
pollution incident.  When this situation arises industry will not only have 
little incentive to increase pollution prevention expenditures but will wish to 
reduce pollution prevention expenditure because such expenditures do not 
appear to lead to a reduction  of pollution tax (fund contributions).  This 
occurred in Japan where the financial contribution by industry to the fund 
rose in spite of industry's substantial pollution control expenditures.  Claims 
increased due to the time lag in the worsening of health of the victims after 
the pollution occurred so that claims actually went up after pollution had 
decreased.  As a result of industry complaints about the rising contribution, 
the Government decided in 1988 to allow no. additional patients to  claim 
compensation from air pollution related illnesses. 
Administration 
The possible arrangements in existence to organise fund activities are: 
•  central government body (Netherlands, France, Japan) 
•  regional government (Germany) 
•  private sector 
•  insurance sector (Sweden) 
•  polluting firms  (France) 
These bodies take care of raising finances and distribution of funds and 
execution of actions. 
Funds can be administered at a national scale, as in France, the Netherlands, 
Japan and Sweden, and down to a regional and local scale as in Germany. 
The scale at which a fund is operated will affect which government 
department is  responsible for the-fund and the sources of the finances.  It 
also can affect where fund money can be allocated.  Regional governing 
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bodies will have more control over cleanup within their region under a 
regional fund than equivalent regional governments will have under 
national funds. 
However a national level fund enables the use of national taxes and national 
institutions to collect the financial contributions to the fund. 
In the US, the Superfund reform package laid out by the EPA proposes to 
move towards decentralization and localisation of the administration of 
Superfund.  States will have more authority in the allocation of funds and 
communities will have more involvement in the whole process. 
In France the privately run compensation fund had a short life as companies 
had little incentive to contribute voluntarily to the fund.  In Germany the 
fund involving private company contributions also broke down when the 
fund attempted to widen its scope and thus increase the financial 
responsibility of its private members. 
There is also the option to have cooperation between public and private 
agents such as in Germany and Sweden.  In Sweden, the existing 
administrative structures for collecting insurance premia were used to levy 
contributions to the fund.  In Germany, by getting industry to contribute to 
the fund the public authority reduced the ·need to raise finances through 
alternative taxation. 
Limits on Claims 
Financial limits can be imposed for every claim or on the total amount that 
can be claimed per year per person. 
Sweden has limits on payments per year.  However like many other funds 
due to its lack of activity (in this case, lack of claims compensated) the 
effectiveness of this policy cannot be determined. 
Japan laid down guidelines as to how much benefit coUld be claimed for 
different ailments per person. 
LESSONS LEARNT 
Using the criteria for appraising compensation systems the most commonly 
used options are presented below with their strengths and weaknesses. 
Role 
A key issue is low to design a compensation fund that can play a valuable 
role in remedying environmental damage, compensating victims who 
otherwise could not find a liable party. 
•  Past Problems 
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waste sector in France and Germany, to restore historic pollution problems in 
the form of orphan contaminated sites.  Over time the firms who caused the 
pollution cannot now be identified or have become insolvent.  Compensation 
funds therefore provide a financing bridge between current polluters and 
past pollution.  The current polluters however did not cause the past 
·pollution which is being cleaned up.  This type of approach conflicts with 
the polluter pays principle and fails  to create incentives for future 
prevention. 
•  Multi-source Pollution Funds 
A fund for air pollution damage compensation appears appropriate in certain 
circumstances.  There is considerable difficulty for injured parties to prove 
precise causality of damage to a polluting party (such as a factory).  Proving 
which industrial sector causes the damage is easier than pin-pointing the 
individual factory emitting the damaging substance.  Also in many cases 
ther:e will be more than one factory contributing to the pollution damage. 
Whenever there are multiple parties liable for damage, a compensation fund 
is more appropriate than individual action as a fund has the capacity to raise 
compensation from the collective parties involved (for example taxing a 
sector of industry).  Japan's fund is a good illustration of the way a fund for 
multi-source pollution can function using the government to tax polluting 
industry.  Financing the fund by an emissions tax creates incentives for 
preventing future emissions of the taxed pollutant (eg 502 waste level) and is 
consistent-with the polluter pays principle. 
The Japanese fund also shows the problems faced by funds when the 
damage covered manifests itself after a long lags.  When it takes years for 
pollution to cause damage a situation arises when claims can be increasing 
even though industry has reduced pollution levels.  In Japan, despite sulphur 
emission levels having dropped since the 1970s, claims kept rising in the 
1980s.  Eventually the government, in 1988, had to halt additional claims 
being made due to industry complaints about the increased taxation rates 
arising from the increased claims. 
A broadly based fund could also be used in restoring ecological damage to 
the unowned environment, where the damage is caused by many polluters 
and remediation would benefit a large population. 
Scale 
A local compensation fund will benefit the industry paying for it as it cleans 
up the local area, which can then attract investment into the area. 
However, outside Germany the trend is to establish a special body under the 
central government which can then utilize nationally raised funds (taxes) to 
carry out national cleanup or compensation payments. 
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There are two main options for financing funds which are: 
•  from public funds financed by general taxation - not in line with the 
polluter pays principle; 
•  restricting taxation to the sector causing the pollution.  In this situation 
the tax should be proportional to the amount of pollution the h~dustry is 
producing. 
A taxation system to raise funds for compensation payments can provide 
incentives for companies to adopt measures ~o reduce levels of charged 
pollution if the tax levied is based on the level of a firm's pollution (such as 
sulphur emissions or waste production).  The reduction of pollution levels by 
Japanese industry in the 1970s because of the sulphur emissions tax is an 
example of how this system can work. 
The funds show that this is possible, to some extent, for air pollution but not 
contaminated land.  This is because air pollution emissions from factories can 
be monitored and because the taxed emissions can to some extent be linked 
to the environmental damage.  Thus this combines a compensation fund to 
remedy the environmental damage costs with a market based instrument 
such as a pollution change to finance the fund.  In cases where the type of 
pollution (eg so~  causing the damage is less clear such pollution related 
taxes may be difficult to impose. 
For restoration of contaminated sites, connectihg polluters to the damage to 
be cleaned up is even more complex.  Orphan sites exist specifically because 
the polluter cannot be found.  Often the industrial sector responsible, such 
as mining, has since decreased in size.  Other taxable sectors, such as the 
waste sector, taxed in Germany and France for compensation funds, are not 
the sectors which caused the environmental damage. 
An alternative to raising financing for compensation funds is to fund cleanup 
through normal exchequer funds, where the final use of the funds is not 
earmarked at the time the funds are raised.  Taxes would be pooled and the 
remediation measures would be part of other governmental environmental 
protection expenditures. 
Administration 
The breakdown of the two funds (in France and Germany) which relied on 
the active involvement of industry suggest that a compensation fund should 
be organised by a public body.  Levying contributions to a compensation 
fund is an area which needs public authority involvement because firms are 
unwilling to volunteer to contribute to a compensation fund.  Using existing 
national systems and institutions for collecting the taxes or charges to 
finance the fund can reduce the costs of administering the fund. 
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However, industry's cooperation not only increases the amount of funds 
which can be raised but can reduce administration costs for the government, 
where the contributions can be based on an existing administrative system 
(eg insurance premia in the case of Sweden). 
Claims 
The scope of claims has an important effect on the effectiveness of a  fuhd. 
The conditions for the validity of a claim need to be accurately defined but 
not too limited.  Japan's compensation fund had so many claimants that it 
became financially burdened and had to restrict further claims.  Sweden's 
compensation fund on the other hand defined what it considered a valid 
claim in such a limiting manner that few claims were made and so far none 
have been deemed valid. 
4.3.1  Overall Conclusions 
Advantages 
The advantages of compensation funds are that: 
•  A fund provides a mechanism for cleaning up environmental damage 
and/or compensating victims of environmental damage which otherwise 
would not be covered under a liability system. 
•  Funds may intervene when remediation is  too slow. 
•  Funds may avoid complicated cases of litigation between multiple parties 
and victims.  The Netherlands uses funds when transaction costs would 
be too high. 
Limitations 
The limitations of a compensation fund are: 
•  Industry will resist additional costs through compensation fund levies, 
where it appears that they are paying for significant amounts of other 
firms' pollution. 
•  Under a compensation fund system the polluter pays system is not 
adhered to and the mechanisms of finance do not lead to efficient 
incentives for firms to adopt pollution prevention measures and reduce 
their environmental liabilities.  With a compensation fund the polluter, or 
even the same polluting sector of industry, often does not pay for the 
restoration of the damage it caused.  In Germany and France the waste 
sector is  targeted for payment to the funds.  The waste sector, although a 
polluter in its own right did not contribute to the environmental damage 
the compensation funds are restoring. 
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ascertain levels of pollution and thus proportional payment.  In Japan it 
was possible to introduce a pollution tax because, with the air pollution 
fund, there was an identifiable single polluting substance and industries 
emitting the substance were identifiable. 
•  Compensation funds can give perverse signalS to industry when claims 
made to the fund do not change in proportion to pollution prevention 
expenditures.  This may happen when damage occurs some time after the 
pollution.  This occurred in Japan where the situation developed that the 
financial contribution by industry to the fund rose in spite of substantial 
pollution control expenditures.  Claims increased due to the lag time 
before the deterioration in the health of the victims became evident after 
the pollution occurred so that claims actually went up after pollution had 
decreased. 
•  There is potential for the 'safety net' role of a fund to be abused because 
victims seeking compensation may make a claim to a fund instead of the 
polluting parties because the fund may be an easier option for 
compensation than trying to prove damage (especially from air pollution) 
from individual factories. 
Scale 
Available evidence would suggest that funds are better implemented at 
smaller scales such as regional or national as opposed to EU-level because: 
•  Smaller scales allow funds to isolate the tax base to the polluting sectors 
of industry and facilitate the polluter pays principle which is desired by 
industry.  Industry is  unwilling to contribute to compensation funds and 
pay for other people's pollution.  This unwillingness would be presumably 
even more intense if the fund was for polluting industries in other 
countries. 
•  Using existing national systems and institutions for collecting the taxes or 
charges to finance the fund can reduce the costs of administering the 
fund. 
•  Verifying and administering claims at the local level already establishes 
local involvement and is more likely to lead to the adoption of cost-
effective restoration standards.  EU-level organisation would increase the 
amount of administration needed for a fund to in order to connect 
authorities at each different scale of organisation. 
However, it is not possible on the basis of this broad review to answer fully 
many questions related to the effectiveness of compensation funds, such as 
the optimal scale of a fund.  It is also not evident whether there are 
economies of scale with transaction costs so that administration costs 
decrease with funds of a larger scale. 
ERM  EcoNOMICS  EcoNOMICS OF  LiABILITY,  VoL II:  EC  DC  XI 
5.24 In addition to a large variety in the financial capacity of funds there is also a 
large variety evident in the structural arrangements of the funds in each 
country.  Methods of financing, fund administration and types of damage 
covered varies across the countries depending on national characteristics, 
such as a government's views on the sources of finance for remedying and 
compensating environmental damage.  This variety would also suggest the 
appropriateness of nationally based funds as opposed to an EU-wide 
compensation fund. 
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1.1 
1.2 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This Topic Paper has been prepared to complement the European country 
studies in understanding the economic aspects of environmental liability 
systems.  In 1980, the US federal government introduced Superfund - a 
significant environmental liability system.  Therefore the US has fifte~n years 
of implementation experience (both public and private) from which we can 
extract valuable information regarding the costs of the current programme, 
potential further costs, distribution of costs amongst different economic 
sectors and areas for savings through various reform alternatives. 
AIMS 
The aims of this working paper are to: 
•  Obtain concrete information from actual cases to inform analysis of 
economic implications of alternative elements of environmental liability 
policies in the EC; 
•  Highlight lessons for EC policy making. 
RESEARCH UNDERTAKEN 
The review covers reports from the following sources: 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Resources for the Future (RFF) 
American Academy of Actuaries (AAA) 
RAND, The Institute of Civil Justice 
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) 
Environmental Law Review (ELR) 
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Table 2.211 
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), otherwise known as Superfund, was established in 1980 and 
subsequently reauthorised in 1986 and 1990.  It will be reauthorised again at 
the end of the 1995 and is thus undergoing reform.  Table 2.2a outlines the 
main features of CERCLA and compares them with the Council of Eurcpe's 
Lugano Convention (1>. 
CERCLA gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to 
identify and compel cleanup (upon proof) of the nation's worst hazardous 
waste sites, defined as those on the National Priorities List (NPL). 
Summary Table of  Key US Liability Provisions (Compared to the Lugano 
Convention) 
Policy Element 
Type of damage covered 
Scope of environmental damage 
covered 
Type of pollution covered 
Use of cost-effectiveness in 
defining level of damage restored/ 
compensated 
Scope - activities covered 
Strict liability 
Channelling of liability 
CERCLA 
Damage to owned and 
unowned environment 
Contaminated soil and 
groundwater 
Cumulative 
Historic pollution 
Current pollution 
Lugano Convention 
Damage to people, 
property and the 
environment 
All  ' 
Accidents, gradual, 
cumulative and past 
pollution 
No significant risks for health  Min threshold 
or environment for any end  Reasonable and 
use  cost-effective restoration 
Not use cost-benefit criteria 
Nine criteria, incl cost (as 
secondary) 
All activities handling the 
waste (see below) 
Yes 
Current and past owners and 
operators of sites, and 
generators of waste 
Transporters who chose the 
disposal site; 
Lenders (if repossess secured 
assets or if involved in 
operations) 
Parent companies 
All dangerous activities 
Yes 
To operator of 
dangerous activity 
(I) Council of Europe (1993) Draft Connntion on Civil Liability for  Da•ag~ ResuJting fro• Activities Dang~rou to 
th~ Environ•~nl Council of Europe, January 1993. 
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6.3 Policy Element 
Joint and several vs proportionate 
Financial limits 
Burden of proof 
Defences 
Action rights 
Compulsory insurance/financial 
security 
Retroactive liability 
Limitation period for victim's right 
to sue after damage is evident 
ERM  EcoNOMICS 
CERCLA  Lugano Convention 
Joint and several, and then  Joint and several unless 
costs allocated in relation to  operator proves only 
parties' relative contribution  caused part of damage 
(Gore factors) 
No  No 
EPA  to prove prima facie  case  Facilitate proof 
(low proof threshold); 
Defendant then to disprove 
claims and prove their 
eligibility for limited defences 
Nariow,  Yes 
Act of god, 
Act of war, 
Disch~  caused by third 
party 
Where innocent new owner 
made all appropriate 
enquiries prior to purchase 
Government agencies  Interest groups 
Not non-governmental parties 
No compulsory insurance but  Yes but only where 
compulsory financial  appropriate 
guarantees 
Yes  Waste disposal sites 
6 yrs up to 30 yrs 
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3.1 
Table 3.1a 
ECONOMIC IMPUCATIONS OF SUP~RFUND 
OVERALL ECONOMIC lMPUCATIONS OF SUPERFUND 
This section summarises the key cost and benefit issues consequent to 
Superfund legislation.  Large variety of estimations exist due to different 
projections over the size of the cleanup problem and different methodologies 
in formulating costs.  Table 3.1 a attempts to highlight the key findings from 
recent studies analysing Superfund costs, using unit site estimates. 
Summary of  Studies of  Superfund Costs Under the Current Progt'!lm 
Studies' Conclusions 
ToW Number of Sites: The estimated 
number of non-federal NPL sites ranges from 
about 3,(XX)  to 4,500. 
Review Group's Comments 
Recent placement rates are not consistent 
with the number of sites estimated by the 
studies.  The Review Group believes that the 
ultimate numbers of non-federal sites is more 
in the order of 2,(XX). 
Cost per Site: The estimated midpoint of total  Based on 2,000 sites, the Congressional 
(undisrounted) cleanup cost per site ranges  Budget Office (CBO) study suggests average 
from about $35 million to $50 million.  cleanup costs of $40 million per site.  About 
40%  of this, or $17 million, is attributable to 
operations and maintenance, the most 
uncertain element of site cost 
ToW Ultimate Cleanup Cost: The estimated  The above two comments suggest that the 
midpoint of (undisrounted) total cleanup cost  cost of the non-federal sites will be less than 
ranges from about $150 billion to $165 billion.  $100 billion. 
Ann.W Cleanup Cost: The estimated 
midpoint of total annual cleanup costs, 
including transaction costs is approximately 
$2 billion (0.03%  of GOP). 
Ann.W Transaction Cost: The estimates of 
annual transaction costs are relatively 
uniform and are about $900 million. 
The Review Group believes that the estimates 
of annual cleanup costs are reasonable. 
The Review Group believes that while 
transaction costs l!'ay increase initially, they 
are likely to decrease over the next ten years 
as more sites are cleaned up and the amount 
of litigation begins to decrease. 
Source: American Academy of Actuaries, Studies of Superfund Costs and Reform. 
The Review Group refers  to the group of authors who researched and compiled this 
report.  The study sumnwrises the finding from  reports from  the following  a~thors 
(which  are believed to include all the key and up-to date reports on the economic 
aspects of Superfund):  University of Tennessee;  1993  Treasury  Proposal; 
Congressional  Budget Office;  Office of Management and Budget;  Best Week;  General 
Accounting Office;  The  Brookings Institute and Resources for  the Future; 
Congressional  Budget Office Testimony;  Superfund Reform 95; National 
Environmental Policy Institute and the Chemical Manufacturers Association. 
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Overall, it is estimated that the total am~unt  of money spent on Superfund 
since 1980, including settlement costs of Partly Responsible Parties (PRPs), is 
in excess of $25 billion. < 1
> 
The University of Tennessee has updated the calculated cost estimates for 
total cleanup costs for the remaining sites.  They calculate that cleaning up 
the remaining 1,350 sites under current standards will amount to $52 billion. 
This could drop to $35 billion if less stringent standards are imposed on 
cleanup levels.  <2> 
These figures need to be reviewed in light of the magnitude of the US 
economy and expenditures on federal environmental regulatory programs. 
The average annual total cleanup costs is estimated to be approximately $2 
billion which is only 0.03 percent of US GDP (3) and only 1.5 percent of the 
$135 billion < 4
> spent in the US per year to comply with all federal 
environmental regulations (this includes both EPA and private industry 
costs). 
Restoration Costs 
There has been huge controversy over the large and increasing annual costs 
of national site cleanup.  Site restoration is often carried out by the EPA and 
the cost is then recouped through compensation settlements from the 
responsible parties.  Key financial statistics of the programme include: 
•  The total cumulative value of settlements (since 1980) between responsible 
parties (RPs)  and the government at (NPL) sites is $8.3 billion. (5) 
•  EPA and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the average cost of 
cleaning up a single NPL site at $25 million, in 1993.  <
6
>  Probst et al. 
estimated a slightly higher cleanup cost of $29.1  million, in 1994. 
•  Cleanup costs per site can vary widely for different types of industrial 
problems, ranging from $170.4 million for mining site~ to $12.7 million for 
asbestos sites. 
•  The costs are so high because of the stringent cleanup standards imposed 
by the EPA.  Sites must be cleaned up to standard levels and requirements 
laid down by Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements 
(ARARs)  and not based on individual site specifications end land uses. 
(I) Probst et at.  Footing the Bill  for Superfund Cleanup.  Who Pays and How7, The Brookings Institute and Resources for 
the Future, 1995. 
(1)  University of Tennessee, 1995 (figures in nominal terms) 
(3)  GOP in 1993 was $6378 billion, The Economist 
(C)  figure in Probst et al., RFF,  1995,  pll. 
(5)  Probst et al.  RFF,  1995,  p24. 
(6)  Erin  Mcfl.:eil,  EESC  lssue Paper,p59 December 1993 
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The implications of such costs are that there is a large incentive for RPs, 
particularly PRPs, to try and avoid being held accountable for the 
remediation costs, which leads them into litigation. 
•  The cleanup cost can be broken down by stage and operation of the 
cleanup process as follows:  $4.2 million for site studies; $22.0 million for 
the cleanup actions (which are based on a remedial action at the site); and 
operations and maintenance (O&M) activities costing $2.9 million (10  · 
percent of site remediation cost). (t)  There is current debate over these 
figures, particularly the O&M costs.  The CBO 1994 study (2) estimates 
O&M costs as $15.2 million (41  percent of site cleanup cost).  The O&M 
costs are currently the most uncertain element in ultimate cleanup costs. 
This is because few  cleanups have been completed and therefore there is 
still little experience with these costs.  (3) 
•  One main difference between cost estimates (in different studies) is 
whether future cleanup costs are discounted or left in a nominal state. 
The difference is substantial with discounted costs ranging from 40-65 
percent of nominal costs, since the cleanups are expected to be paid out 
over a long period of time.  <•> 
Transaction  Costs 
Due to the incentive for firms to debate compensation costs in court, 
transaction costs involved with site remediation have been extremely large 
and one of the most highly criticised components of the Superfund program. 
•  The RAND survey (of 5 PRPs) found transaction costs averaged 21 
percent of total firm outlay.  The split between transactional and remedial 
expenditures was reasonably consistent across these firms, ranging from 
15 to 31  percent.  The bulk of these transaction costs was for legal 
representation. (5) 
•  At a single site, there are at least five  separate tiers of litigation/settlement, 
namely, negotiation 1) between EPA and Partly Responsible Parties (PRPs) 
2) among settling parties 3) between settling parties and those disputing 
the settlement 4) between PRPs and their insurers and 5) between 
insurers and reinsurers.  At each site there may be many PRPs, all of 
whom hire lawyers and technical experts to represent their interests.  In 
addition to legal costs, PRPs often conduct their own risk assessments or 
site evaluations to provide an independent assessment of the EPA's work. 
•  Transaction costs as a percentage of total cleanup costs appear to fall as 
sites move through the remedial process.  This is because the initial 
(I) This operations and maint~nance cost represents the net present value of future operations and maintenance costs at a 
site, Probst et al.  RFF  1995,  p36. 
(2)  Congressional Budget Office (1994) The Total Costs of Cleaning up Nonfederal Superfund Sites. 
(3)AM,p2 
< 4> AAA,  p2 
(5) Acton et al., Superfund and Transaction Costs, The Experience of Insurers and very Luge Industrial Firms, RAND, the 
Institute for Civil Justice, 1995. 
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the beginning of the remediation actions.  This suggests that as more of 
the nation's inactive sites movl! to the later s tabes of the cleanup process, 
transaction cost shares will fall.  (l) 
•  In the US, under joint and several liability regimes, transaction costs as a 
percentage of total cost {sum of cleanup and transaction costs) increase 
significantly with the number of responsible parties at each site.  60 
percent of all NPL sites have 10 or fewer responsible parties.  For one 
party, transaction costs were only five percent and for 2-10 parties 
transaction costs contributed 20 percent to total costs.  Fewer than 15 
percent of the sites have more than 100 responsible parties.  Sites over 50 
parties had transaction costs of 30 percent of total cost.  The average 
transaction cost is 21  percent of total costs.  (2) 
•  Table 3.1.2b presents estimates of projected transaction costs by industry 
sector for the ten year period 1994 to 2003.  This shows a fairly uniform 
distribution in the extent ·of transaction costs in total cleanup costs, for 
each sector.  In terms of annual costs, the estimates of transaction costs 
for the industries are: 
•  Mining has $46 million in transaction costs per year 
(21%  of total cleanup cost) 
•  Lumber has $21.8 million in transaction costs per year (18%) 
•  Chemicals and allied products has $97.6 million in transaction costs 
per year (20%) 
•  Petroleum refining and related industries have $22.d million in 
transaction costs per year (23% ). 
•  The electronics sector (excluding computers) has $12.4 million in 
transaction costs per year {18% ).  <•> 
3.1.2  Costs for Specific Industries 
Costs are broken down between costs for direct liability and taxes for the 
Superfund's Trust Fund. 
Remediation  Costs for  Direct Liability 
•  Industries' facilities account for 38%  {431/1134 sites) of National Priorities 
List Sites (non-federal). <•> 
(I) RAND, Superfund and Transaction Costs, p61. 
(2)  Probst et ai.,RFF,1995,  p46. Taken from  the RAND  report. 
<
4
) Probst et ai.,RFF,1995,p49,  percentages calculated from  tables 3.4  and 3.3 
< 4)  Probst et al, RFF, 1995, p36. 
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sectors: 
•  Wood preserving sites average $40.6 million. 
•  Waste oil site average $32.3 million. 
•  Electrical sites are estimated at $26.4 million. 
•  Mining sites are $170.4 million. 
•  Chemical manufacturing sites are $41.1  million. (t) 
Under the current financing set-up the annual responsible party cleanup 
costs, by industry, are estimated as follows: 
Table 3.1.2a  Current Annual Cleanup Costs by Sector of  Industry 
Mining  Lumber  Chemicals  Petroleum  Electronics 
Annual party clean  174  98  394  75  58 
up costs (million $) 
Cleanup costs as a  11.2  6.2  35  4.8  3.7 
percent of total 
industry cleanup 
costs 
Source:  Probst et al.,  RFF,  1995. 
Below are projected future cleanup expenditures for selected industry sectors. 
Table 3.1.2b  Projected Cleanup and Transaction Costs, by Sector of  lndustrg 1994 -2203 (in 
Billions of Dollars) 
Stage  Mining  Lumber  Chemicals  Petroleum  Electronics 
Cleanup  1.7  1.0  3.9  0.8  0.6 
expenditures 
Transaction  0.5  0.2  1.0  0.2  0.1 
expenditures 
Total costs  2.2  1.2  4.9  1.0  0.7 
Transaction as %  23.0  18.0  20.0  23.0  18.0 
of total costs  (ZJ 
Source:  Probst  et al.,  RFF.  Based on cleaning up  remaining NPL  sites  ovtr the defined period of time. 
(t)  Probst et al., RFF,  1995, p36. 
(2)  This line shows large variation from  current percentages, set' transaction section above 
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Table 3.1.3c summarizes the extent of liability for the individual sectors with 
respect to their financial size. 
Table 3.1.3c  Industry's Annual Liability as Percentage of Value Added 
Mining  Lumber  Chemicals  Petroleum  Electronics 
Liability as  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.1 
percent of 
value added 
Sourct: Probst tt al., RFF,  (Liability incluths cleanup and traTZSQdion costs) 
•  After taxes in 1991, the mining industry had annual losses of $300 million. 
In 1990, a much better year for the industry, after-tax profits were $1 
billion, of which annual cleanup and transaction liabilities represent a 
significant share (22 percent in 1990 (220/1000)). 
•  The chemical industry's cleanup costs are a much smaller percentage of 
their after-tax profits.  In 1991  the chemical industry reported after-tax 
profits of $21  billion, more than sixty times the profit of the mining 
industry.  So even though in absolute terms the chemical industry is 
burdened with $492 million for cleanup this is a relatively small bite into 
industry profits. 
•  The petroleum industry's leading twenty firms had net income in 1991  of 
$13.2 billion, down from $16.7 billion in 1990.  Thus $97 million of cleanup 
costs for  the whole industry is less than one percent of the annual net 
income (after-tax profits) of these twenty firms. 
There are several interesting points to note with regard to understanding 
these cost figures: 
•  The costs of Superfund may already be incorporated into the share 
value of firms.  Share-price reductions depend on the extent to 
which investors already know about the number of Superfund sites 
to be cleaned up by responsible parties and thus are planned 
expenditures. 
•  Some firms within industry sectors will be badly hit and suffer more 
than the industry in general appears to be suffering. 
•  These figures do not take into account the possibility for companies 
to recoup losses through passing on costs to the consumer through 
price increases.  The extent of 'pass through' will depend on the 
competitive structure of the market. 
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•  Probst et al. assume that it is the shareholders of the companies 
affected that would bear the brunt of cleanup and transaction cost 
liability. 
Trust Funds 
I 
In addition to the direct liability costs there is another $1.6 billion being 
added to cleanup efforts from the Trust Fund per year.  It is this split 
between sources of cleanup financing which is most commonly disputed in 
the US as most polluting agents want a larger fiscal role for the Trust Fund, 
thus reducing their direct liability costs.  At present the Trust Fund 
contributes to 27 percent of cleanup costs. 
The Trust Fund is a compensation fund.  It is used to finance  si~e studies 
when identified responsible parties refuse to pay.  It finances cleanup at sites 
where RPs are not identifiable or are insolvent (ie orphan sites).  It can also 
be used to speed up site cleanups and then recover expenditures from 
compensation costs retrieved from PRPs. 
The design of the Trust Fund attempts to· charge industry sectors differently. 
The fund is financed from four sources of taxation: 
•  The tax on domestically produced and imported oil raises around 
.  $570 million per annum (37%  of Fund). 
•  A similar tax on feedstock chemicals raises about $245 million per 
annum (16%  of Fund). 
•  The corporate environmental tax raises about $460 million per year 
(26%  of Fund).  This is broken down by sector of industry as follow: 
•  Manufacturing (52%);  Services (3% );  Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate (17% );  Construction (0.7% );  Retail Trade (5% ); Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing (0.2% );  Transportation and Public Utilities 
(16% );  Wholesale trade (3% );  and Mining (2% ). 
•  General revenues (no definition for this) fluctuate around $250 
million per year (18%  of the Fund). 
The summation of all these sources of revenue total the Trust Funds 
resources at approximately $1.6 billion per year. <t> 
The cost burden on industry from these taxes is minimal, resulting in a price 
increase (for outputs) of a fraction of production costs, amounting to less 
than 0.0005%  for almost all industry sectors. <2
> 
(I) These figures are for 1990.  Figures taken  from  wAssigning  Liability for Superfund Cleanups, An Analysis of Policy 
Options, RFF  Report by Probst and  Portney. 
(Z)  Probst et al.  input-output model  calculations, p71. 
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for raising revenues due to the high collection costs (administration in 
calculating out amounts) and the low amounts of revenue collected. 
3.1.3  Benefits 
Environmental Benefits 
There were 1,320 sites on the NPL at the end of the 1993 fiscal year (which 
accounts for 14 out of the 16 years of Superfund operation): 
•  617 (47  %)  were in the site study or design phase with no cleanup a~vity 
taking place. 
•  Only 52 sites (4  %) had been deleted from the list- that is the EPA had 
determined that no further cleanup action was needed at these sites as 
they were deemed cleaned to required standards.  Another 15 sites had 
been deleted by 1994.  This highlights the slow rate of progress. 
•  At 166 sites (13  %) remedies had been completed, although many of them 
may require further long-term treatment, such as pumping contaminated 
groundwater or periodic monitoring to ensure that contamination does 
not migrate off-site. 
•  At 393 sites (30  %)  cleanup activities were initiated. 
Thus, at the end of the 1993 fiscal year fifty percent o~ all NPL sites had not 
yet been the subject of long-term cleanup, with more than 40 percent being 
subject to removal actions. <t>  Removal actions are temporary cleanup 
actions, such as top soil containment and removal, usually carried out for 
sites in urgent need of cleanup, as a first measure provision before 
permanent treatment can be carried out. 
Even these small numbers overestimate the amount of action taken.  The US 
General Accounting Office reported in 1993 that only 60 percent of the sites 
deemed to have completed remedies {166)  were actually subject to 
remediation.  At 19 percent of these sites studied, the EPA determined that 
only a removal action was needed to address an immediate threat and no 
cleanup action at all was needed at another 21  percent. < 2
>  Therefore, 
under 10 percent of all NPL sites have actually been cleaned up. 
Preventative Benefits 
There are also current and future benefits from avoided pollution due to 
private sector actors being deterred from causing further pollution.  This 
though is hard to quantify and verify. 
(IJ  Probst et al., RFF,  1995,  p18. 
(l)  Probst et al., RFF,  1995,  p19. 
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3.2 
' 
ECONOMIC lMPUCATIONS OF KEY PROVISIONS IN SUPERFUND 
Specific components of an environmental liability system can have two main 
economic effects.  They can alter the total quantity of money spent on 
cleanup, through number of sites and level of cleanup achieved; and they 
can alter who pays for the cleanup, which is a distributional and equity 
issue.  These two effects have implications for the' efficiency and effect.lveness 
of the program through affecting propensities for cooperation among 
industry and coordination of cleanups. 
One of the major factors affecting total cleanup costs (as opposed to who 
pays for cleanup) is the required standards of cleanup imposed under the 
regulations of Superfund.  Different types of end goals for site restoration 
have huge cost implications: 
•  CERCLA describes what criteria the EPA is to use to clean up sites.  The 
goals of the program are to achieve permanent solutions, preferably 
involving treatment processes, as opposed to containment of hazardous 
substances. 
•  The levels of cleanup are based on health standards and risk assessments. 
CERCLA requires the EPA  to follow a set of state and federal regulations 
before selecting site remediation standards to comply with the required 
health standards.  These are known as "Applicable or Relev\lnt and 
Appropriate Requirements" or ARARs.  ARARs vary across states leading 
to different levels and .costs of dean-ups. 
•  In general many believe that compliance with ARARs is one of the major 
factors leading to high clean up costs, although consistent data regarding 
the determinants of the costs of dean-up are not available. (t) 
•  The Chemical Manufacturers Association produced a report (by 
Brattle/IRI), estimating cleanup costs for a sample of .sites (already cleaned) 
using reduced stringency in cleanup standards, and compared them to 
existing EPA site restoration levels.  CMA proposed that these lower levels 
of restoration were acceptable to health and environmental requirements. 
The figures show substantial room for cost savings.  It was found that 35 
percent cost savings could be attained on site cleanups using their 
alternative set of criteria.  At an average of $26 million per site this works 
out on average to a saving of $9 million per site.  The significant 
difference in their remediation solutions was that CMA suggested 
temporary over permanent solutions. < 2
> 
•  At one site with metals contamination in both soil and groundwater CMA 
proposed a soil cover solution as opposed to the EPA proposal for soil 
excavation and offsite disposal.  The CMA claimed that soil remediation 
(I)  Probst et al., RFF,  1995,  pl6. 
(7)  Brattle/IRI report for CMA, Assessment of Cost Savings Resulting from  Implementation of the CMA Remedy Selection 
Approach 
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under buildings was not necessary because the foundations act as a cap. 
The CMA solution is only 20 percent of the EPA expenditure for this site 
($0.35 million compared to $1.8 million).  At another site, (an abandoned 
metals mill) close to a national forest the CMA proposed excavation, onsite 
disposal and multi-layering capping as opposed to the EPA's measures of 
excavation, offsite reprocessing, reclamation and disposal of residuals.  The 
alternative measures by CMA amount to $3.32 lnillion in contrast to $6.21 
million spent by the EPA on the more comprehensive cleanup measures. 
•  It is difficult to discern how 'clean' the alternative proposed measures are 
and thus how plausible are the CMA's suggested cost savings.  It is also 
difficult to discern the validity of their claim that their alternative 
measures entail no increased environmental damage. 
•  The other specific component that affects total cleanup financing is the 
number of sites placed on the National Priorities List (NPL).  There are 
numerous projections of how many sites should be and/or will be 
eventually cleaned up.  Each of these have associated cost estimates.  The 
University of Tennessee made cost calculations based on 3,000 sites to be 
cleaned, whereas CBO 94 and RFF studies both estimated that 4,500 sites 
would be cleaned.  However, these will both probably turn out to be 
over-estimates as the reform provisions (discussed below) propose to cap 
the increase in sites to only 100 additional sites over the next three years. 
OVERALL ECONOMIC lMPUCATIONS OF SUPERFUND REFORMS 
In the light of CERCLA reauthorisation planned for the end of 1995, major 
reform proposals are being produced by many different agencies and 
departments of the government involved with the Superfund program. 
These policy papers and ensuing debates provide a unique opportunity to 
further explore the dynamics and economic implications of the individual 
components of the US liability system. 
In June of 1995 Senator Bob Smith, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment, released an outline/blueprint 
of the upcoming Superfund Refortn, which is probably very close to what we 
can expect to see introduced in the Senate, but still no gilarantee of what 
will pass in  to Ia w. 
The outline identifies six provisions for change: 
•  Increase the contribution of local communities in facility remediation 
planning by establishing Comn1unity Response Organisations (CRQs). 
•  Increase the state involvement in, and authority, over cleanups.  States 
can be delegated by the EPA to supervise site cleanups.  Once a state 
receives its certification from the EPA, the state will have exclusive 
authority for implementing and enforcing the federal Superfund 
program.  The states will still receive financing from both PRPs and the 
Trust Fund. 
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•  Change the number of sites on the NPL.  A flexible cap is suggested 
which will cillow the addition of only 30 sites per year for the next 
three years and then stop further increases. (t) 
•  Alter the levels and standards of site cleanup.  Emphasis is put on cost-
effective cleanup which allows for flexible solutions which are not 
necessarily permanent.  Interim actions such as containment will now 
be considered.  It calls for the elimination of ARARs.  Current and 
future land and water use are to be considered when planning the 
levels of remediation.  "The objective is protection of human and health 
and the environment from realistic and significant risks through cost-
effective and cost-reasonable remedies." 
•  Scope of liability is to become more limited: 
•  Retroactive liability is only to operate post-1980.  Contamination 
actions occurring both pre- and post-1980 will be apportioned 
according to the amount of damage caused after 1980. 
•  Proportionate liability is  to be imposed so that no person shall be 
held liable for more than the share of removal, response or natural 
resource damage ("NRD") costs attributable to that person's conduct. 
An independent allocator will determine the appropriate level of 
liability of each party currently liable.  The following factors are to 
be considered when determining the persons' proportionate share of· 
liability: 1) the degree of involvement of each party in the 
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the 
hazardous substances; 2)  the toxicity of the substances involved; 3) 
the mobility of the materials; 4)  the degree of care exercised, taking 
into account the hazards posed by the material; and 6) the degree of 
cooperation with federal, state and local officials ..  Orphan shares-
attributable to insolvent firms or unattributable parties - shall be 
paid by the Trust Fund. 
•  Lender liability will be amended to limit potential loss through 
property acquired through foreclosure or property held due to 
exercising financial control pursuant to credit agreements. 
•  Natural Resource Damage which deal with natural resources as 
opposed to health and property damage will be amended so that 
damage shall only be recoverable for actual injury to measurable, and 
ecologically significant functions of publicly used environment.  The 
recovery costs will be limited to cost-effective restoration or resource 
replacement and not merely resource replication.  This means that with 
the exception of direct monetary damage resulting from a lost use of 
the natural resource, there shall be no recovery for lost use or non-use 
damage to the environment at the time of the conduct giving rise to 
the damage. 
(t) This is a much lower number than was expected and will make  many studies' total cleanup costs significant 
overestimates as they are based on 2,000-4,000 sites being eventually on the NPL. 
ERM  EcoNOMICS  EcoNOMICS OF  l..wlnnY,  VOL  II:  EC DC  XI 
6.15 These reforms, if instituted, will have significant effects on the cost b·urdens 
of industry.  They will a~fect:  · 
•  The share of costs borne by industry directly as opposed to the use of 
Trust Fund resources. 
•  The total cost of cleanup depending on types of remediation implemented. 
•  The proportion of transaction costs as a percentage of total cleanup costs 
for individual sites. 
•  The amount of compensation costs liable for environmental damage. 
Cost on Industry vs Trust Fund 
The elimination of retroactive liability for pre-1980 site contamination reduces 
the financial burden to respQnsible parties and increases the share of cleanup 
costs to be borne by the Trust Fund.  Under the current provisions the Trust 
Fund covers 27 percent of the remaining cleanup.  Probst et al.  calculate that 
if only multiparty sites pre-1980 cleanups are covered by the Trust Fund, the 
Trust Fund will have to cover 70 percent of all remaining cleanup costs.  This 
comes to $16.4 billion (0.25% of GDP).  The increase in government-
implemented cleanups is also expected to result in a $2 billion increase in the 
total cleanup bill since public sector cleaning is considered to be less efficient 
than private sector cleanup because the private sector parties have greater 
financial incentives to dean up the sites at a lower cost.  If pre-1980 sites for 
which a single party is responsible are also included then these figures will 
be even higher.  The changes will also be greater if natural resource damage 
are included. 
Thus, industries with greater direct responsibility for cleanup will be greatly 
advantaged by this scheme as the Trust Fund taxes the breadth of industry. 
The Trust Fund taxes, however, are not evenly collected across the sectors, 
so an increase in them will have different implications for different sectors of 
industry. 
More Cost-effective Cleanup 
Flexible cleanup levels would be based on cost-effective action. The cleanup 
selection process proposed was based on site-specific risk assessment (as 
opposed to ARARs)  with regard to actual and planned uses of the land and 
water resources.  They also include containment as a possibility and not just 
treatment.  The methodology of this Congressional reform appears similar to 
that proposed by CMA and discussed in Section 3.2. 
By changing the end results demanded in cleanup actions the reforms can 
substantially reduce average site cleanup costs and thus total Superfund 
costs, at least in the medium term.  Annual costs will not necessarily reduce 
as more sites can be cleaned up if lower levels of dean up per site are 
required.  Long term cost also may not reduce as eventually temporary and 
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interim arrangements will need to be converted. into permanent solutions. 
The CMA study believes that if site specific cleanup requirements are carried 
out that a cost saving of 35%  can be reached on site cleanup costs (see Section 
3.2 for further details).  The University of Tennessee has also made projections 
about cost savings from less stringent levels of cleanup (of unspecified 
standard).  They calculate a 33%  cost saving as remaining cleanup would 
drop from $52 billion to $35 billion._ 
Lower Transaction  Costs 
The elimination of pre-1980 retroactive liability and the consequent transfer 
of financial responsibility results in a reduction of transaction costs. 
Estimated annual transaction costs as a percentage of total site costs are 
estimated by Probst et al.  to fall from 16 percent under the current law to 7 
percent under the reform.  However, the savings are only due to the fact 
that Trust Ftind payments circumvent responsible party disputes.  Figures 
show that industry does not get more efficient in its transaction dealings and 
that industry transaction costs fall only because total industry cleanup costs 
fall.  Under the altered retroactive liability scheme, firm  transaction costs as a 
proportion of their cleanup costs would only fall from an average of 21 
percent to 19 percent, according to Probst et al.  However, Probst et al. 
calculate that no cost savings will result overall from this alternative strategy. 
In fact, because government cleanup is less cost efficient than private sector 
cleanup transferring of responsibility to the Trust Fund results in an 
estimated increase of $2 billion to the total remaining cleanup pill (which is 
$52 billion according to the University of Tennessee). 
The modification of other aspects of the liability system will also impact on 
transaction costs.  The implementation of proportionate liability will 
(supposedly) replace joint liability and thus reduce the desire or the 
opportunity to dispute site responsibility.  This is one of the major 
contributions to transaction costs.  The degree of change will depend on 
whether parties need to prove extent of contribution to damage. 
Valuation  of Natural Resource Damage 
The limiting of Natural Resource Damage (NRD) to cost-effective solutions 
for measurable damage could lead to reduced compensation requirements by 
responsible parties.  In light of the complexities of resource valuation, 
estimating resulting changes to compensation payments in this area is 
extremely difficult. 
3.3.1  EPA Proposed Refonns m 
The EPA, in the light of the forthcoming reauthorisation and after two years 
of research, also detailed the following conclusions for an improved 
Superfund policy.  These are three-fold:: 
(ll EPA  Press Release, Octobt>r 2nd  1995. 
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•  Reduce litigation and increase fairness; 
•  Increase information and communit) involvement in decision making 
processes. 
Cost-effective site cleanups (whilst still protecting health) 
EPA concluded that all types of cleanup actions should be combined with 
site-specific risk assessments and processes should be streamlined to shorten 
cleanup period.  EPA propose to set up an EPA National Remedy Review 
Board to ensure costs are appropriate to the cleanup needs (establishing 
"rules of thumb" for consistency).  EPA also conclude that some sites should 
be kept off the NPL to aid redevelopment as there are negative economic 
aspects to being denoted a NPL site. 
Reduce litigation and increase fairness 
To reduce litigation and increase fairness, EPA conclude that: 
•  The compensation fund should pay for cleanup costs attributable to 
insolvent parties "orphan shares". 
•  Double the number of "small party" entities who would be exempted from 
the liability provisions.  These are small businesses or citizens who 
contribute to pollution at Superfund sites in a small way (de minimis) but 
get sued by larger polluters in an attempt to delay site resolutions. 
•  Ensure that settlement funds are dedicated to specific sites by placing 
them in site-specific accounts. 
•  EPA will reward cooperative parties by significantly reducing EPA 
oversight of their cleanup activities. 
Increase information and community involvement in decision  making processes. 
To increase information and community involvement in decision making 
processes, EPA conclude that there is a need for: 
•  Providing clearer information on remedy selection decisions through 
simple summary sheets available to communities and ~dustry, explaining 
the relationship between risk and cost. 
•  Promoting consensus in choosing cleanup options by developing and 
initiating pilot projects in which EPA empowers and assists citizens, PRPs 
and other stakeholders in devising a mutually acceptable cleanup plan. 
•  Increase state involvement in remedy selection. 
Budgetary Matters 
At present, federal spending for Superfund is running at $1.5 billion a year 
from the Superfund Trust Fund.  The House Appropriations Committee, 
which has jurisdiction over the federal spending incurred by the Superfund 
program, recently voted to allocate only $1  billion to Superfund spending in 
the Financial Year 1996.  They allowed that a revision would be possible if a 
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reform bill is passed.  However, due to pressures to balance the budget this 
year the allocation may only rise to $1.2 billion.  With retroactive liability 
being called into question, financing will become even more critical. 
Debate is ensuing over the need to increase tax funding to account for the 
lost revenue from responsible parties or if it can be paid for out of the 
planned savings through different remedy selection (lower cleanup 
standards) or through reduced transaction costs. (I) 
The CMA estimates that with the stated revisions taking place ie repeal of 
pre-1981  retro liability and taking on orphan sites previously paid for by 
other responsible site parties under joint and several liability, annual 
Superfund spending will need to be about $2.5 billion.  Even if this is only 
roughly accurate a "funding gap" is evident (of around $1-1.5 billion). (2) 
The CMA has called upon the insurance industry to make a financial 
contribution to the Superfund Trust Fund in order to help cover this funding 
gap.  CMA argued that insurers would gain enormous savings from the 
removal of retroactive liability as they would be relieved of a massive backlog 
of insurance claims from policyholders held responsible for cleaning up such 
sites under existing law.  This is also based on the fact that in 1994 the 
insurance industry "volunteered" to pay $800 million a year into a proposed 
Environmental Insurance Resolution Fund (EIRF) included in the 1994 
Superfund reform bill (which ultimately failed  to get through Congress). 
CMA argues that the insurance industry should be willing to make the same  · 
amount of contribution this year as well.  (3)  The insurers though have 
vigorously rejected the CMA proposal, arguing that, far from gaining any 
windfall from retroactive liability repeal, they would simply be relieved of a 
burden for which they do not consider themselves responsible.  <•> 
(I) Environmental Law  Review Volume 23, july 1995,  p13 
(2)  ELR023 July 1995,  p13 
(3)  ELR023 July 1995,  p13 
(4) views of the American  Insurance Association (AlA)  in  ELR023 July 1995,  p13 
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4  LESSONS FOR TilE EC 
This brief reviewing highlights the following conclusions, insights and issues 
for the development of environmental liability systems in Europe. 
Organisation 
The liability system instituted in the US is inherently slow as case specific 
financing arrangements compounded by highly burea1;1cratic processes in the 
coordination of cleanups lead to lengthy disputes and site cleanup. 
In the US  the average time of restoration from time of site identification to 
final remediation action is 11-15 years.  The initial stages are especially 
arduous.  EPA site studies require a thorough investigation of site 
contamination and a comprehensive analysis of possible remedial action, the 
need to coordinate with the appropriate state agencies and the need to 
address the concerns of local citizens regarding methods of cleanup. <t> 
These stages need to be completed before the remediation is initiated and the 
process needs to be streamlined. 
Cleanup procedures 
One weakness of Superfund has been the lack of clearly defined end goals. 
Initial standards required total environmental restoration without sufficient 
reasoning supporting such a decision.  There is a need for explaining what is 
trying to be achieved by the cleanup standards selected.  This can be 
achieved through setting out procedures for assessing risks and determining 
cost-effective cleanup.  These can act as both guidelines and jUstifications for 
action. 
Interim cleanup processes called 'removal actions' in the US  have been 
viewed by many as one of the key successes of the Sup.erfund program. 
These are useful options to remedy urgent problems and speed up cleanup 
processes. 
Serious consideration is now being given to the adoption of cost-effective 
criteria for the cleanup of sites that take account of the possible use of the 
site (a fitness for use criteria), the costs of cleaning up a site to its original 
condition and the additional benefits of such clean up of a site to its original 
condition compared with its best alternative use.  It is thought that this will 
reduce overall costs and add flexibility to site cleanup needs and thus be 
more attractive to industry.  Cost-effective reform preferences of the Federal 
Government are for the lowest cost alternative that adequately protects 
human health and the environment considering both short and long-term 
costs.  < 2> 
(I) Probst et, op cit,  p21 
(2)  Part of the Reform  of Superfund Act (ROSA) of 1995 
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6.20 Site selection 
Sites placed on cleanup lists can have their economic value altered as interest 
in future redevelopment possibilities declines due to fears that future cleanup 
costs to be incurred on the site will probably be high.  In poor urban areas in 
the US  this is now a topic of concern.  Attempts are being made to be more 
selective in putting such sites on the NPL. 
]oint and several liability 
Joint and several liability provisions were received badly by industry in the 
US.  In?ustry consistently has stated that it would be more willing to finance 
liability schemes if they are seen to be fair and correlate closely with the 
polluter pays principle.  If there are multi-parties involved in settlements 
instead of joint liability procedures of charging only one responsible party, all 
PRPs should be named in the initial settlement negotiation when possible. 
The US now proposes instituting proportional liability. 
Financing• 
It is important to develop appropriate financing schemes so that cash flow 
for cleanups is not problematic.  In the US  the cleanup has been delayed 
because the EPA has suffered from lack of available resources for further 
cleanups whilst it awaits repayments from industry. 
Companies appear willing to accept polluter pays principle if it is consistently 
used.  It is important to demonstrate that money put out by a company goes 
to cleanup their share of the environmental remediation costs in a cost-
effective manner (eg by setting up site-specific accounts for settlement funds) 
and that the company's money is  not used to clean up the damage costs of 
others. 
A link should be made between the agent who pays for site remediation and 
the agent that earns revenue from the increase in value for the property 
upon its sale.  For instance if the EPA cleans up a site with Trust Fund 
money and in so doing so increases the site's value, provisions should be 
made so that EPA can claim back some of the cleanup costs through an 
increased sale price.  Conversely it is not fair for a seller of a site to receive a 
low price for a known contaminated site and then have the EPA make them 
liable for cleanup through retroactive liability. 
Financial incentives should be set up for PRPs to accept cleanup 
responsibility.  The EPA is now considering introducing a new accelerated 
cleanup tax credit of 50 percent for PRPs that conduct cleanups. <t> 
(I) EPA  press release 2W9f15 
ERM  EcONOMICS  EcONOMICS OF  l...v.BI1..11Y:  EC  DG  XI 
6.21 Public image 
One negative point voiced over Superfund is its limited results -as 
represented by t~e small amount of sites cleaned up. 
Proponents of Superfund ·draw attention call issue to its potential effects in 
preventing pollution by deterring firms from contamination sites in future. 
Identifying and measuring the benefits of an environmental liability system 
should include (where possible) its effectiveness in deterring future pollution: 
The lack of good information in the US about site conditions and cleanup 
options has often led to cynicism and mistrust of the Superfund program. 
This is particularly disappointing as the policy is supposed to be for the good 
of the people.  Information is thus important in developing public support 
for any such program. 
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